for acts done in their official capacity, except for escapes, three years. Statutory penalties, and forfeitures, libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, and actions for negligently or wrongfully causing the death of another, two years. Actions against sheriffs, etc., for escapes, one year. Action against bank for paying forged check one year after return of check to depositor. Persons under disabilities, except infants, may bring action after the disability ceases, provided the period is not extended more than five years, and infants one year after coming of age; actions by representatives of deceased persons, one year from death; against the same, one year from granting letters testamentary or of adminstration. New promise must be in writing. The time of limitation does not run in favor of persons absent from the State.

WYOMING.- Real actions, ten years. Bonds of executors, administrators, guardians, sheriffs, and other officers, all bonds required by statute, and causes of action not specially enumerated, ten years. Specialties and contracts in writing ten years. Contracts not in writing, and statutory liabilities other than forfeiture or penalty, eight years, but on all foreign claims, judgments, or contracts contracted or incurred before the debtor became a resident of the State, actions must be commenced within five years after he establishes his residence in the State. Trespass on real estate, actions for taking, detaining, or injuring, personal property, or for the specific recovery of the same, action for injury to plaintiff's rights not arising on contract, or for relief on ground of fraud and those not otherwise provided for, four years. Libel, slander, assault and battery, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, or statutory penalty on forfeiture, one year. Limitations in personal actions do not run against persons under disabilities until after the removal of the same. Time of defendant's absence from the State or absconding or concealment is not reckoned. Actions on causes arising out of the State between non-residents and barred there cannot be maintained here. New acknowledgment or promise must be in writing.

For Statutes of Hawaii, the Philippines and Porto Rico see Appendix.

CHAPTER XXIII.

INTEREST AND USURY.

SECTION I.

WHAT INTEREST IS, AND WHEN IT IS DUE

INTEREST means a payment of money for the use of money. In most civilized countries the law regulates this; that is, it declares how much money may be paid or received for the use of money; and this is called legal interest; and if more is paid or agreed to be paid than is thus allowed, it is called usurious interest. By interest is commonly meant legal interest; and by usury, usurious interest.

Interest may be due, and may be demanded by a creditor, on either of two grounds. One, a bargain to that effect; the other, by way of damages for withholding money that is due. Indeed, it may be considered as now the settled rule, that wherever money is withheld which is certainly due, the debtor is to be regarded as having promised legal interest for the delay. And upon this implication, as on most others, the usage of trade, and the customary course of dealings between the parties, would have great influence.

Thus, in New York, it was held, that, where it was known to one party that it was the uniform custom of the other to charge interest upon articles sold or manufactured by him after a certain time, the latter was allowed to charge interest accordingly.

In general, we may say that interest is allowed by law as follows: on a debt due by judgment of court, it is allowed from the rendition of judgment; and on an account that has been liquidated, or settled, from the day of the liquidation; for goods sold, from the time of the sale, if there be no credit, and if there be, then from the day when the credit expires; for rent, from the time that it is due, and this even if the rent is payable other. wise than in money, but is not so paid; for money paid for another or lent to another, from the payment or loan.

Interest is not generally recoverable upon claims for unliqui dated damages, nor in actions founded on tort. By unliqui. dated damages is meant damages not agreed on, and of an uncertain amount, and which the jury must determine. By torts is meant wrongs, or injuries inflicted. But although interest cannot be given under that name, in actions of this sort, juries are sometimes at liberty to consider it in estimating the damages.

It sometimes happens that money is due, but not now payable; and then the interest does not begin until the money is payable. As if a note be on demand, the money is always due, but it is not payable until demand; and therefore is not on interest until demand. But a note payable at a certain time, or after a certain period, carries interest from that time, whether it be demanded or not.

The laws which regulate interest and prohibit usury are very various, and are not perhaps precisely the same in any two of our States. Formerly, usury was looked upon as so great an offence, that the whole debt was forfeited thereby. The law now, however, is generally, at least-much more lenient. The theory that money is like any merchandise, worth what it will bring and no more, and that its value should be left to fix itself in a free market, is certainly gaining ground. In many States there are frequent efforts so to change the statutes of usury that parties may make any bargain for the use of money which suits them; but when they make no bargain, the law shall say what is legal interest. And, generally, the forfeiture is now much less than the whole debt.

At the close of this chapter will be found a statement of the usury laws of the states.

There is no especial form or expression necessary to make a bargain usurious. It is enough for this purpose if there be a sub stantial payment, or promise of payment, of more than the law allows, either for the use of money lent, or for the forbearance of money due and payable. One thing, however, is certain: there must be a usurious intention, or there is no usury. That is, if one miscalculates, and so receives a promise for more than legal interest, the error may be corrected, the excess waived,

and the whole legal interest claimed. But if one makes a bar. gain for more than legal interest, believing that he has a right to make such a bargain, or that the law gives him all that he claims, this is a mistake of law, and does not save the party from the effect of usury.

It may be well to remark, that the law makes a very wide distinction between a mistake of fact and a mistake of law. Generally, it will not permit a party to be hurt by a mistake of fact; but it seldom suffers any one to excuse himself by a mistake of law, because it holds that everybody should know the law, and because it would be dangerous to permit ignorance of the law to operate for any one's benefit.

The question has been much discussed, whether the use of the common tables which are calculated on the supposition tha a year consists of 360 days, is usurious. In New York, it har been held that it is; but in Massachusetts, and some othe States, it is held that the use of such tables does not render th transaction usurious. We think this latter the better opinion.

If a debtor requests time, and promises to pay for the forbear ance legal interest, and as much more as the creditor shall be obliged to pay for the same money, this is not a usurious con tract. And, even if usurious interest be actually taken, this, although strong evidence of an original usurious bargain and intent, is not conclusive, but may be rebutted by adequate proof or explanation.

When a statute provides that a usurious contract is wholly void, such a contract cannot become good afterwards; and there. fore a note which is usurious, if it be therefore void by law in its inception, is not valid in the hands of an innocent indorsee. But it is otherwise where the statute does not declare the contract void on account of the usury. If a note, or any securities for a usurious bargain, be delivered up by the creditor and can celled, and the debtor thereupon promises to pay the original debt and lawful interest, this promise is valid.

New securities for old ones which are tainted with usury are equally void with the old ones, or subject to the same defence. Not so, however, if the usurious part of the original securities be expunged, and not included in the new; or if the new ones are

given to third parties, who were wholly innocent of the originai usurious transaction. And if a debtor suffers his usurious debt to be sued, and a judgment recovered against him for the whole amount, it is then too late for him to take any advantage of the usury.

So, if land or goods be mortgaged to secure a usurious debt, and afterwards conveyed to an innocent party, subject to such mortgage, the latter cannot set up the defence of usury, and thereby defeat an action to enforce the mortgage.

Usurers resort to many devices to conceal their usury; and sometimes it is very difficult for the law to reach and punish this offence. A common method is for the lender of money to sell some chattel, or a parcel of goods, at a high price, the borrower paying this price in part as a premium for the loan. In England, it would seem from the reports to be quite common for one who discounts a note to do this nominally at legal rates, but to furnish a part of the amount in goods at a very high valuation. In all cases of this kind, or rather in all cases where questions of this kind arise, the court endeavors to ascertain the real character of the transaction. Such a transaction is always suspicious, for the obvious reason that one who wants to borrow money is not very likely to desire at the same time to buy goods at a high price. But the jury decide all questions of this kind, and it is their duty to judge of the actual intention of the par ties from all the evidence offered. If that intention is substantially that one should loan his money to another, who shall therefore, in any manner whatever, pay to the lender more than legal interest, it is a case of usury. "Where the real truth is a loan of money," said Lord Mansfield, "the wit of man cannot find a shift to take it out of the statute." If this great judge meant only that, whenever legal evidence shows the transaction to be a usurious loan, the law pays no respect whatever to any pretence or disguise, this is certainly true. But the wit of man does undoubtedly devise many "shifts," which the law cannot detect. There seems to be a general rule in these cases in reference to the burden of proof; the borrower must first show that he took the goods on compulsion; and then it is for the lender to prove that no more thar their actual value was received ar charged for them.