is such testimony, it is not improper to introduce in evidence standard life-tables to show the expectancy of life of one of the age of the injured party, as a basis upon which to estimate the amount of damages he should recover. It is not required that the injury should result in entire disability: the rule is satisfied if the injury proved is permanent; and proof of the life expectancy of the injured person is admissible, though the injury, while permanent, will not result in entire disability. The expectancy tables are not admissible in evidence until the proper foundation has been laid by proof of the plaintiff's age,. or by introducing evidence from which his age may be inferred or ap-proximately arrived at. The tables are not conclusive of the question,. or the only method of proving expectancy, and are to be considered with reference to the particular individual and the conditions surrounding him, such as the existence of disease tending to shorten his life, the particular member of his body of the use of which he they were not permanent. It was held that the opinion of a physician as to the probable duration of the injuries was admissible, where the employé had been under his care for several years, and the physician described injuries which, from their very nature, were permanent: Barkley v. New York Cent. &c. R. Co., 35 App. Div. (N. Y.) 228; s. c. 54 N. Y. Supp. 766. Union &c. R. Co. v. Yates, 79 Fed. Rep. 584; s. c. 40 L. R. A. 553; Whelan v. New York &c. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 15; Richmond &c. R. Co. v. Garner, 91 Ga. 27; s. c. 16 S. E. Rep. 110; Powell v. Augusta &c. R. Co., 77 Ga. 192; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Miller, 140 Ind. 685; s. c. 37 N. E. Rep. 343; Allen v. Ames &c. R. Co., 106 Iowa 602; s. c. 76 N. W. Rep. 848; Keyes v. Cedar Falls, 107 Iowa 509; s. c. 78 N. W. Rep. 227; Kircher v. Larchwood, 120 Iowa 518; s. c. 95 N. W. Rep. 184; McDonald v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 26 lowa 124; Ronn v. Des Moines, 78 Iowa 63; Stomne v. Hanford Produce Co., 108 Iowa 137; s. c. 78 N. W. Rep. 841; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Martin, 59 Kan. 437; s. c. 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 266; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 4; 53 Pac. Rep. 461; Haines v. Lake Shore &c. R. Co., 129 Mich. 475; s. c. 8 Det. Leg. N. 1035; 89 N. W. Rep. 349; Leach v. Detroit Elec. R. Co., 125 Mich. 373; S. c. 7 Det. Leg. N. 547; 84 N. W. Rep. 316; Mott v. Detroit &c. R. Co., 120 Mich. 127; s. c. 79 N. W. Rep. 3; Wilkins v. Flint, 128 Mich. 262; s. c. 3 Tex. 4 Atlanta Consol. St. R. Co. v. Beauchamp, 93 Ga. 6; s. c. 19 S. E. Rep. 24. 5 Friend v. Ingersoll, 39 Neb. 717; s. c. 58 N. W. Rep. 281. is deprived, and the extent to which he is disabled from supporting himself. It is the duty of the court to inform the jury as to the method of computing the damages after the probable duration of the life of the injured person has been shown." § 7271. Disfigurement and Deformity. The jury, in estimating the damages resulting from a personal injury, may consider, among other things, to what extent the person has been disfigured or marred in his or her personal appearance as a natural consequence of the injury; and this principle has been held to allow the jury to consider the effect of such disfigurement on the prospects of marriage of a girl five years of age as an item of general damage. For like reasons damages are recoverable for injuries resulting in deformities and the weakened condition which generally follows such an effect.10 § 7272. Expert Testimony as to Extent of Injuries not Indispensable. The usual method of proving the injured person's condition im Mary Lee Coal &c. R. Co. v. Chambliss, 97 Ala. 171; S. C. 11 South. Rep. 897; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 254; Greer v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 94 Ky. 169; s. c. 14 Ky. L. Rep. 876; 21 S. W. Rep. 649. The American mortality tables are admissible in evidence to be considered with the other evidence, in arriving at the amount of damages to a brakeman alleged to have sustained personal injuries by the company's negligence, although when injured he was engaged in a more hazardous employment than persons with reference to whom the tables were compiled, that being merely a circumstance to be considered by the jury as tending to show that his expectancy of life is less than the tables indicate for one of his age: Birmingham Mineral R. Co. v. Wilmer, 97 Ala. 165; s. c. 11 South. Rep. 886. An inquiry as to the habits of sobriety of plaintiff in an action for personal injuries, for the purpose of determining whether his expectation of life is equal to the average shown by the tables of mortality, should not be confined to the date of the injury, but if confined to his habits at such time, may extend down to the trial two years afterwards, since habits are not formed hurriedly: Townsend V. Briggs, 99 Cal. 481; s. c. 34 Pac. Rep. 116. 7 Southern R. Co. v. O'Bryan, 119 Ga. 147; s. c. 45 S. E. Rep. 1000; Seifred v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 206 8 Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Hill, 93 Ala. 514; s. c. 9 South. Rep. 722; Birmingham v. Lewis, 92 Ala. 352; s. c. 9 South. Rep. 243; Railway Co. v. Dobbins, 60 Ark. 481; s. c. 30 S. W. Rep. 887; 31 S. W. Rep. 147; Railroad Co. v. Young, 81 Ga. 397; s. c. 7 S. E. Rep. 912; Railroad Co. v. Lanier, 83 Ga. 587; s. c. 10 S. E. Rep. 279; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Krempel, 103 Ill. App. 1; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. James, 69 Ill. App. 609; Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51; Cameron v. Bryan, 89 Iowa 214; s. c. 56 N. W. Rep. 434; Newbury v. Getchell &c. Co., 100 Iowa 441; s. c. 69 N. W. Rep. 743; Power v. Harlow, 57 Mich. 107; s. c. 23 N. W. Rep. 606; Sherwood v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 82 Mich. 374; s. c. 46 N. W. Rep. 773; Schmitz v. Railway Co., 119 Mo. 256; s. c. 24 S. W. Rep. 472; 23 L. R. A. 250; Galveston &c. Co. v. Clark, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 167; s. c. 51 S. W. Rep. 276; Nichols v. Brabazon, 94 Wis. 549; Heddles v. Railway Co., 77. Wis. 228; s. c. 46 N. W. Rep. 115. 9 " Smith v. Pittsburg &c. R. Co., 90 Fed. Rep. 783. For a case where such injuries were alleged as an item of special damages, see Hunter v. Stewart, 47 Me. 419. 10 Reliance Textile &c. Co. V. Mitchell, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1286; s. c. 71 S. W. Rep. 425. mediately after the accident is by medical expert testimony; but there is no rule limiting the testimony on this point to that class of witnesses, and testimony as to the extent of the injury may be given by any one having knowledge of the facts.11 § 7273. Poverty of Plaintiff and Wealth of Defendant.-While in some cases of personal injuries, as we shall presently see, it is admissible to show the worldly condition of the plaintiff,-his earnings, etc., -with a view of enabling the jury to estimate the damages consequent upon his diminished capacity to earn money,12 it is clearly improper otherwise to admit evidence of the poverty of the plaintiff or the number of persons dependent upon him for support,13 or on the other hand of the wealth of the defendant in a case where the damages are purely compensatory, with a view to the aggravation of the damages, as such evidence is calculated to arouse the sympathy or prejudice of the jury and divert their minds from the real issue before them. In one case, evidence as to the financial and domestic situation of the plaintiff was admitted and its admission justified on the ground that it tended to prove loss of capacity to meet the obligations imposed by law on him.15 In another case, where damages were claimed for the dis 14 "Birkel v. Chandler, 26 Wash. law v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73; s. c: 52 241; s. c. 66 Pac. Rep. 406. 12 Post, § 7287. See also, Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. St. 479; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Books, 57 Pa. St. 339; Winters v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 39 Mo. 468. But see Stockton v. Frey, 4 Gill (Md.) 406. 13 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Binion, 107 Ala. 645; s. c. 18 South. Rep. 75; Barbour County v. Horn, 48 Ala. 566; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Collinsworth, Fla.; s. c. 33 South. Rep. 513; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Camp, 81 Fed. Rep. 807; s. c. 26 C. C. A. 626; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Few, 15 Ill. App. 125; Chicago v. O'Brennan, 65 Ill. 160; Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Powers, 74 Ill. 341; Quincy Horse R. &c. Co. V. Omer, 101 Ill. App. 155; Eagle Packet Co. v. Defries, 94 Ill. 598; Kansas City &c. R. Co. v. Egan, 64 Kan. 421; s. c. 67 Pac. Rep. 887; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Hall, 115 Ky. 567; s. c. 74 S. W. Rep. 280; 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2487; Stockton v. Frey, 4 Gill (Md.) 406; s. c. 45 Am. Dec. 138; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205; Southern R. Co. v. McLellan, 80 Miss. 700; s. c. 32 South. Rep. 283; Sykes v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 88 Mo. App. 193; Laid N. E. Rep. 679; rev'g s. c. 3 App. Div. (N. Y.) 374; s. c. 37 N. Y. Supp. 770; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Gower, 85 Tenn. 465; s. c. 3 S. W. Rep. 824; Belton v. Lockett (Tex. Civ. App.), 57 S. W. Rep. 687; Dallas v. Moore, Tex. Civ. App. -; S. c. 74 S. W. Rep. 95; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Hamilton, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 76; s. c. 42 S. W. Rep. 358; Sesler v. Rolfe Coal &c. Co., 51 W. Va. 318; s. c. 41 S. E. Rep. 216; Crouse v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 102 Wis. 196; s. c. 78 N. W. Rep. 446; Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451; s. c. 26 L. ed. 141; Price v. Wright. 35 N. B. 26. But admission held not reversible error in these cases: Kinsley v. Morse, 40 Kan. 577; s. c. 20 Pac. Rep. 217; Central &c. R. Co. v. Kuhn, 86 Ky. 578; s. c. 6 S. W. Rep. 441; Hewitt v. Flint &c. R. Co., 67 Mich. 61; s. c. 34 N. W. Rep. 659. 14 Macon &c. R. Co. v. Winn, 26 Ga. 259; Moody v. Osgood, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 628; Sun Life Assur. Co. v. Bailey, 101 Va. 443; s. c. 44 S. E. Rep. 692. 15 Youngblood v. South Carolina &c. R. Co.. 60 S. C. 9; s. c. 38 S. E. Rep. 232. See also, Loyacano v. Jurgens, 50 La. An. 441; s. c. 23 South. figurement of the plaintiff's face, the fact that she was "a plain girl, moving in an humble walk in life," was taken into consideration in fixing the amount.18 The wealth and standing of the defendant, as we have already seen, may generally be shown where exemplary damages are claimed.1 § 7274. Malpractice of Physician Setting Broken Arm.-The measure of damages in an action against a surgeon for malpractice in setting and treating a broken arm is the damage accruing to the plaintiff in excess of that which would have accrued naturally from the breaking of his arm if he had been treated with the degree of skill ordinarily possessed by surgeons.18 § 7275. Liability of Druggist to Third Person Taking Poison Sold as Medicine.—A merchant who sells a poisonous drug by mistake to a person for a harmless medicine, which is taken for medicine by a third person, without negligence, will be liable to the third person. for the resulting damage, notwithstanding there is no privity of contract between them.19 § 7276. Physical Examination of Plaintiff to Determine Extent of his Injuries. The decided weight of authority in this country sustains the right of a court to require the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination at the instance of defendant to enable him properly to prepare his defense, when it is made sufficiently to appear that the ends of justice will be promoted by such an examination.20 As Rep. 717; Chicago v. Powers, 42 Ill. 170 (death by wrongful act). 16 The Oriflamme, 3 Sawy. (U. S.) 397; s. c. 2 Cent. L. J. 473; 7 Chic. Leg. N. 347. 1 Ante, § 7171. See also, Caldwell v. Murphy, 1 Duer (N. Y.) 233; Cosgrix v. Miller, 10 Wyo. 190; s. c. 68 Pac. Rep. 206. In a case which will warrant the infliction of exemplary damages, the wealth of the defendant may be taken into consideration: New Orleans &c. R. Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660. 18 Miller v. Frey, 49 Neb. 472; s. c. 68 N. W. Rep. 630. 19 Peters v. Johnson, 50 W. Va. 644; s. c. 41 S. E. Rep. 190; 57 L. R. A. 428. See also, Balm Co. v. Cooper. 83 Ga. 457; s. c. 10 S. E. Rep. 118; 5 L. R. A. 612; 20 Am. St. Rep. 324; Norton v. Sewall, 106 Mass. 143; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 298; Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397; s. c. 57 Am. Dec. 455; Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470; s. c. 15 N. E. Rep. 350; 4 Am. St. Rep. 561; Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 204; s. c. 25 L. ed. 621; Langridge v. Levy, 4 M. & W. 337; George v. Skivington, L. R. 5 Exch. 1. 20 Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71; Sibley v. Smith, 46 Ark. 275; Richmond &c. R. Co. v. Childress, 82 Ga. 719; South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind. 418; s. c. 60 N. E. Rep. 271; Shroeder v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 47 Iowa 375; Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Thul, 29 Kan. 466; Ottawa v. Gilliland, 63 Kan. 165; s. c. 65 Pac. Rep. 252; Belt Electric Line Co. v. Allen, 102 Ky. 551; s. c. 44 S. W. Rep. 89; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Martlege (Ky.), 74 S. W. Rep. 742; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Simpson, 111 Ky. 754; s. c. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1044; 64 S. W. Rep. 733; Graves v. Battle Creek, 95 Mich. 266; s. c. 54 N. W. Rep. 757; Hatfield v. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 33 Minn. very pertinently observed by Brewer, J., in a strong dissenting opinion in Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford," a case most strongly presenting the opposite view: "The end of litigation is justice. Knowledge of the truth is essential thereto. It is conceded, and it is a matter of frequent occurrence, that in the trial of suits of this nature, the plaintiff may make in the court-room, in the presence of the jury, any not indecent exposure of his person to show the extent of his injuries; and it is conceded, and also a matter of frequent occurrence, that in private he may call his personal friends and his own physician into a room and there permit them a full examination of his person, in order that they may testify as to what they see and find. In other words, he may thus disclose the actual facts to the jury if his interest require; but, by this decision, if his interests are against such a disclosure, it cannot be compelled. It seems strange that a plaintiff may, in the presence of a jury, be permitted to roll up his sleeve and disclose on his arm a wound of which he testifies; but when he testifies as to the existence of such a wound, the court, though persuaded he is perjuring himself, cannot require him to roll up his sleeve and thus make manifest the truth, nor require him in the like interest of truth, to step into an adjoining room and lay bare his arm to the inspection of surgeons. It is said that there is a sanctity of the person which may not be outraged. We believe that truth and justice are more sacred than any personal consideration; and if in other cases, in the interests of justice or from considerations of mercy, the courts may, as they often do, require such personal examination, why should they not exercise the same power in cases like this, to prevent wrong and injustice?"22 Courts denying this right proceed upon the theory that such a proceeding was unknown at the common law, and hence only to be allowed where expressly authorized by statute.23 The right is now given by statute in New 130; Owens v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 95 Mo. 169; Sidekum v. Wabash &c. R. Co., 93 Mo. 400; Stuart v. Havens, 17 Neb. 211; Brown v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 12 N. D. 61; s. c. 95 N. W. Rep. 153; Miami &c. Turnpike Co. v. Baily, 37 Ohio St. 104; Hess v. Lake Shore &c. R. Co., 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 565; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Johnson, 72 Tex. 95; Lane v. Spokane Falls &c. R. Co., 21 Wash. 119; s. c. 57 Pac. Rep. 367; White V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 61 Wis. 536. 1 Marv. (Del.) 269; s. c. 40 Atl. Rep. 1114; Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Story, 104 Ill. App. 132; Stack v. Railroad Co., 177 Mass. 155; s. c. 58 N. E. Rep. 686; 52 L. R. A. 328; 83 Am. St. Rep. 269; Kingfisher v. Altizer, 13 Okla. 121; s. c. 74 Pac. Rep. 107; Austin &c. R. Co. v. Cluck, Tex.; s. c. 77 S. W. Rep. 403; rev'g s. c. 73 S. W. Rep. 569; Fort Worth &c. R. Co. v. White (Tex. Civ. App.), 51 S. W. Rep. 855; Galveston v. Railroad Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 67 S. W. Rep. 776; Galveston &c. R. Co. v. Sherwood (Tex. Civ. App.), 67 S. W. Rep. 776; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Brown, Tex. Civ. App. ; s. c. 75 S. W. Rep. 807; Gulf &c. |