Let us consider the effect of section 634 of the numerical grade requirements of the Marine Corps for the remainder of fiscal year 1953. Please refer to the chart on page 2. This chart indicates: (1) The number of officers in each grade which we have now; (2) the end fiscal year 1953 billet requirements; (3) the limitation imposed by the Officer Personnel Act of 1947; and (4) the number to which we are currently restricted by section 634: 1 Assuming OPA of 1947 percentile distribution of total commissioned officers. As can be seen on this chart, the Marine Corps has established billet requirements for fiscal year 1953 for substantially fewer officers in all grades above captain than is authorized by the Officer Personnel Act. Characteristic economy was used in the preparation of the grade distribution of officers necessary to properly command and staff the approved force structure of the 3 divisions and 3 aircraft wings. However, in certain grades the number required was greater than the numbers allowed by section 634. This means that in some cases officer billets are being filled by officers of lesser grades than those necessary for efficient operation of the Marine Corps. Utilizing officers of lower grades than called for by the approved force structure is not considered in the best interest of military efficiency. It is not fair, on an economic or prestige basis, to the individual officer who is required to discharge responsibilities greater than normal for his grade. This restriction below billet requirements is particularly troublesome in the grade of lieutenant colonel. It is in this grade that the proportionally greatest numerical inadequacy exists. This is further aggravated by the fact that lieutenant colonel is the Marine Corps' most critical grade, for it is here that the opposing attributes of physical vigor and mature judgment must be combined if the officers concerned are to measure up to their responsibilities. There are many important commands in the Marine Corps which require both the physical stamina for field service and the professional experience of a lieutenant colonel. There are likewise many vital staff billets for which the Marine Corps cannot afford greater rank, but which demand as a minimum the experience and judgment of a lieutenant colonel. Section 634 also adversely affects the Marine Corps Reserve officers on active duty just as it affects regular officers. All officers are carried on a combined lineal list with seniority established by date of rank. These officers become eligible for selection for promotion in the order of their seniority. The Marine Corps personnel plans for fiscal year 1953 anticipated voluntary continuation on active duty of many Reserve officers. A number of these officers were eligible for promotion. This accounts, in some measure, for their desire to remain on active duty. Section 634 reduces the number which the Marine Corps may promote during this fiscal year. Promotions have already been cut back to insure compliance with the limitations imposed. Some Reserve officers who may not be promoted because of this restriction no longer desire to voluntarily remain on active duty. Others will undoubtedly request release from active duty for the same reason. As a result, it will be necessary to procure new officers to replace these trained officers who cannot be retained. Such increased procurement requirements will incur additional expense in procurement costs, training, travel, and outfitting. An additional and very important point is that, administratively speaking, the provision is extremely difficult of implementation. For these reasons, the Marine Corps is convinced that section 634 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1953, should be repealed. If this committee should be inclined to retain a revised version of the Davis amendment, I urge you to consider the problem of the Marine Corps with respect to the number of lieutenant colonels to be allowed, even though we are not affected by provisions of law relating to physicians and dentists. Of significance is the effect of section 634 on the Marine Corps as compared to the effect on the other services. Section 634 permits the following numbers of lieutenant colonels per 10,000 personnel in the services indicated: Army. Air Force.. Marine Corps. 85 lieutenant colonels per 10,000 personnel. Despite the limitation imposed by section 634, the Marine Corps has a very real need for the 1,350 lieutenant colonels shown as billet requirements in the foregoing chart. I do not believe that you will disagree with me when I state that the Marine Corps cannot entrust the command of a battalion of ground troops or a squadron of combat aircraft to an officer of any less experience and judgment than a lieutenant colonel; nor would you disagree with reference to the assignment of lieutenant colonels as second-in-command of larger formations, such as regiments and aircraft groups. I can assure you that the same need is in evidence with respect to all of the other billets which the Marine Corps proposes to fill with lieutenant colonels. While it would be obviously impossible for you to give me enough time to discuss the reasons why we must assign a lieutenant colonel to each one of these many other billets, it may be worthwhile to look at a typical example. Let us consider the commanding officer of a marine barracks such as the one at the Naval Mine Depot, in Yorktown, Va. This young lieutenant colonel commands a total of 425 officers and men and is responsible to the naval commander for the security of that vital Naval Establishment, with its inherent danger of sabotage. As the commanding officer, he is responsible for the administration of his entire command, and for the morale and efficiency of his men. His decisions affect almost every aspect of the lives of those men. He holds wide disciplinary authority over the officers and men committed to his charge. He must participate frequently in planning conferences with his superior officers with regard to the operational problems facing his command. This officer shoulders a sufficiently heavy responsibility to merit compensation as a lieutenant colonel. More important, an officer of lesser grade will not combine the professional experience and mature judgment required for the discharge of his many professional responsibilities. Considerations such as these are studied in Headquarters Marine Corps prior to the determination of every requirement for a lieutenant colonel or officer of any other grade. As I said before, it would be impracticable to go through the detailed considerations for each of the 1,350 billets which the Marine Corps feels should be filled by lieutenant colonels. I believe this typical case will suffice. Before closing my statement, I feel that one more point should be clarified. Repeated reference has been made to the greater number of officers currently in the armed services in the grade of lieutenant colonel and above than were so serving during World War II. I am convinced that a comparison of the 1945 officer grade distribution to the 1953 officer grade distribution serves absolutely no useful purpose in officer personnel planning, no relationship whatever between the current situation and that then obtaining. Nevertheless, because of the interest which has been demonstrated in such a comparison, I should like at this time to give you the complete picture in that regard. As an example, records show that in 1945 there were 81 general officers in the Marine Corps. Today the Marine Corps requirement for general officers is 64. As you know, since 1951 the Marine Corps has been restricted to 60 general officers by a Senate Armed Services ruling. Later, section 634 further reduced the number of general officers in the Marine Corps to 59. From these numbers, it does not appear that the Marine Corps has planned to promote an excessive number of general officers. The reasons for the greater number in the grade of colonel and lieutenant colonel today, over those of 1945, have not been clearly presented. There are two major reasons for this increase, both of which we feel are justifiable: First, at the beginning of mobilization prior to World War II, the active-duty Marine Corps was composed of 1,380 officers and 18,052 enlisted men, a total of 19,432 personnel. There were only 1,012 officers and 14,925 enlisted men in the Marine Corps Reserve. The Marine Corps was required to expand from this base to 37,664 officers and 447,474 enlisted men in a period of approximately 5 years, an increase of almost 14 times the original size. The point of entry for officers into the Marine Corps to achieve this expansion was in the lowest officer grade-second lieutenants. To have promoted to meet actual officer requirements for the forces then authorized would have required completely unacceptable rates of promotions of these young and relatively inexperienced officers. The Marine Corps chose to promote as conservatively as possible. As an example, the Commandant, General Vandergrift, directed that no officer would be promoted to the grade of colonel unless he had 15 years' commissioned service. The result of this was that in August 1945 there were 399 colonels serving in the Marine Corps—a number well below actual billet requirements for that grade. It should be understood that even by following this conservative course, the number of officers in the grade of lieutenant colonel and above was only 385 less than the number the Marine Corps requested for fiscal year 1953. This is a realistic request in view of the fact that the experience and service of both Regular and Reserve officers have continually increased during the years since the end of World War II. As a result, these officers have arrived at a point of service where the Marine Corps can now meet minimum billet requirements based on existing tables of organization. The second major reason for the increase in the grades of colonel and lieutenant colonel, as well as an additional requirement in general officers, is that the Marine Corps is now required to perform certain activities which are not required in a full emergency as in 1945. In addition, many new functions, for which there was no counterpart in 1945, have arisen from such developments as the creation of NATO, the Defense Department, and the military-aid programs. In order to set forth clearly this increase, the accompanying table is presented. I feel sure that you will recognize the requirement for more Marine Corps officer in the higher grades than was necessary during World War II following study of table. As you will note, this table shows at the foot of the "Difference" columns that we now require 4 generals, 154 colonels, and 248 lieutenant colonels to fill billets which did not exist in 1945 because at that time we were in total war, and because the Department of Defense, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, military-aid programs, and similar activities were not in being. General WENSINGER. As did Vice Admiral Holloway, I should like to review briefly the background of our current Marine Corps system of officer promotion. Prior to 1934, the distribution and promotion of our officers was governed generally by the laws relating to officers of the Army. Promotion from second lieutenant up to and including colonel was by seniority with all the defects and shortcomings inherent in such a system. As each officer reached the top of his grade he was, with few exceptions, promoted upon the occurrence of a vacancy. The officer who kept out of trouble and exerted himself just enough to get by, was awarded promotion along with the able, active, and efficient officer. Rates of promotion depended entirely upon the rates of attrition which, in turn, were governed by such variable factors as deaths, retirements, resignations, and discharges. Vacancies in the higher grades were seldom sufficient to afford opportunity of advancement to officers in lower grades until long after they had passed the most useful ages for those grades. There was no incentive, since promotion came as well to the mediocre as to the most able officer. By the act of March 4, 1925, a sort of selective system was provided for advancement of colonels to brigadier general, with involuntary retirement at age 56 if not then on a promotion list, but this did not materially improve the overall situation. Stagnation of promotion and overage in grade became so serious, and the outlook for the future so hopeless, that earnest efforts were thereafter made to obtain remedial legislation. These efforts were rewarded through the provisions of the act of May 29, 1934. This act provided that Marine officers should be placed on a comparable basis with naval officers insofar as distribution in grade and promotion were concerned. Since 1934, general applicability to officers of the Marine Corps of laws relating to officers of the line of the Navy has continued. Some slight modifications have been necessary because of inherent differences in the two services. Basic principles, however, are the same and these principles as presently laid down in the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, are considered sound from the point of view of the Marine Corps, and fair and equitable from the standpoint of the individual career officer. They are not, nor were they designed to be, completely adequate to a situation such as arises in an emergency like that which exists at present. For a basic-officer structure, and except under most abnormal conditions, they are believed to be entirely adequate and desirable. The authority for temporary promotions contained in the act of July 24, 1951, has enabled the Marine Corps to meet its unusual officer needs during the present emergency. At this point, I should like to comment on the position of the Marine Corps regarding recent congressional action on the matter of officer-grade distribution. As I told the Committee on Armed Services previously, the Davis amendment allows the Marine Corps fewer general officers and fewer lieutenant colonels than the number necessary to command and staff properly our approved force structure. In every grade the limitation is proportionately more severe with respect to the Marine Corps than with respect to the other services. However, because of our traditional conservatism regarding promo |