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it was held that, as the employé was not at the scene of the accident in the performance of any duty, but was a mere spectator, his declarations were not admissible. So, an admission by the driver of a street railway company in charge at the time of an accident by which a passenger was injured, made some days after the accident, that the harness and brake were defective, was held not within the scope of his authority, and, hence, not admissible against the company.11

§ 7742. Admission of Guardian.—A similar principle to that just discussed denies a natural guardian the power to deprive his ward of his legal rights by any unguarded admissions he may make concerning the cause of a personal injury to his ward. The law makes the natural guardian of a child a guardian of his person only, with no control over any estate the ward may possess except by judicial proceedings and after he has given security for responsible care.+2

§ 7743. Admissions for Purpose of Compromise.-Admissions made with a view to a compromise or amicable adjustment of the matter are clearly inadmissible.43 But evidence that on the day of an accident resulting in injuries to a horse the defendant said that it was an accident, but that he would do what was right about it and would pay the veterinary surgeon's bill and let the plaintiff have the use of a horse while the injured one was laid up, has been held admissible as an admission, it not appearing that the admission was made by way of compromise. So, in a suit against a common carrier for goods lost, the promise of the carrier after the commencement of the suit to pay for the goods, if the plaintiffs would swear to a list of them, was held to be an admission of the carrier's liability; and an affidavit of the plaintiff, made in pursuance of such agreement, is admissible as evidence of the amount of his demand.45

40

44

Verry v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 47 Iowa 549. Compare Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Coleman, 18 Ill. 297; Bellefontaine R. Co. v. Hunter, 33 Ind. 335; Cramer v. Burlington, 45 Iowa 627; Dorn v. Southwork Man. Co., 11 Cush. (Mass.) 205; Lane v. Bryant, 9 Gray (Mass.) 245; Morse v. Connecticut River R. Co., 6 Gray (Mass.) 450; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Books, 57 Pa. St. 339; Luby V. Hudson River R. Co., 17 N. Y. 131.

42

"Rainnie v. St. John City R. Co., 31 N. B. 552.

42 Power v. Harlow, 57 Mich. 107 (statement of mother that child had been warned frequently of the dangers of exploders on railroad which caused his injuries).

43 Collier v. Coggins, 103 Ala. 281; s. c. 15 South. Rep. 578.

"Bassett v. Shares, 63 Conn. 39; s. c. 27 Atl. Rep. 421.

45 Hurd v. Pendrigh, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 502.

[blocks in formation]

7752. Further of matters deemed the 7761. Witness may not state opin

subject of expert testimony

-Master and servant.

7753. Competency of experts.

ion of others.

7762. Conclusions of witnesses.

§ 7747. Opinions and Conclusions of Witnesses Not Generally Admissible. It may be stated as a general rule that, if the facts of any particular inquiry can be so placed before the jury that, men of ordinary intelligence, they can fully understand the matter and draw the proper inferences and conclusions therefrom, the opinions and conclusions of a witness, whether an expert or a non-expert, should not be received. In conformity with this rule a witness

1 Richardson v. Eureka, 96 Cal. 443; s. c. 31 Pac. Rep. 458; Kauffman v. Maier, 94 Cal. 269; s. c. 18 L. R. A. 124; Shafter v. Evans, 53 Cal. 32; Heníon v. New York &c. R. Co., 79 Fed. Rep. 903; s. c. 51 U. S. App. 157; 25 C. C. A. 223; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Harkins, 55 Fed. Rep. 932; Weber Wagon Co. v. Kehl, 139 Ill. 644; Pennsylvania Co. v. Lindley, 2 Ind. App. 111; Munger v. Waterloo, 83 Iowa 559; s. c. 49 N. W. Rep. 1028; Langhammer v. Manchester, 99 Iowa 295; s. c. 68 N. W. Rep. 688; Duer v. Allen, 96 Iowa 36; s. c. 64 N. W. Rep. 682; Erb v. Popritz, 59 Kan. 264; s. c. 52 Pac. Rep. 871; Murray v. Woodson Co., 58

Kan. 1; s. c. 48 Pac. Rep. 554; Con-
nelly v. Hamilton Woolen Co., 163
Mass. 156; s. c. 39 N. E. Rep. 787;
Connelly v. Hamilton &c. R. Co., 163
Mass. 156; s. c. 39 N. E. Rep. 787;
Bergquist v. Chandler Iron Co., 49
Minn. 511; s. c. 52 N. W. Rep. 136;
Freeberg v. St. Paul Plow Works, 48
Minn. 99; Atchison &c. R. Co. v.
Lawler, 40 Neb. 356; s. c. 58 N. W.
Rep. 968; Burns v. Farmington, 31
App. Div. (N. Y.) 364; s. c. 52 N. Y.
Supp. 229; Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97
N. Y. 507; Hoffman v. Delaware &c.
Canal Co., 16 App. Div. (N. Y.) 527;
s. c. 44 N. Y. Supp. 949; Baltimore
&c. R. Co. v. Schultz, 43 Ohio St.
270; s. c. 54 Am. Rep. 805; Nerney

will not be allowed to state his opinion as to whether an act was carefully or negligently done; nor whether the injured party was

v. Reading, 150 Pa. St. 611; Reece v. Clark, 198 Pa. St. 312; s. c. 47 Atl. Rep. 994; Auberle v. McKeesport, 179 Pa. St. 321; s. c. 39 W. N. C. (Pa.) 423; 27 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 308; 36 Atl. Rep. 212; Couch v. Charlotte &c. R. Co., 22 S. C. 557; St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Jones (Tex.), 14 S. W. Rep. 309; Saunders v. Southern Pac. Co., 15 Utah 334; s. c. 49 Pac. Rep. 646; Clifford v. Richardson, 15 Vt. 620; Milwaukee &c. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 475. Evidence as to whether or not the danger of riding on a handcar while in motion is obvious and patent to any man of common sense is properly excluded, as the danger is a matter of common knowledge: Alabama Mineral R. Co. v. Jones, 114 Ala. 519; s. c. 21 South. Rep. 507; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 383.

2 Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Tapia, 94 Ala. 226; s. c. 10 South. Rep. 236; Camp v. Hall, 39 Fla. 535; s. c. 22 South, Rep. 792; Birmingham &c. Co. v. Baylor, 101 Ala. 488; s. c. 13 South. Rep. 793; Warden v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 94 Ala. 277; s. c. 14 L. R. A. 552; 10 South, Rep. 276; Little Rock &c. R. Co. v. Shoecraft, 56 Ark. 465; s. c. 20 S. W. Rep. 272; Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Myers, 63 Fed. Rep. 793; s. c. 11 C. C. A. 439; Springfield v. Coe, 166 Ill. 22; s. c. 46 N. E. Rep. 709; Ashley Wire Co. v. Mercier, 61 Ill. App. 485; Johnston v. Oregon &c. R. Co., 23 Or. 94; s. c. 31 Pac. Rep. 283; McKean v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 55 Iowa 192; Woeckner v. Erie Electric Motor Co., 187 Pa. St. 206; s. c. 43 W. N. C. (Pa.) 50; 41 Atl. Rep. 28; Pacheco v. Judson Man. Co., 113 Cal. 541; s. c. 45 Pac. Rep. 833; Fordyce v. Edwards, 65 Ark. 98; s. c. 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 521; 44 S. W. Rep. 1034; Brush Electric Light &c. Co. v. Wells, 103 Ga. 512; s. c. 30 S. E. Rep. 533; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 255; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Hall, 87 Ala. 708; s. c. 6 South. Rep. 277; 4 L. R. A. 710; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Bouldin, 110 Ala. 185; s. c. 20 South. Rep. 325; Bassett v. Shares, 63 Conn. 39; s. c. 27 Atl. Rep 421; Ardmore Coal Co. v. Bevil, 61 Fed. Rep. 757; s. c. 27 U. S. App. 96; East Tennessee &c. R. Co. v. Wright, 76 Ga. 532; Printup v. Patton, 91 Ga.

422; s. c. 18 S. E. Rep. 311; East St. Louis v. Donahue, 77 Ill. App. 574; Louisville &c. Consol. R. Co. v. Berry, 9 Ind. App. 63; s. c. 35 N. E. Rep. 565; 36 N. E. Rep. 646; Duer v. Allen, 96 Iowa 36; s. c. 64 N. W. Rep. 682; Scott v. Hogan, 72 Iowa 614; s. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 444; Clinton v. Root, 58 Mich. 182; s. c. 55 Am. Rep. 671; Langworthy V. Green Twp., 88 Mich. 207; s. c. 50 N. W. Rep. 130; Gutridge v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 94 Mo. 468; s. c. 13 West. Rep. 644; 7 S. W. Rep. 476; Case v. Perew, 46 Hun (N. Y.) 57; s. c. 10 N. Y. St. Rep. 811; Tillett v. Norfolk &c. R. Co., 118 N. C. 1031; s. c. 24 S. E. Rep. 111; Nutt v. Southern Pac. Co., 25 Or. 291; s. c. 35 Pac. Rep. 653; Elder v. Lykens Valley Coal Co., 157 Pa. St. 490; s. c. 33 W. N. C. (Pa.) 333; 24 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 195; 27 Atl. Rep. 545; North Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kirk, 90 Pa. St. 15; International &c. R. Co. v. Armstrong, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 146; s. c. 23 S. W. Rep. 236; Houston v. Brush, 66 Vt. 331; s. c. 29 Atl. Rep. 380; Oleson v. Tolford, 37 Wis. 327. The opinion of a witness as to what an ordinarily prudent man would have done under the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff, and his statement of what he would have done himself under such circumstances, are inadmissible on the question of contributory negligence: Sonnefield v. Mayton (Tex.), 39 S. W. Rep. 166; s. c. 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 711 (no off. rep.). But an answer of a witness, who had measured an opening through which plaintiff had fallen, that he was called to go and measure it and was therefore "careful" in doing so, though a statement of a conclusion, was regarded as harmless where the other portions of the testimony showed how the measurements were made: Pennsylvania Co. v. Frund, 4 Ind. App. 469; s. c. 30 N. E. Rep. 1116. A question to a witness, whether it was negligence for a person having business on a railroad track to stand on a track immediately in front of a moving train, is properly excluded as calling for the witness's opinion upon a matter exclusively within the jury's province: Hamilton v. Rich Hill &c. Min. Co., 108 Mo.

acting within the line of his duty at the time of receiving an injury;3 nor as to the safety of a particular appliance or place of work, where the same can be described and easily understood; nor as to whether a highway was safe, or defective, or dangerous, at the place where an accident happened; nor what cause or occasion the witness saw

364; s. c. 18 S. W. Rep. 977. The opinions of railroad experts are not admissible on the question whether or not it is dangerous to run a train at a designated rate of speed, as that is a question which the jury are competent to decide: Fisher v. Oregon &c. R. Co., 22 Or. 533; s. c. 16 L. R. A. 519; 12 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 139; 30 Pac. Rep. 425. It is not competent for a witness to give an opinion as to the propriety of a given method of operating trains: Jeffrey v. Keokuk &c. R. Co., 56 Iowa 546.

3 Grand Rapids &c. R. Co. v. Ellison, 117 Ind. 234; s. c. 20 N. E. Rep. 135.

'Smuggler Union Min. Co. V. Broderick, 25 Colo. 16; s. c. 53 Pac. Rep. 169; District of Columbia v. Haller, 4 App. (D. C.) 405; s. c. 22 Wash. L. Rep. 761; Chicago v. McGiven, 78 Ill. 347; Kolb v. Sandwich Enterprise Co., 36 Ill. App. 419; Huntington v. Burke, 21 Ind. App. 655; s. c. 1 Repr. (Ind.) 435; 52 N. E. Rep. 415; Edwards v. Worcester, 172 Mass. 104; s. c. 51 N. E. Rep. 447 (safety of highway); Girard v. Kalamazoo, 92 Mich. 610; s. c. 52 N. W. Rep. 1021; Gleason v. Smith, 172 Mass. 50; s. c. 51 N. E. Rep. 937; Harley v. Buffalo Car Man. Co., 142 N. Y. 31; s. c. 58 N. Y. St. Rep. 437; 36 N. E. Rep. 813; Dooner v. Delaware &c. Canal Co., 164 Pa. St. 17; s. c. 10 Am. R. & Corp. Rep. 264; 30 Atl. Rep. 269; Musick v. Latrobe, 184 Pa. St. 375; s. c. 39 Atl. Rep. 226 (condition of highway); Platz v. McKean Twp., 178 Pa. St. 601; s. c. 39 W. N. C. (Pa.) 480; 36 Atl. Rep. 136; Graham v. Pennsylvania Co., 139 Pa. St. 149; s. c. 12 L. R. A. 293; 27 W. N. C. (Pa.) 297; 21 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 249; 48 Phila. Leg. Int. 117; 21 Atl. Rep. 151: Inland &c. Coasting Co. v. Tolson, 139 U. S. 551; s. c. 35 L. ed. 270; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 653; 19 Wash. L. Rep. 438; Stowe v. Bishop, 58 Vt. 498; s. c. 2 N. E. Rep. 109; Bemis v. Central Vermont R. Co., 58 Vt. 636;

s. c. 2 N. E. Rep. 187; Eureka Block Coal Co. v. Wells, 29 Ind. App. 1; s. c. 61 N. E. Rep. 236; Sprague v. Atlee, 8 Iowa 1; s. c. 46 N. W. Rep. 756. But see McNerney v. Reading, 150 Pa. St. 611; s. c. 25 Atl. Rep. 57; 30 W. N. C. (Pa.) 534; Kitchen v. Union Twp., 171 Pa. St. 145; s. c. 33 Atl. Rep. 76.

Ryerson v. Abington, 102 Mass. 531; Hutchinson v. Methuen, 1 Allen (Mass.) 33; Lincoln v. Barre, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 590; Lester v. Pittsford, 7 Vt. 158; Benedict v. Fond du Lac, 44 Wis. 495; s. c. 7 Cent. L. J. 258; 6 Repr. 799; Griffin v. Willow, 43 Wis. 509; Kelley v. Fond du Lac, 31 Wis. 179; Montgomery v. Scott, 34 Wis. 338; Oleson v. Tolford, 37 Wis. 327. Contra, Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Pa. St. 463; King v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 98 Mo. 235; s. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 563. Evidence as to whether or not a sidewalk on which the plaintiff was injured was in a reasonably safe condition for public travel after the witness had finished repairing the same is properly excluded where he has testified fully as to the condition of the walk and what he did towards repairing it: Atherton v. Bancroft, 114 Mich. 241; s. c. 4 Det. Leg. N. 570; 72 N. W. Rep, 208. In an action against a city for damages for injuries from a defective sidewalk, a witness cannot give his opinion of whether a sidewalk is dangerous and unsafe; but where, immediately before, he had described it in detail, and from such description no other inference could have been reasonably drawn than that it was unsafe, his opinion will not be presumed prejudicial to the opposing party: Topeka v. Sherwood, 39 Kan. 690; s. c. 18 Pac. Rep. 933. The rule that the witness I will not be heard to give his opinion as to whether an obstruction in the highway was dangerous or not has been denied in Pennsylvania, after an examination of several English cases: Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Pa. St. 463.

for the accident, nor as to matters relating to the sufficiency of a highway, as this is, in general, a question of fact merely, and not of science or skill.' In like manner, where the question was as to whether the plaintiff had been guilty of contributory negligence, it was held improper to permit the plaintiff to testify as to what he thought about the danger of doing what he did.s

§ 7748. Further of Inadmissible Opinion Evidence-Examples.— On the ground that the matter was susceptible of proof and within the comprehension of the jury, courts have found the expression of opinions by witnesses upon the following questions a palpable invasion of the province of the jury:-Whether piling baggage on the upper deck of a ship was consistent with the safety of passengers, whether goods in course of transportation were properly protected from the elements;10 whether a stock car was a dangerous place for one to ride; whether the locality at which a crossing accident occurred was dangerous;12 whether right-of-way fences were sufficient to prevent stock from breaking through;13 whether an effective cattle-guard could have been constructed and maintained at a particular highway crossing; whether it was unsafe to remove all the stakes from one side of a car loaded with lumber;15 whether a railroad embankment was so improperly or negligently constructed as to obstruct the flow of surface water;16 whether the danger from the operation of a particular piece of machinery was obvious to a common mind;17 whether precautions against obvious dangers to a servant were necessary;18 whether a boy was a proper person to put to work on a designated machine fully described to the jury;19 whether the means of escape furnished by an employer were sufficient for employés in case

94.

Patterson v. Colebrook, 29 N. H.

'Benedict v. Fond du Lac, 44 Wis. 495; s. c. 7 Cent. L. J. 258; 6 Repr. 799.

Sterling Bridge Co. v. Pearl, 80 Ill. 251.

9

Horowitz v. Hamburg-American Facket Co., 18 Misc. (N. Y.) 24; s. c. 13 Nat. Corp. Rep. 212; 41 N. Y. Supp. 54.

16 Schwinger v. Raymond, 105 N. Y. 648; s. c. 11 N. E. Rep. 952.

11 Lawson v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 64 Wis. 447.

12 Childress v. Chesapeake &c. R. Co., 94 Va. 186; s. c. 26 S. E. Rep. 424.

1 Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. De Bolt, 10 Ind. App. 174; s. c. 37 N. E. Rep. 737; Green v. Hornellsville &c. R.

Co., 24 App. Div. (N. Y.) 434; s. c. 48 N. Y. Supp. 576; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 34 Ill. App. 155.

14 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Clonch, 2 Kan. App. 728; s. c. 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 240; 43 Pac. Rep. 1140.

15 Hughes v. Richter, 161 Ill. 409; s. c. 43 N. E. Rep. 1066; aff'g s. c. 60 Ill. App. 616.

16 Lincoln &c. R. Co. v. Sutherland, 44 Neb. 526; s. c. 62 N. W. Rep. 859.

"Gilbert v. Guild, 144 Mass. 601; s. c. 4 N. Eng. Rep. 648; 12 N. E. Rep. 368.

18 Denver &c. R. Co. v. Wilson, 12 Colo. 20; s. c. 20 Pac. Rep. 340; 2 Denv. Leg. N. 73.

19 McGuerty v. Hale, 161 Mass. 51; s. c. 36 N. E. Rep. 682.

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