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LAND WARRANTS.-See PUBLIC LANDS. LANES.-The word "lanes," in a statute empowering a gas light company to open "streets and lanes," does not signify the land of individuals over which there is only a private right of way, but construed with reference to the maxím noscitur a sociis, must be held to mean only such ways as the public have acquired a right to use.1

LAPSE. Where the person to whom a legacy is bequeathed dies before the testator, the legacy is said to be lapsed, that is, lost or fallen, and sinks into the residuum of the testator's personal estate. A devise is said to be lapsed where the devisee dies in the intermediate period between the making of the will and the death of the testator.3 Legislation in some States has prevented total lapses in certain cases. (See LEGACIES AND DEVISES.)

In Ecclesiastical Law.-A benefice is said to lapse when the patron does not exercise the right of presentment within six calendar months after the avoidance of the benefice. In such case there is a devolution of the rights of patronage from a neglectful patron to the bishop as ordinary, to the metropolitan as superior, and to the sovereign as patron paramount of all the benefices in the realm.4

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In criminal proceedings, “lapse" is used, in England, in the same sense as abate" in ordinary procedure, i. e., to signify that the proceedings came to an end by the death of one of the parties, or some other event.5

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3. LORD ELLENBOROUGH, in Doe v. Sheffield, 13 East 534.

The word "lapse" will not be taken in its technical sense of non rest, where that will defeat the testator's intentions. Van Pretres v. Cole, 73 Mo. 39, where the court said: "We think this word was employed by the testatrix in a sense broad enough to designate either the falling in of the estate in the event her niece should not survive her, or the falling in of said estate upon the happening of the limitation or condition subsequent, viz: the death of her niece without issue living. The technical signification of the word would be sufficient to characterize correctly the first event, but, in view of the other parts of the clause, a broader and more comprehensive signification must be given to it

to make it accurately describe the latter. This larger meaning is equally applicable to both events, and because the more restricted meaning is sufficient for one event, it does not follow, as argued by the appellant, that the word should have the restricted meaning also when applied to the other event."

In a statute providing that "hereafter legacies and devises to children and grandchildren shall not lapse by the death of the legatee or devisee before the testator, provided such legatee or devisee shall have children living at the death of the testator," etc., the word lapse "must not be taken in its technical sense as indicating the falling back of the legacy or devise, or its subject, into the testator's estate," but it applies to all cases where such legacy or devise would have fallen back or gone to others under the will, whether the devisee be specially named or is one of a class of devisees dying before the testator. Yeates v. Gill, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 206. And see the reference to this case in Chenault's Guardian v. Chenault's Estate, 9 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) 775

4. Whart. Law Lex.
5. Rap. and Lawr. L. Dict.

LAPSED DEVISES.-See LEGACIES AND DEVISES.

LAPSED LEGACIES.-See LEGACIES AND DEVISES.

LARCENY (See also BURGLARY; CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY).

/I. Definition, 761.

II. Essential Elements of Larceny, 762.

1. Taking, 762.

2. Carrying Away, 763.

3. The Personal Property of Another, 765.

4. Possession of the Owner or
His Agent, 766.

5. Possession Obtained, 770.
6. Without the Consent of the
Owner, 774.

7. A Felonious Intent, 776. III. Who May Commit the Offence, 780.

1. With Reference to the Degree
of the Crime, 780.
a. Principles, 780.
b. Accessories, 781.

IV. Subjects of Larceny, 781.
1. Things Savoring of the
Realty, 781.

2. Animals, 782.

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3. Written Instruments, 783.

4. Choses in Action, 784.

5. Coin, Money and Other Obligations, 784.

6. Other Things, 785. V. Lost Property, 786.

VI. What Taking Does Not Amount to Larceny, 788.

VII. Different Kinds of Larceny, 791. 1. With Reference to the Man

ner of Taking, 791. [791. a. Larceny from the Person, b. Larceny from a Dwelling House or Other Building, 791.

2. With Reference to the Value
of the Thing Taken, 793.
a. Grand Larceny, 793.
b. Petit Larceny, 794.

VIII. Prosecution for Larceny, When
Barred, 794.

IX. Jurisdiction, 796.

1. The Federal Courts, 799.

2. Courts Martial, 799.

3. Local Courts, 799.

X. The Indictment, Information or Complaint, 800.

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1. Allegations of Ownership, 2. Description of the Property Taken, Soб.

3. Allegations of the Taking and Carrying Away, 815.

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6. Alleging Felonious Intent, 7. Value of the Thing Stolen, 8. Laying the Venue, S20. [S18. 9. Particular Kinds of Larceny, 821.

a. From the Person, 821.
b. From a Building, 821.
10. Former Conviction, 822. [823
11. The Statute of Limitations,
12. Form of the Indictment,823.
13. Duplicity, 825.

14. Charging Different Crimes
in Different Courts, 826.
15. Amendment of the Indict-
ment, 828.

XI. Indictment Under Special Stat-
utes, 829.

XII. The Plea, 830.

XIII. Matters Preliminary to the Trial, 831.

XIV. Proof, 832.

[832.

1. What Evidence Is Required, a. Ownership of the Property, 832.

b. The Taking, 833. c. Identity of the Stolen Property, 835. [dant, 837. d. Identity of the Defene. Absence of Consent, 838. f. The Felonious Intent, 838. g. Proof of Value, 841. h. Proof of Venue, 843. 2. Character and Admissibility of the Evidence, 843. a. Possession of the Stolen Property, 845.

(1) Explanation of Defendant's Possession, 849. b. Evidence of Similar Crimes, 855.

c. Acts of Conspirators, 854. d. Evidence of Other Larceny, 855.

e. Res Gestæ, 857.

f. Admissions and Declara

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c. Identification of the Place

of the Crime, 868.

d. Value, 869.

e. Time, 869.

f. Venue, 869.

XV. Instructions to the Jury, 870.

1. As to Ownership, 873.

2. As to Identity, 873.

3. As to Consent, 874.

4. As to Fraudulent Intent, 874. a. Taking Under Claim of Right, 875.

5. As to Value, 877.

6. As to the Evidence of Other Crimes, 878.

7. As
to the Circumstantial
Evidence, 879.

a. Possession of the Stolen
Property, 879.

XVI. The Verdict, 881.

1. Assessment of Value, S84.
2. Defects in the Verdict, 885.
3. Setting Verdict Aside or Re-
versing Conviction, 888.

4. Verdict Under Special Stat-
utes, 892.

XVII. Arrest of Judgment, 894.
XVIII. Exceptions, 894.

XIX. Punishment, 894.

I. DEFINITION.-Larceny is the wrongful and fraudulent taking and carrying away, by any person, of the mere personal goods of another, from any place, with a felonious intent to convert them to his, the taker's, use, and make them his property without the consent of the owner.1

As a general rule, stealing and larceny are synonymous terms,2 and, by the penal code of New York, larceny includes not only the offence as defined at common law, but also embezzlement,

1. Bouv. L. Dict. (15th ed.), tit. Larceny. State v. Gray, 37 Mo. 463; State v. South, 28 N. J. (4 Dutch.) 28; s. c., 75 Am. Dec. 250.

Bishop, in his Criminal Law (7th ed.), §758, defines larceny to be the taking and removing, by trespass, of personal property which the trespasser knows to belong, either generally or specially, to another, with the intent to deprive such owner of his ownership therein.

Wharton says larceny may be defined to be the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right, with the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner, without his consent. Whart. Cr. L. (9th ed.), § 862.

Simple larceny is the taking and carrying away of the personal goods of another. 4 Black. Com. 230.

Larceny, by the common law, is the felonious and fraudulent taking and carrying away by any man or woman, of the mere personal goods of another neither from the person nor by night in the house of the owner. 3 Co. Inst. 107.

"The definitions of larceny," said BARON PARKE, an eminent judge, "are none of them complete. Mr. East's is the most so, but that wants some little explanation. His definition is, 'the wrongful or fraudulent taking and carrying away, by any person, of the mere personal goods of another, from any

place, with a felonious intent to convert them to his (the taker's) own use, and make them his own property, without the consent of the owner.' This is defective in not stating what the definition of 'felonious' in this definition is. It may be explained to mean that there is no color of right or excuse for the act, and the 'intent' must be to deprive the owner, not temporarily, but permanently, of his property." From this definition differ those of Coke, Hawkins and Blackstone, in the omission of two important requisites: first, the conversion to the taker's own use; and secondly, without the consent of the owner. Whart. Cr. L. (9th ed.), § 862.

2. Carr v. State, 24 Tex. App. 562; Gay v. State, 20 Tex. 504; Campbell v. State, 22 Tex. App. 262.

By express provision of the Texas penal code, theft includes all unlawful acquisition of personal property punishable by law. Martin . State, 9 Tex. App. 293.

A fraudulent taking of property without the consent of the owner with the intent to deprive the owner of the value of the property, and appropriate it to the use and benefit of the person taking it, constitutes the offence of theft. The taking is the factum probandum, and completes the offence. Crowell v. State, 24 Tex. App. 404; s. c., 6 S. W. 318.

The terms "steal" and "larceny," as

obtaining money by false pretences, and felonious breaches of trust; while the revised statutes of the United States, for the protection of property within the admiralty and maritime juris diction, punishes all acts of spoliation upon property belonging to a vessel wrecked or in distress, whether such as would constitute piracy, if committed on the high seas, or robbery, theft, trespass, malicious mischief or any fraudulent or criminal breach of trust, if committed on land, no specific intent being necessary to con stitute the offence.2

II. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF LARCENY-1. Taking. The taking is an essential part of the crime of larceny, but the stolen prop erty need not pass into the actual manual possession of the thief. It must, however, constitute an intentional taking without the consent of the owner, and an intentional fraud and ap

used in the 25th section of the 4th chapter of the penal code of Alabama (Clay's Dig. 420, § 25), are technical, and do not include an offence which would not amount to a larceny if committed in that State. Spencer v. State, 20 Ala. 24.

Larceny of Branded Stock.-The effect of the Colorado statute relating to branding stock is not to make the larceny of branded stock any the less a crime under the general law appertain ing to larceny. Kollenberger v. People, 9 Col. 233.

1. People v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502; S. C., 13 N. E. 325. See as to other States State v. Fenn, 41 Conn. 590; Quinn v. People, 123 Ill. 333; S. C., 15 N. E. 46.

Under the New York Code, larceny can be committed in four ways: First, by a person who, with intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property, or of the use and benefit thereof, takes from the possession of such owner, or any other person, any money, personal property, thing in action, evidence of debt, or contract or article of value of any kind; second, by a person who, with like intent, obtains from the true owner, or any other person, possession by color or aid of fraudulent or false representations or pretences, or of any false token or writing, any money, personal property etc.; third, any person who, with like intent, secretes, withholds or appropriates to his own use any such property etc.; and fourth, any person who, with like intent, having in his possession, custody or control the property of another as bailee, servant, attorney, agent, clerk, etc., appropriates the same to his own use. N. Y. Penal Code, § 528. See

People v. Cogdell, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 94; People v. Anderson, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 294; Abrams v. People, 6 Hun (N. Y.) 491; Wilson v. People, 39 N. Y. 459.

2. U. S. Rev. Stat., § 5358. U. S. v. Stone, 8 Fed. Rep. 252.

The act of congress of March 3rd, 1825, § 9, against plundering or stealing money, goods, merchandise or other effects from or belonging to any ship or vessel in distress or shipwrecked, lost or stranded, does not apply to property which has been abandoned by the owners. U. S. v. Smiley, 6 Sawy. (U. S.) 640.

The feloniously stealing goods which have been cast away from a vessel wrecked at Rockaway Beach, the goods when so taken having been above high water mark in Queens County, New York, is an offence under the act of March 3rd, 1825, § 9 (4 Stat. 116); U. S. v. Coombs, 12 Pet. (U. S.) 72.

The word steal, if used alone, might necessarily import larceny, as at common law, but when used in connection with "plunder" and "destroy," as found in § 5358 of the U. S. Rev. Stat., it will not be restrained so as to define only the crime of larceny of lost goods on land as known to the common law. U. S. v. Stone, 8 Fed. Rep. 232.

3. State v. Homes (note Larceny), 57 Am. Dec. 271; Wright v. State, 18 Tex. App. 358. See State v. Verry, 36 Kan. 416; Stevens v. State, 19 Neb. 647.

Larceny by Statute.-At common law a taking was necessary to constitute larceny, but not so as to all the offences created by statute. Spivey v. State, 26 Ala. 90.

4. Lem Doss v. State, 21 Tex. App. 505; s. c., 57 Am. Rep. 618.

propriation, though this intent may not have existed at the time of the taking, but had its inception afterwards while the property is in the possession of the thief.2

Such taking must be secretly and fraudulently but not forcibly accomplished in order to constitute the crime of larceny,3 in such manner as not only to deprive the owner of his property, but to have him as far as possible in ignorance of the taker.

2. Carrying Away. Without an asportation, there can be no larceny.5 This asportation consists in removing the property from the place where it was before, it need not be actually carried away,

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If the thief fraudulently procure a person innocent of any felonious intent to take goods for him, his offence will be the same as if he had taken them himself. Madison v. State, 16 Tex. App. 435.

The prosecutor, in a complaint for larceny, accidentally left his purse containing money on an old saddle in a livery stable, where he had placed it while changing his clothes; the defendant requested a small boy to take it and hand it to him, which he did, and the defendant appropriated the contents to his own use without the owner's consent. Held, that he was guilty of larceny. Pyland v. State, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 357

The defendant pointed out to A a cow and calf, on a range, falsely stating that he owned them and sold them to A. Held, a fraudulent taking such as constitutes theft under the Texas statute. Lem. Doss v. State, 21 Tex. App. 505; s. c., 57 Am. Rep. 618.

1. Mullins v. State, 37 Tex. 337; Stokely v. State, 24 Tex. App. 509; 6 S. W. 538.

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Where the defendant, a cropper, had hauled cotton to the lessor's gin, giving the lessor actual possession thereof, and subsequently, and in secret manner, takes and carries it away, he is guilty of a larceny. State v. Copeland, 86 N. Car. 691.

If the defendant did not participate in the original taking of the property, the good or bad faith of a purchase subsequently made by him is immaterial. Phillips v. State, 19 Tex. App. 158.

2. A drove away a flock of lambs from a field, and in so doing inadvertently drove away with them a lamb, the property of another person, and as soon as he discovered that he had done so, sold the lamb for his own use and then denied all knowledge of it. Held,

that as the act of driving the lamb from the field in the first instance was a trespass, as soon as he appropriated the lamb to his own use the trespass became a felony. Reg. v. Riley, 14 Eng. Law & Eq. 544.

The act of inveigling or persuading a slave to leave his owner, and then carrying off the slave, so that the owner is deprived of his service, make one offence, and constitute stealing the slave under the South Carolina statute of 1754. State v. Brown, 3 Strobh. (S.

Car.) 508.

3. State v. Ledford, 67 N. Car. 60.

Distinction Between Larceny and Robbery -It is larceny, not robbery, to snatch from one his property, without violence or putting in fear. State v. Sommers, 12 Mo. App. 374.

Robbery is committed by force, larceny by stealth, and where there is no violence or circumstances of terror resorted to for the purpose of inducing the owner to part with his property for the sake of his person, the crime committed is not robbery, but larceny. State v. John, 5 Jones (N. Car.) L. 163; s. c., 69 Am. Dec. 777.

4. State v. Ledford, 67 N. Car. 60. Concealing would include any act tending to render the discovery of the property difficult, such as clipping a horse and in other ways seeking to prevent identification. State v. Ward, 49 Conn. 429.

5. Williams v. State, 63 Miss. 58; note (Larceny), 57 Am. Dec. 272.

Asportation, or at least an intent to convert the property, is an essential element in larceny. A person could not be convicted of larceny on proof of killing a domestic animal, without removing it from the place where killed, and merely as an act of malicious mischief toward the owner. People v. Murphy, 47 Cal. 103.

6. State v. Higgins, 88 Mo. 354; S. C.,

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