firm belief.1 Where "religion, morality and knowledge" are declared in the constitution to be essential to good government, the 'knowledge" referred to is "knowledge of the truth," and comprehends in itself all that is comprehended in the other two words "religion" and "morality."2 In the case of a bona fide purchaser there is a difference between the want of knowledge and the want of notice. He may have been notified without being made to know the prior right.3 The "knowledge" which renders the owner of a vessel liable for the negligence of the crew is some personal knowledge or means of knowledge of which he is bound to avail himself, of a contemplated loss, or of a condition of things likely to produce or contribute to the loss, without adopting appropriate means to prevent it.4 Personal knowledge of an allegation in an answer is a personal knowledge of its truth or falsity, and if the allegation is a negative one, this necessarily includes a knowledge of the truth or falsity of the allegation denied.5 KNOWN.--In order to constitute the exemption of coal lands contemplated by the pre-emption act under the head of "known mines," there must be ascertained coal deposits upon the land of such an extent and value as to make the land more valuable to be worked as a coal mine under the conditions existing at the time, than for merely agricultural purposes. So where in an 1. Hatch v. Carpenter, 9 Gray (Mass.) 271. “Between mere belief and knowledge there is a wide difference." Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Reynolds, 124 U. S. 374. 2. Bd. of Educa. of Cincinnati v. Minor, 23 O. St. 211, where it was held that the constitution of the State did not enjoin or require religious instruction, or the reading of religious books, in the public schools of the State. 3. Cleveland Woolen Mills v. Sibert (Ala.), 1 South. Rep. 777. also no information. "The two statutory words 'knowledge' and 'information' have not, as thus used, the same legal significance." Haney v. People (Colo.), 21 Pac. Rep. 39. but An affidavit otherwise correct closing with the words "to the best of his knowledge, information and belief,” thereby qualifying the prior declarations contained therein, was held defective and insufficient but not void, so that the plaintiff was entitled after judgment, with the leave of the trial 4. Lord v. G. N. & P. S. Co., 4 court, to make it positive and sufficient Sawy. (U. S.) 292. 5. West v. Home Ins. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 622. Where a party is allowed by the code to make supplemental pleadings alleging facts which may have come to his knowledge since the filing of the former pleading, he may allege a fact that could have been seen at a previous term of the court from other papers in the case on file, as the "knowledge" spoken of is actual, not constructive, knowledge. Peoples v. Carroll, II Heisk. (Tenn.) 417. An averment in an answer that defendant "hath no knowledge upon which to base a belief" was held defective in failing to state that he has by amendment. Harrison v. Beard, 30 6. Colo. Coal Co. v. U. S., 123 U. application for a placer claim the failure to mention veins or lodes "known to exist" is made by statute a conclusive declaration that the applicant has no right to such veins or lodes, it is not enough that there may have been some indications by outcroppings on the surface of the existence of lodes or veins of rock in place bearing gold or silver or other metal to justify their designation as "known" veins or lodes. To meet that designation the lodes or veins must be clearly ascertained and be of such extent as to render the land more valuable on that account, and justify their exploitation. Where an insurance policy contains S. 307 (s. c., 8 Sup. Ct. Repr. 140), a general sense; and yet it becomes where the court, after reviewing difficult of interpretation when applied former cases, say: "It will thus be seen to the determination of rights asserted that, so far as the decisions of this to such veins or lodes from the possescourt have heretofore gone, no lands sion, or absence, of such knowledge at have been held to be known mines' the time application is made for the unless, at the time the rights of the patent. At the outset, as stated when purchaser accrued, there was upon the the case was here before, the enquiry ground an actual and opened mine must be whether the alleged knowledge which had been worked or was capable must be traced to the applicant, or of being worked. It is not whether it is sufficient that the existence sufficient, in our opinion, to constitute of the vein or lode was at the time of 'known mines' of coal, within the the application generally known. If meaning of the statute, that there general knowledge of such existence should merely be indications of coal should be held sufficient, the inquiry beds or coal fields of greater or less ex- would follow as to what would content and of greater or less value, as stitute such general knowledge, so as shown by outcroppings. The to create an exception to the grant, notcircumstance that there are surface withstanding the ignorance of the patindications of the existence of veins of entee. Such suggestions indicate the coal does not constitute a mine. It difficulties of some of the questions does not even prove that the land will which may arise in the application of ever be under any conditions suffi- the statute. The court below instructed ciently valuable on account of its coal the jury that it was unnecessary to dedeposits to be worked as a mine. A clare what circumstances might be change in the conditions occurring sufficient to affect a patentee with subsequently to the sale, whereby new knowledge as prescribed by the statute discoveries are made, or by means 'for, if, in any case, it appear that an whereof it may become profitable to application for a patent is made with work the veins as mines, cannot affect intent to acquire title to a lode or vein the title as it passed at the time of the which may exist in the ground beneath sale. The question must be determined the surface of a placer claim, it is be according to the facts in existence at lieved a patent issued upon such applithe time of the sale." And see the cation cannot operate to convey such case of John Downs, 7 U. S. Pub. Land. lode or vein;' and further, that 'that inDec. 71. tention could be formed only upon investigation as to the character of the ground, and the belief as to the exist ence of a valuable lode therein, which would amount to knowledge under the statute.' This instruction is plainly erroneous. The statute speaks of acquiring a patent with knowledge of the existence of a vein or lode within the boundaries of the claim for which a patent is sought, not the effect of the intent of the party to acquire a lode which may or may not exist, of which he has no knowledge. Nor does it 1. U. S. v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 9 Sup. Ct. Repr. 195, 199; s. c., 128 U. S. 673. In Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Reynolds, 124 U. S. 374 (s. c., 8 Sup. Ct. Repr. 603), it is said: "The question under this section, which must control and limit any conflicting exception expressed in the patent is, when can it be said that a vein or lode is known to exist' within the boundaries of a placer claim for which a patent is sought. The language of the statute appears to be sufficiently ntelligible in a clause avoiding the policy in case the insured shall die in the "known violation of law," these words do not extend to mere trespasses against property or other infringements of civil laws. to which no criminal consequences are attached. For the word render belief, after examination, in the existence of a lode, knowledge of the fact. There may be difficulty in determining whether such knowledge in a given case was had, but between mere belief and knowledge there is a wide difference. The court could not make them synonymous by its charge and thus in effect incorporate new terms into the statute. Knowledge of the existence of a lode or vein within the boundaries of a placer claim may be obtained from its outcrop within such boundaries; or from the developments of the placer claim previous to the application for a patent; or by the tracing of the vein from another lode, or perhaps from the general condition and developments of mining ground adjoining the placer claim. It may also be obtained from the information of others who have made the necessary explorations to ascertain the fact, and perhaps in other ways. We do not speak of the sufficiency of any of these modes, but mention them merely to show that such knowledge may be had without making hopes and beliefs on the subject its equivalent. As well observed by the court, when the case was here before, it is better that all questions as to what kind of evidence is necessary, and we may add sufficient, to prove the knowledge required by the statute, should be settled as they arise." 1. Cluff v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 13 Allen (Mass.) 308. "Violation of law,' as used in this policy, means crime; and 'known violation of law' indicates a voluntary criminal act." Cluff v. Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 317. Such a policy is not avoided, if the assured was killed after retreating from an altercation which he had commenced under circumstances which would make the slayer guilty of felonious homicide. Hayer's Admr. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 19 Mo. 506, where the court said: "It is obvious that, in giving the words of the condition a literal meaning, cases will be embraced which no one will maintain were in the contemplation of the parties. If the person whose life is insured uses offensive language to whilst they are engaged in an unlawful game of chance, one 12 C. of L.-34 which language is concerning the game, and he is shot down for the provocation, it would not be maintained that he died in the known violation of law, within the meaning of the contract. So, if he is riding a race in a public highway, which is forbidden, and his horse falls and he is thrown and his neck broken, he does not die in the known violation of a law of the land, within the meaning of the terms of the condition. So also in a quarrel, if he assaults another with his open hand, and is thereupon instantly shot down, he does not die in the known violation of a law, within the intent of the policy. Many similar instances might be put which, it is clear, were not within the meaning of the parties, and if they were, the contract would be much narrowed in its operation. So, a killing in self-defence is not a "known violation of law." Overton v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 39 Mo. 122. In Bradley v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co. 45 N. Y. 422 (s. c., 6 Am. Rep 115), the court say: "The supreme court of this State, whose decision is now under review, do not agree to the interpretation given to the proviso by the courts of Massachusetts and Missouri, and a difference of opinion exists between the members of this court as to whether the proviso applies only to violations of the criminal law, or whether it embraces all illegal acts of such a character as to lead to violence. But, independently of that question, and whatever be the nature of the violation of law urged by the insurance company, as avoiding the policy, it seems to be clear that a relation must exist between the violation of law and the death, to make good the defence; that the death must have been caused by the violation of law to exempt the company from liability. It cannot be the true meaning of the proviso that the policy is to be avoided by the mere fact that, at the time of the death, the assured was vio lating the law, if the death occurred from some cause other than such violation." And see dis. op. of Grover, J. So in Cluff . Ins. Co., 13 Aller. (Mass.) 318, it is said: "He must have received the mortal wound during and 529 in other connections see note I. while engaged in the commission of a crime, not merely in consequence of it afterwards." 1. Where a statute excepts from the offence of bigamy the case of one marrying a second time whose husband or wife has been absent for seven years and "shall not have been known" by such person to be living within that time, a finding by the jury that they had no evidence of defendant's knowledge, but were of opinion that she had the means of acquiring knowledge if she had chosen to make use of them, was held not to sustain a conviction. Reg. v. Briggs, Dears. & B. 98. As to facts which render the owner of a vessel "known" to one having a lien against it, see Story v. Buffum, 8 Allen (Mass.) 35. "Known creditors," in a statute providing that commissioners on the insolvent estates of deceased persons shall give notices of meetings to all "known creditors," means creditors known to the exectuor or administrator, and not merely those known to the commissioners. Davis' Appeal, Conn. 395. 39 one "Known Equivalent."-Where employs known devices which in mechanics are recognized as proper substitutes for the devices used by a patentee to effect the same results, this is an infringement of the patent. "In this sense the mechanical devices used by the defendant are known substitutes or equivalents for those employed in the Morley machine to effect the same result; and this is the proper meaning of the term 'known equivalent,' in reference to a pioneer machine such as that of Morley. Otherwise a difference in the particular devices used to accomplish a particular result in such a machine would always enable a defendant to escape the charge of infringe ment, provided such devices were new with the defendant in such a machine, because, as no machine for accomplishing the result existed before that of the plaintiff, the particular device alleged to avoid infringement could not have exexisted or been known in such a machine prior to the plaintiff's invention." Morley Sewing Machine Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U. S. 263. "Known Intemperate Habits."-To authorize a conviction for selling liquor to a person of such habits, the jury must be satisfied from the evidence that the defendant had knowledge of such intemperate habits; and they may infer guilty knowledge on his part from the fact that he had good reason to believe that such were the habits of that person; but this is an inference of fact to be drawn by the jury, and not a presumption of law to be brawn by the court. Smith v. State, 55 Ala. 1. "Not known or used before the application," in the patent law, means "not known or used by the public." Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 1. So, in Plimpton v. Malcolmson, 3 Ch. D. 555, it is said: "It was decided, and now, therefore, is the legal sense and meaning of the statute, that he was a first and true inventor within the statute if the invention, being in other respects novel and useful, was not previously known in this country-known' being used in that particular sense as being part of what had been called the common or public knowledge of the country." Quoted in Re Avery's Patent, 56 L. T., N. S. 327. "Personally Known." Where the formula prescribed for the acknowledgment of deeds is "personally appeared before me with whom I am personally acquainted," etc., an officer's certificate in which he certifies that grantor is "personally known" to him, is a compliance with the statute. "To be 'personally acquainted with' and to 'know personally' are equivalent phrases. Personal knowledge to the extent certified necessarily included the personal identity of the officers, as well as the incumbency of their offices. A defect of such knowledge as to either point would be inconsistent with the language used and falsify the certificate. It can hardly be doubted that the paragraph was meant to cover both points. It is a reasonable and necessary construction to give it that effect. Indeed, it involves no straining to hold that the phrase 'personally known to him to be such' applies proprio vigore to those named, alike individually and officially; in other words, that the certifier meant that he personally knew them to be such individuals and such officers." Kelly v Calhoun, 5 Otto (U. S.) 710, 713. Where a justice took an acknowledgment of the assignment of a mortgage, stating that the assignor was to him "personally known to be the identical person" whose name was signed to the KNUCKLES.—See BRASS KNUCKLES. LABELS Definition. In the construction of the act of June 18th, 874, ch. 301, §§ 3, 18, stat. 79, the words "engraving," "cut," and, "print," shall be applied only to pictorial illustrations and works connected with the fine arts, and no prints or labels designed to be used for any other articles of manufacture shall be entered under the copyright law, but may be registered in the patent office. If the label is published prior to its registry in the patent office, it is void.2 instrument, and the assignment proved to be a forgery, it was held that he was not liable on his official bond to a purchaser relying upon the validity of the assignment. Wyllis v. Hann, 47 Ia. 614. DAY, J. (concurring in part), said: "The statute requires that the certificate of acknowledgment shall state that the person making the acknowledgment was personally known to the person taking it. The statute does not require acquaintance. A mere introduction would not make one acquainted with the person introduced. Acquaintance is familiar knowledge, a state of being acquainted, or of having intimate, or more than slight or superficial, knowledge, as I know the man, but have no acquaintance with him. See Webster's Dictionary. No arbitrary time after an introduction can be fixed which will justify a person in saying I know that man. Whilst the statute requires the officer to state that he personally knows the person making the acknowledgment to be the person whose hame is affixed to the instrument, yet he is not liable civilly and criminally, from the simple fact that the statement turns out to be untrue. In order to create this liability the false statement must be knowingly made; that is, the officer must certify that the person was personally known to him, when he knows that he was not personally known to him. If an officer, from all the circumstances, has reasonable grounds to believe, and does believe, that he personally knows a man, then he cannot know that he does not know him. It is impossible that a man should really believe a fact to exist, and at the same time know it not to exist." 1. Trade Mark Can be Registered as a Label.-The several acts of congress regarding the registration of a label containing matter which might be registered as a trade mark do not exclude from registration a label containing matter which might be registered as a trade mark; nor does the fact that a label bears such distinguishing marks as entitle it to registration as a trade mark, exclude it from registration as a label, if the owner desires it to be registered as such. Whether the commissioner of patents is to regard it as one or the other depends entirely on the will of the owner. U. S ex rel. Willcox & Gibbs Sewing Machine Co. v. Marble, Mackey (Sup. Ct. D. C.) 284; s. c., 22 Pat. Office Gaz. 1366. The rule in the patent office is the opposite. Shumacher v. Exlinger, 22 Pat. Office Gaz. 1291. What Cannot be Registered as a Label.-A single letter not descriptive. Lorrilard v. Dolean. A device consisting of a single horseshoe, though it might be registered as a trade mark. Lorrilard v. Drummond Tobacco Co., 22 Pat. Office Gaz. 1208. Falsely Marking Label "Copyrighted." -Marking an article copyrighted which could be registered as a label but could not be and was not copyrighted, does not make the person so marking liable to the penalty for falsely marking "copyrighted.' Contained in section 4963 Revised Statutes. Because neither the right of another can be impaired or the public deceived. Rosenbach v. Dreyfuss, 17 O. G. (Pat. Office U. S.) 1153; s. c., 2 Fed. Rep. 217. 2. Marsh v. Warren, 13 Pat. Office Gaz. 7; s. c., 24 Pittsb. L. J. 207; 8. C., 14 Blatchf. (C. C.) 263. What Is Publication.-The use of a label on bottles containing a certain compound, held publication of label. Marsh v. Warren, 13 Pat. Office Gaz. 7; s. c., Pittsb. L. J. 207; s. c., 14 Blatchf. (C. C.) 263. What Can be Registered as a Label.— Printed balloons, intended to be cut apart and manufactured into balloons, are not pictorial illustrations connected with the fine arts, but may be prints or labels designed to be used for another manufacture. Rosenbach v. Dreyfuss, |