levied upon until they have been made parties to the judgment by scire facias.1 survivors and the executor or administrator of the decedent, or his heirs and terretenants in a real action or ejectment. Bolinger v. Fowler, 14 Ark. 27; Greer v. State Bank, 10 Ark. 456; Huey v. Redden, 3 Dana (Ky.) 488; Calloway v. Ewbank, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 280; Holder v. Commonwealth, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 407; Murray v. Baker, 5 B. Mon. (Ky.) 172; Gray v. McDowell, 5 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 501; McAfee v. Patterson, 2 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 172; Zanesville etc. Co. v. Granger, 7 Ohio 165; Dowling v. McGregor, 91 Pa. St. 410. Compare Vredenburgh v. Snyder, 6 Iowa 39; Finn v. Crabtree, 12 Ark. 597; Hanson v. Jacks, 22 Ala. 549; Howe v. Gibert, 2 Bail. (S. Car.) 306; Dibble v. Taylor, 2 Spear (S. Car.) 308; s. c., 42 Am. Dec. 368; Hamlin v. Atkinson, 6 Rand. (Va.) 574; Swan v. Hazen, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 46. Persons who claim title to real property by title paramount to the lien of the judgment should not be made parties. Polk v. Pendleton, 31 Md. 118; Morton v. Croghan, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 106; Lusk v. Davidson, 3 Penr. & W. (Pa.) 229. Personal Representatives.-A judgment may ordinarily be revived by or against an executor or administrator. Baker v. Ingersoll, 37 Ala. 503; Powell v. Macon, 40 Ark. 541; Knapp v. Knapp, 134 Mass. 353; Laidley v. Kline, 23 W. Va. 565; Halsey v. Van Vliet, 27 Kan. 474 Shepherd v. Ryan, 53 Ga. 563; Ireland v. Litchfield, 22 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 178. See also Sharp v. Herrin, 32 Ala. 502; Commercial Bank v. Kendall, 13 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 278; Gwin v. Latimer, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 22; Howard v. Randall, 58 Vt. 567. Heirs. A judgment may be revived against the heirs of the judgment debtor to compel its satisfaction from the lands descended to them. Ogden v. Smith, 14 Ala. 428; Burbridge v. China, 34 La. An. 681; Commercial Bank v. Kendall, 13 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 278; Wood v. Harrison, Dev. & Bat. (N. Car.) 356; Campbell v. Rawdon, 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 495; Lusk v. Davidson, 3 Penr. & W. (Pa.) 229. Compare Powell v. Macon, 40 Ark. 541. But it has been held that the cause of action must be proved against heirs de novo. Cox v. Reed, 27 Ill. 434; Colwell v. Rockwell, 100 Pa. St. 133 Heirs and Personal Representatives. -It has been held that the writ will not lie against the heirs at law and the personal representative jointly. Strong v. Lee, 44 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 61; Barnes v. McLemore, 12 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 316; Welborn v. Jolly, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 279; Walden v. Craig, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 147. Compare Bank v. Powell, 3 Fla. 175; s. c., 52 Am. Dec. 367. But where the judgment affects the title to land, the personal representative, heirs and terretenants are all made parties. Reynolds v. Henderson, 2 Gilm. (Ill.) 110; Graves v. Skeels, 6 Ind. 107; Calloway v. Ewbank, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 286; Mitchell v. Smith, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 243; Roland v. Harbaugh, 5 Watts (Pa.) 365; Dougherty v. Hurt, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 430. Compare Lee v. McClosky, 44 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 60. Practice. For matters of practice, form and requisites of writ, service, etc., title Scire Facias, and note 94 Am. Dec. 235. see As to the requirements of notice, see Rose v. Thompson, 36 Ark. 254; Gruble v. Wood, 27 Kan. 535; Lichty v. Hochstettler, 91 Pa. St. 444; Adams v. Roe, 11 Me. 89; s. c., 25 Am. Dec. 266. υ. As to the time within which proceedings to revive judgments by scire facias must be brought, see Thomas Towns, 66 Ga. 78; Anzell v. Martin, 24 Kan. 334; Tefft v. Citizens' Bank, 36 Kan. 457; Kirby v. Cash, 93 Pa. St. 505; Hughes v. Torrence, 111 Pa. St. 611; Laidley v. Kline, 23 W. Va. 565; Shackelford v. Miller, 18 Ala. 675; Knapp v. Knapp, 134 Mass. 353 At common law there was no limitation of the time. Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bland (Md.) 284; s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 236. 1. Polk v. Pendleton, 31 Md. 118; In re Fulton's Estate, 51 Pa. St. 212; Dengler v. Kiehner, 13 Pa. St. 38; s. c., 53 Am. Dec. 441; Fox v. Seal, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 441. According to some authorities, terretenants are necessary parties although the judgment debtor is living. Bowie v. Neale, 41 Md. 124; Doub v. Barnes, 4 Gill (Md.) 1; Murphy v. Cord, 12 G. & J. (Md.) 182; Zerns v. Watson, 11 Pa. St. 260; Chahoon v. Hollenbeck, 16 S. & R. (Pa.) 425; s. c., 16 Am. Dec. 587. Compare Lunsford v. Turner, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 104; Morton v. The scire facias must issue from the court where the judgment was entered or to which the record has been removed.I While a scire facias has been called an action for some purposes, it is not a new action, but a continuance of the old one.3 The judgment rendered is not a new one for the debt and damages, but an order that execution issue.4 Croghan, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 106. See also Von Puhl v. Rucker, 6 Iowa 187; Williams v. Fowler, 3 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 316. 1. Barron v. Pagles, 6 Ala. 422; Funderburk V. Smith, 74 Ga. 515; Dickinson v. Allison, 10 Ga. 557; Handley v. Fitzhugh, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 562; Osgood v. Thurston, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 110; State v. Brown, 41 Me. 535; Vallance v. Sawyer, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 62; Martinez v. Vives' Succ., 32 La. An. 305; State v. Kinne, 39 N. H. 129; Tindall v. Carson, 16 N. J. L. 94; Wilson v. Tierman, 3 Mo. 577; Dougherty's Estate, 9 W. & S. (Pa.) 189; s. c., 42 Am. Dec. 326; Grimke v. Mayrant, 2 Brev. (S. Car.) 202; Gibson v. Davis, 22 Vt. 374. Compare Freeman v. Batchelder, 36 Vt. 292. In Nebraska, the county court can revive its own judgments. Dennis v. Omaha Bank, 19 Neb. 675; Hunter v. Leahy, 18 Neb. So. In Oregon, only the circuit court can revive a judgment of a justice's court to make it a lien on real estate. Glaze v. Lewis, 12 Oreg. 347. 2. Ensworth v. Davenport, 9 Conn. 390; Kirkland v. Krebs, 34 Md. 93; Gedney v. Com., 14 Gratt. (Va.) 318; Bentley v. Sevier, 1 Hemp. (U. S.) 249; Howard v. Randall, 58 Vt. 564. υ. 3. Blackwell v. State, 3 Ark. 320; Brown v. Harley, 2 Fla. 159; Denegre 7. Hann, 13 Iowa 240; Challenor v. Niles, 78 Ill. 78; Adams v. Roe, 11 Me. 89; s. c., 25 Am. Dec. 266; Comstock 7. Holbrook, 16 Gray (Mass.) 111; Gray . Thrasher, 104 Mass. 373; Kirkland v. Krebs, 34 Md. 93; Eldred v. Hazlett, 38 Pa. St. 16; Irwin Nixon's Heirs, 11 Pa. St. 419; s. c., 51 Am. Dec. 559; Ingram v. Belk, 2 Strobh. (S. Car.) 207; Hopkins v. Howard, 12 Tex. 7; Carter v. Carriger 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 411; s. c., 24 Am. Dec. 585; Treasurer v. Foster, 7 Vt. 52; Lavell v. McCurdy, 77 Va. 763; Fitzhugh v. Blake, 2 Cranch (U. S.) 37; Hatch v. Eustis, 1 Gall. (U. S.) 160. Compare Greenway v. Dare, 16 N. J. L. 305; Connigal v. Smith, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 106; Bibo v. Allen, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 31. Reversal or satisfaction of the original judgment has a like, effect on the scire facias. Eldred v. Hazlett, 38 Pa. St. 16. The lien of a judgment against two persons may be continued against one of them by an amicable scire facias. Edward's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 89. But ordinarily all defendants who are living must be made parties. Bolinger v. Fowler, 14 Ark. 29; Calhoun v. Adams, 43 Ark. 238; Bowie v. Neale, 41 Md. 124; McAfee v. Patterson, 2 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 593; Funderburk v. Smith, 74 Ga. 515; Austin v. Reynolds, 13 Tex. 544; Carson v. Moore, 23 Tex. 450; Grenell v. Sharp, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 344; See also Lewis v. Oliver, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 412; Clinton Bank v. Hart, 19 Ohio 372. Although as against the judgment debtor and his heirs or personal representatives, the scire facias proceeding is a continuation of the original proceedings in which the judgment was obtained; yet as against terretenants, who are entire strangers, a scire facias intended to subject land claimed by them to the payment of a judgment against another, must be regarded as so far a new proceeding that everything necessary to coexist to affect their rights must appear in the writ. Bish v. Williar, 59 Md. 382. Who May Revive.-An attorney who has an interest in a judgment, evidenced by and embraced in the judgment may sue for its revival. Martinez v. Vives' Succ., 32 La. An. 305. If a fi. fa. be paid off by one of the joint defendants therein, and transferred to him, he is entitled to have it revived on becoming dormant in the name of the plaintiff for his use. Huckaby v. Sasser, 69 Ga. 603. 4. Hanly . Adams, 15 Ark. 232; Denegre v. Hann, 13 Iowa 240; Murray v. Baker, 5 B. Mon. (Ky.) 172; Locke v. Brady, 30 Miss. 21; Woolston v. Gale, 9 N. J. L. 32; Tindall v. Carson, 16 N. J. L. 94; Bullock v. Ballew, No defence can be presented to a scire facias that might have been taken advantage of in the original action; nor can mere errors or irregularities in the original proceedings be presented in defence of the scire facias.2 Any defence which has arisen 9 Tex. 498: Camp v. Gainer, 8 Tex. 372; Whitworth v. Thompson, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 480; Lavell v. McCurdy, 77 Va. 763. Compare Huston v. Ditto, 20 Md. 305; Conyngham v. Walter, 95 Pa. St. 85. But where, in Massachusetts, a trial justice, in an action against the administrator of an estate, erroneously rendered a judgment for damages and costs against the estate, and the execution issued thereon was declared illegal, an order of the superior court, upon a petition for a writ of scire facias to obtain a new execution on the judgment, that execution should issue against the estate for the damages, was affirmed by the supreme court upon the plaintiff entering a remittitur for the amount of the costs. Look v. Luce, 140 Mass. 461. Alimony. The writ will not lie to enforce the payment of temporary alimony where the amount due cannot be ascertained from the record. Chestnut v. Chestnut, 77 Ill. 346. But it will lie for alimony where the amount is certain. Morton v. Morton, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 518. 1. Calhoun v. Adams, 43 Ark. 238; Betancourt v. Eberlin, 71 Ala. 461; Duncan v. Hargrove, 22 Ala. 150; Bradford v. Bradford, 5 Conn. 127; Camp v. Baker, 40 Ga. 148; Harrison v. Hart, 21 Ill. App. 348; Vredenburgh v. Snyder, 6 Iowa 39; McCutchen v. Askew, 34 La. An. 340; Folger v. Slaughter, 33 La. An. 341; Bowen v. Bonner, 45 Miss. 10; Pollard v. Eckford, 50 Miss. 631; Smith v. Eaton, 36 Me. 298; s. c., 58 Am. Dec. 746; Stephens v. Howe, 127 Mass. 164; Riley v. McCord, 24 Mo. 265; Kemp v. Cook, 6 Md. 305; Moore v. Garrettson, 6 Md. 444; NcFarland v. Irwin, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 77; Fereber v. Doxey, 6 Ired. (N. Car.) 448; Dowling v. McGregor, 91 Pa. St. 410; Barber v. Chandler, 17 Pa. St. 48; s. c., 55 Am. Dec. 533; Koon v. Ivey, 8 Rich. (S. Car.) L. 37; Bell v. Williams, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 196; Love v. Allison, 2 Tenn. Ch. 111; Dickson v. Wilkinson, 3 How. (U. S.) 57; May v. State Bank, 2 Rob. (Va.) 56; s. C., 40 Am. Dec. 726. See also Dunn v. Brogden, 68 Ga. 63. Compare Gris wold v. Stewart, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 459 The plea of coverture to a scire facias to revive and continue the lien of a judgment, entered on the warrant of attorney, in the bond of a married woman, is not a denial of the existence of the judgment on which the scire facias issued, nor an averment of the satisfaction or the discharge thereof; it is therefore inappropriate and insufficient to prevent the entry of judgment, and it is not error for the court to strike it off. Coulyn v. Parker, 113 Pa. St. 29. Upon a scire facias to revive a judgment which was served on the defendant and on the voluntary assignee for the benefit of creditors of a firm of which the defendant was a member as terretenant, the latter, being a mere volunteer, cannot defeat a judgment of revival by averring generally in an affdavit of defence that the real estate assigned to him was partnership real estate, and as such not subject to the lien of a judgment against one partner; and further, that the assigned estate being insufficient to pay partnership creditors, no surplus would remain for individual creditors. The plaintiff in such case is entitled to a judgment of revival, without prejudice to the subsequent determination of the respective rights of partnership and individual creditors. Kepler v. Erie etc. Co., 101 Pa. St. 602. It is no defence to a scire facias to revive a judgment that the amount of the judgment has already been allowed, without a revivor, in a suit instituted by the personal representative for the purpose of administering the estate, as an insolvent estate, and ordered to be paid its pro rata. McIntosh v. Paul, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 45. See also Carter v. Coleman, 12 Ired. (N. Car.) 274. In Louisiana, lack of jurisdiction of the person is no defence to an action to revive a judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction ratione materiæ. Theriot v. Bayard, 37 La. An. 689. A judgment against a township may be revived by scire facias although it does not own real estate. Conyngham v. Walter, 95 Pa. St. 85. 2. Betancourt v. Eberlin, 71 Ala. since the judgment was rendered may be set up in scire facias proceedings based thereon.1 The remedy by scire facias has been abolished in some States and the remedy by action on the judgment substituted.2 461; Anthony v. Humphries, 9 Ark. 76; Richardson v. Walcott, 10 Allen (Mass.) 439; Langston v. Abney, 43 Miss. 164; Bank v. Dunn, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 513; Ford v. Beckwith, 48 Ill. 210. See also Brown v. Neale, 3 Allen (Mass.) 74. 1. Brown v. Morange, 108 Pa. St. 346; Thompson . Hurley, 19 Iowa 331; Downey v. Forrester, 35 Md. 117. Compare Shaw v. Boyd, 12 Pa. St. 215. Nul tiel record is a good plea to a writ of scire facias. Bergen v. Williams, 4 McLean (U. S.) 125; Hager v. Cochran, 66 Md. 263. If the original judgment has been reversed, the writ will not lie. Mills v. Conner, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 7. A terretenant may defend by showing that the judgment was never a lien on his land. Colwell v. Easley, 83 Pa. St. 31. The pendency of an appeal with supersedeas which does not prevent the failure of the judgment lien is no defence to a scire facias to revive the judgment. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 17 Mo. App. 590; Farrelly v. Cross, 10 Ark. 404. Where the judgment debtor, on the order to show cause, made affidavit that the judgment was paid and satisfied, it was held error to revive it without hearing testimony. Garrison v. Aultman, 20 Neb. 311; Cowan v. Shields, 1 Overt. (Tenn.) 64. See also Hartman v. Alden, 34 N. J. L. 518; Seymour v. Hubert, 83 Pa. St. 346. Upon the trial of a scire facias to revive a judgment, it is competent to show by parol testimony that by reason of what has occurred since the judgment was entered, the plaintiff is not entitled, according to the terms of a verbal agreement between the parties, to have his execution. Bown v. Morange, 108 Pa. St. 69. A judgment absolutely void cannot be revived. Levy v. Calhoun, 34 La. An. 413; In re Administrators' Board, 37 La. An. 916; McFadden v. Lockhart, 7 Tex. 573; Phelps v. Hawkins, 6 Mo. 197. See also Gray v. Stuart, 33 Gratt. (Va.) 351; Jones v. Dilworth, 63 Pa. St. 447. Where the period of the statute of limitations has elapsed from the date of the judgment, and no fi. fa. was issued, or, if issued, no levy was made, and no steps taken as provided by law to revive the same, proceeding by scire facias is barred in some States. Siebels v. Hodges, 65 Ga. 245. Compare Betancourt v. Eberlin, 71 Ala. 461. In a scire facias against heirs and devisees to continue the lien of a judgment entered against an executor within five years of the decedent's death, the defendants may contest the debt, not the lien. Colwell v. Rockwell, 100 Pa. St. 133. Discharge in bankruptcy is a proper defence to scire facias to revive a judgment, and if not set up the defendant will be concluded by a judgment of revival. Thomas v. Towns, 66 Ga. 78; Murphy v. Crawford, 114 Pa. St. 496. 2. Humiston v. Smith, 21 Cal. 129; Hughes v. Shreve, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 547; Alden v. Clark, 11 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 209; Thurston v. King, 1 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 126. 150; JUDICIAL NOTICE (See FOREIGN LAWS; NOTICE). 1. Definition.—Judicial notice is the exercise, by courts, of knowledge of facts of uniform natural occurrence, immemorial usage, historical sanction, or general notoriety; and, when admissible, so recognizing and acting upon them without averment or proof. 2. Generally. Courts will usually take notice of whatever ought to be generally known or generally ascertainable within the limits. of their jurisdiction. The general principle upon which this class of facts is received, without averment or proof, is that the court knows; and if it is not sufficiently advised, the fact may be ascertained by special enquiry and reference to any authentic means of knowledge. The judges do not assume any private or technical information of the matter, but they simply recognize the fact as being already sufficiently established. When such fact is of universal application it will be judicially noticed, generally; but where its operation is absolute within certain limitations, it will only be recognized within the jurisdiction to which the same extends. Thus impressed with absolute verity, such facts may be embraced in instructions to juries without infringing upon their province of determining issues of fact. While the rules governing the exercise of this peculiar power by the courts are founded in well settled principles of the law, the subjects requiring such determination are so various and diverse in character, it would seem, those rules cannot, in every instance, be made strictly to apply, and the decision must frequently depend upon the particular circumstances in such cases. The admissibility of those classes of facts, which are in their nature official, political, 1. Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37; I Greenleaf's Ev. (14th ed ), § 6. General Principles Upon Which Facts Are Judicially Noticed. The principle upon which certain matters are judicially noticed, without any proof being required in respect to them, appears to be partly, that they are of such general and public notoriety that every subject of the realm may fairly be presumed to be acquainted with them; and partly, that the matters so noticed are generally quite collateral to and unconnected with the point in issue, and are of such a kind that there is no risk in dispensing with the strict formal proof, whereas, in requiring it there might be great inconvenience by reason |