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The act of March 1, 1879, chapter 125, section 9, 20 Statutes 341 (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 593), is amended to read as follows:
Where any marshal or deputy marshal of the United States within the district for which he shall be appointed shall find any person or persons in the act of operating an illicit distillery, it shall be lawful for such marshal or deputy marshal to arrest such person or persons, and take him or them [forthwith] within a reasonable time before some judicial officer named in section 591 of this title, who may reside in the county of arrest or if none, in that nearest to the place of arrest, to be dealt with according to the provisions of sections 591, 596, and 597 of this title.
The act of June 18, 1934, chapter 595, as amended by the act of March 22, 1935, chapter 39, title 2 (49 Stat. 77, U. S. c., title 5, sec. 300 (A)), is amended to read as follows:
The Director, Assistant Directors, agents, and inspectors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice are empowered to serve warrants and subpenas issued under the authority of the United States; to make seizures under warrant for violation of the laws of the United States; to make arrests without warrant for felonies which have been committed and which are cognizable under the laws of the United States, in cases where the person making the arrest has reasonable grounds to believe that the person [so arrested is guilty of such felony and where therc is a likelihood of the person escaping] may escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest, but the person arrested shall be [immediately] within a reasonable time taken before a committing officer. Such members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice are authorized and empowered to carry firearms.
Section 397 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia (D. C. Code, title 4, sec. 4-140) is amended to read as follows:
The several members of the police force shall have power and authority to immediately arrest, without warrant, and to take into custody any person who shall commit, or threaten or attempt to commit, in the presence of such member, or within his view, any breach of the peace or offense directly prohibited by Act of Congress, or by any law or ordinance in force in the District, but such member of the police [force] shall [immediately, and without delay ], within a reasonable time, upon such arrest, convey in person such offender before the proper court, that he may be dealt with according to law.
MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. CRAVENS
The Congress, in empowering certain officers to make arrests and in setting up agencies to enforce the criminal laws of the United States has, without exception, been careful to provide that persons arrested on a criminal charge should be promptly taken before a judicial officer for disposition. Unfortunately, however, until the decision of the Supreme Court in the McNabb case there was no effective way of assuring compliance with these definite and well-established provisions of law. It is common knowledge that in many cases arrested persons are, contrary to law, subjected to coercive tactics by arresting officers between the time of their arrests and their ultimate appearances before a judicial tribunal
. These tactics are practiced upon both the guilty and innocent alike, and customarily take the form either of physical violence toward the person arrested or of continuous and uninterrupted questioning over prolonged periods of time by relays of police officers. During these periods the accused is held incommunicado and his family and friends kept ignorant of his arrest or whereabouts.
The Supreme Court, recognizing the ineffectiveness of other means of giving practical effect to the mandates of the Congress that arrested persons should be promptly arraigned before a judicial officer, adopted the rule announced in the McNabb case and thus sought to deter overzealous police officers from such illegal practices by making the fruits of the same inadmissible against the accused. By this means, and for the first time, the Supreme Court devised a workable and realistic means of implementing the policy of the Congress requiring prompt arraignment of an accused and for eliminating the opportunities available to police officers for the application of improper and universally condemned pressures upon those arrested.
It is, of course, true that even before the decision in the McNabb case that a confession wrung from an arrested person would not be admitted against him upon his trial if improper force were used by police officers to obtain it. The practical difficulty, however, was the inability of the accused to establish the fact that improper force or inducement had been used against him. Rarely, on such occasions, is anyone present except the accused and the officers involved and, of course, the proceedings are not publicly conducted.
In considering the problem under consideration and the evil aimed at in the McNabb case sight should not be lost of the fact that not a single proper police activity is interfered with by prompt arraignment of the accused as provided by law. Ordinarily an arraignment consumes only a very few minutes. All the powers of police investigation exist and may proceed whether the accused is arraigned or not. The procedure of arraignment merely lessens the opportunity for improper police imposition and conduct, and to some extent assures to the person arrested the protection sought to be accorded him by law.
To adopt the proposed legislation would not only constitute a step away from enlightened and humane procedure but would at the same time put the Congress in the inconsistent position of piously paying lip service to due process and legal conduct while, for all practical purposes, denouncing and eliminating the only means by which that objective may be reasonably assured and safeguarded. In my judgment, the decision in the McNabb case as modified and explained in the Mitchell case leaves unhampered all appropriate police conduct and at the same time provides the individual—both guilty and innocent—with the safeguards accorded him by wellconsidered laws of long standing based upon traditional concepts of governmental decency.
The legislation proposed is not needed. It may, if adopted, be but the beginning of a course which will ultimately lead to the elimination of all protections, built up through years of struggle and designed to safeguard personal rights and liberties under law.
FADJO CRAVENS O
INCREASING THE DEBT LIMIT OF THE UNITED STATES
MARCH 2, 1945.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state
of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. DOUGHTON of North Carolina, from the Committee on Ways and
Means, submitted the following
(To accompany H. R. 2404)
The Committee on Ways and Means, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 2404) to increase the debt limit of the United States, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment, and recommend that the bill do pass.
The bill is designed (1) to increase to $300,000,000,000 the limitation on the amount of public-debt securities issued under the Second · Liberty Bond Act, as amended, which may be outstanding at any one time, and to bring under such limitation guaranteed securities outstanding in the hands of the public; (2) to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to utilize, in addition to incorporated banks and trust companies, certain other financial institutions, such as savings and loan associations, building and loan associations, credit unions, cash depositories, and industrial banks, as paying agents in connection with the redemption of United States savings bonds; (3) to allow findings of death authorized to be made by law, or by the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, to be accepted as sufficient proof of death by accountable officers of the Treasury Department and any Federal Reserve bank, without risk of financial responsibility, in connection with the payment, exchange, etc., of United States securities; (4) to authorize the Treasurer of the United States to redeem certain direct obligations of the United States which may become the property of the United States by gift or bequest, and, out of the proceeds thereof, to pay gift or inheritance taxes as may be due, and (5) to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to sell, exchange, or otherwise dispose of bonds, notes, or other securities, not in excess of a million dollars of any single issuer, acquired by him on behalf of the United States under judicial process or otherwise.