by reasonable diligence have cars enough to accommodate them.74 In like manner, a carrier is liable in exemplary damages for refusal to return a passenger to a station passed without affording him an opportunity to alight, when the mistake was discovered within a reasonable distance and there was no controlling agency aside from mere inconvenience to prevent the return.75 A recovery was denied in a case where a passenger was carried beyond her destination and was exposed on the platform of a car for several minutes on a cold night, where she had been taken by the conductor to wait for the approach of a train from the opposite direction, which would carry her back to her station, since the conductor at most was guilty merely of negligence, there being no evidence indicating a wanton disregard of the passenger's rights.76 But it has been held that such damages were recoverable where a passenger, by the defendant's negligence, was compelled to stand in a rainstorm while a train was passing, and was injured by such exposure, and was laughed at and tantalized by the defendant's servants on the train while exposed to the storm." Generally, there may be no recovery for a mere neglect or omission without wantonness to stop a train at a point to which it has undertaken to transport a passenger.78 So, it has been held that punitive damages are not recoverable by a passenger upon a railroad train, who was illegally arrested by the conductor for riding beyond the station to which he had paid his fare, where the train did not stop at such station so that he could leave it, but he is entitled to compensatory damages for physical injury sustained by him, and for injury to his feelings resulting from the indignity to which he was subjected. Nor may there be a recovery of such damages for mere

79

"Purcell v. Richmond &c. R. Co., 108 N. C. 414; s. c. 12 S. E. Rep. 954; 12 L. R. A. 113; 10 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 35.

Samuels v. Richmond &c. R. Co., 25 S. C. 493; s. c. 14 S. E. Rep. 943. So, a woman carried by a railroad train beyond her station, at which the railroad employés refused to put her off, and to whom they "were insulting in words, tone or manner," may be allowed to recover punitive damages: Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Ballard, 88 Ky. 159; s. c. 2 L. R. A. 694: 10 Ky. L. Rep. 735; 10 S. W. Rep. 429. Exemplary damages may be awarded against a railroad company whose conductor, within the Scope of his employment, has refused to run a train back to a station past which it has negligently run and at which it was his duty to

stop it, and willfully compels a passenger with a ticket to such station to alight in a driving rain several hundred yards from any shelter while so encumbered with her child and baggage as to be unable to protect herself from exposure during the walk back to the station: Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9; s. c. 9 South. Rep. 375; 10 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 224.

76 Southern R. Co. v. O'Bryan, 119 Ga. 147; s. c. 45 S. E. Rep. 1000.

"Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Keller, 104 Ky. 768; s. c. 47 S. W. Rep. 1072.

78 Southern R. Co. v. Harden, 101 Ga. 263; s. c. 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 250; 28 S. E. Rep. 847.

79 Cone v. Central R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 99; s. c. 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 659; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 278; 40 Atl. Rep. 780.

negligence in the manner of stopping a train at a station, unless such negligent act is actuated by willfulness or other aggravating conduct.80

§ 7183. Negligence in Connection with Boarding and Alighting from Cars. It is the duty of a railroad company to provide reasonable means of protection so as to insure the safety of passengers while boarding and alighting from its cars, and a wanton disregard of this duty will render such a company liable in exemplary damages to a person injured thereby.81 These damages may not be awarded where there is nothing in the evidence to show malice or wanton disregard of the rights of passengers.2 Thus, exemplary damages were refused against a railroad company for the act of a conductor in pulling or jerking a passenger, who was under the influence of liquor, from the car because of his slowness in alighting, the element of wantonness being absent. In another case it was held that the act of the conductor in pushing a newsboy on the arm, who had offered his papers in the car and was standing on the step, was not wanton where passengers were waiting at the crossing the car was approaching.

84

§ 7184. Refusal to Sell Tickets.-Exemplary or vindictive damages have been held properly allowed for the refusal of a carrier to sell a passenger a ticket or to check his baggage to a regular stopping station of a passenger train, in pursuance of an unreasonable regulation of the company which indicated a wanton disregard of the rights of passengers.

85

§ 7185. Expulsion of Child Travelling on Half Fare Ticket.When awarding damages for the expulsion of a child who had a half fare ticket, who was claimed by the carrier to be over age, the circumstances should be looked to in determining whether the conductor was reasonable in raising the question and acted upon his honest

So Dorrah v. Illinois &c. R. Co., 65 Miss. 14; s. c. 7 Am. St. Rep. 629; 3 South. Rep. 36 (failure to stop long enough to allow passenger to alight in safety); Mississippi &c. R. Co. v. Gill, 66 Miss. 39; s. c. 5 South. Rep. 393; Dorsey v. Atchison &c. R. Co., 83 Mo. App. 528 (sudden stopping).

81 Appleby v. South Carolina &c. R. Co., 60 S. C. 48; s. c. 38 S. E. Rep. 237.

82 City &c. R. Co. v. Findley, 76 Ga. 311 (sudden starting of car); Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Stewart, 55 Kan. 667; s. c. 41 Pac. Rep. 961.

83 Smith v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 87 Md. 48; S. c. 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 264; 38 Atl. Rep. 1072. See also, Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.) 213; s. c. 16 L. ed. 77; Milwaukee &c. R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 493; s. c. 23 L. ed. 376.

S4 Philadelphia Traction Co. V. Orbann, 119 Pa. St. 37; s. c. 12 Atl. Rep. 816; 21 W. N. C. (Pa.) 76.

85 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Lyon, 123 Pa. St. 140; s. c. 2 L. R. A. 489; 46 Phila. Leg. Int. 311; 19 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 286; 23 W. N. C. (Pa.) 69; 16 Atl. Rep. 607.

belief as to the child's age. If the child was small in size and of ten der years, larger damages should be awarded for the expulsion than if he were large and overgrown, closely bordering on the limit, and having the appearance of being over the age limit.86

$7186. Dishonor of Railroad Tickets.-A passenger is generally entitled to exemplary damages for the wanton and willful refusal of a conductor to accept a valid ticket tendered for passage.87 Thus, where the general passenger agent of a railroad company deliberately repudiated a large number of mileage tickets which had been issued and sold to the public by his authority, and in consequence of his orders one who had purchased one of such tickets in good faith was ejected from defendant's train, this act was held to show such wanton and reckless disregard of the railroad company's duties and of the rights of its ticket holders as to be equivalent to an intentional violation of these rights, and to warrant the imposition of exemplary damages.88 But where a railroad ticket is not good on a certain train, the refusal of the conductor of such train to carry the holder will not entitle the latter to exemplary damages from the railroad company, though his evidence tends to show that the ticket was sold to him by the agent of the company as being good on any train.89

$7187. Expenses of Litigation.-Wherever the jury are entitled to give exemplary damages for the injury, it is proper for them to take into consideration the expenses of litigation which the plaintiff has been compelled to incur in order to secure his rights, and the court should so instruct them.90

Gibson v. East Tennessee &c. R. Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 904.

*Scott v. Chesapeake &c. R. Co., 43 W. Va. 484; s. c. 27 S. E. Rep. 211. It was held proper where a passenger, holding a ticket for retorn passage, which was to be signed and stamped for the return, finding no one present at the station authorized to validate his ticket, boarded the train without having it signed and stamped, and, though he explained the circumstances to the conductor and offered to guarantee the payment of his fare after he reached his destination, was expelled from the train in the early hours of a dark, rainy morning at a place with which he was unfamiliar: Southern R. Co. v. Wood, 114 Ga. 140; s. c. 39 S. E. Rep. 894; 55 L. R. A. 536.

88 Cowen v. Winters, 96 Fed. Rep. 929; s. c. 37 C. C. A. 628; aff'g s. c. 90 Fed. Rep. 99; Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. Rep. 530; s. c. 16 U. S. App. 613, 647; 8 C. C. A. 201; Railway Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489; Railway Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101-111; s. c. 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261; Railroad v. Winter, 143 U. S. 60; s. c. 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 396; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58-88; s. c. 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265.

99 Yazoo &c. Co. v. Rodgers; 80 Miss. 200; s. c. 31 South. Rep. 581.

90 Beecher v. Derby Bridge Co., 24 Conn. 496; Winters v. Cowen, 90 Fed. Rep. 99; Lindsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 235; Welch v. Durand, 36 Conn. 182; Dalton v. Beers, 38 Conn. 529.

ART. I.

CHAPTER CXCI.

DIRECT AND REMOTE DAMAGES.

General Principles, §§ 7193-7205.

ART. II. Duty to Lighten Consequential Damages, §§ 7209-7213.

§ 7193. Damages Limited to Proximate Result of Wrongful Act.The damages allowed should be such as result directly from the wrongful or negligent act.1 "Damages produced by other agencies than those causing the injury, or even by agencies remotely connected with those causing the injury, cannot be awarded as proximate or proper compensation, but only where the injury flows from the wrongful act as its natural concomitant, or as the direct result thereof. Where speculation or conjecture has to be resorted to for the purpose of determining whether the injury results from the wrongful act or from some other cause, then the rule of law excludes the allowance of damages for such injury." Where the damages result directly from the wrongful act, they are recoverable as a general rule, without regard to whether they could

1 Montgomery &c. R. Co. v. Boring, 51 Ga. 582; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277; Challis v. Lake, 71 N. H. 90; s. c. 51 Atl. Rep. 260 (malpractice); Mayne v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 12 Okla. 10; s. c. 69 Pac.

Tex.

Rep. 933; Dallas v. Moore,
Civ. App. -; s. c. 74 S. W. Rep.
95.

2 Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Birney, 71 Ill. 391.

have been foreseen or contemplated as a probable result. Nor is it necessary that these effects should make an instant appearance. A recovery is not prevented by the fact that a disease or other effect of the injury does not make its appearance until some time after the happening of the accident causing the injury. In a case where erysipelas developed in a wound, and there was nothing to show that it intervened from any want of care or skill on the part of the physician, or from the want of any proper precautions in the treatment of the wound, it was held that it was to be regarded as directly caused by the same act which caused the wound.5

ages

6

$7194. Proximate Result a Question of Fact.-Whether the damclaimed are the proximate result of the negligence complained of is purely a question of fact for the jury, unless the evidence is so clear as to admit of but one conclusion. Illustrative of this principle is the case where a traction engine broke through a county bridge and the fireman of the engine fell into the stream below, where it was held a question of fact whether the injuries suffered by him three months after the accident, and whether his physical condition at the time of the trial, were the direct consequences of the fall."

§7195. Remote, Speculative or Conjectural Damages.-Easily recognized as the concomitant of the doctrine limiting the recovery to such damages as are the proximate cause of the wrongful act, is the doctrine which denies a recovery of damages of a remote, speculative or contingent character. Under this doctrine only actual damages, estab

'Cowan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 122 Iowa 379; s. c. 98 N. W. 281; Schumaker v. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 46 Minn. 39; s. c. 48 N. W. Rep. 559; 12 L. R. A. 257; Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523; s. c. 14 L. R. A. 226; 50 N. W. Rep. 403. It is not necessary to enable one to recover for damages from blood poisoning resulting from a wound inflicted by another's negligence, that blood poisoning should be the ordinary effect of such a wound: McCarrahan V. New York &c. R. Co., 171 Mass. 211; s. c. 50 N. E. Rep. 610.

'Louisville &c. R. Co. v.. Falvey, 104 Ind. 409; s. c. 3 N. E. Rep. 389; 4 N. E. Rep. 908; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74, 619; s. c. 48 Am. Rep. 134; McGarrahan v. New York &c. R. Co., 171 Mass. 211; s. c. 50 N. E. Rep. 610; Wood V. New York Cent. &c. R. Co., 83 App. Div. (N. Y.) 604; s. c. 82 N. Y.

Supp. 160; Dickson v. Hollister, 123
Pa. St. 421; s. c. 16 Atl. Rep. 484;
Houston &c. R. Co. v. Leslie, 57 Tex.
83; Cox v. Chicago, 83 Ill. App. 540.

5 Dickson v. Hollister, 123 Pa. St. 421; s. c. 46 Phila. Leg. Int. 241; 19 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 321; 23 W. N. C. (Pa.) 128; 16 Atl. Rep. 484.

East Tennessee &c. R. Co. v. Lockhart, 79 Ala. 315. In an actionfor injuries alleged to have been occasioned by reason of an explosion of gas, testimony by a physician tending to prove that the physical impairment of the plaintiff, due to an affection of his heart, was the direct effect of the explosion, though he sustained no external physical injury, is sufficient to have the question of his injury submitted to the jury: Baudler v. People's Gaslight &c. Co., 108 Ill. App. 187.

'Smith v. Muncy Creek Tp., 206 Pa. St. 7; s. c. 55 Atl. Rep. 767.