tions are alleged to have been false and fraudulent. Repairs being required on the premises, B was let into partial possession and made repairs, which, by agreement, were to be included in the debt. Subsequently the lot was sold under the mortgage without relief from valuation or appraisement laws, although the mortgage did not authorize this, and the property was purchased by B, who had been let into full possession and who now claims to hold an absolute title to the property, although the time for redemption has not yet expired. It is alleged that the rents and profits since the property has been in possession of B, have more than paid both debts, interest and repairs. A offered to pay any balance due on an account being taken, and demands judgment for any excess of payment and possession of the property. Held, that the complaint contains a good cause of action. Scheffermeyer v. Schaper, 97 Ind. 70. See also Felton v. Smith, 84 Ind. 485.

In another recent case, arising in Illinois, it appeared that land was sold on execution, at a grossly inadequate price, and bid in by one who was the family physician of the debtor, and regarded as an intimate friend and advisor, the debtor being an aged, illiterate person, almost wholly ignorant of his legal rights. The purchaser promised to give the debter all the time he wanted to redeem, telling him he had fifteen months in which to redeem, and by artifice and misrepresentation lulled him into a sense of security until the time of redemption had passed, with the knowledge and participation of the assignee of the certificate of purchase, to whom a sheriff's deed was made. It was held, that the debtor, under these circumstances, was entitled, on bill in equity, to redeem from the sale, and have the sheriff's deed set aside as a cloud on his title. Palmer v. Douglas et al., 107 Ill. 204. See also Fletcher v. McGill, 110 Ind. 395.

But where a purchaser at an execution sale, after the sale, offered to convey to the execution debtor the land purchased, upon being paid a certain amount within a certain time, which amount the debtor agreed to pay within the time named, if he could raise it, but failed to perform on his part, it was held, that these facts would not support an action by the debtor against the pur

chaser and his grantee to redeem the land. Tarkington v. Conley, 59 Iowa 28.

1. Dougherty v. Postgate, 3 Iowa 92; Rorer on Judicial Sales, § 1181; Lytle v. Etherly, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 389; People v. Mayhew, 26 Cal. 655.

The holder of a sheriff's certificate of purchase of real estate sold on execution cannot defeat a redemption in a case where the clerk receives in good faith the amount necessary to redeem in bank notes, deposits them in bank and has continuously, from the time of the receipt, lawful money ready for the holder of the certificate, which he is willing to deliver, and does tender, to him; and where such facts appear in the complaint, in an action to set aside the sheriff's deed executed after such redemption, and to quiet title to the land. the complaint is sufficient on demurrer. Boyd v. Olvey, 82 Ind. 294. See also Webb v. Watson, 18 Iowa 537; Hall v. Fisher, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 17; Buford v. Henzier, 8 Biss. (U. S.) 177 But compare People v. Hays, 4 Cal. 127, People v. Baker, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 602.

2. In some States it may be paid to the officer who made the sale. Elkin v. People, 3 Scam. (Ill.) 207; People v. Baker, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 602. In others to the clerk of the court. Webb v. Watson, 18 Iowa 537. In others it is sufficient to offer to credit the debtor with the amount where the creditor redeems. Moore v. Gore, 35 Ala. 701. See also Elkin v. People, 3 Scam. (III.) 207; s. c., 36 Am. Dec. 541, and note; Freeman on Executions, § 318.

The holder of the certificate of sale, and not the assignee of the judgment, is entitled to the redemption money. Brown v. Harrison, 93 Ind. 142.

A, B and C, in consecutive order of time, obtained judgments against D, which became liens on the debtor's real estate. A's judgment was satisfied by sheriff's sale of the real estate to A, and B, within the proper time, redeemed by virtue of his judgment, paying the proper sum to the clerk, which the clerk, upon demand, paid to A as for such redemption. B's judgment was afterwards reversed for error, and remanded, and another trial resulted in another judgment in his favor. B then brought suit against A, C, D, and the sheriff, alleging these facts, and that D still owned the land, and was otherwise

DEATH; DISCONTINUANCE; ERROR, WRIT OF FOREIGN ATTACHMENT; NOTICE; REMOVAL OF CAUSES; SERVICE OF PROCESS, etc. etc.

Conflicts of Jurisdiction. See CONFLICTS OF LAWS; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; HABEAS CORPUS; INTERNATIONAL LAW; JUDGMENT; NONRESIDENTS; PARTITION; REMOVAL OF CAUSES, etc. etc. Effect of Acting without Jurisdiction. -See CONSTABLE; HABEAS CORPUS; JUDGE; JUDGMENT; JUSTICE OF THE PEACE; MALICIOUS PROSECUTION; SHERIFF, etc. etc.

Incidental Jurisdiction. See also CONTEMPT OF COURT; COURTS [for RULES OF COURT].

Restraint of Acting without Jurisdic tion.-See PROHIBITION, Writ of.

Territorial Jurisdiction.-See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; EQUITY; EJECTMENT; NONRESIDENTS; SERVICE OF PROCESS; PARTITION, etc. etc.

1. Bouv. L. Dict. (15th ed.), vol. 2,

P. 26.

2. Definition.-There is perhaps no word in English law that has been more frequently defined than this of "jurisdiction." From the earliest times we find the question of its proper definition engaging the attention of jurists. Thus we find the following: "And jurisdiction is nothing else than to have the authority of judging, that is of pronouncing judgment between parties in actions against persons or things, according as they have been brought into judgment by an authority either ordinary or delegated, concerning which we have spoken above concerning the powers of those who judge.' Bracton De Legibus Angliae (Master of Rolls' ed. 1883), vol. 6, p. 159, or lib. 5, tract 5, fol. 400 v. Juris ductio est potestas de publico introducta cum necessitate jurisdicendi, 1 Bulst. 210." The case of the Marshalsea, 10 Coke 73a, or as translated by Mr. Burrill: "Jurisdiction is a power introduced of common right [by public authority or for the common benefit] arising out of the necessity of declaring the law."

66

"The right by which judges exer

cise their power. "Hale's Anal., § 11. "The power of hearing and determining causes, and of doing justice, in matters of complaint." Halifax Anal., v. 3, c. 8, num. 4.

In the United States supreme court in 1832 the word was thus defined by Mr. JUSTICE BALDWIN: "The power to hear and determine a cause is juris diction; it is coram judice,' whenever & case is presented which brings this power into action; if the petitioner states such a case in his petition that on a demurrer the court would render judgment in his favor, it is an undoubted case of jurisdiction, whether on an answer denying and putting in issue the allegations of the petition, the petitioner makes out his case, is the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by the filing of a petition containing all the requisites and in the manner prescribed by law." U. S. v. Arrendo et al., 6 Peters (U. S.) 691, 709.

And the same justice said later (1838) that "jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between parties to a suit, to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them; the question is, whether on a case before a court, their action is judicial or extrajudicial; without the authority of law, to render a judgment or decree upon the rights of the litigant parties. If the law confers the power to render a judgment or decree, then the court has jurisdiction; what shall be adjudged or decreed between the parties, and with which is the right of the case, is judicial action by hearing and determining it. State of Rhode Island v. State of Massachusetts, 12 Peters (U. S.), 657, 718. See also Grignon's Lessee v. Astor et al., 2 How. (U. S.) 319, 338.

Many of the decisions in the State courts are to the same effect. Thus in a recent case in Indiana (1887), the court, in reversing the court below on an appeal on the ground that the court had not jurisdiction in the case, said: "Two things are absolutely essential to the power of a court to decide a legal controversy-jurisdiction of the subject matter and jurisdiction of the person.

Both must exist, otherwise it is the imperative duty of the court to decline to do more than ascertain and declare that it has no power to examine or decide the merits of the controversy. Authors and courts agree upon this rudimentary principle of law. Neither in reason nor upon authority can there be a doubt as to its soundness. Power is essential to the validity of every act, judicial, legislative or executive. Where there is no power to hear and determine, there can be no judicial decision. Expressions of individual opinion there may be, but a' judicial judgment there cannot be. A judicial judgment is the product of power-the power of the law-and is not the mere expression of the individual opinion of a judge. The question is purely and intrinsically one of power, for the jurisdiction of a court consists solely in its power to hear and determine the causes brought to its bar. If jurisdiction does not exist, power is absent, and if power is lacking, an expression of opinion upon any other than a jurisdictional question, although judicial in form, is simply the opinion of its author; valuable, it may possibly be, as an argument, but effective as the opinion of the court it is not." Robertson v. State (Ind.), 7 West. Rep. 481, 488; s. c., 10 Northeast. Rep. 582, 583. Many of the State courts have defined jurisdiction as the power to hear and determine the cause. See Wightman v. Krasner, 20 Ala. 446; Goodman v. Winter, 64 Ala. 410; Tramwell v. Town of Russellville, 34 Ark. 105; Hickman v. O'Neal, 10 Cal. 292; Ex parte Bennett, 44 Cal. 84; Buch v. Hanson, 70 Ill. 480; Schroeder v. Merchants & Mec. Ins. Co., 104 Ill. 71; State v. Lazarus (La.), 1 South. Rep. 361, 391; Bumstead v. Read, 31 Barb. (N Y.) 661; King v. Poole, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 242; Brownsville v. Basse, 43 Tex. 440; State v. Whitford, 54 Wis. 150, 157.

1. Alleged Defect in Definition. If jurisdiction is simply the power to hear and determine, it follows that a court having jurisdiction of a cause may enter whatever judgment it may think proper, because it is a principle of the common law that the judgment of a court having jurisdiction is conclusive, and therefore there is no tribunal that

could collaterally revise and correct its decision. Thus in a case where, in an adverse proceeding, a decree had been entered restraining a municipal corporation from granting to certain persons the right to construct a railroad on a city street, and subsequently a person had been adjudged guilty of a contempt in not obeying that injunction, and fined on appeal to the court of errors and appeals, JOHNSON, J., in delivering the opinion of the appellate court, quoted the above definition from State of Rhode Island, State of Massachusetts, 12 Pet. (U. S.) 718), ante, n. 2, p. 245), and then continued: "This, I apprehend, points to the true line of enquiry to determine the question of jurisdiction. We are not called upon to say whether the court decided right or not in granting the injunction, but whether it became their duty to decide either that it should be granted or denřed. If such was their duty, then they had jurisdiction, and their decision, be it correct or erroneous, is the law of the case until it shall be reversed upon appeal; and can only be questioned upon a direct proceeding to review it, and not collaterally." People v. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y. 263, 267.

And in 1809, in an action of ejectment, wherein the defendants relied upon a purchase at an execution issued on a judgment confiscating the said real estate, the plaintiff contended that the act did not authorize confiscation in this case. The supreme court refused to consider this question, because the court which entered the judgment had general jurisdiction in the action, and therefore its judgment, even if erroneous, was not void, and could not be enquired into in a collateral proceeding. Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy, 5 Cranch (U. S.) 173.

So in another early case in the United States supreme court (1830), where in a petition for a habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of the petitioner's imprisonment by virtue of a judgment of a United States circuit court, the petitioner alleged that the indictments under which he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, charged no offence for which the pris oner was punishable in the court, or of which that court could take cognizance, and consequently that the proceedings