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SECTION

SECTION

7394. Is a question of fact where

fair-minded men might draw

with existence and non-existence of negligence.

different conclusions from 7396. In case of violation of penal

disputed or undisputed facts.

7395. Rule where plaintiff's testi

mony is equally consistent

statutes and municipal ordinances.

§7387. Reasonable Care is Generally a Question of Fact.-In a former volume1 the author discussed at some length the various theories with regard to when contributory negligence is a question for the court, and when a question for the jury. It will be seen that the same rules and the same limitations apply with reference to the question of negligence, and that whether reasonable care has been exereised under given circumstances is generally a question of fact, under proper instructions by the court. In general, it may be said that when the circumstances under which the parties act are complicated, and the general knowledge and experience of mankind do not at once condemn the conduct as careless, the question is for the jury. With reference to the province of the court and the jury in regard to negligence, it is for the court to say when there is sufficient evidence from which negligence can be reasonably inferred; but whether negligence ought to be inferred from those facts," and whether

1 Vol. I, § 424, et seq.

2 Colorado &c. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 16 Colo. 219; s. c. 10 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 351; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 235; 27 Pac. Rep. 701; Mills v. Wilming ton City R. Co., 1 Marv. (Del.) 269; s. c. 40 Atl. Rep. 1114; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Gore, 105 Ill. App. 16; North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Zeiger, 78 Ill. App. 463; Otstot v. Indiana &c. R. Co., 103 Ill. App. 136; Peoria &c. R. Co. v. Reed, 17 Ill. App. 413; St. Charles v. Hannon, 56 Ill. App. 515; Riley v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.,

Neb.; s. c. 95 N. W. Rep. 20; Arnold v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 115 Pa. St. 135; s. c. 6 Cent. Rep. 630; Neslie v. Second Ave. &c. R. Co., 113 Pa. St. 300; s. c. 4 Cent. Rep. 700; Abbott v. Grinnell, 76 Wis. 514; s. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 496.

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* Sampson Min. &c. Co. v. Schaad, 15 Colo. 197; s. c. 25 Pac. Rep. 89; J. W. Middleton Co. v. Roycroft, 33 Ill. App. 381; Pennsylvania Co. v. Conlan, 101 Ill. 93; Delaware &c. R. Co. v. Converse, 139 U. S. 469; s. c. 35 L. ed. 213; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 569; Inland &c. Co. v. Tolson, 139 U. S. 551; s. c. 35 L. ed. 270; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 653; 19 Wash. L. Rep. 438.

'Central Branch Union Pac. R. Co. v. Hotham, 22 Kan. 41 [compare Johnson v. Husband, 22 Kan. 277]; Gaynor v. Old Colony &c. R. Co., 100 Mass. 208; Haycroft v. Lake Shore &c. R. Co., 64 N. Y. 636; Johnson v. Hudson &c. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 65; Mangam v. Brooklyn &c. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 455; Seabrook v. Hecker, 2 Robt. (N. Y.) 291; Anderson v. Northern &c. Lumber Co., 21 Or. 281; s. c. 28 Pac. Rep. 5; Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Spearen, 47 Pa. St. 300; West Chester &c. R. Co. v. McElwee, 67 Pa. St. 311; Paterson v. Wallace, 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 748.

'Neal v. Wilmington &c. Elec. R. Co., 3 Pen. (Del.) 467; s. c. 53 Atl. Rep. 338; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Anderson, 166 Ill. 572; s. c. 46 N. E. Rep. 1125; aff'g s. c. 67 Ill. App. 386; Ryan v. McCully, 123 Mo. 636; s. c. 27 S. W. Rep. 533; Culbertson v. Holliday, 50 Neb. 229; s. c. 69 N. W. Rep. 853; Miller v. Strivens, 48 Neb. 458; s. c. 67 N. W. Rep. 458; Omaha &c. R. Co. v. Morgan, 40 Neb. 604; s. c. 59 N. W. Rep. 81; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Porter, 38 Neb. 226; s. c. 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 289; 56 N. W. Rep. 808; Southern

6

the acts complained of constitute negligence, and caused the injury to the plaintiff,' are questions for the jury, under general instructions by the court."

§ 7388. Further Expressions of the Above Doctrine.-The Supreme Court of Georgia has spoken upon this question as follows: "This court has repeatedly held for many years that negligence is a question for the jury; and what facts make a question of negligence is a conclusion which the jury must reach without aid from the court, and the court errs if in charging the jury it tells them what facts constitute negligence and thus reaches a conclusion for them." If the measure of duty is ordinary or reasonable care, and the quantum of care varies according to the circumstances of the particular case, the question whether due care has been exercised is for the jury;10 and whether there is sufficient proof to authorize the jury to find due care is also a question for the jury; or, stated in another way, where the evidence is circumstantial, it is for the jury to determine what facts are established and the proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.12 Another way of stating the rule is to say that, except as to those things declared by law to constitute negligence per se, the question is one of fact,13 where the standard of duty shifts with the circumstances developed in the case.14 So, too, it is for the jury to say what means of diligence were at hand and appropriate for

Pac. Co. v. Burke, 60 Fed. Rep. 704; s. c. 13 U. S. App. 110; Morrow v. Canadian Pac. R. Co., 21 Ont. App. 149; O'Hearn v. Port Arthur, 4 Ont. L. Rep. 209.

9 Atl. Rep. 317; 19 W. N. C. (Pa.) 418.

11 Wabash &c. R. Co. v. Locke, 112 Ind. 404; s. c. 11 West. Rep. 877; 14 N. E. Rep. 391; Wormell v. Maine

8 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Behrens, &c. R. Co., 79 Me. 397; s. c. 4 N. 101 Ill. App. 33.

'Schumpert v. Southern R. Co., 65 S. C. 332; s. c. 43 S. E. Rep. 813. Texas &c. R. Co. v. Murphy, 46 Tex. 356; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Greenlee, 70 Tex. 553; s. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 19. Where the facts have been specially found by the jury, the court may state their legal effect: Conner v. Citizens' St. R. Co., 105 Mo. 62; s. c. 2 West. Rep. 625; Seyfer v. Otoe Co., 66 Neb. 566; s. c. 92 N. W. Rep. 756.

9 Central R. Co. v. Thompson, 76 Ga. 770; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Greenleaf, 70 Tex. 553; s. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 129.

10 Quincy Gas &c. Co. v. Baumann, 203 111. 295; s. c. 67 N. E. Rep. 807; Bensing v. People's Elec. St. R. Co., 9 Pa. Super. 142; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Peters, 116 Pa. St. 206; s. c.

Eng. Rep. 692; 10 Atl. Rep. 49.

12 McDermott V. San Francisco &c. R. Co., 68 Cal. 33.

13 Farrell v. Waterbury Horse R. Co., 60 Conn. 239; s. c. 21 Atl. Rep. 675; 22 Atl. Rep. 544; 46 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 207; Central R. Co. v. Hubbard, 86 Ga. 623; s. c. 12 S. E. Rep. 1020; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Fischer, 31 Ill. App. 36; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Trayes, 33 Ill. App. 307; Smith v. McCarthy, 33 Ill. App. 176; Trott v. Wolfe, 35 Ill. App. 163.

* Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Peters, 116 Pa. St. 206; s. c. 9 Atl. Rep. 317; 19 W. N. C. (Pa.) 418; Robb v. Pennsylvania Co., 3 Pa. Super. 254; s. c. 40 W. N. C. (Pa.) 129; Winans v. Randolph, 169 Pa. St. 606; s. c. 37 W. N. C. (Pa.) 22; 32 Atl. Rep.. 622.

each party.15 The duty which one person owes to another is, in the law of negligence, a question of law; but whether that duty has been performed is a question of fact for the jury;16 and it has been held not error to refer the question of duty to the jury under circumstances detailed in the evidence, where it amounts merely to a reference of the question of diligence or negligence.17

$7389. Always for the Jury where the Evidence is Conflicting. -Where the question of the defendant's negligence turns upon the existence of a hypothesis of fact as to which the evidence is conflicting, the question is always for the jury;18 and in such a case the con

"Smith v. Savannah &c. R. Co., 84 Ga. 698; s. c. 11 S. E. Rep. 455; 42 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 105.

16 Nolan v. New York &c. R. Co., 53 Conn. 461; s. c. 1 N. Eng. Rep. 826.

"Parker v. Georgia Pac. R. Co., 83 Ga. 539; s. c. 10 S. E. Rep. 232. Error in judgment or opinion does not necessarily imply a failure in the performance of duty, or negligence, but whether the mistake was due to a failure of performance of duty, either on his part or on the part of some one else, is a question of fact: Chicago &c. R. Co. v. O'Conner, 119 Ill. 586; s. c. 6 West. Rep. 773.

18 Vol. I, § 427; Kansas City &c. R. Co. v. Smith, 90 Ala. 25; s. c. 8 South. Rep. 43; Lord v. Mobile, 113 Ala. 360; s. c. 21 South. Rep. 366; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Banks, 132 Ala. 471; s. c. 31 South. Rep. 573; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Watson, 90 Ala. 68; s. c. 8 South. Rep. 249; Richmond &c. R. Co. v. Weems, 97 Ala. 270; s. c. 12 South. Rep. 186; Davies v. Oceanic S. S. Co., 89 Cal. 280; s. c. 26 Pac. Rep. 827; Peters v. McKay, 136 Cal. 73; s. c. 68 Pac. Rep. 478; Lord v. Pueblo Smelting &c. Co., 12 Colo. 390; s. c. 21 Pac. Rep. 148; Mackey v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 19 App. (D. C.) 282; s. c. 18 Wash. L. Rep. 767; McDade V. Washington &c. R. Co., 5 Mack. (D. C.) 144; Metropolitan R. Co. v. Snashall, 3 App. (D. C.) 420, 435; s. c. 22 Wash. L. Rep. 377, 381; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Healy, 86 Fed. Rep. 245; s. c. 57 U. S. App. 513; 30 C. C. A. 11; Northern &c. R. Co. v. Krohne, 86 Fed. Rep. 230; s. c. 56 U. S. App. 593; 29 C. C. A. 674; Union &c. R. Co. v. Novak, 61 Fed. Rep. 573; Jacksonville &c. R.

Co. v. Peninsular Land &c. Co., 27 Fla. 157; s. c. 9 South. Rep. 661;, Raleigh &c. R. Co. v. Lowe, 101 Ga. 320; s. c. 28 S. E. Rep. 867; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 398; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Keller, 77 Ill. App. 474; Knuth v. Geo. A. Weiss Malting &c. Co., 72 Ill. App. 389; Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Foster, 74 Ill. App. 387; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Walborn, 127 Ind 142; s. c. 26 N. E. Rep. 207; Rogers v. Leyden, 127 Ind. 50; s. c. 26 N. E. Rep. 210; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. McCullough, 65 Kan. 860; s. c. 70 Pac. Rep. 364; Chesapeake &c. R. Co. v. Dupee, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2349; s. c. 67 S. W. Rep. 15; Campbell v. Eveleth, 83 Me. 50; s. c. 21 Atl. Rep. 784; Cleaves v. Pigeon Hill Granite Co., 145 Mass. 541; s. c. 5 N. Eng. Rep. 507; 14 N. E. Rep. 646; Kennedy v. Lowell &c. St. R. Co., 184 Mass. 31; s. c. 67 N. E. Rep. 875; Lazell v. Knapp, 83 Mich. 36; s. c. 46 N. W. Rep. 1028; McCullough v. Minneapolis &c. R. Co., 101 Mich. 234; s. c. 59 N. W. Rep. 618; Minkley v. Springwells Twp., 113 Mich. 347; s. c. 4 Det. Leg. N. 313; 71 N. W. Rep. 649; Mynning v. Detroit &c. R. Co., 64 Mich. 93; s. c. 7 West. Rep. 324; Ribble v. Starratt, 83 Mich. 140; s. c. 47 N. W. Rep. 244; Sadowski v. Michigan Car Co., 84 Mich. 100; s. c. 47 N. W. Rep. 598; Shadford v. Ann Arbor St. R. Co., 121 Mich. 224; s. c. 80 N. W. Rep. 30; Bennett v. Syndicate Ins. Co., 39 Minn. 254; s. c. 39 N. W. Rep. 488; Nutzmann v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 82 Minn. 116; s. c. 84 N. W. Rep. 730; Stoker v. Minneapolis, 32 Minn. 478; Hamman v. Central Coal &c. Co., 156 Mo. 232; s. c. 56 S. W. Rep. 1091; Lamb v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 147 Mo. 171; s. c. 48 S. W. Rep. 659;

flict or dispute is sufficient to take the case to the jury if it raises a fair controversy.19

§ 7390. Question should be Submitted to Jury where there is Any Evidence Tending to Show Negligence.-The general rule is that if

Lepp v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 87 Mo. 139; s. c. 2 West. Rep. 109; Maus v. Springfield, 101 Mo. 613; s. c. 14 S. W. Rep. 630; Cox v. Syenite Granite Co., 39 Mo. App. 424; McLain v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 100 Mo. App. 374; s. c. 73 S. W. Rep. 909; Swift v. Holoubek, 60 Neb. 784; s. c. 84 N. W. Rep. 249; s. c. aff'd, 62 Neb. 31; 86 N. W. Rep. 900; Prescott v. Laconie Car Co. Works, 71 N. H. 59; s. c. 51 Atl. Rep. 265; Consolidated Traction Co. v. Scott, 58 N. J. L. 682; s. c. 33 L. R. A. 122; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 371; 55 Am. St. Rep. 620; 34 Atl. Rep. 1094; New York &c. R. Co. v. New Jersey Elec. Trac. Co., 60 N. J. L. 52; s. c. 38 L. R. A. 516; 37 Atl. Rep. 627; Van Steenburgh v. Thornton, 58 N. J. L. 160; s. c. 33 Atl. Rep. 380; Burke v. Brooklyn Wharf &c. Co., 86 App. Div. (N. Y.) 296; s. c. 83 N. Y. Supp. 795; Crow v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 174 N. Y. 539; s. c. 66 N. E. Rep. 1106; aff'g s. c. 70 App. Div. (N. Y.) 202; 75 N. Y. Supp. 377; Davidson v. Cornell, 31 N. Y. St. Rep. 982; s. c. 10 N. Y. Supp. 521; Dise v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 22 Misc. (N. Y.) 97; s. c. 48 N. Y. Supp. 551; aff'g s. c. 21 Misc. (N. Y.) 790; 47 N. Y. Supp. 1134; Flanagan v. New York &c. R. Co., 70 App. Div. (N. Y.) 505; s. c. 75 N. Y. Supp. 225; Harley v. Buffalo Car Man. Co., 38 N. Y. St. Rep. 574; s. c. 15 N. Y. Supp. 37; Healey v. Hart Bagging Co., 39 N. Y. St. Rep. 122; s. c. 14 N. Y. Supp. 934; Keane v. Waterford, 130 N. Y. 188; s. c. 41 N. Y. St. Rep. 291; 29 N. E. Rep. 130; Leggett v. Watertown, 55 App. Div. (N. Y.) 321; s. c. 66 N. Y. Supp. 910; Lewin v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 41 App. Div. (N. Y.) 89; s. c. 58 N. Y. Supp. 113; McCarragher v. Gaskell, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 451; Probst v. Delamater, 100 N. Y. 226; s. c. 1 Cent. Rep. 509; Shanley v. Stanley, 27 Jones & Sp. (N. Y.) 495; s. c. 39 N. Y. St. Rep. 368; 15 N. Y. Supp. 136; Scholl v. Broadway R. Co., 28 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 205; s. c. 17 N. Y. Supp. 755; 43 N. Y. St. Rep. 770; Swift v. Staten Island &c. R. Co., 123 N. Y. 645;

s. c. 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 180; 33 N. Y. St. Rep. 604; 25 N. E. Rep. 378; Woods v. Wiman, 122 N. Y. 445; s. c. 34 N. Y. St. Rep. 46; 25 N. E. Rep. 919; rev'g s. c. 47 Hun (N. Y.) 362; 14 N. Y. St. Rep. 526 (question should be submitted to jury where a single witness testifies that he saw the occurrence in question, although he is strongly contradicted by others who had every facility for observing the occurrence); Capital Printing Co. v. Raleigh, 126 N. C. 516; s. c. 36 S. E. Rep. 33; Ward v. Odell Man. Co., 123 N. C. 248; s. c. 31 S. E. Rep. 495; Fritz v. Jenner, 166 Pa. St. 292; s. c. 31 Atl. Rep. 80; Gray v. Floersheim, 164 Pa. St. 508; s. c. 25 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 158; 30 Atl. Rep. 397; Iaquinta v. Citizens' Traction Co., 166 Pa. St. 63; s. c. 36 W. N. C. (Pa.) 86; 25 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 467; 30 Atl. Rep. 1131; Keeple V. Pennsylvania Torpedo Co., 7 Pa. Super. 620; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Greiner, 113 Pa. St. 600; s. c. 4 Cent. Rep. 901; Moran v. Versailles Traction Co., 188 Pa. St. 557; s. c. 41 Atl. Rep. 652; Owens v. People's Pass. R. Co., 155 Pa. St. 334; s. c. 32 W. N. C. (Pa.) 313; 26 Atl. Rep. 748; Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Kane (Pa.), 5 Cent. Rep. 909; Marsh v. Western Union Tel. Co., 65 S. C. 430; s. c. 43 S. E. Rep. 953; Bates v. Fremont &c. R. Co., 4 S. Dak. 394; s. c. 57 N. W. Rep. 72; Texas &c. R. Co. v. Levi, 59 Tex. 674; Texas &c. R. Co. v. Robertson, 82 Tex. 657; s. c. 17 S. W. Rep. 1041; Preece v. Rio Grande &c. R. Co.. 24 Utah 493; s. c. 68 Pac. Rep. 413; Sherman v. Delaware &c. Canal Co... 71 Vt. 325; s. c. 45 Atl. Rep. 227; Costa v. Pacific Coast Co., 26 Wash. 138; s. c. 66 Pac. Rep. 398; Piper v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 77 Wis. 247; S. c. 46 N. W. Rep. 165.

19 Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Feehan, 149 Ill. 202; s. c. 36 N. E. Rep. 1036; aff'g s. c. 47 Ill. App. 66 (testimony of one or more witnesses who were in position to hear, that they did not hear a bell rung, is sufficient to raise a conflict in the evidence, where several other wit

there is any evidence tending fairly to show actionable negligence on the part of the defendant,20 or even scant and slight evidence, if it is admitted without objection,21 the case should be submitted to the jury, if it might be reasonably and properly concluded that there was negligence. A case should not be withdrawn from the jury unless a recovery cannot be had upon any view that can reasonably be taken of the facts which the evidence tends to show;22 and the fact that the defendant offers strong evidence showing that plaintiff must have been mistaken in her version of the accident, will not justify the court in taking the case from the jury.23

§ 7391. But Not where there is but a Mere Scintilla of Evidence to show Negligence. But the jury cannot be permitted arbitrarily to declare that certain actions constitute actionable negligence, where there is no proper foundation for such a finding; but there must be facts to warrant the inference of negligence.24 Thus, a mere surmise of negligence is not sufficient to take the case to the jury.25 The rule is thus expressed by Williams, J., in Toomey v. London &c. Railway Co.:26 "A scintilla of evidence, or the mere surmise that there may have been negligence on the part of the defendant, would not justify the judge in leaving the case to the jury; there must be evidence upon which they might reasonably and properly conclude

nesses testified that the bell was ringing continually while the train was approaching the crossing); Johnson v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 18 Neb. 690; Goldsboro v. Central R. Co., 60 N. J. L. 49; s. c. 37 Atl. Rep. 433. For example, in the case of a railroad-crossing accident, there was sufficient conflict in the evidence to carry the case to the jury, where a part of defendant's witnesses testified that lights were displayed and signals given, while plaintiff testified that he did not see or hear the signals, although he was looking and listening for them, and was in a position to have seen and heard them if they had been given: Annacker v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 81 Iowa 267; s. c. 47 N. W. Rep. 68.

"Hartung v. North Chicago St. R. Co., 102 Ill. App. 470; Cumberland &c. Iron Co. v. Scally, 27 Md. 589; Rowe v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 82 Md. 493; s. c. 33 Atl. Rep. 761; Carver v. Detroit &c. Co., 69 Mich. 616; s. c. 25 N W. Rep. 183; Sheldon v. Flint &c. R. Co., 59 Mich. 172; s. c. 26 N. W. Rep. 507; Flori v. St. Louis, 3 Mo. App. 231; Gour

ley v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 25 Mo. App. 144; Beckwith v. New York &c. R. Co., 54 Hun (N. Y.) 450; s. c. 28 N. Y. St. Rep. 130; 7 N. Y. Supp. 721; Fouhy v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa.), 2 Cent. Rep. 39 (no off. rep.).

V

21 Highland Ave. &c. R. Co. Walters, 91 Ala. 435; s. c. 8 South! Rep. 357; Moore v. Metropolitan R. Co., 2 Mack. (D. C.)'437.

22 Great Northern R. Co. v. McLaughlin, 70 Fed. Rep. 669; s. c. 17 C. C. A. 330; 44 U. S. App. 189.

23 O'Toole v. Central Park &c. R. Co., 58 Hun (N. Y.) 609 (mem.); s. c. 35 N. Y. St. Rep. 591; 12 N. Y. Supp. 347.

24 Chicago City R. Co. v. Maloney, 99 Ill. App. 623.

25 Greenleaf v. Illinois &c. R. Co.. 29 Iowa 22; Beaulieu v. Portland Co., 48 Me. 291; Adams Co. Bank v. Hainline, 67 Mo. App. 483; Lehman v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 234; Morris v. Lake Shore &c. R. Co., 148 N. Y. 182; s. c. 42 N. E. Rep. 579; Vany v. Pierce, 82 Fed. Rep. 162; s. c. 54 U. S. App. 196; 39 Ohio L. J. 152; 26 C. C. A. 521. 26 3 C. B. (N. S.) 146, 150.

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