THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF LAW. JOINTURE.-See DOWER. JOURNEY.-See CONCEALED WEAPONS; TRAVEL. JOURNEYS ACCOUNTS.-A new writ which the plaintiff was permitted to sue out within a reasonable time after the abatement, without his fault, of the first writ.1 J. P.-Abbreviation for Justice of the Peace.2 1. Spencer's Case, 6 Co. 10; Kinsey v. Heyward, 1 Ld. Raym. 432; Davies v. Lowndes, 7 M. & G. 762; Richards v. Maryland Ins. Co., 8' Cr. (U. S.) 84; Bouv. L. Dict. It is a continuance of the former writ, and must be in the same court, between the same parties, or where one of the plaintiffs has died, or one of the defendants. Spencer's Case, 6 Co. 10. "The word dieta signifies a day's journey, and the best account of the word is given by Selden, that the chancery being a movable court and following the king's court, the party who purchased the second writ ought to have applied to the king's court as hastily as the distance of the place would allow, accounting twenty miles for every day's journey." Kinsey v. Heyward, 1 Ld. Raym. 432. 2. "Two justices then were authorized to take bail in the present case. The persons approving of the recognizance respectively affixed to their sig. natures the letters, J. P. These charac12 C. of L.-I 1 ters are understood to be an abbreviation of the term justice of the peace, one in common use and clearly indicating that that office is intended. It sufficiently appears that the bond was entered into before and approved by two justices." Shattuck v. People, 5 III. 477. 3. Jubilee cannot be registered as a trade mark under the English statutes on the subject. "It is not, obviously, meaningless or not descriptive with reference to note paper, because it may be note paper which is produced in the jubilee year. I have said the jubilee year. Mr. Ashton argued at some little length that the word jubilee' was not a good English word; but it is plain that it is a common English word, and used without reference to the term year. The term 'jubilee' is used by several writers of authority, not of the present day, but of times past, such as Dryden and Sir Walter Scott, and I could give many others." Towgood v. Pirie, 56 L. T., N. S. 305; s. c., 35 W. R. 729. Definition. JUDGE (See also BILL OF EXCEPTIONS; CHANGE OF VENUE; CONTEMPT; CORONER; COURTS; DE FACTO OFFICERS; EVIDENCE; INSTRUCTIONS; JURISDICTION; JURY AND JURY TRIAL; JUDICIAL NOTICE; JUSTICE OF THE PEACE; NEW TRIAL; OFFICERS (Public); TRIAL). I. Definition, 2. II. General Powers and Duties, 3. 1. Personal Nature of Duties, 3. 2. Judicial and Ministerial (a) Nonjudicial Duties, 5. 3. Territorial Limitation of 4. Review of Decisions, 10. 6. Property Under Court's Con- III. Powers and Duties in Matters of Practice, 11. 1. Attendance at Trial, 11. 2. Appeals and Bills of Exception, II. 3. New Trials, 13. 4. Opinions and Orders, 13. IV. Rights in Relation to Office, 17. (a) Abolition or Change of 3. Vacancies in Office, 20. [24. V. Special and Substitute Judges, 1. Definition, 24. 2. Powers and Duties, 24. (a) Constitutional Law, 24. 26. (c) When Special Judge Can Act, 26 (d) When Special Fudge Cannot Act, 27. (e) Proof of Special Judges' Authority, 28. VI. Judges as Witnesses, 31. 5. Classes of Judges Within the Rule, 38. 6. Liability for Fraud and Corruption, 39. VIII. Disqualification of Judges, 40. 1. General Principle, 40. 2. Disqualification at Common Law, 41. [42. 3. Disqualification by Statute, 4. Character of Disqualifying Interest, 45. (a) Generally, 45. (b) Interest as Citizen, 46. (d) What Interest Disquali- (e) What Interest Does Not Disqualify, 48. 5. Void and Voidable Acts, 48. 6. Removal of Disqualification, (a) Generally, 50. (b) Consent of Parties, 50. [50. 7. Disqualification in Decedents' Estates, 51. 8. Disqualification for Prejudice, 52. 9. Disqualification for Relationship, 54 10. Disqualification as Former Counsel, 55. II. Practice, Evidence, etc., 57. I. DEFINITION.-A judge is a public officer appointed to decide litigated questions according to law; an officer so named in his commission and who presides in some court.1 1. Bouv. L. Dict. Other Definitions.-A judge is a person whose office is to administer justice in courts held for that purpose; a public officer authorized by law to hear and 2 statedly for that purpose. thority to hear and determine causes II. GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES-1. Personal Nature of Duties.A judge declining to preside may be compelled by mandamus, where there is no reason against his acting. Only judicial officers can exercise judicial powers or functions. Judicial offices must be exercised in person, and a judge cannot delegate his authority to another. The provisions of State con civil or criminal, and to administer justice between parties in courts held for that purpose, according to his commission or according to law. Webster's Dict., cited by counsel in Com. v. Conyngham, 65 Pa. St. 76. Judges Are Incident to Courts.-Under a power to establish courts, the legislature cannot maintain the office of judge except as incident to some court. Upon abolition of a court under valid statute, the judge's powers and functions, and his right to future salary, cease. Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala. 103, 118. Members of Court Martials Sit as Judges. It is a general and sound principle that whenever the law vests any person with a power to do an act and constitutes him a judge of the evidence on which the act may be done, and, at the same time, contemplates that the act is to be carried into effect through the instrumentality of agents, the person thus clothed with power is vested with discretion, and is, quoad hoc, a judge." Vanderheyden v. Young, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 158. Surrogate in New York Not a Judge.— Not every official who exercises functions some of which are of a judicial nature is to be holden a "judge." The surrogate in New York is not a "judge" within the limitation of seventy-year age in the New York constitution. Constitutions, which are general instruments framed for the reading by all classes of the commonwealth, are to have their language construed in a popular sense. People v. Carr, 100 N. Y. 236. Highway Commissioners.-Statutory prohibition of "any judge" disqualified from acting was held not to apply to highway commissioners in the State of New York whose duties under statute were ministerial. Foot v. Stiles, 57 N. Y. 399. Canal Commissioners.-Canal commissioners who hear evidence and argument, assess damages, etc., constitute a court. Regina v. Aberdale Canal Co., 14 Ad. & El. N. R. 854; Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, 3 H. of L. 759. Justice of the peace is a "judge of any court" within the meaning of a disqualifying statutory provision. Carrington v. Andrews, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 348; Edwards v. Russell, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 63; Foot v. Morgan, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 654; Baldwin v. McArthur, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 414, 423. of Justice and Judge. The word "justice" is frequently used instead "judge." Pa. Const., art. 5, § 5; 6 Vin. Abr. 484; Wheat. Dig. 127; 3 Com. Dig. 300; Ib. 386; 2 Bl. Com. Append. 111; Ib. 40; Ib. 41; 4 Inst. 73; 1 Pa. St. Laws. Appen. 58. Senior Judge. That the senior judge is he who has served the longest under his present commission rather than another judge who may have been longest in continuous service, see State v. Hueston, 44 Ohio St. 1. Chief Justice.-The law of Nevada provides that the senior justice in commission shall be chief justice, and in case the commission of any two bear the same date they are to determine by lot who shall be chief justice. In Kentucky, the constitution provides that the judge having the shortest time to serve shall be styled the chief justice. And see the constitutions of Oregon, Michigan, Georgia, West Virginia, Mississippi, Missouri, California and Nebraska. In 1886, in nineteen States, there was no provision for the selection of a chief justice, no such officer seeming to be known to the law. 1. State v. Judge (La.), 6 So. Rep. 22. Mandamus.-The rule in awarding mandamus at common law is that "it is not by the office of the person to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, that the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined. If mere ministerial duties are devolved on an officer, judicial or executive, he may be compelled to their performance." Thompson v. Holt, 52 Ala. 491; Tennessee etc. R. Co. v. Moore, 36 Ala. 371; Nichols v. Comptroller, 4 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 154. 2. Kent's Com (12th ed.) 457; Vandercook v. Williams, 106 Ind. 345; stitutions specifying the courts to be created and the judges to officiate therein, must be strictly followed, and even the legislature cannot create a commission in aid of a court established by the constitution. Nor can the constitution be evaded by chang Wilkins v. State, 113 Ind. 514; State v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350; Chandler υ. Nash, 5 Mich. 410. See also 39 Alb. L. J. 242, 257, and authorities cited in succeeding notes. The reception of a verdict is a judicial act. Judicial power cannot be delegated. Reception of a verdict by an attorney whom the court, with the consent of the parties, had designated to receive it, is a nullity; the consent of the defendant cannot vest such judicial authority in the person selected to receive it. Attorneys, to hold court, must be appointed in the mode and for the causes prescribed by law. Britton v. Fox, 39 Ind. 369; McClure v. State, 77 Ind. 287. Where a judge telegraphed to the clerk to discharge a jury and it was so done, it was held error, and the prisoner was entitled to discharge. State v. Jefferson, 66 N. Car. 309. 1. Vandercook v. Williams, 106 Ind. 345. In delivering the opinion of the court ELLIOTT, C. J., said: "The assumption that the supreme court can perform its judicial duties through the medium of masters in chancery or master commissioners, or persons charged with duties like those performed by masters in chancery and master commissioners is without foundation. If it cannot thus perform judicial duties, it can perform none, for its duty and its power are exclusively judicial. The supreme court must decide for itself all questions of law and of fact. The facts must be gathered from the record by the court itself, and cannot be obtained from any other source or by any other persons than the judges. It is a court of errors, an appellate tribunal charged with the duty of deciding cases upon the record, and this duty cannot be performed by deputies. Independently of any constitutional provisions, this would be so, because judicial powers cannot be delegated. This principle has been established for ages. CHANCELLOR KENT thus states this familiar rule: 'The general rule is that judicial offices must be exercised in person, and that a judge cannot delegate his authority to another. I do not know of any exception to this rule with us.' 3 Com. (12th ed.) son. 457; Broom, Leg. Max. 841; Campbell v. Commrs. of Monroe Co., 118 Ind. 119 (March 26th, 1889); Hards v. Burton, 79 Ill. 504. Those who are chosen by the people to sit as judges must themselves discharge all the judicial duties of their offices. The trust is imposed upon them and they cannot share their judicial duties with any perThe people have a right to the judgment of those whom they have made judges, and this right the judges cannot surrender, if they would, without a flagrant breach of a sworn duty. The trust is a personal one, inalienably invested in the persons selected by the people, and it cannot be delegated by the judges themselves, nor by anyone else for them. It is only the appointed judge,' says CHIEF JUSTICE RYAN, 'who can speak the authoritative words of the law. Van Slyke v. Trempealeau Co. Farmer's F. Inc. Co., 39 Wis. 390. But centuries before, and at a time when the king was the fountain of judicial power theoretically, and sat in the courts of law and equity, SIR EDWARD COKE even more emphatically stated the rule. Said that gladsome light' of jurisprudence, 'the judicature only belongeth to the judges.' 4 Inst. 73. MATTHEW BACON said: The king himself, though he be entrusted with the whole executive power of the law, cannot sit in judgment in any court, but his justice and the laws must be administered according to the power committed to and distributed among his several courts of justice.' 2 Bac. Abr. 619. Again we quote from this high authority, who, speaking of the judges, says: They cannot act by deputy, nor in any way transfer their power to another.' Id. 620. The theory of our governmental system, as embodied in our constitution, requires that the persons to whom the people have entrusted the judicial power shall themselves exercise it, and not entrust its exercise to others. A duty imposed upon a department of government must be performed by the chosen officers of that department, and it can neither be delegated nor surrendered. Cooley Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 116-139. Where a specific duty is imposed upon a tribunal, by that tribunal it must be performed with |