tions the right of expatriation" is declared to be "inconsistent with the fundamental principles" of our government. 13 St. 223; Rev. St. § 1999.1 So, therefore, if persons born or naturalized in the United States have removed from the country, and renounced, in any of the ordinary modes of renunciation, their citizenship, they thenceforth cease to be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.2 With this explanation of the meaning of the words in the fourteenth amendment, "subject to the jurisdiction thereof," it is evident that they do not exclude the petitioner from being a citizen. He is not within any of the classes of persons excepted from citizenship, and

1The treaty was signed on the twenty-eighth of July, 1868. The following act of congress was approved the twenty-seventh of the same month:

CHAPTER CCXLIX. - An Act Concerning the Rights of American Citizens in Foreign

States.

Whereas, the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and whereas, in the recognition of this principle this government has freely received emigrants from all nations and invested them with the rights of citizenship; and whereas, it is claimed that such American citizens, with their descendants, are subjects of foreign states, owing allegiance to the governments thereof; and whereas, it is necessary, to the maintenance of public peace, that this claim of foreign allegiance should be promptly and finally disavowed; therefore,

Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the United States of America, in congress assembled, that any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officers of this government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this government.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, that all naturalized citizens of the United States, while in foreign states, shall be entitled to, and shall receive from this government, the same protection of persons and property that is accorded to nativeborn citizens in like situations and circumstances.

Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, that whenever it shall be made known to the president that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the president forthwith to demand of that government the reasons for such imprisonment, and if it appears to be wrongful, and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the president shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, it shall be the duty of the president to use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate such release, and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall, as soon as practicable, be communicated by the president to congress.

Approved July 27, 1868.

The provisions of this statute are re-enacted in the Revised Statutes, in sections 1999, 2000, and 2001.

2 Many other cases might be mentioned where persons would not be citizens, though born in the country. Thus, as Kent says: "If a portion of the country be taken and held by conquest in war, the conqueror acquires the rights of the conquered as to its dominion and government, and children born in the armies of a state while abroad and occupying a foreign country are deemed to be born in the allegiance of the sovereign to whom the army belongs." 2 Comm. 42. By allegiance, as thus used, is meant the duty of obedience to the government or sovereign under which the children live for the protection they receive. But while they are in their infancy they cannot, of course, perform that duty, and its performance must necessarily be respited until they arrive at the years of discretion and responsibility. They then owe obedience, not only for the protection then enjoyed, but, as observed

the jurisdiction of the United States over him at the time of his birth was exclusive of that of any other country.

The clause as to citizenship was inserted in the amendment not merely as an authoritative declaration of the generally recognized law of the country, so far as the white race is concerned, but also to overrule the doctrine of the Dred Scott Case, affirming that persons of the African race brought to this country and sold as slaves, and their de-> scendants, were not citizens of the United States, nor capable of becoming such. 19 How. 393. The clause changed the entire status of these people. It lifted them from their condition of mere freedmen, and conferred upon them, equally with all other native-born, the rights of citizenship. When it was adopted, the naturalization laws of the United States excluded colored persons from becoming citizens, and the freedmen and their descendants, not being aliens, were without. the purview of those laws. So the inability of persons to become citizens under those laws in no respect impairs the effect of their birth, or of the birth of their children, upon the status of either as citizens under the amendment in question.

Independently of the constitutional provision, it has always been the doctrine of this country, except as applied to Africans brought here and sold as slaves, and their descendants, that birth within the dominions and jurisdiction of the United States of itself creates citizenship. This subject was elaborately considered by Assistant Vice-chancellor SANDFORD in Lynch v. Clarke, found in the first volume of his reports. [1 Sandf. 583.] In that case one Julia Lynch, born in New York in 1819, of alien parents, during their temporary sojourn in that city, returned with them the same year to their native country, and always resided there afterwards. It was held that she was a citizen of the United States. After an exhaustive examination of the law, the vice-chancellor said that he entertained no doubt that every person born within the dominions and allegiance of the United States, whatever the situation of his parents, was a natural-born citizen; and added that this was the general understanding of the legal profession, and the universal impression of the public mind. In illustration of this general understanding he mentions the fact that when at an election an inquiry is made whether the person offering to vote is a citizen or an alien, if he answers that he is a native of this country the answer is received as conclusive that he is a citizen;

by Judge WILSON, for that which they have received from their birth. 1 Wils. Works, 313. By being born within the allegiance of a government is only meant being born within the protection of its laws, with a consequent obligation to obey them when obedience can be rendered. So, also, as to members of the Indian tribes within the limits of the United States. These tribes are independent political communities, retaining, in many respects, the right of self-government, notwithstanding they are under the protecting power of the United States; and a member thereof, though born in the country, is not, by his birth, a citizen of the United States, under the fourteenth amendment. He is not born under their actual and exclusive jurisdiction, which the amendment contemplates. McKay v. Campbell, 2 Sawy. 118; U. S. v. Osborne, 6 Sawy. 406; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515.

that no one inquires further; no one asks whether his parents were citizens or foreigners. It is enough that he was born here, whatever was the status of his parents. He shows, also, that legislative expositions on the subject speak but one language, and he cites to that effect not only the laws of the United States, but the statutes of a great number of the states, and establishes conclusively that there is on this subject a concurrence of legislative declaration with judicial opinion, and that both accord with the general understanding of the profession and of the public.1

Whether it be possible for an alien who could be naturalized under our laws to renounce for his children while under the age of majority the right of citizenship, which, by those laws, he could acquire for them, it is unnecessary to consider, as no such question is presented here. Nor is the further question before us whether, if he cannot become a citizen, he can, by his act, release any right conferred upon them by the constitution.

As to the position of the district attorney, that the restriction act prevents the re-entry of the petitioner into the United States, even if he be a citizen, only a word is necessary. The petitioner is the son of a merchant, and not a laborer, within the meaning of the act. Being a citizen, the law could not intend that he should ever look to the government of a foreign country for permission to return to the United States, and no citizen can be excluded from this country ex

In 1855 congress passed the following act, securing citizenship to children of citizens of the United States born without their limits:

CHAPTER LXXI.-An Act to Secure the Right of Citizenship to Children of Citizens of the United States Born out of the Limits thereof.

Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the United States of America, in congress assembled, that persons heretofore born, or hereafter to be born, out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were, or shall be, at the time of their birth, citizens of the United States, shall be deemed and considered, and are hereby declared to be, citizens of the United States: provided, however, that the rights of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers never resided in the United States.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, that any woman who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who shall be married, to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen.

Approved February 10, 1855.

The provisions of this statute are re-enacted in the Revised Statutes, in sections 1993 and 1994.

2 The restriction act of congress of July 5, 1884, amending the act of May 6, 1882, "to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese," provides that every Chinese person other than a laborer entitled to enter the United States, under the treaty between our government and China, or under that act, shall obtain from the Chinese government, or the government of which he is a subject, its permission to come within the United States, authenticated by its certificate, containing various particulars of himself and family so as to clearly identify him; and while such certificate is only prima facie evidence against our government, it is made the sole evidence permissible on the part of the person producing it to establish his right of entry into the United States. Chapter 220, § 6, St. 1883-84, p. 115.

cept in punishment for crime.

The peti

Exclusion for any other cause is unknown to our laws, and beyond the power of congress. tioner must be allowed to land; and it is so ordered.

HANCOCK INSPIRATOR Co. v. JENKS.

(Circuit Court, E. D. Michigan. February 11, 1884.)

1. PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-AMENDED APPLICATION -VERIFICATION-ACT OF 1836.

Where a patent, issued on a supplementary or amended application, under the act of 1836, upon its face recites that "the patentee has made oath to his application," this recital, in the absence of fraud, is conclusive evidence, in a suit against an infringer, that the necessary oath was taken by the applicant before letters patent were granted.

2. SAME-COMBINATION-CLAIMS.

The claims for a combination patent need not include any elements except such as are essential to the peculiar combination and are affected by the invention.

3. SAME CONSTRUCTION OF CLAIMS.

While a patentee is limited by his claims, courts are allowed to look at the detailed specifications, models, or drawings, for the purpose of construing such claims.

4. SAME-UTILITY OF DEVICE-INFRINGEMENT.

In a suit for infringement, that plaintiff's device is a useful one is sufficiently shown by the fact that, with other devices open to him, defendant prefers to use the mechanism patented by plaintiff.

5. SAME - HANCOCK BOILER INJECTOR — PATENTABILITY — ANTICIPATION — InFRINGEMENT.

Letters patent No. 86,152, granted January 26, 1869, to John T. Hancock, for an improvement in boiler injectors, construed, and held, that the device therein described was a patentable invention, not anticipated by prior devices, and that the first and second claims thereof are infringed by the "duplex injectors" manufactured, sold, and used by defendant.

Per BROWN, J.

6 SAME-REHEARING-RUE Patent.

On rehearing, and comparison of the Hancock and Rue patents, held, that the latter did not anticipate the Hancock injector.

Per MATTHEWS, Justice; BROWN, J., concurring.

In Equity.

This was a bill to recover damages for an infringement of letters patent No. 86,152, dated January 26, 1869, to John T. Hancock, for an improvement in boiler injectors. The bill recited, in the usual form, the grant of letters patent, the introduction into general use of the patented device, both by the patentee and the plaintiff, the assignment of the patent to the plaintiff, the infringement of the same. by the defendant in the manufacture, sale, and use of "duplex injectors," so called, and prayed for an account, a decree for profits and damages, and for an injunction. The answer denied, for various

reasons, the validity of the plaintiff's patent, and also the infringement by the defendant.

Elmer P. Howe and Chauncey Smith, for plaintiff.

T. S. Sprague, for defendant.

BROWN, J. The main object of all boiler injectors is to raise water by means of a vacuum, created by the condensation of steam, and to force the water so raised into the boiler from which the steam originally issued. The general construction of all these devices is much the same. The principal features of each are common to all. They consist of an upright tube, through which the water is raised into a chamber at the top, in which a vacuum is created; a second tube at right angles to the first, provided with a conical nozzle of small diameter, through which the steam is driven with great velocity against the water rising from the first tube. The effect of the steam-jet isFirst, to produce a vacuum in the chamber, about the nozzle, which is filled by the uprising water; and, second, to drive this water into the boiler. In so doing it is itself condensed, and returns with the water to the boiler, from which it issued. The success of these devices is dependent very largely upon the separation, as far as possible, of the water and steam up to the very point where they come in actual contact. The maximum of efficiency is attained when the jet of steam retains the same temperature which it had when it issued from the boiler, and when the water to be acted upon is as cool as possible. The pressure, and consequently the velocity, of the propelling jet of steam is then at its maximum. In both injectors and ejectors, which differ from each other mainly in the use to which they are put, and not materially in their construction, the jets may be reversed; that is, the steam may take the place of the water in the annular chamber, and a jet of water be propelled through the conical nozzle. In all devices prior to the plaintiff's, the water was allowed to circulate for a greater or less distance about the nozzle through which the steam rushed. The effect of this was twofold: First, to cool the steam somewhat before it left the nozzle, and thereby diminish its velocity; and, second, to heat the water, and thereby diminish its condensing power after it came in actual contact with the steam. To remedy this defect was the object of Hancock's invention, which consists principally in substituting, for the conical nozzle ordinarily used, a plate or plug with an orifice, and some other trifling changes incidental thereto. In the specifications the device is described as follows:

"In the drawings, A A represent a cylinder, with induction pipe, B, at right angles with A, the pipe, B, being connected with the source of power. C is a concentric tube, smaller than A, which is placed within, and firmly attached at one end to A. The bore of this tube, C, is conical from d to e and from d to g. E is a plug closely fitted into A at the end opposite C. This plug has a central, conical orifice, K, which presents an area at its inner face similar in size to the area of tube, C, at d. This plug is provided on its inner face with the annular recess, n, n, thus providing a passage-way for the motor