A part of the solution should be the enactment into law of the requirement that all arresting officers be bonded, so that any failure on their part to observe the law would make them not only subject to suit, as they are now, but also able to respond in damages.

THE UNIFORM ARREST ACT

The Uniform Arrest Act, by Hon. Sam B. Warner, is a suggested solution that should have careful study.

The suggestion given by the Attorney General of the United States (see his testimony in the hearings, pp. 35, 36, and 37) that the arraignment statutes should be made uniform and should have but one requirement as to time, to wit: "within a reasonable time," also demands full consideration.

As suggested in the McNabb decision, the English rules for the interrogation of prisoners while in custody prescribed by the judges of the King's Bench should also be studied diligently and constructively with a view to seeing how they may be adapted to the administration of the criminal law in the United States. As so adapted, similar rules should be made by law a part of the solution of this problem.

The bill of rights committee of the American Bar Association, under date of May 15, 1944, has furnished the subcommittee that held the hearings on H. R. 3690 with a splendid brief showing clearly and fully the need for protracted and indefatigable study of this whole problem and for the enactment into law of its proper solution. They very kindly offer the services of this committee in collaboration toward these objectives.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, it is manifest that this bill is but an emergency measure, the sole purpose of which is to stop immediately the wrecking of our law-enforcement machinery resulting from the McNabb decision.

The enactment of this bill would do this and give your Committee on the Judiciary time, without the pressure and penalty of suspended law enforcement, within which to study these delicate and difficult problems, and for the preparation of such a bill as may be then agreed

upon.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

By the amendments which the committee made to this bill it is proposed to make the following changes in existing law (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

The act of August 18, 1894 (ch. 301, sec. 1, 28 Stat. 416), as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 595), is amended to read as follows:

It shall be the duty of the marshal, his deputy, or other officer, who may arrest a person charged with any crime or offense, to take the defendant within a reasonable time before the nearest United States Commissioner or [the nearest] other nearby judicial officer having jurisdiction under existing laws for a hearing, commitment, or taking bail for trial, and the officer or magistrate issuing the warrant shall attach thereto a certified copy of the complaint, and upon the arrest of the accused, the return of the warrant, with a copy of the complaint attached, shall confer jurisdiction upon such officer as fully as if the complaint had originally been made before him, and no mileage shall be allowed any officer violating the provisions hereof.

The act of March 1, 1879, chapter 125, section 9, 20 Statutes 341 (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 593), is amended to read as follows:

Where any marshal or deputy marshal of the United States within the district for which he shall be appointed shall find any person or persons in the act of operating an illicit distillery, it shall be lawful for such marshal or deputy marshal to arrest such person or persons, and take him or them [forthwith] within a reasonable time before some judicial officer named in section 591 of this title, who may reside in the county of arrest or if none, in that nearest to the place of arrest, to be dealt with according to the provisions of sections 591, 596, and 597 of this title.

The act of June 18, 1934, chapter 595, as amended by the act of March 22, 1935, chapter 39, title 2 (49 Stat. 77, U. S. C., title 5, sec. 300 (A)), is amended to read as follows:

The Director, Assistant Directors, agents, and inspectors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice are empowered to serve warrants and subpenas issued under the authority of the United States; to make seizures under warrant for violation of the laws of the United States; to make arrests without warrant for felonies which have been committed and which are cognizable under the laws of the United States, in cases where the person making the arrest has reasonable grounds to believe that the person [so arrested is guilty of such felony and where there is a likelihood of the person escaping] may escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest, but the person arrested shall be [immediately within a reasonable time taken before a committing officer. Such members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice are authorized and empowered to carry firearms.

Section 397 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia (D. C. Code, title 4, sec. 4-140) is amended to read as follows:

The several members of the police force shall have power and authority to immediately arrest, without warrant, and to take into custody any person who shall commit, or threaten or attempt to commit, in the presence of such member, or within his view, any breach of the peace or offense directly prohibited by Act of Congress, or by any law or ordinance in force in the District, but such member of the police [force] shall [immediately, and without delay 1, within a reasonable time, upon such arrest, convey in person such offender before the proper court, that he may be dealt with according to law.

MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. CRAVENS

The Congress, in empowering certain officers to make arrests and in setting up agencies to enforce the criminal laws of the United States has, without exception, been careful to provide that persons arrested on a criminal charge should be promptly taken before a judicial officer for disposition. Unfortunately, however, until the decision of the Supreme Court in the McNabb case there was no effective way of assuring compliance with these definite and well-established provisions of law. It is common knowledge that in many cases arrested persons are, contrary to law, subjected to coercive tactics by arresting officers between the time of their arrests and their ultimate appearances before a judicial tribunal. These tactics are practiced upon both the guilty and innocent alike, and customarily take the form either of physical violence toward the person arrested or of continuous and uninterrupted questioning over prolonged periods of time by relays of police officers. During these periods the accused is held incommunicado and his family and friends kept ignorant of his arrest or whereabouts.

The Supreme Court, recognizing the ineffectiveness of other means of giving practical effect to the mandates of the Congress that arrested persons should be promptly arraigned before a judicial officer, adopted the rule announced in the McNabb case and thus sought to deter overzealous police officers from such illegal practices by making the fruits of the same inadmissible against the accused. By this means, and for the first time, the Supreme Court devised a workable and realistic means of implementing the policy of the Congress requiring prompt arraignment of an accused and for eliminating the opportunities available to police officers for the application of improper and universally condemned pressures upon those arrested.

It is, of course, true that even before the decision in the McNabb case that a confession wrung from an arrested person would not be admitted against him upon his trial if improper force were used by police officers to obtain it. The practical difficulty, however, was the inability of the accused to establish the fact that improper force or inducement had been used against him. Rarely, on such occasions, is anyone present except the accused and the officers involved and, of course, the proceedings are not publicly conducted.

In considering the problem under consideration and the evil aimed at in the McNabb case sight should not be lost of the fact that not a single proper police activity is interfered with by prompt arraignment of the accused as provided by law. Ordinarily an arraignment consumes only a very few minutes. All the powers of police investigation exist and may proceed whether the accused is arraigned or not. The procedure of arraignment merely lessens the opportunity for improper police imposition and conduct, and to some extent assures to the person arrested the protection sought to be accorded him by law.

8

To adopt the proposed legislation would not only constitute a step away from enlightened and humane procedure but would at the same time put the Congress in the inconsistent position of piously paying lip service to due process and legal conduct while, for all practical purposes, denouncing and eliminating the only means by which that objective may be reasonably assured and safeguarded. In my judgment, the decision in the McNabb case as modified and explained in the Mitchell case leaves unhampered all appropriate police conduct and at the same time provides the individual-both guilty and innocent-with the safeguards accorded him by wellconsidered laws of long standing based upon traditional concepts of governmental decency.

The legislation proposed is not needed. It may, if adopted, be but the beginning of a course which will ultimately lead to the elimination of all protections, built up through years of struggle and designed to safeguard personal rights and liberties under law.