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Lastly, he must make due delivery of the goods a the proper time, in the proper way, and at the proper place and to the proper person; and this person should be some one who was authorized by the owner or sender to receive the goods.

If a party authorized to receive the goods refuse, or is unable to do so, the carrier must keep them for the owner, and with due care; but now under the liability of a warehouseman, and not of a carrier; that is, he is now liable only for fault of some kind.

So the carrier must keep the goods for the owner, if he has good reason to believe that the consignee is dishonest, and will defraud the owner of his property. As to the time when goods should be delivered, it must be within the proper hours for busiress, when they can be suitably stored; or if the goods are delivered to the sender himself, or at his house, then at some suitable and convenient hour.

There must be no unnecessary delay, and the goods must be delivered as soon after a detention as may be with due diligence.

As to the way and the place at which the goods should be delivered, much must depend upon the nature of the goods, and much also upon the usage in regard to them, if such usage exists.

The goods should be so left, and with such notice, as to «ecure the early, convenient, and safe reception of them by the person entitled to have them. Something also must depend on this point, on the mode of conveyance. A man may carry a parcel into the house and deliver it to the owner or his servant; a wagon or cart can go to the gate, or into the yard, and there deliver what it carries. A vessel can go to one wharf or another, and is bound to go to that which is reasonably convenient to the consignee, or to one that was agreed upon; but a vessel is not always bound to comply with requirements of the consignee as to the very wharf the goods should be left at, but may leave the goods at any safe, convenient, and accessible wharf at which such goods are usually left.

Where the goods are not delivered to the owner personally,

or to his agent, immediate notice should be given to the owner. The carrier is generally obliged to give notice of the delivery of goods, and if the owner has in any way designated how the goods may be delivered to himself, he is bound to obey this direction. The notice must be prompt and distinct. And if the goods are delivered at an unsuitable or unauthorized place, no notice will make this a good delivery.

Railroads terminate at their station, and although goods might be sent by wagons to the house or store of consignees, this is not usually done, as it is considered that the railroad. carrier has finished his transit at his own terminus. Usually, the consignee of goods sent by railroad has notice from the consignor when to expect them; and this is so common, that it is seldom necessary, in fact, for the agents of the railroad to give notice to the consignee. But this should be given where it is necessary; and should be given as promptly, directly, and specifically as may be necessary for the purpose of the notice.

A railroad company may be compared to owners of ships in this respect, that neither can take the cars or the ships farther than the station or the wharf, and therefore may deliver the goods there. But a carrier by water is bound to give notice that the goods are on the wharf, and is not exonerated as carrier until he gives such notice; whereas, a railroad company is not bound to give notice.

It may happen that some third party may claim the goods under a title adverse to that of the consignor or consignee. If the carrier refuse to deliver them to this third party, and it turns out that the claimant had a legal right to demand them, the carrier would be liable in damages to him. But the carrier may and should demand full and clear evidence of the claimant's title; and if the evidence be not satisfactory, he may demand security and indemnity. If the evidence or the indemnity be withheld, he certainly should not be held answerable for anything beyond that amount which the goods themselves would satisfy, for he is in no fault. If he delivers the goods to such claimant, proof that the claimant had good title is an adequate defence against any suit by the consignor or consignee for nondelivery.

SECTION IV.

THE LIEN OF THE COMMON CARRIER.

THE legal meaning of this word, as we have said before, when we have had occasion to use the word in preceding chapters, is the right of holding or detaining property until some charge against it, or some claim upon the owner on account of it is satisfied.

The common carrier has this right against all the goods he carries, for his compensation. While he holds them for this purpose, he is not liable for loss or injury to them as a common carrier; that is, not unless the injury happen from his own fault.

He may not only hold the goods for his compensation, but may recover this out of them, by any of the usual means in which a lien upon personal chattels is made productive. That is, he holds them just as if they were pledged to him by the owner as a security for the debt. Therefore, if the debt be not paid in a reasonable time after it is due and demanded, the carrier may have a decree of a court of equity for their sale; or may sell them himself at auction, retaining his pay from the proceeds, and paying over the remainder. But to make this course justifiable and safe, the carrier must wait a reasonable time, and give full notice of his intention, so that the owner may have a convenient opportunity to redeem the goods; and there must be proper advertisement of the sale, and every usual precaution taken to insure a favorable sale; and the carrier must not himself buy the goods, and must act in all respects with entire honesty.

SECTION V.

THE LIABILITY OF THE COMMON CARRIER.

THIS is perfectly well established as a rule of law, although it is very exceptional and peculiar. It is sometimes said to arise from the public carrier being a kind of public officer. But the true reason is the confidence which is necessarily reposed in him, the power he has over the goods intrusted to him, the ease with which he may defraud the owner of them, and yet make it

appear that he was not in fault, and the difficulty which the owner might have in making out proof of his default. This reason it is important to remember, because it helps us to construe and apply the rules of law on this subject. Thus, the rule is that the common carrier is liable for any loss or injury to goods under his charge, unless it be caused by the act of God, or by the public enemy. The rule is intended to hold the common carrier responsible wherever it was possible that he caused the loss, either by negligence or design.

Hence, the act of God means some act in which neither the carrier himself, nor any other man, had any direct and immediate agency. If, for example, a house in which the goods are at night is struck by lightning, or blown over by a tempest, or washed away by inundation, the carrier is not liable. This is an act of God, although man's agency interferes in causing the loss; for without that agency, the goods would not have been there. But no man could have directly caused the loss. On the other hand, if the building was set on fire by an incendiary at midnight, and the rapid spread of the flames made it absolutely impossible to rescue the goods, this might be an inevitable accident if the carrier were wholly innocent, but it would also be possible that the incendiary was in collusion with the carrier for the purpose of concealing his theft; and therefore the carrier would be liable for such a loss, however innocent.

As a general rule, the common carrier is always liable for loss by fire, unless it is caused by lightning, an accidental fire not being considered an act of God, or a peril of the sea; and this rule has been applied to steamboats and other vessels. So, it may be true that after the lightning, the tempest, or inundation, the carrier was negligent, and so lost the goods which might have been saved by proper efforts, or that he took the opportunity to steal them. If this could be shown, the carrier would, of course, be liable; but the law will not suppose this without proof, if the first and main cause were such that the carrier could not have been guilty in respect to it. So, a com mon carrier would be liable for a loss caused by a robbery, however sudden, unexpected, and irresistible, or by a theft,

however wise and full his precautions, and however subtle and ingenious the theft, although either of these might seem to be unavoidable by any means of safety which it would be at all reasonable to require.

The general principles of agency extend to common carriers, and make them liable for the acts of their agents, done while in the discharge of the agency or employment. So, the knowledge of his agent is the knowledge of the carrier, if the agent be authorized expressly, or by the nature of his employment, to receive this notice or knowledge. But an agent for a common carrier may act for himself,-as a stage-coachman in carrying parcels, for which he is paid personally and does not account with his employer,—and then the employer, as we have said, is not liable, unless the owner of the goods believed the stage1oachman carried the goods for his employer, and was justified ty the facts and apparent circumstances in so believing.

It is very

A carrier may be liable beyond his own route. common for carriers, who share between them the parts of a long route, to unite in the business and the profits, and then all ure liable for a loss on any part of the route.

If they are not so united in fact, but say they are so, or say what indicates that they are so, they justify a sender in sup posing they are united, and then they are equally liable.

If a carrier takes goods to carry only as far as he goes, and then engages to send them forward by another carrier, he is iable as carrier to the end of his own route; he is liable also if he neglects to send the goods on; but he is not liable for what may happen to them afterwards.

SECTION VI.

THE CARRIER OF PASSENGERS.

THE carriers of passengers are under a more limited liability than the carriers of goods. This is now well settled. The reason is, that they have not the same control over passengers as over goods; cannot fasten them down, and use other means of securing them. But while the liability of the carrier of passengers is thus mitigated, it is still stringent and extreme.

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