the total number of officers and now under the Davis amendment and even under H. R. 2332 we have departed from that and you are basing your distribution of grade on the total strength.

Now, that is wrong in principle.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. As far as we are concerned, that is wrong in principle.

Mr. BLANDFORD. That is right. But I want to know why in 1916 you distributed, if you know, or why you think that the system of distributing officers based on the total number of officers is a better system, instead of distributing it on your total strength.

Commander WHEELER. Oh, then I did not misunderstand your question.

In 1916 we went to the distribution of officers based on the line requirements. The distribution of Staff Corps officers was entirely different from that of the unrestricted line.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Admiral, I think you understand what I mean. Admiral HOLLOWAY. I understand your question. I hope I can answer it.

In 1916 we used the total number of officers first of the line, with a percentage of the enlisted strength. In other words, let us say we had an enlisted strength of a half-million, or 500,000, and we were permitted 7 percent of line officers on that.

Mr. BLANDFORD. That is right.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. That came out with 35,000 line officers.

Now, we did have the percentage we imposed upon that total of officers for purposes of distribution in grade, which was 1 percent admiral, 4 percent captains, 7 percent commanders, and so on.

Now, in 1947-and I will have to ask Commander Wheeler to check me on this-we changed the percentage of officer distribution within grade to insure less forced attrition. In other words, we decreased the number of the subalterns and increased the number of the field officers.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Wasn't that based on the principle-I will answer my own question, in a way:

Wasn't it based on the principle that your career officers, that is, the officer structure of the Navy, had to remain constant?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes.

Mr. BLANDFORD. There might be times when you would have fewer enlisted personnel. There might be variation from year to year in the strength.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. That is correct.

Mr. BLANDFORD. But anyway, you ran the Navy, you had to have a certain number of officers. That is why your distribution was based upon your total number of officers.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes.

Mr. BLANDFORD. And not based upon your total strength.
Admiral HOLLOWAY. That is correct.

May I take it one step further? It will perhaps clarify the matter. As I remember, the Congress appropriated on an authorized enlisted strength of the Navy, rather than on the actual. That was before the war. To maintain the officer numbers fairly stable, that

was done.

In other words, Congress might appropriate for only 400,000 enlisted but authorized 500,000. But we were permitted to base our officer strength upon a percentage of 500,000, the authorized enlisted. Mr. KILDAY. That goes back to your statement that a permanent man is hard to get rid of.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. That is right, sir; a stable flow across there. Mr. KILDAY. He either has to die, be court-martialed, or something. Admiral HOLLOWAY. Right, sir.

Does that clarify it, Mr. Blandford?

Mr. BLANDFORD. Yes. I wanted the record to show why you didn't base this on the total distribution-I mean, the distribution based upon total strengths.

Now, the next question is on temporary promotions.

When an officer fails of selection for temporary promotion and then he again fails for selection for temporary promotion, what effect does that have upon his career?

Commander WHEELER. That varies with his grade. If he fails for temporary promotion to rear admiral two successive times, and has completed 30 years' service, he is then retired upon the completion of the 30 years' service.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Take it all the way down, please.

Commander WHEELER. If he has not been considered by-if he has not failed twice for rear admiral, but completes 31 years' service, he is also retired on the completion of that amount of service as though he had been twice failed.

An officer considered for and failed twice for captain is retired after 26 years' service. Both conditions must be met: two failures and completion of 26 years of service.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Let me interrupt right there: Supposing an officer has 24 years of service, and has twice failed of selection. Does he still remain eligible for selection to the temporary grade until he completes his 26 years of service?

Commander WHEELER. He does. He remains eligible as long as he is on the active list.

Mr. BLANDFORD. So that a man might have 3, 4, or possibly 5 chances for promotion.

Commander WHEELER. Prior to his departure.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Prior to the completion of the length of service which then compels him to retire.

Commander WHEELER. That is correct.

A lieutenant commander considered and twice failed of selection to commander, and having completed 20 years' service, is retired.

An officer of lesser grade twice failed is separated after the second failure of selection with severance pay computed at 2 months' pay per year to a maximum of 2 years' pay based on his total amount of service.

Mr. BLANDFORD. You don't mean that a lieutenant today who fails twice of selection for the temporary lieutenant commander will be given severance pay? He is retained; is he not?

Commander WHEELER. At the moment we are retaining him.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Those are the things that we want to get in the record.

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Commander WHEELER. However, that can't last indefinitely. We are retaining those officers now.

Mr. BLANDFORD. What I am getting at is that that accounts for the officers you have in these grades.

Now, how many of those people, for example, have failed twice of selection, and ordinarily would be severed, but are being retained because you need them?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Emergency.

Commander WHEELER. If I may venture a guess, approximately 300 lieutenants and a thousand junior lieutenants.

Mr. KILDAY. Suppose that man wants to get out, will you let him out?

Commander WHEELER. At the moment we wouldn't, unless he has severe hardship, sir.

Mr. KILDAY. He is in a pretty bad way, then; isn't he?

His career is gone, and he can't get started in another one.
Commander WHEELER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ARENDS. In other words, had it not been for the emergency, they would be out.

Commander WHEELER. That is correct, Mr. Arends.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Mr. Chairman, if I may interpolate, we are relaxing the resignation policy somewhat now to take care of the more difficult hardship cases in the young officer who is passed over. But it has been an emergency and the number of junior officers needed has been very great.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Now, these 300 lieutenants that have failed for selection to lieutenant commander and have the required time of years of service is that 14 years?

Commander WHEELER. No; now they go out-any amount under 20 that they happen to have.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Well, is it possible for those lieutenants, then, to be considered for promotion while they are in this retention period? Commander WHEELER. They are. All officers while retained or continued on active duty remain fully eligible for selection by successive boards.

Mr. BLANDFORD. So you haven't taken away all of their opportunity for continuing their career.

sir.

Commander WHEELER. That is right.

Mr. GAVIN. Approximately 16 years; is that right?

Commander WHEELER. Up to 20 years for lieutenant commander. Mr. GAVIN. I don't understand you. Let him answer.

Commander WHEELER. Up to 20 years for lieutenant commander,

Mr. GAVIN, Oh; for lieutenant commander.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Van Zandt.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. These officers who are frozen, how many of them are Academy graduates?

Commander WHEELER. I will check that for sure, sir, but I would guess that we have in the neighborhood of 100.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. One hundred. And is it not true that there are a lot of men who came out of ranks who find themselves frozen in this group of officers?

Commander WHEELER. There are some there; yes, sir.

Mr. Van ZandT. In other words, they were chief petty officers or moved up to warrant and then commissioned?

Commander WHEELER. No, sir; these include only those officers who are now permanent.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Permanent.

Commander WHEELER. Regular officers. The ones in enlisted status still there by virtue of temporary commission may be reverted administratively.

Mr. HARDY. Yes, but they can't get out. They can't retire. Commander WHEELER. No, sir; they generally are not eligible to

retire.

Mr. HARDY. Even if they have a period of service long enough to retire, they are not permitted to retire; are they?

Commander WHEELER. Yes, sir; we have now instituted a program where those officers can take advantage of the fleet reserve provisions. Mr. HARDY. That is very recently.

Commander WHEELER. That is a fairly recent action; yes, sir. Mr. VAN ZANDT. Is it not true that today you might see a 2-striper or a 22-striper out of the ranks, and yet he may be 35, 40, or 45 years of age?

Commander WHEELER. He may be, sir; quite likely is.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Blandford, do you have anything else?

Mr. BLANDFORD. I don't know whether you plan to get into the Temporary Promotion Act of 1941 in your presentation, but you might mention that you are not using it now, except up to the grade of lieutenant commander, I believe.

Commander WHEELER. When we expanded so very rapidly at the commencement of World War II, the existing Officer Personnel Act was not sufficiently flexible to take care of that situation, and the Congress passed an act in July 1941

Mr. BLANDFORD. Yes.

Commander WHEELER. That allowed promotions to be made in such manner as the Secretary of the Navy might deem necessary and in such numbers.

When the Officer Personnel Act was passed in 1947, that emergency promotion legislation was not repealed. A proviso was inserted in the 1947 act stating that emergency legislation could not be used except in the case of some future emergency or war.

Under the emergency declared with the Korean situation and because of the fact that the Navy had to take their Reserve officers where they found them, and in large numbers in the lower grades, we requested permission of this committee and the Congress and authority was granted to suspend portions of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 for the grades of lieutenant (junior grade) by Executive order, and the President issued such an Executive order allowing us to make promotions of lieutenants and junior lieutenants to higher grade under that emergency wartime act, and it is by that means that we are by using that law-not forcing the lieutenants and the junior lieutenants failed of selection to go home.

Mr. GAVIN. In other words, you are not improving their morale, either. If they are entitled to consideration and the time comes and they are justified and they are experienced and qualified, they feel, if that rank is coming to them, they ought to have it. It certainly doesn't make them feel very sweet, I presume, in their jobs.

Although I am not so familiar with it as my colleagues here, I can readily recognize that these boys are not quite satisfied about that situation.

Commander WHEELER. They are not, Mr. Gavin.

Mr. GAVIN. What are you going to do about it?

Commander WHEELER. We believe in the Navy that as long as we were involuntarily recalling Reserve officers from their homes and other businesses, it was not quite fair to not retain these career officers who were able to carry out their duties, even though somewhat unhappily.

Mr. GAVIN. Well, that is what I can't understand. Now, you got your Navy personnel and you call these Reserve officers. Many of them are in the upper echelons, above the lieutenant commanders-I mean the junior-what is the lower echelon?

Commander WHEELER. Junior lieutenant.

Mr. GAVIN. Junior grade.

Commander WHEELER. Junior grade lieutenant.

Mr. GAVIN. They see somebody else move in and they feel they are entitled to that spot, and here you call back some Reserve officers. Now, if you are relaxing you just said a minute ago you were relaxing on resignations. Well, here is the experienced, qualified personnel that were in the Navy and now you are calling in Reserve officers.

I would rather hold these men that are on duty now, and are experienced and qualified, than to be calling in Reserve officers that might have gotten rusty over the years and use the personnel you have now, and advance them, rather than call anybody else back.

I am merely giving you my viewpoint, not being so familiar with the subject, as I see it.

Commander WHEELER. The admiral, I think, would like to answer that, please.

sir?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Mr. Gavin, may I help with that a little bit, When Korea came we couldn't bring in just young Reserve officers from the bottom out of the NROTC line. We had to take advantage of established experience. So we did bring in a great many of the older Reserve officers. It is generally true, however, that by the first of November-I believe that is the date-of 1953, almost every senior Reserve officer will be demobilized, except those who volunteer and are particularly anxious to remain on active duty.

These things have to be faced, and as you know, we can't accomplish them all at once. From that time forward, we hope to conductI am not talking about physicians and dentists because that is a special situation

Mr. GAVIN. No; I am not talking about that.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Because this is a special situation, as you know. But from that time forward we hope to run the Navy, operate it, with a normal flow in of short-term commissioned people plus Regulars from the bottom.

Mr. GAVIN. Why do you have to wait until November, Admiral? Admiral HOLLOWAY. Well, it just is a matter of administratively fazing them out, Mr. Gavin. It is as if I had to cut the Navy to 500,000 today. It would be a chaotic demobilization. But if I could faze it over 12 months, for such matters as transportation and the