of anything.3

the individuals who take their meals and lodge in such hotel and have no other domicil, live therein. So the controlling head of a house of ill fame, or of a house reputed to be a house of ill fame, keeps such a house." State v. Main, 31 Conn. 572. "The keeping is not to be understood as having or renting in point of property; for in that sense she (a married woman) cannot keep it; but the keeping here is the governing and managing a house in such disorderly manner as to be a nuisance." Reg. v. Williams, 1 Salk. 384. In this sense, one who controls the business of a victualling shop, though in the name and on the credit of his wife, keeps it within the meaning of a revenue law. St. Johnsbury v. Thompson (Vt.), 50 Vt. 300; 11 East Rep. 771. And a clerk or servant may be liable for keeping an unlicenced liquor shop. "To keep may in its ordinary and more obvious sense apply only to one who exercises control or proprietorship of the building or place used. But to 'maintain' has no such limited use." Commonwealth v. Kimball, 105 Mass. 465. A gambling house is kept by him, in whose possession, occupancy, or under whose control it is. Stoltz v. People, 5 Ill. 168.

A requirement that he shall keep the jail does not impose on him "the duty to construct a jail, or furnish the bolts, bars and keys of the prison;" nor of employing guards where the jail is insufficient. Mitchell v. Commrs. of Leavenworth Co., 18 Kas. 188.

An indictment, under statute, for entering an enclosed park and taking fish, bred, kept and preserved there, is not sustained in a case where a river

flowed through the park uninterruptedly without any obstruction to keep the fish there, and where nothing was done to stock the river. Rex v. Caradice, 1 R.

& R. 205.

1. Keep is used in this sense in statutes and provisions in policies of in-, surance against keeping hazardous and dangerous goods. Biggs v. Mitchell, 2 B. & S. 523. "It is not enough, according to this phraseology, that hazardous articles are upon the premises. They must be there for the purpose of being stored or kept; and the premises must be appropriately applied or used to

effect that purpose. This is the definition that has been settled by repeated decisions in reference to the word 'storing;' and there is no reason why it should not be applied to 'keeping,' a word of more extensive signification, undoubtedly, but which in this connection seems to demand a continued occupation of the whole, or a part of the premites insured, in pursuance of a design for the specified purpose." A mere temporary or casual deposit is not such. Hynds v. Schenectady Co. M. I. Co., 11 N. Y. 554; affirming s. c., 16 Barb. N.Y.119; Williams v. Firemen's Fund I. Co., 54 N. Y. 569. "The words 'keep or have,' as applied to the articles first enumerated, evidently were intended to prevent a storage of the prohibited articles upon the premises either permanently or habitually. While the words are used in the disjunctive, they are evidently synonymous, and signify to retain in possession." Mears . Humboldt Ins. Co., 92 Pa. St. 15.

In a chattel mortgage, by the terms of which the mortgagee might sell, to. pay the debt due, together with all reasonable costs pertaining to the taking, keeping, advertising and selling of the property, "the word 'keeping' evidently means the keeping of the property after the taking and pending the advertising before the sale. When the subject of the mortgage consists of inanimate chattels,it includes storage, and in many cases insurance," but not the expenses of keeping while in possession, actual or constructive, of the mortgagor. State Bank of Neb. v. Lowe, 22 Neb. 68; s. c., 33 N. W. Rep. 482.

2. It is actionable per se to say of a woman that a certain man "keeps her." "The words, 'keep' and 'kept' have, undoubtedly, several meanings; the precise signification in any given case depending on the context of which they form a part, or the circumstances under which they are used. But when it is said in reference to a female, that a certain man 'keeps her,' the ordinary and popular interpretation of the expression is, that the relation between the parties is one which involves illicit intercourse." Downing v. Wilson, 36 Ala. 717.

3. Stevens People, 67 Ill. 587. In an act making it unlawful to allow

animals to go "at large without a keeper," "the phrase 'at large without a keeper' must have a reasonable interpretation applicable to the subject mat

ter.

'A keeper' says Worcester, 'is one who has something in charge.' To be 'without a keeper,' in the purview of the statute, is to be without the charge of anyone having the right of control, or 'not under the care of a keeper,' as the statute of Massachusetts expresses it. Such charge or care does not in all cases imply direct physical power to control the actions of the animals; in some cases moral means would be sufficient for this purpose, such as the proximity of the owner of the animal, the human voice, gestures, and like means. Whether in a given case, physical or moral power over the animals is necessary depends upon the nature, age, character, habits, discipline and business or use at the time, and whatever other circumstances have a hearing upon the subject. What would constitute a person a keeper of one animal would not make him keeper of another under different circumstances. It is sufficient to constitute the owner of animals their keeper, in a given case, if it appears that he possessed the means upon which a person in the exercise of ordinary care, judgment and intelligence upon these matters would rely to control their actions. Whether or not animals are thus in charge is a question of fact to be determined by the jury under proper directions." Jennings v. Wayne, 63 Me. 468.

In a statute making the keeper as well as the owner of a dog liable for injuries done by it, the word includes a street railway company whose employee the owner was, and about whose stables the dog was kept. Barrett v. & M. R. Co., 3 Allen (Mass.) 101. And where the plaintiff had enticed the dog from its owner's premises and had kept it on his Own premises, he himself was its keeper. "A man may own a dog and

yet not be its keeper. One may take somebody else's dog to keep." Burnham v. Strother (Mich.), 33 N. W. Rep. 410; and see Cummings v. Riley, 52 N. H. 368.

One may be convicted as the keeper of a gaming house if he, as employee, has general superintendence and charge. It is not necessary that he be proprietor or lessee, or be interested in the profits. Stevens v. People, 67 Ill. 587.

Under an act imposing a penalty on a ferryman who took a slave out of the State, and, in case the ferryman was a slave, upon the owner or keeper of the ferry, "keeper" meant not the ferryman, but a grantee, lessee, or other person having a beneficial interest in and control over the ferry. Covington Ferry Co. v. Moore, 8 Dana (Ky.) 158.

1. It is, in a commercial sense, a refined coal or earth oil, and is embraced within those terms as used in an insurance policy. Bennett v. No. Brit. & Merc. I. Co., 81 N. Y. 273.

The legislature of New York having declared that certain grades of kerosene are proper and safe to use, a court will not take judicial notice that kerosene is an "inflammable fluid" within the meaning of an insurance policy: this must be proved as a fact. Wood v. N. W. Ins. Co., 46 N. Y. 421. "The policy forbids the use of camphene, spirit gas, or any burning fluid or chemical oil. It was proved that kerosene was used.

The defendant's witness stated that he did not know what chemical oil meant, and he stated how kerosene was made from petroleum. We cannot hold, aside from proofs, that kerosene comes under the words 'burning fluid; any more than it did under the words inflammable fluid.' 'Burning fluid' in this position, cannot mean every fluid that will burn." Mark v. National F. I. Co., 24 Hun (N. Y.) 565. And see Morse v. Buffalo F. & M. I. Co., 30 Wis. 534; s. C., 11 Am. Rep. 587. 2. Encyc. Dict.

dictionaries, the act cannot be taken to apply to something done with the object of improving the appearance of the seed without introducing foreign substances in it, and passing it off as a thing substantially different from that which it is. Without express words I do not think that we can treat the

word 'quality' as synonymous with 'kind.'"" For the point decided in this case, see ANOTHER.

In Whitehall Mfg. Co. v. Wise Bros., 119 Pa. St. 484 (s. c., 21 W. N. C. 268; 13 Atl. Rep. 299), it was held no error for the court below to use the word "grade" as synonymous with "kind." "We can see no difference in the words themselves as expressive of the same idea. The word 'grade' is perhaps somewhat more technical, but it is perfectly manifest that the classification of the lumber into numbered grades, as Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, was in the trade a practical division of it into different kinds. At any rate this was the sease in which the witnesses and the court used the word 'grade,' and the jury could not be misled by it. It is a mere play upon words to say that because 'grade' means also 'quality,' therefore only quality was meant when the word grade was used, and the context both of the testimony and charge fully illustrates that no such confusion was intended or expressed."

"Kind of property," in an act referring to exemptions from rating, "refers to the sort of property, not to its locality." Tate v. Carlisle Board, 2 El. & Bl. 512. See also Toxteth Park Guardians v. Toxteth Park Board, 1 B. & S. 167, 176. 1. Wetter v. Walker, 62 Ga. 144, quoting 2 Wms. Exrs. 815.

The kindred by affinity of a poor person cannot maintain a complaint against the father of such person for expenses of support, the term "any

kindred" in the Rev. Stat., extending only to kindred by consanguinity. Farr v. Flood, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 24.

So in Leigh v. Leigh, 15 Ves. 107, it is said: "In a general sense the being of a man's kindred is being of his blood; as the word 'consanguinity,' which is the same as 'kindred,' imports."

2. Power v. Hafley (Ky.), 4 S. W. Rep. 683, where it was held to include children by adoption.

In Delano v. Benerton, 148 Mass. 619 (s. c., 20 N. E. Rep. 309), it was held that an adopted child who is at the same time the grandson of the adopting father, cannot inherit the property of his grandfather in a twofold capacity, as his son and as his grandson. The court said: "He claims the right to inherit, under the first part of the section, as his son, and under the last clause because he is included among his 'kindred,' when the legislature provided that no person should, by being adopted, lose his right to inherit from his natural parents or kindred. We do not think it understood or intended that 'kindred' should include the adopting parent. It intended to save the right of inheritance from other parties, having already provided as to the right of inheritance from the adopting parents."

3. Hughes v. Decker, 38 Me. 153, where the mother of an illegitimate child was held not to be of its “kindred."

Half-blood.-Massachusetts Gen. St.. ch. 91, § 5, providing that "kindred of the half-blood shall inherit equally with those of the whole blood in the same degree," must be construed as meaning to admit the kindred of the half-blood relation in the different degrees to participation in personalty with those of the whole blood in the same degree. Larrabee v. Tucker, 116 Mass. 562.