lished by proof of facts from which they may be rationally inferred with reasonable certainty, are recoverable. It is not enough to sustain an award that injuries received may develop into a more serious character, but there must be a probability amounting to a certainty that they will so develop. Thus, where a hernia resulted from an accident, evidence of the danger to one's life from a hernia of that description is inadmissible as being remote and conjectural.10 § 7196. Cases Where Damages have been held Remote or Speculative. As examples of damages regarded by the courts as too remote or conjectural to support a recovery may be mentioned a prospect of promotion;11 injury to the marriage prospects of a girl from the bite of a dog causing a scar on her face;12 loss of pasture owing to failure of a wind-mill to furnish an adequate supply of water;18 expenses incurred by a libelant in replacing certain papers lost by him in a collision;14 humiliation resulting from annoying remarks of persons cognizant of the plaintiff's wrongful ejection from a train;15 loss of seed that could not be planted because of illness resulting from negligence of the defendant;16 injury to the health of a boatman by exposure in voluntarily remaining upon his canal boat after a collision for the purpose of looking after her;17 humiliation suffered by a sister $ Central Coal &c. Co. v. Hartman, 111 Fed. Rep. 96; s. c. 49 C. C. A. 244; Hall v. Cedar Rapids &c. R. Co., 115 Iowa 18; s. c. 87 N. W. Rep. 739; O'Reilly v. Monongahela St. R. Co., 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 626. In an action for delay in delivering a telegram announcing the death of plaintiff's father, plaintiff could not recover expenses incurred in making a trip to attend the funeral when it was too late, he having been otherwise advised of his father's death, which he would not have incurred had the telegram been delivered, such damages being too uncertain and problematical: Alexander v. Western Union Tel. Co., 126 Fed. Rep. 445. "Streng v. Frank Ibert Brewing Co., 50 App. Div. (N. Y.) 542; s. c. 64 N. Y. Supp. 34. 10 Chicago v. Lamb, 105 Ill. App. 204. "Southern Indiana R. Co. v. Davis, 32 Ind. App. 569; s. c. 69 N. E., Rep. 550. But see Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Elliott, 149 U. S. 266; s. c. 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 837; 37 L. ed. 728. In an action by a Government employé to recover damages for injuries negligently inflicted upon him by another, which permanently disabled him from performing labor, evidence is not admissible to show his prospects of promotion in the government service, for the purpose of increasing the damages, where there was no vacancy to which he could have been promoted at the time of the injury, and there were other persons in the direct line of promotion who were at least as likely to receive promotion as himself, and political considerations were shown to enter somewhat into the promotions of that kind: Richmond &c. R. Co. v. Allison, 86 Ga. 145; s. c. 12 S. E. Rep. 352; 11 L. R. A. 43. 12 Price v. Wright, 35 N. B. 26. 13 Cole v. Laird, 121 Iowa 146; s. c. 96 N. W. Rep. 744 14 Jacobson v. Dalles, P. & A. Nav. Co., 93 Fed. Rep. 975. 15 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Hine, 121 Ala. 234; s. c. 25 South. Rep. 857; Hoffman v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 45 Minn. 53; s. c. 47 N. W. Rep. 312. 10 San Antonio v. Smith, 94 Tex. 266; s. c. 59 S. W. Rep. 1109; rev'g s. c. 57 S. W. Rep. 881. "The Brinton, 50 Fed. Rep. 581. because of the fact that her brother died in a distant place and was buried at the cost of strangers on account of the failure of a telegraph company promptly to deliver to the sister a telegram announcing the death and asking instructions as to the disposition of the body;18 the failure of a student to receive benefit from his studies because of worry over the loss of a position caused by the negligent failure of a telegraph company to transmit a message correctly;19 the fact that a person was evicted from her home because of a failure promptly to receive money transmitted by a telegraph company and the injury to her reputation generally because of such eviction.20 So, damages for failure to deliver a telegram have been held too remote where, if it had been received, it would only have given the plaintiff an opportunity to make a business contract which he might or might not have made, the profits on which, if made, would have been subject to many contingencies.21 §7197. Examples of Damages not Remote or Speculative.—Recoveries contested on the ground of remoteness have been upheld under the following circumstances:-Where greenhouse plants were lost through freezing without negligence on the part of the owner by reason of the negligence of city employés in leaving a pipe connecting with the greenhouse exposed so that the water froze;22 where a marriage engagement was broken because of the want of ordinary diligence and care of a physician in determining the fitness of the bridegroom to enter into the marriage relation;23 where a passenger compelled to stand in a crowded car sustained injuries by reason of her holding a child not her own, but which she had assumed to care for;24 where diabetes developed in a person injured by negligence, and his experts testified that in their opinion the disease was due to the injury, though they admitted it might be produced by a large number of causes, notwithstanding experts for the defendant testified that the disease was not caused by the accident.25 $7198. Difficulty of Computation not Conclusive on Question. -Damages are not to be considered remote or speculative by reason S 78 S. W. Rep. 969. *Stansell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 106 Fed. Rep. 668. "Johnson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 79 Miss. 58; s. c. 29 South. Rep. 787. 2 Stock v. Boston, 149 Mass. 410; 21 N. E. Rep. 871. 23 Harriott v. Plimpton, 166 Mass. 585; s. c. 44 N. E. Rep. 992. 24 Texas &c. R. Co. v. Rea, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 549; s. c. 65 S. W. Rep. 1115. Eichholz v. Niagara Falls Hydraulic Power &c. Co., 174 N. Y. 519; s. c. 66 N. E. Rep. 1107; aff'g s. c. 68 App. Div. (N. Y.) 441; 73 N. Y. Supp. 842. of the difficulty involved in determining the amount to be awarded.. This question involves the mere matter of computation, and is not to be confused with the right to recover." 26 $7199. Evidence to Disprove Contention of Proximate Result. -On the question whether the plaintiff's condition resulted from the negligence for which the defendant is responsible, the defendant may show a fact other than the negligent act from which it may reasonably be inferred the condition had its origin.27 § 7200. The Doctrine in its Application to Injuries of Passengers. -The doctrine limiting the recovery to such damages as are the direct result of the injuries complained of finds frequent application in cases involving the carrier relation.28 Thus, where it appeared that a train failed to stop at a station where a passenger was waiting for it, to be transported to another station, and he, instead of hiring another conveyance or waiting till the next train came, walked to his place of destination, in very cold weather, and on account of the exposure became sick, it was held that his sickness and the loss to him thereby occasioned were not elements of the damages he could recover; that if his business required it, he might have hired another conveyance, and the company would have been liable for such actual damages as he could prove in the way of necessarily increased expenses either in waiting or procuring another vehicle, and such loss to his business as he might suffer on account of the delay, but he had no right to inflict injury on himself to enhance the amount of his damages.29 In another case, the defendant, a common carrier of passengers, contracted to take 20 Occidental Consol. Min. Co. v. Comstock Tunnel Co., 125 Fed. Rep. 244. "Mullin v. Consolidated Traction Co. (N. J. L.), 42 Atl. Rep. 764. 28 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Bambrey (Pa.), 16 Atl. Rep. 67 (sickness caused by walking eight miles to reach home rather than spend night in a strange town at which plaintiff, female passenger, was wrongfully put off train-recovery upheld); Rawlings v. Wabash R. Co., 97 Mo. App. 511; s. c. 71 S. W. Rep. 534 (child carried two hundred and fifty yards beyond his station, and put off without any injury, denied recovery for sickness owing to his having fallen down in the mud and become wet and frightened while going from the train to the station). 29 Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Birney, 71 Ill. 391. See also, Ohio &c. R. Co. v. Burrow, 32 Ill. App. 161. Where a person purchased a ticket on the statement of the ticket agent that the train she was about to take made close connections at a certain point with another train going to her place of destination, which statement was erroneous, and such person, on arriving at such connecting point, was obliged to wait some ti: ie for such connecting train, and thereupon, in the face of a storm, and of her delicate state of health. she procured a buggy, and drove over a rough road to her father's house, she could not recover for the injuries resulting from such drive: Fowlks v. Southern R. Co., 96 Va. 742; s. c. 32 S. E. Rep. 464. the plaintiff, a young lady, from a railroad depot to her home, but, before arriving there, set her down in the city, a mile from her residence, on the sidewalk of a frequented street on which ran a line of street cars which passed within a square of her house. It was on a dry but very cold winter day. The plaintiff was of a delicate constitution, though not sick at the time. Being warmly clad, she walked home in company with a friend, but in doing so contracted a cold which permanently injured her health. It was held that the injury was too remote, and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff too direct, to warrant a recovery for her sufferings, loss of employment, and permanent injury to health; that her recovery must be limited to the reasonable cost of a conveyance home, and her expenses in endeavoring to avoid exposure to the cold.30 In still another case it was held that a passenger carried beyond her station because of the porter's negligent failure to have her called as requested was not entitled to recover damages because in her absence from home a tenant failed to pay a debt, it not being shown what she might have done if present to compel payment of the debt.31 So, where the conductor of the defendants' train unreasonably ordered the plaintiff, a passenger, to leave the train, and upon refusal placed his hand upon the plaintiff's shoulder to compel him to go, and the plaintiff rose from his seat and followed the conductor out of the car, but in so doing slipped and fell upon the car steps and was injured, it was held that the injuries caused by the fall were not elements to be taken into consideration in estimating the damages he might recover for being wrongfully ejected from the train. In a comparatively recent English case, the rule seems to have been applied with unnecessary rigor. The evidence showed that, through the negligence of the servants of the defendant, a railway company, the plaintiffs (husband and wife) and their two children were taken to the wrong station, where they could obtain neither accommodation nor a conveyance; consequently they were obliged to walk several miles, in the middle of a wet night. The female plaintiff caught cold and was sick for some time, and unable to assist her husband in his business. The sickness made medical attendance and other expenses necessary. The plaintiffs recovered £10 for the personal inconvenience suffered under these circumstances, and £20 in respect of the wife's illness. On appeal, it was held that the plaintiffs could not recover damages for the 33 "Francis v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 5 Mo. App. 7. Airey v. Pullman &c. Co., 50 La. An. 648; s. c. 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 836; 23 South, Rep. 512. 32 32 Williamson v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 17 Up. Can. C. P. 615. 33 Hobbs v. London &c. R. Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 111; s. c. 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 49; 23 Week. Rep. 520; 32 L. T. (N. S.) 352. illness of the wife or the losses in consequence, such damage being too remote, and not flowing immediately from the cause of action. Cockburn, C. J., thus expressed the difficulty he had in coming to a decision and laying down a rule as to the measure of damages in actions of this kind: "The nearest approach to a definition, it seems to me, is, that to entitle a person to damages for a breach of contract, the injury for which compensation is asked should be one that may be taken to have been in the contemplation of the parties as fairly the consequence that might arise from the breach, or as fairly flowing from it, and not merely connected through a series of intermediate causes between the breach and the injury complained of." Mellor, J., in the same case, stated the rule thus: "The damage which, as a matter of law, must be construed as a measure of damages is such as arises naturally and directly from the breach of contract, or such as both parties might reasonably have expected to result from a breach of the contract.” Cockburn, C. J., also said: "As to walking home, it must be in the contemplation of the parties that passengers put down at a wrong place will have to get home. If there are means of doing so they must avail themselves of them, and the company are responsible for the cost incurred; if there are no such means, the company are responsible, and must compensate for the inconvenience which the absence of means causes. But in the case of the cold caught, that cannot stand on the same footing." He then gives the two following hypothetical cases, which he claimed to be analogous to the case at bar: "The party aggrieved would in like manner be entitled to recover as where in walking home in the dark a false step is taken which results in a fall and a broken limb. In that case the damage would be too remote, not being a consequence which could reasonably be anticipated to follow from a breach of contract, as a person might walk many times from Esher to Hampton without such an occurrence. Or, again, persons are entitled under such circumstances to take a carriage; suppose that done, and the carriage to be overturned and the person to sustain a bodily injury, it may be said that if this person had been put down at the right place he would not have had to walk or ride, and so could have met with neither accident; but still the injury is too remote. That, I think, is the case here; it is not the necessary, not even the probable, consequence of this breach of contract that personal injury should be sustained or a cold caught. That cannot be reasonably expected, and so to have been within the contemplation of the parties; other words, too remote." The foregoing language would seem to be open to criticism. It may be true that the taking of a false step resulting in a broken limb, or a bodily injury from the overturning of a in |