Opinion of the Court. 318 U.S. It is admitted that the $10,000,000 Trustees' Certificates or such of them as are presently held by the R. F. C. are worth par. No finding was made by the Commission of the value of the new Firsts. Evidence before the court showed them of a value between 80 and 90 and of poor marketability on account of the system's interest record. The court made no finding as to either. If the R. F. C. were treated on its notes, on the basis of the proportion of bonds held as collateral, precisely as the other noteholders, it would receive $414,175 of income mortgage bonds and $649,516 of new preferred stock, in addition to its proportion of common stock. 233 I. C. C. 409, 416. This proportion of common stock would allot a much greater aggregate of common stock to the R. F. C. than it obtained by the adjustment. By reason of accepting the less valuable new Firsts in lieu of cash for its $10,000,000 Trustees' Certificates, it will receive for the principal of its claims $1,185,200 of new income bonds and $1,777,800 of new preferred stock. The R. F. C. received its unpaid interest in no par common stock at $57 per share. This is the same allocation given claimants who hold the old Firsts. 233 I. C. C. 409, 452. The other noteholders received a large proportion of the principal of their claims in no par common stock at $62 per share. It is difficult to appraise in dollars, as of the date of the Commission approval, the advantage secured for the plan by the arrangement with R. F. C. It is equally difficult to appraise similarly as of that date the value of the Trustees' Certificates relinquished by the R. F. C. over the value of the new Firsts or to determine how much of additional worth the R. F. C. obtained. The argument that the Commission does not have statutory authority to pay a creditor, even R. F. C., a government banking corporation, for furnishing new money has little weight. Nor do we see any reason why all claims of R. F. C. may not be considered by the Commission as a single claim. Consolidated 448 Opinion of the Court. Rock Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510, 520. There is nothing to lead us to a conclusion that the Commission gave any advantage to R. F. C. for which full consideration was not given. New money, the Commission said, "is absolutely necessary to effect a reorganization." 233 I. C. C. 409, 414. We have no reason to think the Commission allowed more compensation for this new money to R. F. C. than it would have been compelled to allow in some way, by interest or additional collateral or otherwise to another supplier. We conclude there was nothing in the discretionary action of the Commission to justify its invalidation. C. We have held hereinbefore that valuation might be made by a method based primarily upon earnings and that so long as creditors receive "full compensatory treatment" their priorities may be represented by securities of different ranks. The Commission has made allocations of securities to the various creditors according to its judgment of the worth of their creditor position or priority in relation to the total worth of the property. It has found specifically that certain claims, under its valuations, have no value. We have pointed out the evidence before the Commission on the question of value. We cannot see that putting definitive dollar values on the whole and on parts of this property would aid the Commission in its work of valuation or the courts in their limited review of the Commission's action. By its order of June 21, 1939, section P, 233 I. C. C. 441, 451, confirmed September 19, 1939, 236 I. C. C. 1, the Commission authorized the issue of around eighty-four million dollars of securities against the system property. This treats the equipment trusts and the securities with a face value as worth par and the no par common stock at $57 per share for all recognized creditors except the Railroad Credit Corporation and the A. C. James Company. For distribution to these latter two creditors, the common was valued at $62. Opinion of the Court. 318 U.S. The Commission had before it the data pertaining to past traffic, receipts, earnings and operating ratios, the system's physical condition and prospects for business. This gave an adequate basis for an intelligent estimate of future income likely to be available to meet annual charges before dividends and those dividends themselves. From this information, a conclusion was reached as to the debts which could be paid in the order of their full or absolute priority. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U. S. 106, 117. The secured claim of A. C. James Company could not be satisfied in full even with the more liberal valuation of the common stock. Claims of lesser dignity were eliminated. Those entitled to priority over the mortgages, that is, current liabilities, trustees obligations and reorganization expenses, were to be satisfied by cash or assumed by the reorganized company as a charge on its assets superior to the new securities. 233 I. C. C. 409, 452; 230 I. C. C. 61, 100, 101, 102. This left as creditors only the holders of the old 5% Firsts, with an underlying mortgage on the greater part of the property, the R. F. C., the Railroad Credit Corporation and the A. C. James Company, the latter three with refunding mortgage bonds as collateral. We have already explained the arrangement whereby R. F. C. acquired the status of a first mortgage bondholder. Here it is sufficient to say that as determined by the Commission the Refundings had a lien superior to the Firsts on some assets (233 I. C. C. 414), and the First superiority over the Refunding on the major portion. 230 I. C. C. 61, 97. See infra, Priorities of Conflicting Liens. With the foregoing facts and primary findings before it, the Commission drew the final conclusion as to allocation of securities as set out on page 461, supra. This allocation was based upon "the relative priority, value and equity of the various claims." Cf. 233 I. C. C. 414, 416, 417, 451 P. The distribution and report seems in accord with the re quirements and standards of subsections (b), (d) and (e) (1), note 7, supra. Priorities of Conflicting Liens. No. 61 is a petition by the Irving Trust Company, trustee of the General and Refunding Mortgage, which raises questions of the priority between the Refunding Mortgage and the First Mortgage as a lien on three classes of property. These are the debtor's equity in certain rolling stock and equipment acquired under equipment trusts and a lease, the debtor's interest in the Northern California Extension and the debtor's title to certain "non-carrier" property. The Commission's plan is predicated on the priority of the First Mortgage as a lien on these properties and the Commission accordingly undertook tentatively to determine the legal questions involved. The Commission held that the First Mortgage, senior to the Refunding Mortgage, should be considered to be a first lien on these three classes of property. Petitioner, the Irving Trust Company, as substituted trustee under the Refunding Mortgage, made appropriate objections but the ruling of the Commission was adopted by the District Court. In reversing on appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals did not pass on the question though the issue was presented. The point is made here by a party prevailing below, the petitioner Irving Trust Company, on behalf of holders of refunding mortgage bonds. As the matter is fully presented by the petition for certiorari and its decision is essential to a complete review of the District Court we have concluded to consider the question. § 240 (a) Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 347. United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U. S. 240, 294, 295. Such action is in the interest of expedition. Continental Bank v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 294 U. S. 648, 685. Cf. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, 567; Cole v. Ralph, 252 U. S. 286, 290. The issues are those of construction of the terms of the First Mortgage. In the case of the first two classes of property, which were acquired after 1916, the year of the mortgage, the question is whether such property is covered by the after-acquired property clauses of that indenture and in the case of the third class, the "noncarrier" real property, the question is the application of the granting clauses to property not intimately connected with the operation of the road at the time of the 1916 reorganization of the debtor. None of the parties relies, at least as to personalty, on the controlling nature of rules of law of a particular jurisdiction. The Commission treated the question as one of the interpretation of the language of the mortgage and we shall do likewise. A. As to the first class of property, it is the contention of the trustee of the Refunding Mortgage that the debtor's equity in the rolling stock subject to the three equipment trusts and the lease is not subject to the lien of the First Mortgage and that it is subject to the lien of the Refunding Mortgage. Since nothing turns on the difference between the equipment trusts and the lease, they will not further be distinguished. This equity is stipulated to have been worth over $6,000,000 on December 31, 1935, the nearest date available to August 21, 1935, the date of the filing of the petition. Since the obligations secured by all the refunding mortgage bonds outstanding amount to eleven millions it is apparent that determination of this question in favor of the refunding mortgage bondholders would go far towards assuring them equality of treatment with first mortgage bondholders. The equipment trusts, the usual method of financing the acquisition of rolling stock, were created in 1923, 1924, 1929 and 1931. All are dated between the execution of the First Mortgage and the Refunding Mortgage. Under all, as is usual, the trustee retained title to the equipment, |