might be a subject of much subtile discussion, but he distinctly implies his own opinion. He seems, however, to have been over-cautious, for if a method may be patentable, of which it is apprehended there can be no doubt, then, of consequence, a process, which in this application of the term is, in many respects, synonymous with method, may be so also; may be So, for in respect to this latter, we must speak with the same qualifications, and subject to the same exceptions, as when we use the term method, as descriptive of the subjects of patents.

Sec. V.-PRINCIPLE.

The question whether a principle is a subject of monopoly under the patent laws, was much discussed in the cases relating to Watt's specification of his improvement in the steam-engine. In that specification, the patentee stated that his invention "consisted in the following principles," and then proceeded to describe particularly the construction of the engine according to his improvement. This gave occasion to numerous, elaborate, and subtile discussions on the patentable character of a principle. And Watt described his invention as consisting of the "following particulars," all this disquisition would have been lost,

and yet this would have been substantially equivalent to the phraseology he did use, for after stating that his invention consisted of principles, he proceeded to define and explain what he meant by that expression, and it was not objected that his description was at all defective.30 The real question then was, whether Mr. Watt had used the word principle in a wrong sense, and, if so, whether his patent was defeated for this philological inaccuracy, which to all practical purposes was not of the slightest importance, since any person could understand the construction of his machine, and any mechanic could construct another after his description, as well as if he had committed no such inaccuracy. And the strife was a very doubtful one, and the patent would have been lost, had not the judges, on the final decision of the cause, been very strongly disposed to maintain it on account of the great merit and utility of the invention. We will proceed to a review of those discussions, which are useful in throwing light on the question, what are pa

30 But Mr. John Farey in his statement before the Committee of the House of Commons in 1829. Rep. p. 32, says the description in Watt's specification was allowed by the courts to be sufficient upon very insufficient evidence; and that it was not so in fact, and that a knowledge of his mode of constructing engines came out incidentally thirty years after the date of his patent, and not by means of the specification.

tentable subjects, though the case which gave rise to this term does not, in this respect, seem to have been one of any well-grounded doubt.

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"The

"It is a clear position of law," says Mr. Justice Heath," that the organization of a machine may be the subject of a patent, but principles cannot. Indeed it seems impossible to specify a principle, and its application to all cases, which furnishes an argument, that it cannot be the subject of a patent.' very statement of what a principle is," says Mr. Justice Buller, "proves it not to be a ground for a patent. It is the first ground and rule for arts and sciences, or in other words, the elements and rudiments of them. A patent must be for some new production from those elements, and not for the elements themselves. If the principle alone be the foundation of this patent, it cannot possibly stand, with that knowledge and discovery which the world were in possession of before. The effect, the power, and the operation of steam, were known long before the date of this patent; all machines which are worked by steam, are worked on the same principle. The principle was known before, and therefore if the principle alone be the foundation of the patent, though

27 Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Bl. 482, 483.

the addition may be a great improvement, yet the patent must by void ab initio "28 "Undoubtedly,"

said Eyre C. J. "there can be no patent for a mere principle." Lord Kenyon said, "the principal objection made to this patent, is that it is a patent for a philosophical principle only, neither organized nor capable of being organized." If the objection were well founded in fact, it would be decisive; but I do not think that it is so.30 "I am inclined," said Mr. Justice Grose, "to think that a

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patent cannot be granted for a mere principle." Mr. Justice Lawrence said, "if it were necessary to consider whether or not mere abstract principles are the subject of a patent, I should feel great difficulty in deciding that they are.

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Such are the opinions of the judges on the patentable character of principles. But what meaning did they attach to the word? Mr. Justice Lawrence says, "a principle may mean a mere elementary truth, but it may also mean constituent parts.' Mr. Justice Rooke thus explains the word. "The term principle is equivocal; it may denote either the radi

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cal elementary truths of a science, or those consequential axioms which are founded on radical truths; but which are used as fundamental truths by those who do not find it expedient to have recourse to first painciples. The radical principles on which all steamengines are founded, are the natural properties of steam, its expansiveness and condensibility. Whether the machines are formed in one shape or another, whether the cylinder is kept hot or suffered to cool, whether the steam is condensed in one vessel or another, still the radical principles are the same."

The signification in which a principle is not a subject of a patent is distinctly pointed out by Abbott C. J. He says, "No merely philosophical or abstract principle can answer to the word manufactures, Something of a corporeal and substantial nature, something that can be made by man from the matters subjected to his art and skill, ot at the least some new mode of employing practically his art and skill, is requisite to satisfy this word."35

Mr. Justice Story remarks, upon the use of this term as descriptive of the subjects of patents, that "In the minds of some men, a principle means an

34 Boulton v. Bull. 2 H. Bl. 478.

85 King v. Wheeler, 2 B. & Ald. 350.