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7069. Exception where wife is killed. 7073. Existence of persons having 7070. Injury received at hands of

fellow servant.

better right of action.

§ 7068. The Action Cannot be Maintained unless the Deceased could have Maintained an Action if Death had Not Ensued.-Most of the statutes have followed Lord Campbell's Act in providing that if the deceased could not have maintained the action "if death had not ensued," his personal representatives cannot maintain it.1

§ 7069. Exception where Wife is Killed.-But the statute, in allowing actions to be maintained only in cases where an action would lie by the party injured, if living, does not refer to the party in any narrow or technical sense. It manifestly looks rather to the cause

1 See Singleton v. Felton, 101 Fed. Rep. 562; s. c. 42 C. C. A. 57; Cannon v. Rowland, 34 Ga. 422; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Swett, 45 Ill. 197; Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Conroy, 68 Ill. 560; Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Moore, 77 Ill. 217; Jeffersonville &c. R. Co. v. Hendricks, 26 Ind. 228; s. c. 41 Ind. 48; Madison &c. R. Co. v. Bacon, 66 Ind. 205; Ohio &c. R. Co. v. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366; Slattery v. Toledo &c. R. Co., 23 Ind. 81; Edmondson v. Kentucky Cent. R. Co., 105 Ky. 479; s. c. 49 S. W. Rep. 200, 448; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Collins, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 114; Hubgh v. New Orleans &c. R. Co.. 6 La. An. 495; Vredenburg v. Behan, 33 La. An. 627; Clark v. New York &c. R. Co., 160 Mass. 39; s. c. 35 N. E. Rep. 104; Spiva v. Osage Coal &c Co., 88 Mo. 68; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Young, 58 Neb. 678; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Zernecke, 59 Neb. 689; s. c. 82 N. W.

Rep. 26; McMillan v. Saratoga &c. R. Co., 20 Barb. (N. Y.) 449; Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290; s. c. 55 N. E. Rep. 923; aff'g s. c. 56 N. Y. Supp. 1117; Maher v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 181 Pa. St. 391; s. c. 40 W. N. C. (Pa.) 477; 37 Atl. Rep. 571; Artusy v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 73 Tex. 191; s. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 177; Cole v. Parker, 27 Tex. 563; s. c. 66 S. W. Rep. 135; Lipscomb v. Houston &c. R. Co., 95 Tex. 5; s. c. 64 S. W. Rep. 923; 55 L. R. A. 869; Ean v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 95 Wis. 69; s. c. 69 N. W. Rep. 997; Dynen v. Leach, 26 L. J. (Exch.) 221; Senior v. Ward, 28 L. J. (Q. B.) 139; s. c. 7 Week. Rep. 261; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 172; 1 El. & El. 385; Swainson v. North-Eastern R. Co., 26 Week. Rep. 413; Wigmore v. Jay, 19 L. J. (Exch.) 300; s. c. 5 Exch. 354..

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of action than to the particular parties of record. Hence an action may be maintained by the administrator of a deceased wife for damages sustained by her death, although, if she had lived, she could not have sued alone for the injuries, but must have joined her hus-. band.2

$7070. Injury Received at Hands of Fellow Servant.-Under the general principles of negligence applicable to the relation of master and servant, damages cannot be recovered of the common employer where death has been caused by the "wrongful act, neglect, or default" of a fellow servant. It is held in Missouri, under a statute which provides that "whenever any person shall die from an injury," etc.,5 an action may be maintained by the surviving relatives, that the words "any person" do not include employés killed by the negligence of a fellow servant. In Georgia, there is a statute making it no defense to actions for injuries sustained by railroad employés that the injury was caused by a fellow servant. But in the absence of statute, railroad companies may, in the contract of employment, stipulate that they will not be responsible for injuries sustained through the negligence of a coemployé. In Alabama a father has been been allowed to recover for the death of his minor son while an employé of a corpora

'Green v. Hudson River R. Co., 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 260; overruling Lynch v. Davis, 12 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 323. 'See Vol. IV, § 4846, et seq. 'McDonald v. Eagle &c. Man. Co., 68 Ga. 839; s. c. 67 Ga. 761; Kansas &c. R. Co. v. Salmon, 11 Kan. 83; Linck v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 107 Ky. 370; s. c. 54 S. W. Rep. 184; Clark v. New York &c. R. Co., 160 Mass. 39; s. c. 35 N. E. Rep. 104; Dacey v. Old Colony R. Co., 153 Mass. 112; s. c. 26 N. E. Rep. 437; Elliott v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 67 Mo. 272; Higgins v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 36 Mo. 418; Lutz v. Atlantic &c. R. Co., 6 N. M. 496; s. c. 16 L. R. A. 819; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 478; 30 Pac. Rep. 912; Miller v. Coffin, 19 R. I. 164; Packet Co. v. McCue, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 508; Hutchinson v. York &c. R. Co., 6 Eng. Rail. Cas. 580; Smith v. Steele, L. R. 10 Q. B. 125; s. c. 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 60. And see Paulmier v. Erie R. Co., 34 N. J. L. 151; and Smith v. New York &c. R. Co., 6 Duer (N. Y.) 225. But see Marshall v. Stewart, 33 Eng. Law & Eq. 1; The Highland Light, 2 Am. L. T. 118. And see Baltimore &c. R. Co.

v. Trainor, 33 Md. 542. Under Carroll's Ky. St. 1899, § 6, giving a right of action for death caused by a defendant's negligence, there may be a recovery against the master for the death of a servant resulting from the ordinary negligence of a superior servant engaged in the same employment, though there could have been no recovery for the injury if it had not resulted in death: Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. Cook, 113 Ky. 161; s. c. 67 S. W. Rep. 383; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2410.

Mo. Rev. Stat 1899, § 2864. See Vol. IV, § 5315.

Proctor v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 64 Mo. 112; Connor v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 59 Mo. 285; overruling Schultz v. Pacific R. Co., 36 Mo. 13.

Ga. Code 1895, § 2323. See Vol. IV, § 5293; Atlanta &c. R. Co. v. l Ayres, 53 Ga. 12; Killian v. Augusta &c. R. Co., 78 Ga. 749; s. c. 3 S. E. Rep. 621. See also, Philo v. Illinois &c. R. Co., 33 Iowa 47; Major v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 115 Iowa 309; s. c. 88 N. W. Rep. 815.

Western &c. R. Co. v. Strong, 52 Ga. 461. See Vol. IV, § 5315.

tion, caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, where the corporation employed him without his father's knowledge or consent, although the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence.9

§ 7071. Deceased must have been Free from Contributory Negligence. Plainly, the condition that the action can only be maintained where the deceased could have sued had he survived, will defeat a recovery where the deceased directly contributed to the infliction of the injury by which he lost his life,10 unless the act of the defendant

Williams v. South &c. R. Co., 91 Ala. 635; s. c. 9 South. Rep. 77.

10 King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505; Gay V. Winter, 34 Cal. 153; Schneider v. Market St. R. Co., 134 Cal. 482; s. c. 66 Pac. Rep. 734; Robinson v. Detroit &c. Nav. Co., 73 Fed. Rep. 883; s. c. 43 U. S. App. 191; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Fietsam, 123 III. 518; s. c. 15 N. E. Rep. 169; 12 West. Rep. 844; Evansville &c. R. Co. v. Lowdermilk, 15 Ind. 120; Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Stout, 53 Ind. 143; Lofton v. Vogles, 17 Ind. 105; Knight v. Pontchartrain R. Co., 23 La. An. 462; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Fryer, 30 Md. 47; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Miller, 29 Md. 252; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Smith, 29 Md. 460; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Trainor, 33 Md. 542; Cumberland &c. R. Co. v. Fazenbaker, 37 Md. 156; Northern &c. R. Co. v. Geis, 31 Md. 357; State v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 24 Md. 84, 108; Bancroft v. Boston &c. R. Co., 97 Mass. 275; Meyer v. King, 72 Miss. 1; s. c. 16 South. Rep. 245; Harlan v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 64 Mo. 480; s. c. 65 Mo. 22; Higgins v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 36 Mo. 418; Karle v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 55 Mo. 476; Maher v. Atlantic &c. R. Co., 64 Mo. 267; Scoville v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 81 Mo. 434; Crete v. Childs, 11 Neb. 252; Paulmier v. Erie R. Co., 34 N. J. L. 151; Telfer v. Northern R. Co., 30 N. J. L. 188; Bronk v. New York &c. R. Co., 5 Daly (N. Y.) 454; Button v. Hudson River R. Co., 18 N. Y. 248; Curran v. Warren Chemical &c. Co., 36 N. Y. 153; Lehman v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 234: Massoth V. Delaware &c. Canal Co., 6 Hun (N. Y.) 314; McIlwaine V. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 74 App. Div. (N. Y.) 496; s. c. 77 N. Y. Supp. 426; Mitchell v. New York &c. R. Co., 2 Hun (N. Y.) 535;

Oldfield v. New York &c. R. Co., 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 103; Sheridan v. Brooklyn &c. R. Co., 36 N. Y. 39; Wilds v. Hudson River R. Co., 24 N. Y. 430; Willetts v. Buffalo &c. R. Co., 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 585; Cameron v. Great Northern R. Co., 8 N. Dak. 618; s. c. 80 N. W. Rep. 885; Schausten v. Toledo &c. St. R. Co., 18 Ohio C. C. 691; Wolf v. Lake Erie &c. R. Co., 55 Ohio St. 517; s. c. 36 L. R. A. 812; 37 Ohio L. J. 23; 45 N. E. Rep. 708; North Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kirk, 90 Pa. St. 15; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. St. 318; Price v. Railroad Co., 33 S. C. 556; s. c. 12 S. E. Rep. 413; Springett v. Ball, 4 Fost. & Fin. 472; Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115; s. c. 18 L. J. (C. P.) 336; 2 Thomp. Neg. (1st ed.), p. 1280; Tucker v. Chaplin, 2 Car. & Kir. 730; Witherley v. Regent's Canal Co., 12 C. B. (N. S.) 2. In Illinois, the doctrine of comparative negligence formerly obtained; so that, where the negligence of the deceased was slight, and that of the defendants was gross in comparison therewith, the representatives of the deceased were allowed to recover: See Vol. I, § 259, et seq.; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Troplett, 38 Ill. 482; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Becker, 76 Ill. 25; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Lee, 68 Ill. 576; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Mock, 72 Ill. 141; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Payne, 49 Ill. 499; Chicago v. Starr, 42 Ill. 174; Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Cragin, 71 Ill. 177; Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Goddard, 72 Ill. 567; Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Hoffman, 67 III. 287; Rockford &c. R. Co. v. Delaney, 82 Ill. 198; Schmidt v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 83 Ill. 405. In Indiana it was formerly the rule, until changed by statute, that, in an action for damages caused by the negligence of another, it must appear by the facts alleged, or by direct averment, that the

was wanton or willful. The negligence of a parent which contributed. to the death of his child can be set up as a defense in an action where the parent is a beneficiary.1

$7072. Self-Defense, Inevitable Accident, Command of Law.Although the right to recover is given to a widow or children for the homicide of a husband or parent, in broad terms and without qualification,13 yet this does not cover every case of homicide. Cases of selfdefense, of inevitable accident, of execution by a command of the law, etc., must, from the nature of things, be excepted.14 Where the killing was intentional and the plea of self-defense is set up by the

plaintiff did not contribute to the injury complained of. It was held that this rule applied also in the case of one suing in his own right for the death of another. "It is not enough to aver that the deceased was without negligence. It must also be shown that the person who claims the damages in his own right was also without negligence": Sullivan v. Toledo &c. R. Co., 58 Ind. 26. See Vol. I, §§ 377, 382. In Georgia and Tennessee, the contributory negligence of the deceased may be shown in mitigation of damages: See Macon &c. R. Co. v. Johnson, 38 Ga. 409; Atlanta &c. R. Co. v. Ayers, 53 Ga. 12; Berry v. Northeastern R. Co., 72 Ga. 137; Georgia R. &c. Co. v. Sawyer, 112 Ga. 346; s. c. 37 S. E. Rep. 380; Hendricks v. Western &c. R. Co., 52 Ga. 467; Rowland v. Cannon, 35 Ga. 105; Sears v. Central R. &c. Co., 53 Ga. 630; Sears v. Georgia &c. R. Co., 86 Ga. 811; s. c. 13 S. E. Rep. 88; Sims v. Macon &c. R. Co., 28 Ga. 93; Western &c. R. Co. v. Herdon, 114 Ga. 168; s. c. 39 S. E. Rep. 911; Hill v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 823; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Burke, 6 Coldw. (Tenn.) 45; Nashville &c. R. Co. v. Smith, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 174.

"Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Orr, 121 Ala. 489; s. c. 26 South. Rep. 35; Union Warehouse Co. v. Prewitt, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 67; s. c. 50 S. W. Rep. 964.

"St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Dawson, 68 Ark. 1; s. c. 56 S. W. Rep. 46; Tucker v. Draper, 62 Neb. 66; s. c. 86 N. W. Rep. 917; 54 L. R. A. 321. But where a father had notice of a defect in a highway over which his son was driving in daylight, and forgot to warn his son of its danger

ous condition, he was not guilty of contributory negligence preventing recovery in an action by him for damages because of the death of his son resulting from such defect: Miller v. Meade Twp., 128 Mich. 98; s. c. 87 N. W. Rep. 131; 8 Det. Leg. N. 552. So, where a child of eighteen months was killed by its father negligently driving on the defendant's track, the father is entitled to recover for the death of the child, because of defendant's negligence in not sounding any warning, where his contributory negligence was not willful or intentional, since the right is given by the express words of the statute: Lewin v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 52 App. Div. (N. Y.) 69; s. c. 65 N. Y. Supp. 49.

13 As by Ga. Code 1895, § 3828.

14 Burnham v. Stone, 101 Cal. 164; s. c. 35 Pac. Rep. 627 (homicide by officer in service of writ); Western &c. R. Co. v. Strong, 52 Ga. 461; Locher v. Kluga, 97 Ill. App. 518; Hollingsworth v. Warnock, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 883; s. c. 47 S. W. Rep. 770 (no off. rep.) (self-defense); Johnson v. Williams, 111 Ky. 289; s. c. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 658; 54 L. R. A. 220; 63 S. W. Rep. 759 (duty of officer to know with certainty that the person he was attempting to kill was the person he was authorized to arrest); Morgan v. Durfee, 69 Mo. 469 (self-defense). The doctrine that he who seeks and originates an affray resulting in homicide cannot avail himself of the plea of self-defense, is not applicable to a civil suit for damages brought by the representative of the deceased: Besenecker v. Sale, 8 Mo. App. 211.

defense, it devolves upon the plaintiff affirmatively to show the contrary in order to hold the defendant liable; the killing being shown in such a case, no presumption of wrongfulness or malice arises as in criminal prosecutions for homicide.15 In passing upon the reasonableness of the apprehension of danger which moved the defendant to kill the deceased, the matter must be judged from the standpoint of the defendant, and not from the standpoint of an ordinarily prudent man. The right of self-defense does not rest alone upon the fear of the person asserting the right, but there must be a reasonable appearance of danger to call it into exercise.16 The defendant, however, will not be allowed to testify what his fears were when he fired the fatal shot.17 In such an action, evidence of previous threats of the deceased not communicated to the defendant is not admissible ;18 nor is evidence of previous threats admissible, though communicated to the defendant before the killing, where there is no evidence to show that the killing was done in self-defense.1o The defenses of shooting in self-defense and of accidental shooting are inconsistent; and where both are pleaded by the defendant, he should be required to elect upon which he will rely.20 Where the proof of intentional shooting is clear, the question of negligence is not involved, and it is error to submit the case to the jury, on the theory of negligence.21 An intentional killing does not come within the purview of a statute. allowing a recovery for death caused by "willful negligence," as "the redress of injuries consisting in the destruction of life resulting from negligence is the exclusive subject to which all the provisions of the statute relate."22

§ 7073. Existence of Persons Having Better Right of Action.The defendant may show in bar of the plaintiff's right to recover that there is in esse a person who is given by the statute a precedent right of action over the plaintiff.23 Thus, where the right to recover

15 Evans v. Newland, 34 Ind. 112. See also, White v. Maxcy, 64 Mo. 552; Morgan v. Durfee, 69 Mo. 469; Nichols v. Winfrey, 79 Mo. 544; March v. Walker, 48 Tex. 372. But see Brooks v. Haslam, 65 Cal. 421; Croft v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), 51 S. W. Rep. 1089.

killed in self-defense, proof of threats is admissible to throw light on the state of mind of the deceased: McKinney v. Carmack, 119 Ga. 467; s. c. 46 S. E. Rep. 719.

19 Forbes v. Snyder, 94 Ill. 374. 20 Hollingsworth v. Warnock, 112 Ky. 96; s. c. 65 S. W. Rep. 163; 23

16 Croft v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), Ky. L. Rep. 1305. 51 S. W. Rep. 1089.

17 Nichols v. Winfrey, 79 Mo. 544. 18 Hollingsworth v. Warnock, 112 Ky. 96; s. c. 65 S. W. Rep. 163; 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1395. But where the evidence tends to show that the deceased began the conflict, and was

21 Darling v. Williams, 35 Ohio St. 58; Croft v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), 51 S. W. Rep. 1089.

22 Spring v. Glenn, 12 Bush (Ky.) 172; Chiles v. Drake, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 146.

28 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Jones,

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