LAND GRANTS. See GRANTS, vol. 9, p. 46; PUBLIC LANDS. LANDING.--See note I. releasor. Doe on Demise of Davies v. Williams, 1 H. Blk. 25. A freehold estate in reversion or remainder will pass under the word land in a will. Rooke v. Rooke, 2 Vern. 461; Chester v. Chester, 3 P. Wms. 55; Pond v. Bergh, 10 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 156; Hunter v. Hunter, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 86. Or in a deed. Pond v. Bergh, 10 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 156. Under section 421 of the Ohio Code, which provides that "the lands and tenements of a debtor shall be . bound for the satisfaction" of a judgment, it was held that a vested remainder in fee in land is the subject for judgment lien. Lawrence v. Belger, 31 Ohio St. 175. See also Gilbert on Executions, pp. 38, 39; New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. v. Morris Canal and Banking Co. (N. J.), 15 Atl. Rep. 231. Land-Lands.—Where the plaintiff declared in covenant in a demise of lands, and at the trial it appeared from the evidence that the demise was of "all that piece or parcel of ground and premises, containing by estimation one acre," it was held that there was no variance. Said the court: "Lands is a word of general import, and means the same thing as land; and, however you may subdivide any portion of it, still it is capable of being denominated lands; for by this term in common parlance is not meant a plurality of pieces; one piece will satisfy the term, and herein it differs from the word houses." Birch v. Gibbs, 6 Maule & Sel. 115. Interest in Land.-An easement of light and air is an "interest in land," within the meaning of the Kentucky statute of limitations, which limits the right to bring an action for the recovery of real estate to fifteen years after the right to institute it first accrued to the plaintiff or the person through whom the claims, and which provides that the words "real estate" in the statute shall be construed to mean "lands, tenements and hereditaments, and all rights thereto and interests therein other than a chattel interest." Bay v. Sweeney, 14 Bush (Ky.) I. Land Poor.-By the term "land poor," it is generally understood that the person to whom it relates has a great deal of unproductive land, and perhaps is obliged to borrow money to pay taxes; but a man "land poor" may be largely responsible. Matteson v. Blackmer, 46 Mich. 397. 12 C. of L.-42 Goods Landed.-The defendants were empowered by a local act to levy tolls on all goods "landed" within their harbor. In pursuance of a practice which had continued for many years, stones brought along the coast into the harbor were shot from the plaintiff's boats on to the shore, below high water mark, and remained on the spot where they were deposited till they were shipped for exportation from the harbor. It was held that the stones were not "landed" within the meaning of the act. Said KELLY, C. B.: "The ordinary meaning and purport of the words is perfectly clear, namely, that tolls are to be paid on goods substantially imported; that is, in fact, carried into the port for the purpose of the town and neighborhood. The goods in question, no matter whether brought by land or by sea from the place where they were produced, are destined, not for importation, but to be shipped and exported from the place where they lie." Said BRAMWELL, B.: "Considering the question as a matter of words, were the goods landed? What is landing? It is putting on the land. Where does the land begin? Where the sea ends. Where does the sea end? At high water mark; above the place where the goods were deposited. We must say the goods were landed in the sea. It would certainly be strange if the captain of a steamboat were to say that he had landed his passengers, if he made them get out in three feet of water. Yet I do not say that the goods might not be said to be landed, if they were put there with the means and right of taking them up to the land. As a matter of good sense it might perhaps be, that though goods would not be landed in the usual sense of the word until they had got to the land, yet, as soon as, in any manner, they had reached what might be considered as the end of their transit, that might be called a landing.” Harvey v. Mayor & Corp. of Lyme Regis, L. R., 4 Exch. 260. indictment 1. Public Landing.-An for obstructing a "public landing" is not sustained by proof that a public road leading to the landing was obstructed by the defendant at a place within one hundred yards of the landing. Said the court: "The indictment was for obstructing a public landing. A landing is either the bank or wharf, to or from which per657 LANDLORD.--See note I. LANDLORD AND TENANT-(See also ADVERSE POSSESSION; CONVERSION; CROPS; DISTRESS; EJECTMENT; EVICTION; FIXTURES; FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER; LEASE; Lodg ING HOUSE; RENT; TRESPASS; TROVER; WASTE). (b) Vendor and Purchaser, (c) Master and Servant, etc., 664. (d) Mortgagor and Mortgagee, 665. (e) Cotenants, Foint Occupants, etc., 665. (f) Possession Under Void Lease, 667. II. Kinds of Tenancy, 668. 1. Tenancy at Sufferance, 668. (a) Definition, 670. (b) To What Tenant Is Entitled, 673. (c) How Tenancy at Will Is Terminated, 673. [675 3. Tenancy from Year to Year, (a) Definition, 675. (b) Implied from Holding Over, 675. (c) When Not Implied, 677. (d) How Tenancy Terminated, 679. 4. Tenancies for Periods, 679. Shorter sons or things may go from or to some vessel in the contiguous water; or, it is the yard or open place which is used for deposit and convenient communication between the land and water. A public road to it is essential to make it public, unless where it may be used only in connection with transportation by water. But the road to it is like the road to a ferry; essential to its use, but no part of it. In this case the district judge held that an obstruction of the road within one hundred yards of the landing was an obstruction of the landing: but if the road at the place of obstruction was not widened so as to become part of the landing (and we understand it was not in this case), it is difficult to perceive how one hundred yards differs from a mile, if an obstruction at either distance would prevent 5. Tenancy for Life, 679. (b) How Constituted, 680. (d) Rights of Landlord, 681. 6. Tenancy in Fee, 681. 7. Lodgings and Apartments (See Lodgings and Apartments), 681. III. Rights and Liabilities of Land access lord, 681. 1. Under Covenants, etc., in Lease (See Lease), 681. 2. In Recovery of Rent (See Infra Rent), 681. 3. In Recovery of Possession (See Infra Landlord's Possessory Remedies), 681. 4. Farming on Shares (See Crops), 681. 5. Authority Leased, 682. Over Estate to the landing." State 2. Graham, 15 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 310. See also State v. Randall, 1 Strobh. (S. Car.) 110. 1. The word landlord in Stat. 11 G. II, ch. 19, § 14, which provides that "it shall and may be lawful to and for the landlord or landlords, when the agreement is not by deed, to recover a reasonable satisfaction for the lands, tenements or hereditaments held or occupied by the defendant or defendants, in an action on the case for the use and occupation of what was so held or enjoyed," "does not mean the lord of the soil, but the person between whom and the tenant the relation of landlord and tenant exists. That sense is given to the word in Johnson's Dictionary and Webster's Dictionary." BRAMWELL, B., Churchward v. Fourd, 2 Hurl. & N. 449. (a) Generally, 686. (c) Liability to Third Per- (g) Liability for Nuisance, IV. Rights, Duties and Liabilities of Tenant, 695. 1. Between Landlord and Ten- (a) Under Covenants, etc., of (e) Tenant's General Control (g) Estoppel to Deny Land- [ 708. (h) Boundaries, Fences, etc., (i) Easements, 708. (j) Emblements, 708. (k, Farming on Shares (See (1) Improvements, 713. 2. Between Tenants and Sub- (a) Subleases, 715. 3. Between Tenants and Thira (a) Assignment of Lease, 717. (d) Rights of Tenant as to V. Repairs, 720. 1. Generally, 720. 2. As Affected by Covenant to Repair, 721. 3. Tenant's Implied Duty to Repair, 721. 4. Notice of Repairs to Land lord, 724. 5. Landlord's Right of Entry to Repair, 725. 6. Parol Promises After Lease Executed, 725. 7. Statutory Liability of Land lord for Repairs, 726. 8. Tenant's Remedies, 726. 9. Waiver by Tenant, 728. 10. Damages, 728. II. Covenant to Repair Runs with the Land, 730. 10. Effect of Withholding Possession, 745. 11. Effect of Taking for Public Use, 746. 12. Effect of Occupancy Under Mere Licence, 746. 13. Effect of Lease for Immoral Purposes, 747 14. Effect of Landlord's Failure to Repair, 748. 15. Effect of Landlord's Failure to Give Possession, 749. 16. Effect of Fraud or False Representations, 749. 17. Effect of Parol Change in Lease Under Seal, 750. 18. Abandonment, etc., by Tenant No Release, 751. 19. Apportionment of Rent, 752. 20. Assignment of Reversion,754. 21. Landlord's Remedies for Rent, 756. (a) Action for Use and Occupation, 756. (1) When Sustainable, 756. (2) By and Against Whom Sustainable, 757a. (3) When Use and Occupation Will Not Lie, 757b. (b) Landlord's Lien for Rent, 757C. (1) Lien by Contract, 757c. (4) Extent of Lien, 757h. 7579. (4) Against Whom Distress Will Lie, 7579. (5) What May be Dis- (6) Wrongful and Exces- VII. Termination of Tenancy, 7578. 3. Acts of the Landlord, 757%. 11. Surrender of Premises, 758a. VIII. Eviction, 7586. 4. Presumption from Nonuser, 758i. 5. Surrender by Operation of Law, 758i. 6. Landlord's Rerenting Prem ises, 758j. X. Forfeiture, 758k. 1. Definition, 758k. 2. Nonpayment of Rent, 758k. 3. Repudiation of Lease, etc. Waiver 4. Waiver of Right of Forfeit ure, 758m. 5. Enforcement of Right of Forfeiture, 7580. XI. Holding Over Term, 758p. 1. Consequences in General 75Sp. 3. Effect of Landlord's Notice XII. Landlord's Possessory Reme- 1. Ejectment, 7581. 2. Forcible Entry and Detainer, 3. Summary Statutory Proceedings, 758u. I. DEFINITION-1. Relation Generally.-The relation of landlord and tenant is founded upon contract whereby the tenant, for a consideration, is to have the use and occupation of lands or tenements for life, for years, or at will. The consideration from the tenant to the landlord is usually the payment of a sum or sums of money, or an equivalent therefor, at a specified time or times during the term. Like other contractual relations, that of landlord and tenant may be either express or implied. If express, it is governed by the general rules of construction applicable to other contracts, and may be in writing, usually called a lease, or by parol; the latter, of course, being subject to the limitations and restrictions of the statute of frauds. The operation of the lease or contract must be such that some part of the estate shall be left in the lessor as a reversion, otherwise it will be an assignment of the term. 2. What May be Demised.-As a general rule, anything corporeal or incorporeal may be the subject of a demise, including lands, tenements, appurtenances, ferries, franchises, rights of way, min 1. Com. v. Weatherhead, 110 Mass. 175; Morrill v. Mackman, 24 Mich. 279. ing rights, live stock, farming implements, and many other kinds of property.1 3. Relation Arising by Implication-(a) GENERALLY.-The implied relation may be presumed from the conduct of the parties toward each other, and possession by the tenant is, in general, ground for presumption of a contract to pay rent.3 Presumption of Relation.—Where one claims to be the lessor, and the tenant in possession acquiesces in the claim and pays rent, the presumption is that the relation of landlord and tenant. exists, and this presumption will prevail unless overcome by countervailing evidence.4 If the occupancy is without the consent of the owner, no tenancy can be implied from such occupancy, unless the tenant disclaims title, or the nature of the possession is such as to comport with the idea of a tenancy; but mere occupancy itself is not sufficient to imply the relation.7 1. See generally Eastham v. Anderson, 119 Mass. 526; Freeman v. Underwood, 66 Me. 229; Taylor v. Beeber, 3 Rob. (N. Y.) 262; Commrs. of Pilots v. Clark, 33 N. Y. 251; Lewis v. McNatt, 65 N. Car. 63; Swift v. Goodrich, 70 Cal. 103; Page v. Kinsman, 43 N. H. 328; Harlow v. Lake Superior Iron Co., 36 Mich. 105; Fire Brick Co. v. Pond, 38 Ohio St. 65; Dickenson v. Harris, 48 Ark. 355; Monroe v. Armstrong, 96 Pa. St. 307. 2. Raisy v. Capps, 22 Ala. 288. A contract to pay rent is not necessary to constitute the relation. McKissack v. Bullington, 37 Miss. 535. 3. Jackson v. Mowry, 30 Ga. 143; Littleton v. Wynn, 31 Ga. 583; Phelps v. Conant, 30 Vt. 277. 4. Cressler v. Williams, So Ind. 366; Sargent v. Ashe, 23 Me. 201; Vetter's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 52; Sterrett v. Wright, 27 Pa. St. 259; Harlan v. Emery, 46 Iowa 538; Herrell v. Sizeland, Si Ill. 457; Dunne v. Trustees of Schools, 39 Ill. 578; Ladd v. Riggle, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 620; Cunningham v. Holton, 55 Me. 33; Cunningham v. Horton, 57 Me. 420; Larned v. Hudson, 60 N. Y. 102; Towery v. Henderson, 60 Tex. 291; Wilcox v. Wilburn, 15 R. I. 434; Snedaker v. Powell, 32 Kan. 396; Thompson v. Sanborn, 52 Mich. 141. A railroad company built a spur track across plaintiff's land, paid him rent for a portion of the time the land was thus occupied, and afterwards continued the occupation with his assent, until its whole road (including said spur track) passed into defendant's hands under a foreclosure sale; and defendant continued the occupation without any notice to plaintiff of a claim to hold adversely to him. Held, that the presumption is that defendant held as plaintiff's tenant. Wittman v. Milwaukee etc. R. Co., 51 Wis. 89. 5. Ackerman v. Lyman, 20 Wis. 4556. Jackson v. Mowry, 30 Ga. 143; Gay v. Mitchell, 35 Ga. 139; Oaks v. Oaks, 16 Ill. 106; Chambers v. Ross, 25 N. J. L. 293; Dwight v. Cutler, 3 Mich. 566; Dell v. Gardner, 25 Ark. 134; Haight v. Green, 19 Cal. 113; Alton v. Pickering, 9 N. H. 494. 7. Jackson v. Aldrich, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 106; Victory v. Stroud, 15 Tex. 373; Jordan v. Mead, 19 La. An. 101; Edmundson v. Kibe, 43 Mo. 176; Williams v. Deriar, 31 Mo. 13; Cook v. Norton, 48 Ill. 20; Nance v. Alexander, 49 Ind. 516; Rich v. Bolton, 46 Vt. 84; Richmond etc. Road Co. v. Rogers, 7 Bush (Ky.) 532; Smith v. Houston, 16 Ala. 111; Weaver v. Jones, 24 Ala. 420; Wilcher v. Robertson, 78 Va. 602; Leonard v. Kingman, 136 Mass. 123. The relation of landlord and tenant cannot be created by an entry upon land without right, and the person who so enters cannot take away crops sown by him, and one who enters during pending litigation is chargeable with notice, and is bound by the judgment rendered. Krug v. Davis, 101 Ind. 75. The United States occupied premises without asserting title, the owner making no objection. The officers in possession promised to pay the rent demanded, and the secretary of war sent |