Opinion of the Court. 318 U.S. joint benefit. This court held that the Bankruptcy Act fixed the point of time which is to separate the old situation from the new in the bankrupt's affairs as the date when the petition is filed; that when the Act speaks of property which is exempt, and rights to exemption, it refers to that point of time-namely, the point as of which the general estate passes out of the bankrupt's control and with respect to which the status and rights of the bankrupt, the creditors, and the trustee in other particulars are fixed. The court said: "The exception, as its words and the context show, is not of property which would or might be exempt if some condition not performed were performed, but of property to which there is under the state law a present right of exemption-one which withdraws the property from levy and sale under judicial process.' Accordingly it was held that, as the claim of exemption was not perfected until after the petition was filed, it was ineffective as against the trustee, as it would have been against a creditor then having a levy on the property. If the law of Nevada respecting homestead exemptions were like that of Idaho, or operated in the same way, White v. Stump would be in point. 3. The Nevada Constitution, Art. 4, § 30, reads in part: "A homestead, as provided by law, shall be exempt from forced sale under any process of law, and shall not be alienated without the joint consent of husband and wife, when that relation exists; . . . and laws shall be enacted providing for the recording of such homestead within the county in which the same shall be situated." Section 3315 of the Compiled Laws of Nevada defines property which may be claimed as exempt as a homestead and permits selection by either the husband, the wife, or both, by a declaration of intention in writing to claim the same. After providing what the declaration shall con "White v. Stump, supra, p. 313. tain and that it shall be signed, acknowledged, and recorded as conveyances of real estate are required to be acknowledged and recorded, the statute continues: ". . . from and after the filing for record of said declaration, the husband and wife shall be deemed to hold said homestead as joint tenants." Section 8844 provides that "the following property is exempt from execution, . . . the homestead as provided for by law." 8 Historically, and under the theory of the present Act, bankruptcy has the force and effect of the levy of an execution for the benefit of creditors to insure an equitable distribution amongst them of the bankrupt's assets. The trustee is vested not only with the title of the bankrupt but clothed with the right of an execution creditor with a levy on the property which passes into the trustee's custody. Our question then is whether, under the constitution and statutes of Nevada, a declaration of homestead would be effective as against a creditor to prevent a judicial sale of the property if made and recorded after levy but before sale thereunder. If it would, it must be equally effective as against the trustee, whose rights rise no higher than those of the supposed creditor and attach at the date of the inception of bankruptcy. Examination of the Nevada cases relied on by the court below satisfies us that the settled law of the State entitles the debtor to his homestead exemption if the selection and recording occurs at any time before actual sale under execution. And indeed the petitioner so concedes in his brief, stating that he "admits that under the laws of Nevada as interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court, a * Remington, Bankruptcy, 4th Ed., pp. 4-6; In re Youngstrom, 153 F. 98, 103-4, and cases cited. Hawthorne v. Smith, 3 Nev. 182; McGill v. Lewis, 116 P. 2d 581. Opinion of the Court. 318 U.S. declaration of homestead filed at any time prior to actual execution sale is sufficient to establish the homestead right." In conformity to the principle announced in White v. Stump, that the bankrupt's right to a homestead exemption becomes fixed at the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy and cannot thereafter be enlarged or altered by anything the bankrupt may do, it remains true that, under the law of Nevada, the right to make and record the necessary declaration of homestead existed in the bankrupt at the date of filing the petition, as it would have existed in case a levy had been made upon the property. The assertion of that right before actual sale in accordance with state law did not change the relative status of the claimant and the trustee subsequent to the filing of the petition. The federal courts have generally so held and have distinguished White v. Stump where the state law was similar, in terms or in effect, to that of Nevada 10 The judgment is 10 In re Trammell, 5 F. 2d 326; McCrae v. Felder, 12 F. 2d 554. F.2d 292. Affirmed. Clark v. Nirenbaum, 8 F. 2d 451; Syllabus. CREEK NATION v. UNITED STATES.* CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CLAIMS. No. 321. Argued January 6, 7, 1943.-Decided April 5, 1943. 1. The provisions of treaties of 1866 with the Creek and Seminole Nations, whereby the United States guaranteed to them quiet possession of their country, can not be construed as obliging the United States to indemnify them for damages sustained through wrongful appropriations of tribal land in the guise of "station reservations," but for non-railroad purposes, by railroad companies whose lines were built and operated in the Indians' country by permission of the United States and under sanction of the treaties. P. 633. 2. Section 15 of the Act of February 28, 1902, provided that the Indian tribes through whose land railroads were to be built under the Act, should be compensated by the railroad companies for the land taken, and established a system of valuation under judicial supervision with a right of appellate review. These provisions prescribe an adequate method by which the tribes could protect their own interests, but contain no indication that the United States should pay for the lands taken. P. 636. 3. Read in view of its legislative history and its relation to other similar legislation, the Act of February 28, 1902 (§ 16), in providing that where a railroad is constructed under it in the Indian territory the railroad company shall pay to the Secretary of the Interior, for the benefit of the particular tribe or nation through whose lands it is constructed, "an annual charge of fifteen dollars per mile" did not make the Government an insurer of collection nor put upon the Secretary a mandatory duty to collect, nor does it import an obligation of the United States to the tribe for charges which railroad companies have failed to pay. P. 637. 4. The Act of April 26, 1906, § 11, providing that all revenues accruing to the Creek and Seminole tribes shall "be collected by an officer appointed by the Secretary of the Interior under rules and regulations to be prescribed by him" did not make the United States liable for rents and profits of tribal land allegedly taken and used for non-railroad purposes by railroad companies under color of *Together with No. 322, Seminole Nation v. United States, also on writ of certiorari, 317 U. S. 614, to the Court of Claims, Opinion of the Court. 318 U.S. authority to build and operate railroads in the Indians' country. P. 638. 5. As to trespasses which may have been committed by the railroads without compliance with the forms of the authorizing Acts, or as to holdings, once proper, which the railroads may have retained after the rights to them had expired, the Act of 1906 imposed no absolute duty on the Secretary to obtain compensation. P. 639. 6. The duty of the Secretary of the Interior under the Act of 1906 to collect revenues of the Creeks and Seminoles, and to bring suits for their use in the name of the United States for the collection of any moneys, or the recovery of any land claimed by them, was discretionary. P. 639. 7. The Creek and Seminole Tribes, not having been dissolved, had a legal right to bring actions for trespasses on their lands by railroad companies a right which was not precluded by the fact that the United States also, as guardian, was empowered to sue. P. 640. 97 Ct. Cls. 591, 723, affirmed. CERTIORARI, 317 U. S. 614, to review judgments sustaining demurrers to petitions setting up claims against the United States; and dismissing the petitions. See also 75 Ct. Cls. 873. Mr. Paul M. Niebell, with whom Messrs. C. Maurice Weidemeyer and W. W. Pryor were on the brief, for petitioners. Mr. Archibald Cox, with whom Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Littell, and Messrs. Vernon L. Wilkinson and Dwight D. Doty were on the brief, for the United States. MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. These actions were originally brought in 1926 under special jurisdictional acts of 1924, which gave the Court of Claims jurisdiction over claims under "any treaty or agreement between the United States" and these tribes.' 1 43 Stat. 133, 43 Stat. 139. See also the jurisdictional act of 1937, 50 Stat. 650. |