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IF the whole of a consideration, or if any part of the con sideration of an entire and indivisible promise, be illegal, the promise founded upon it is void. Thus, where a note was given in part for the compounding of penalties and suppressing of crim inal prosecutions, it was held to be wholly void and uncollecti ble. And where a part of the consideration of a note was spirituous liquors, sold by the payee in violation of a Statute, such note was held to be wholly void. But if the consideration consists of separable parts, and the promise consists of corresponding separable parts, which can be apportioned and applied, part to part, then each illegality will affect only the promise resting on it; for in fact there are many considerations and many promises.

If the consideration be entire and wholly legal, and the promise consists of separable parts, one legal and the other illegal, the promisee can enforce that part which is legal.



No contract or promise can be enforced by him who knew that the performance of it was wholly impossible; and therefore a consideration which is obviously and certainly impossible is not sufficient in law to sustain a promise. But if one makes a promise, he cannot always defend himself when sued for nonperformance by showing that performance was impossible; for it may be his own fault, or his personal misfortune, that he cannot perform it. He had no right to make such a promise, and must answer in damages; or if he had a right to make it in the expectation of performance, and this has become impossible subsequently, as by loss of property, for example,—this is his misfortune, and no answer to a suit on the promise. There are, however, obviously, promises or contracts, which, from their very nature, must be construed as if the promisor had said, “I will do so and so, if I can." For example, if A promises to

work for B one year, at $20 a month, and at the end of six months is wholly disabled by sickness, he is not liable to an action by B for breach of his contract; and he can recover his pay for the time that he has spent in B's service. A mere want of money, which makes a pecuniary impossibility, is not regarded by the law as a legal impossibility.



If a promise be made upon a consideration which is appar ently valuable and sufficient, but which turns out to be nothing; or if the consideration was originally good, but becomes wholly valueless before part performance on either side, there is an end of the contract, and the promise cannot be enforced. And if money were paid on such a consideration, it can be recovered back, but only the sum paid can be recovered without any increase or addition as compensation for the plaintiff's loss and disappointment, unless there were fraud or oppression.

If the failure of consideration be partial only, leaving a substantial, though far less valuable, consideration behind, this may still be a sufficient foundation for the promise, if that be entire. The promisor may then be sued on the promise; but he will then be entitled, by deduction, set-off, or in some other proper way, to due allowance or indemnity for whatever loss he may sustain as to the other parts of the bargain, or as to the whole transaction, from the partial failure of the consideration. Thus, if he promised so much money for work done in such a way, or as the price of a thing to be made and sold to him, if no work is done, or the thing is not made or sold, there is an end of the promise, because the consideration has failed. But if the work was done, but not as it should have been, or the thing made and sold, but not what it should have been, and the promisor accepted the work or the thing, he may now show that the consideration for his promise has partially failed, and may have a proportionate reduction in his promise, or in the amount he must pay. And if the promise be itself separable into parts, and a distinct part or proportion of the consideration failed, to which part some

distinct part or proportion of the promise could be applied, that part of the promise cannot be enforced, although the residue of the promise may be.

If A agrees with B to work for him one year, or any stated time, for so much a month, or so much for the whole time, and, after working a part of the time, leaves B without good cause, it is the ancient and still prevailing rule, that A can recover nothing in any form or way. It has, however, been held in New Hampshire, that A can still recover whatever his services are worth, B having the right to set off or deduct the amount of any damage he may have sustained from A's breach of the contract. This view seems just and reasonable, although it has not been supported by adjudication in other States. If A agrees to sell to B five hundred barrels of flour at a certain price, and, after delivering one-half, refuses to deliver any more, B can certainly return that half, and pay A nothing. But if B chooses to retain that half, or if he has so disposed of or lost it that he cannot return it, he must pay what it is worth, deducting all that he loses by the breach of the contract. And this case we think analogous to that of a broken contract of service; but B's liability to pay, even in the case supposed as to goods, has been denied by some courts.

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A difficulty sometimes arises where A, at the request of B, undertakes to do something for B, for which he is to be paid a certain price; and in doing it he departs materially from the directions of B and from his own undertaking. What are now the rights of the parties? This question arises most frequently in building contracts, in which there is usually some departure from the original undertaking. The general rules are these: If B assent to the alteration, it is the same thing as if it were a part of the original contract. He may assent expressly, by word or in writing; or constructively, by seeing the work, and approv ing it as it goes on, or being silent; for silence under such circumstances would generally be equivalent to an approval. But if the change be one which B had a right, either from the nature of the change, or the appearance of it, or A's language respecting it, to suppose would add nothing to the cost, then no promise to pay an increased price would be inferred from either


an express or tacit approval. Generally, as we have seen, if A does or makes what B did not order or request, B can refuse to accept it, and, if he refuses, will not then be held to pay for it. But if he accepts it, he must pay for it. This consequence results, however, only from a voluntary acceptance. For if A choose, without any request from B, to add something to B's house, or make some alteration in it, which being done cannot be undone or taken away without detriment to the house, B may hold it, and yet not be liable to pay for it; and A has no right to take it away, unless he can do so without inflicting any injury whatever on B. This rule would apply whether the addition or alteration were larger or smaller.

It is sometimes provided in building contracts that B shall pay for no alteration or addition, unless previously ordered by him in writing. But if there be such provision, B would be liable for any alteration or addition he ordered in any way, or voluntarily accepted after it was made, when he could have rejected it.

So it is sometimes agreed that any additions or alterations shall be paid for at the same rate as the work contracted for. The law would imply this agreement if the parties did not make it expressly.



A BARGAIN where both parties make promises, and come under obligations, each to the other, may be made without seal, and would then be called an Agreement. If made under seal, it would generally be in the form of, and bear the name of, an Indenture. If a promise by one only, is made in writing, with out a seal, it is a simple promise; but if it be made with a seal, then it would generally be in the form of, and bear the name of, a BOND.

The essentials of a bond are only that one party should acknowledge himself "held, bound, and obliged" unto another party, to pay to him a sum of money; and neither of the words

"held," or "bound," or "obliged," are strictly necessary, al though usual and proper: other words of the same meaning will have the same effect. In such a bond, the party bound is called the obligor, and the party to whom he is bound is called the obligee. The sum for which the obligor is bound is called the penal sum, or the penalty. Such a bond is simply an obligation to pay so much money. But a bond is not often given only for this purpose. It is usually intended to be, in fact, an obligation to do something else, on the penalty of paying so much money if it be not done. This something else may be anything whatever which the obligor may contract to do. All this is contained in an addition, which is written on the same paper immediately after the bond itself; that is, after the words of obligation. And this is called the "Condition" of the bond. It begins with saying, This bond is on the condition following; and then recites the things which the obligor has undertaken to do; and then adds, that if all these things are fully done and performed, then the bond shall be void and of no effect, and otherwise shall remain in full force.

The meaning and effect of all this is, that if the obligor fails, in any respect, to do what the condition recites, then he is bound to pay the money he acknowledges himself, in the bond, bound to pay. But now the law comes in to mitigate the severity of this contract. And whatever be the sum which the obligor acknowledges himself, in the bond, bound to pay, he is held by the courts to pay to the obligee only that amount which will be a complete indemnification to him for the damage he has sustained by the failure of the obligor to do what the condition recites.

For example: suppose A B makes a bond to C D, acknowledging himself bound to C D in the sum of ten thousand dollars. The condition recites that one E F has been hired by C D as his clerk, and that A B guarantees the good conduct of E F; and if E F does all his duty honestly and faithfully, then the bond is void, and otherwise remains in full force. Then suppose E F to cheat C D out of some money. A B is sued on the bond; C D cannot recover from him, in any event, more than the ten thousand dollars; and he will in fact recover from

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