amount which the daughter was entitled to recover at the moment of her death."

$7097. Measure of Damages under Kentucky Statute.-Under the statute of Kentucky which provides that in certain events the damages recovered shall become a part of the estate of the deceased for the payment of his debts, the measure of damages is the loss to the estate caused by the destruction of the earning power of the deceased; and the jury may take into consideration such earning power coupled with the probable duration of the life of the deceased.96 In the case of an infant the value of his earnings during minority is not to be taken into account, nor is the expense of his maintenance and education to be deducted, though the administrator suing is a parent and oneof the beneficiaries.97

$7098. Rule under Missouri Statute.-Under the Missouri statate allowing the recovery of such an amount within the statutory limit as the jury may deem fair and just with reference to the necessary injury, the measure of damages in the action by the widow for the wrongful death of her husband is not necessarily the whole of his probable earnings during the probable length of his life; and, under this particular statutory provision, it is not necessary to prove the amount of the deceased's earnings."

*LeBlanc v. Sweet, 107 La. 355; s. c. 31 South. Rep. 766.

*Chesapeake &c. R. Co. v. Dixon, 104 Ky. 608; s. c. 47 S. W. Rep. 615; Chesapeake &c. R. Co. v. Lang, 100 Ky. 221; s. c. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 65; 38 S. W. Rep. 503; s. c. modified on rehearing, 40 S. W. Rep. 451; petition for further modification denied, 41 S. W. Rep. 271; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 67, 68; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Sullivan, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 854; s. c. 76 S. W. Rep. 525; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Shumaker, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 803; s. c. 53 S. W. Rep. 12; rehearing denied, 56 S. W. Rep. 155; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Clark, 105 Ky. 571; s. c. 49 S. W. Rep. 323; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Taafe, 106 Ky. 535; s. c. 50 S. W. Rep. 850; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Tucker, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1929; s. c. 65 S. W. Rep. 453; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Ward, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1900; s. c. 44 S. W. Rep. 1112 (no off. rep.); Southern R. Co. v. Barr (Ky.), 55 S. W. Rep. 900; s. c. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1615; Southern R. Co. v. Evans, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 568; s. c. 63 S. W. Rep. 445. An instruction to find for a plaintiff suing for the negligent death of her intestate,

such sum as the jury may believe from the evidence will reasonably and fairly compensate the estate of the deceased for the destruction of his power to earn money, is sufficient without stating that if the jury are of opinion that he would have no greater earning capacity during the remainder of his life than at the time of his death, they should deduct from his gross earnings during his life expectancy such reasonable expenses as might be necessary: Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Kelly, 100 Ky. 421; s. c. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 78; 40 S. W. Rep. 452; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 165.

97 Linss v. Chesapeake &c. R. Co., 91 Fed. Rep. 964.

98 Knight v. Sadtler Lead &c. Co., 75 Mo. App. 541; s. c. 1 Mo. App. Repr. 537; McKinley v. Sadtler Lead &c. Co., 80 Mo. App. 93; s. c. 2 Mo. App. Repr. 532; McGowan v. St. Louis Ore &c. R. Co.. 109 Mo. 518: Nichols v. Winfrey, 90 Mo. 403; s. c. 7 West. Rep. 150.

99 McPherson v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 97 Mo. 253; s. c. 10 S. W. Rep. 846.

201

§ 7099. Annuity as Basis of Calculation.-Some jurisdictions give support to the doctrine that the true and fair basis for the measure of damages for failure of support by the death of a person is the cost of an annuity which would furnish the support.100 In Wisconsin the courts take the view that the recovery should be limited to such sum as, being put at interest, will each year, by taking a part of the principal and adding to the interest, yield an amount sufficient for the plaintiff's support during the time the deceased, who supported her, would probably have lived, together with such other sum as she could reasonably have expected to receive from his earnings. 101 The rule fixing the value of an annuity as a limit of the recovery is open to the objection that the jury is too closely restricted in its consideration of the matter of damages.102 It is a principle of general application to this class of actions that the jury, in estimating the damages, should consider all the facts and circumstances, and allow such damages as will fairly compensate for the injury resulting from the death.103

$7100. Duty of Jury to Consider Present Worth of Recovery.Some courts take into consideration the fact that the survivors come into immediate possession of the fund, instead of waiting until the termination of the life of the deceased in the natural course of events, and have adopted the view that the jury should find the total amount likely to accrue to the beneficiaries during the whole period of the expectancy of life, and reduce it to its present worth. 104 Other courts,

100 Railway Co. V. Robbins, 57 Ark. 377; Brockway v. Patterson, 72 Mich. 122; s. c. 1 L. R. A. 708; 40 N. W. Rep. 192; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205; Bernard v. Grand Trunk R. Co., Rap. Jud. Que. 11 C. S. 9. In an action by an administrator of a deceased employé to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in his death, a charge has been held free from error which instructs the jury that: "If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, the measure of damages is that sum which, being put out at interest at eight per cent. per annum, will yield each year, by taking a proportionate part of the principal and adding it to the interest. the amount of his yearly contributions to his family (less his personal expenses), and as that the whole remaining principal at the end of his expectancy of life, added to the interest on his balance for that year,

will equal the amount of his yearly contributions to his family": Deca-. tur Car Wheel &c. Co. v. Mehaffey, 128 Ala. 242; s. c. 29 South. Rep. 646.

101 Rudiger v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 101 Wis. 292; s. c. 77 N. W. Rep. 169; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 196; Nickerson v. Biglow, 62 Fed. Rep. 900.

102 Hinsdale v. New York &c. R. Co., 81 App. Div. (N. Y.) 617; s. c. 81 N. Y. Supp. 356; Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Schultz, 19 Ohio C. C. 639; Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Ranson, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 689; s. c. 41 S. W. Rep. 826; International &c. R. Co. v. Kindred, 57 Tex. 491.

103 Lowe v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 89 Iowa 420; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Spence, 93 Tenn. 173.

104 Alabama Mineral R. Co. V. Jones, 114 Ala. 519; s. c. 21 South. Rep. 507; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 383; Louisville &c. R. Co. v.

with good reason, refuse to turn mathematical problems of a complicated character over to juries, and reach practically the same result by directing the jury to take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, and return such an amount as will fairly compensate the plaintiff for the loss occasioned by the wrongful death.105 Under a statute of the Missouri type, which authorizes a jury to give such damages, not exceeding the statutory amount, as they deem fair and just with reference to the necessary injury, the jury are not concerned with the present worth of the recovery.100

$7101. Probable Duration of Life-Mortality Tables as Evidence. -Where one is entitled to damages because of the negligent killing of another, the probable duration of the life lost is an element to be considered.107 One method of showing the probable duration of the life is by the introduction in evidence of the Carlisle, Northampton, or other standard life tables. 108 But these tables, though admissible,

Jones, 130 Ala. 456; s. c. 30 South. Rep. 586; Atlanta &c. R. Co. v. Newton, 85 Ga. 517; s. c. 11 S. E. Rep. 776; Hackney v. Delaware &c. Teleph. Co., 69 N. J. L. 335; s. c. 55 Atl. Rep. 252; Fajardo v. New York Cent. &c. R. Co., 84 App. Div. (N. Y.) 354; s. c. 82 N. Y. Supp. 912; Coley v. Stateville, 121 N. C. 301; s. c. 28 S. E. Rep. 482; Benton V. North Carolina R. Co., 122 N. C. 1007; s. c. 30 S. E. Rep. 333; Watson V. Seaboard &c. R. Co., 133 N. C. 188; s. c. 45 S. E. Rep. 555; Galveston &c. R. Co. v. Johnson, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 180; s. c. 58 S. W. Rep. 622; Ft. Worth &c. R. Co. v. Morrison (Tex. Civ. App.), 56 S. W. Rep. 931; San Antonio &c. R. Co. v. Waller, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 44; s. c. 65 S. W. Rep. 210; San Antonio Traction Co. v. White, 94 Tex. 468; s. c. 61 S. W. Rep. 706; rev'g s. c. 60 S. W. Rep. 323; Texas &c. R. Co. v. Harby, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 24; s. c. 67 S. W. Rep. 541; Florida Cent. R. Co. v. Sullivan, 120 Fed. Rep. 799; s. c. 57 C. C. A. 167; 61 L. R. A. 410. An instruction in an action for negligently killing a wife and mother of the plaintiff, which makes the recovery depend on the present worth to plaintiff of the life of the deceased. is properly refused where the expectancy of life of each of the plaintiffs is not brought into the calculation, or the time when the minority of the infant plaintiffs would cease: Redfield v. Oakland

Consol. St. R. Co., 110 Cal. 287; s. c. 42 Pac. Rep. 1063; modifying in banc s. c. 110 Cal. 277; s. c. 42 Pac. Rep. 822.

105 Lowe v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 89 Iowa 420; Spaulding v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 98 Iowa 205; s. c. 67 N. W. Rep. 227; Ilinois Cent. R. Co. v. Spence, 93 Tenn. 173; Merchants' &c. Oil Co. v. Burns, 96 Tex. 573; s. c. 74 S. W. Rep. 758; rev'g s. c. 72 S. W. Rep. 626. Under N. Y. Code Civ. Proc., § 1904, relating to actions for wrongful death, which provides that the damages awarded shall "be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent's death to the person or persons for whose benefit the action is brought," it was held to be error, in an action by a surviving wife for the death of her husband, to permit plaintiff to prove the present worth of the gross amount the decedent would have earned had he lived the time specified in the tables of mortality: Mix v. Hamburg &c. S. S. Co., 85 App. Div. (N. Y.) 475; s. c. 83 N. Y. Supp. 322.

100 Barth v. Kansas City Elev. R. Co., 142 Mo. 535; s. c. 44 S. W. Rep. 778; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 281.

107 Baltimore &c. Tpk. Road V. State, 71 Md. 573; s. c. 18 Atl. Rep. 884; Betting v. Hobbett, 142 Ill. 72; s. c. 30 N. E. Rep. 1048; Scheffler v. Minneapolis &c. R. Co., 32 Minn. 518. 108 Denver &c. R. Co. v. Woodward,

are not indispensable, and the jury may make their estimate from the age, health, habits and physical condition of the deceased at the time of his death.100 These mortality tables are admissible without proof of their repute; but the authenticity of the paper produced as a table should be established by satisfactory proof,-as by the testimony of a witness familiar with it and its 110 use. Like methods of proof of expectancy of life apply where the probability of duration of life under consideration is that of the beneficiary.111 As these mortality tables, the modern ones at least, are based on the expectancy of healthy persons, evidence is admissible that the deceased was afflicted with a disease112 or was engaged in a dangerous employment which might affect the probable duration of his life. 118

§ 7102. Deduction of Support and Other Items.-It is plainly theduty of the jury, in their computation of the probable amount of earnings and accumulations of the deceased, to deduct therefrom the amount that would have been expended by the deceased for his

4 Colo. 1, 162; Kansas &c. R. Co. v. Lundin, 3 Colo. 94; Georgia R. Co. v. Oaks, 52 Ga. 410; Georgia R. Co. v. Pittman, 73 Ga. 325; Macon &c. R. Co. v. Johnson, 38 Ga. 409; SouthWestern R. Co. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 356; Donaldson v. Mississippi &c. R. Co., 18 Iowa 280; Walters v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 41 Iowa 71; s. c. 36 Iowa 458; Coffeyville Min. &c. Co. v. Carter, 65 Kan. 565; s. c. 70 Pac. Rep. 635; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Mahony, 7 Bush (Ky.) 235; O'Mellia v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 115 Mo. 205; s. c. 21 S. W. Rep. 503; Boettger v. Scherope &c. Iron Co., 136 Mo. 531; s. c. 38 S. W. Rep. 298; Johnson v. Hudson River R. Co., 6 Duer (N. Y.) 633; Sauter v. New York &c. R. Co., 66 N. Y. 50; Sweet v. Railroad Co., 20 R. I. 785; Phillip v. Heraty, Mich. s. c. 11 Det. Leg. N. 171, 174; s. c. 97 N. W. Rep. 963; 100 N. W. Rep. 186; Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Hines (Tex. Civ. App.), 40 S. W. Rep. 152 (no off. rep.); Rowley v London &c. R. Co., L. R. 8 Exch. 221; s. c. 42 L. J. (Exch.) 153. But see, contra, Armsworth v. SouthEastern R. Co., 11 Jur. 758.

109 Decatur Car Wheel &c. Co. v. Mehaffey, 128 Ala. 242; S. c. 29 South. Rep. 646; Beems v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 67 Iowa 435; Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521; s. c. 23 S. E. Rep. 414: Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Hughes, 55 Kan. 491; s. c. 40 Pac. Rep. 919; Chesapeake &c. R. Co. v.

Lang, 100 Ky. 221; s. c. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 67; 40 S. W. Rep. 541; modify. ing on rehearing s. c. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 65; 38 S. W. Rep. 503; petition for further modification denied, 41 S. W. Rep. 271; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 68; Jones v. McMillan, 129 Mich. 86; s. c. 8 Det. Leg. N. 873; 88 N. W. Rep. 206; Haines v. Pearson, 100 Mo.. App. 104; s. c. 75 S. W. Rep. 194: Camden &c. R. Co. v. Williams, 61 N. J. L. 646; s. c. 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 600; 40 Atl. Rep. 634; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Compton, 75 Tex. 667; s. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 667; Norfolk &c. R. Co. v. Phillips, 100 Va. 362; s. c. 41 S. E. Rep. 726. The question of life expectancy is one of fact, to be determined by the jury from all the facts and circumstances in the evidence: Decatur Car Wheel &c. Co. v. Mehaffey, 128 Ala. 242; s. c. 29 South. Rep. 646.

110 Camden &c. R. Co. v. Williams, 61 N. J. L. 646; s. c. 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 600; 40 Atl. Rep. 634; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), 26 S. W. Rep. 614.

The Dauntless, 121 Fed. Rep. 420. See also, Jones v. McMillan, 126 Mich. 86; s. c. 88 N. W. Rep. 206; 8 Det. Leg. N. 873; Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Crudup, 63 Misc. (N. Y.) 291.

112 Columbus &c. R. Co. v. Bridges, 86 Ala. 448; s. c. 5 South. Rep. 864. 113 Western &c. R. Co. v. Clark, 117 Ga. 548; s. c. 44 S. E. Rep. 1.

own support.114 In Georgia, however, it is provided by statute that the value of the life shall mean the full value of the life of the deceased as shown by the evidence, without any deduction for necessary or personal expenses of the deceased had he lived;115 and this statute, which has the appearance of a legislative invasion of judicial functions, has been upheld by the courts.of that State.116

$7103. Mitigation of Damages. In the case of collateral kindred, it will be admissible for the defendant to controvert the fact of dependency upon the deceased for support; and in the case of a parent, to show he was not entitled to the services of his minor child.117 So, the character of the deceased as a drunken, worthless man, making no provision for his family, but being a burden on them for his support, is proper matter to be proved in mitigation of damages.' But evidence will not be heard of the fact of insurance on the life of the deceased;119 or that the beneficiary would receive a municipal pension 120 or benefits from the relief department of a railroad, and these facts cannot be taken into account by the jury in assessing

114

Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Hall, 105 Ala. 559; s. c. 17 South. Rep. 176; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Kelly, 100 Ky. 421; s. c. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 69; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 165; 38 S. W. Rep. 852; rehearing denied, 40 S. W. Rep. 452; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 78; Southern R. Co. v. Evans, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 568; s. c. 63 S. W. Rep. 445; Mendenhall v. North Carolina R. Co., 123 N. C. 275; s. c. 31 S. E. Rep. 480; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Southwick (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. W. Rep. 392 (no off. rep.); Texas &c. R. Co. V. Yarbrough, - Tex. Civ. App. —; 8. c. 73 S. W. Rep. 844; Durand v. Asbestos Co., Rap. Jud. Que. 19, C. S. 39. While the jury in an action for death may take into consideration the necessary expenses of decedent the failure so to instruct is not error: Southern R. Co. v. Evans, Ky. L. Rep. 568; s. c. 63 S. W. Rep. 445 (no off. rep.).

113

Ga. Code 1895, §§ 3828, 3829. Clay v. Central &c. R. Co., 83 Ga. 345.

68.

117

Quincy Coal Co. v. Hood, 77 Ill.

Disbrow v. Ulster (Pa.), 8 Atl. Rep. 912 (no off. rep.); Nashville ke. R. Co. v. Prince, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 580; Standlee v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 25 Tex. Civ. App. 340; s. c. 60 S. W. Rep. 781.

Clune v. Ristine, 94 Fed. Rep.

118

745; s. c. 36 C. C. A. 450; Western &c. R. Co. v. Meigs, 74 Ga. 857; Sherlock v. Alling, 44 Ind. 181; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Kelley, 100 Ky. 421; Carroll v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 88 Mo. 239; s. c. 3 West. Rep. 839; Cerrillos Coal R. Co. v. Deserant, 9 N. Mex. 49; Althorf v. Wolf, 22 N. Y. 355; Kellogg v. New York &c. R. Co., 79 N. Y. 72; Terry v. Jemett, 78 N. Y. 338; Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470; s. c. 13 West. Rep. 438; 15 N. E. Rep. 350; Coulter v. Pine Twp., 164 Pa. St. 543; s. c. 35 W. N. C. (Pa.) 399; 25 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 135; 30 Atl. Rep. 490; Tyler &c. R. Co. v. Rasberry, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 185; s. c. 34 S. W. Rep. 794; 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 376; Lipscomb v. Houston &c. R. Co., 95 Tex. 5; s. c. 64 S. W. Rep. 923; 55 L. R. A. 869; modifying s. c. 62 S. W. Rep. 954; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Wightman, 29 Gratt, (Va.) 431; Harding v. Townsend, 43 Vt. 536; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 304; Bradburn v. Great Western R. Co., 44 L. J. (Exch.) 9; s. c. L. R. 10 Exch. 1. But see, contra, a decision of Lord Campbell at nisi prius: Hicks v. Newport &c. R. Co., cited in 4 Best & S. 403, note.

120 Geary v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 73 App. Div. (N. Y.) 441; s. c. 77 N. Y. Supp. 54.