Lapas attēli
PDF
ePub

Treaty-making power, on the other hand, is something in which the President, the only officer elected (along with the Vice President) by a national vote of all the people, is asking agreement of another body of the Government. He is asking for it in terms of supporting something he is doing. He is not vetoing something the other body has done; he is asking for support of what he is doing. Therefore, the minority provision that is holding up ratification of a treaty is in effect the veto power by a very slight minority of the Government.

It is not an affirmation and repassing of something over a veto. Let us get that distinct. What happens is that a veto stops an act passed by an ordinary majority of Congress. There is, therefore, a difference of opinion between the two. Now, in order to get that repassed over the veto, the President has to get it repassed by a two-thirds majority of the Senate and of the House, because there has been a difference of opinion between the two parties.

The Senate, on the other hand, can block the President from acting in this matter by a simple one-third power of the most unrepresentative body in the world from the point of population. That is an extraordinary situation. It is not on all fours in the least with the other proposition.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN TREATY MAKING

Since the old reasons of secrecy, longer tenure, and intention to "advise" no longer exists, the House of Representatives for good and affirmative reasons, should participate with the Senate in shaping our foreign policy. The Members of the House are closer to the people, and they are in a better position to act in accordance with the desire of the majority of the people in helping shape our foreign policy.

In our complex society, most of the important domestic laws are necessarily closely interwoven with our foreign policy, laws affecting the merchant marine, the size of the Army, the giving or exchanging of materials of war, tariffs, etc., which require the concurrence of both Houses of Congress, directly pertain to foreign affairs. It is impossible to draw the line between purely local problems and problems dealing with foreign policies. This situation was not envsioned by the founding fathers. Therefore, both types of legislation should be treated the same.

In the years to come, treaties and agreements relating to foreign affairs will grow greatly in number. If this Nation is to maintain its world position, these problems must be handled expeditiously. Few treaties can long be sustained without implementing legislation which requires the concurrence of both Houses of Congress. Appropriations and legislation to work out details will be necessary. Few important treaties can be completely self-executing. The committee can see no present valid reason why one type of legislation should be considered only by the Senate and a two-thirds approval required, when that legislation must sooner or later receive the sanction of the other House of Congress. No foreign policy agreed upon by the Senate can long endure unless it has the support of the people. That support can best be given by having the House of Representatives participate. If it secures the sanction of a majority of both Houses of Congress it is undeniably the foreign policy of the Nation. Having been thus sanctioned, it will receive better and more enlightened support from the people.

Under our Constitution, treaties are declared to be a part of the supreme law of the land along with the Constitution itself, and laws passed in pursuance thereof. This legislative status is an important reason for associating both Houses in the treaty-making process. It is an important reason for permitting them to act by the same majority

which suffices for other legislative acts. At present it is possible for a bare majority in Congress to abrogate a treaty by passing conflicting legislation or by failing to pass subsidiary legislation necessary to carry out its provisions. Such action leaves the treaty in existence as an international obligation, but as the law of the land the treaty is overruled and of no effect. In view of this undeniable fact, the committee feels that it would be better to have both Houses of Congress act upon the treaty by a majority in the first instance. The other method has and will lead to international obligations which cannot be fulfilled because of subsequent congressional action. This creates bad relationships with other countries. It impedes the ability of our negotiators to deal with foreign powers.

If treaties were considered by both Houses of Congress, there would be a short lapse of time between action by the two Houses. This would be to the good. It would give public opinion an opportunity to operate after the public had full facts of the result reached by the House first considering the treaty. It would tend to prevent secret or undiscussed action.

Dr. Arthur M. Holcombe, head of school of government, Harvard University, discussed this benefit of sharing treaty-making responsibility:

That is a very good reason for providing that treaties should be ratified by the ordinary process by which legislation is considered, and then you are sure of an interval between consideration in one branch and consideration in the other branch, and a certain amount of publicity could be secured, and as a result of that, what you said would reinforce the argument that the procedure established for enacting laws is a better one, under given conditions, than the original procedure.

TWO-THIRDS RULE AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

Government must function. This Government must function in the international field. This necessity has forced Chief Executives, particularly during the past 50 years, with the support of the public, to enter into Executive agreements and to resort to the use of concurrent resolutions in order to accomplish the desire of the people. These devices are, of course, used because of a well-founded fear of not being able to secure approval by two-thirds of the Senate to the particular matter under consideration. Thus, the two-thirds provision has an increasing tendency of placing the important foreign affairs of this Nation more and more in the hands of the Executive to the exclusion of Congress.

Testimony before the committee revealed that up to 1939 the United States entered into nearly 2,000 international instruments. Of this number 1,182 were Executive agreements; 799 were treaties. The committee does not condemn the agreements as illegal. They were for the most part necessary for the welfare of the country and have subsequently been approved by Congress, but most of them should have been submitted as treaties. This, the committee believes, would have been done if they could have been considered as other legislation.

This is an unhealthy tendency. It has far-reaching and disastrous possibilities. The maintenance of the two-thirds rule instead of working to maintain a great power in the Senate is actually taking that power away from the Senate. Congress should act as a check

upon the treaty-making powers of the President, but, by maintaining a rule which prevents negotiations which the people desire, the Congress is on the road to eliminating itself from this important function of government. The criticism herein contained of the two-thirds provision is made against the fundamental concept of the rule and because of the danger in its continuation. The criticism is not directed against the Senate or any Members thereof. The Senate would actually benefit by sharing treaty responsibility with the House. By doing that, it could be assured that all subjects which should be considered as treaties would be submitted as treaties. It could be assured of Congress retaining its power of ratifying or disapproving the action of the Executive in this important field of government. It would be assured of popular support of whatever course of action is finally taken.

Dr. William C. Johnstone, dean of school of government, George Washington University, made this observation:

This proposed change will diminish the use of Executive agreements by the President as a means of escaping minority obstruction of action that may accord with the will of the majority. Much friction between the President and Congress has arisen over the use of Executive agreements. Yet, a President desiring to carry out a foreign policy he believes accords with the interests of the American people, is often required to follow a course he may feel is morally wrong and constitutionally undesirable rather than risk defeat at the hands of a small Senate minority. Indeed, the President is even prevented from putting his foreign policy to the test of majority rule by the danger of minority defeat. The proposed change would establish a more effective working relationship between the President and Congress in a field in which Congress, of necessity, must take an increasing interest and increasing action.

PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WOULD BE INCREASED

A full understanding and a healthy discussion of foreign affairs is necessary and vital for the well-being of the Nation. Several witnesses before the committee demonstrated beyond question that the two-thirds rule is impeding public interest and discussion of international affairs. According to the witnesses, many people feel that nothing is to be gained by their study or discussion of international relations because the popular will cannot govern under the provision of the Constitution. The committee feels that the public would better inform itself, and public opinion would more clearly crystallize if the two-thirds rule were repealed in favor of action by Congress.

The committee has had benefit of expert testimony from some of the Nation's most eminent authorities on this subject. The twothirds rule has been a handicap to all Presidents and all Secretaries of State. The committee is of the opinion that the majority of the people are in favor of this resolution.

H. Repts., 79-1, vol. 1--52

PROPER TIME FOR PRESENTATION OF RESOLUTION

The fate of the United States for generations to come will be determined by the agreements and treaties reached between the nations following this global war. This Nation is now handicapped in taking its part in helping reach the solutions which we hope will protect future generations from further catastrophe. This, therefore, is the propitious time to submit this resolution to the legislatures of the States. Forty-five State legislatures meet early in 1945. The committee hopes and recommends that this resolution may be approved by the necessary two-thirds of the two Houses of Congress, and that it may be submitted to the States at an early time for their consideration.

AMERICAN INTERPARLIAMENTARY CONGRESS

FEBRUARY 13, 1945.-Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

Mr. JARMAN, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H. Res. 37)

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the resolution (H. Res. 37) expressing the approval of the House of Representatives of certain resolutions adopted at Santiago, Chile, on April 15, 1944, looking toward the establishment of an American Interparliamentary Congress, having considered the same, report favorably and unanimously thereon without amendment and recommend that the resolution do pass.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs considered House Resolution 37 in an open hearing on February 13, 1945, during which testimony in favor of its passage was given by its author, the Honorable Pete Jar-. man, and the Honorable Luther A. Johnson, who emphasized the importance of its early adoption in view of the impending InterAmerican Conference on Problems of War and Peace which will convene at Mexico City, Mexico, on February 21, 1945.

During his testimony, Mr. Jarman described the purpose of his resolution as a step toward the setting up in this hemisphere of an American Interparliamentary Congress in line with the resolutions which were adopted on April 15, 1944, at Santiago, Chile, at a session attended by himself and by the Honorable Robert B. Chiperfield as delegates representing the House of Representatives of the United States. These resolutions are contained in the language of House Resolution 37, and are as follows:

1. The parliamentary delegations of Peru, Uruguay, Colombia, the United States, Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, and Chile agree to promote through their respective Parliaments a movement of continental unity; 2. To accomplish such project, they propose the establishment of an American Interparliamentary Congress for which the delegates will solicit the approval of their respective Parliaments;

3. To set up a permanent committee composed of the chairmen of the attending delegations, presided over by Don Pedro Castelblanco, President of the Chamber of Deputies of Chile, for the purpose of organizing and fixing the time, place, and subject matter of the Interparliamentary Congress of America;

« iepriekšējāTurpināt »