Coercive Military StrategyTexas A&M University Press, 1998 - 229 lappuses Coercion is persuasion supported by the threat or use of force. Just as warfare is often "diplomacy carried out by other means," coercion--the threat of combat or the threat of an escalation in the intensity of combat--is a more subtle method of dispute that shades the spectrum between diplomacy and warfare. Understanding of coercive military strategy is a prerequisite to the successful making of either policy or war. In "Coercive Military Strategy, " Stephen J. Cimbala shows that coercive military strategy is a necessary part of any diplomatic-strategic recipe for success. Few wars are total wars, fought to annihilation, and military power is inherently political, employed for political purpose, in order to advance the public agenda of a state, so in any war there comes a time when a diplomatic resolution may be possible. To that end, coercive strategy should be flexible, for there are as many variations to it as there are variations in wars and warfare. Cimbala observes several cases of applying coercive strategy in the twentieth century: the U.S. strategy of limited war during the Cold War; the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which both the United States and the Soviet Union applied coercive strategy; Desert Storm, in which the Coalition Forces could practice coercion without restraint; and the Vietnam War, in which U.S. coercive strategy was ultimately a failure. Additionally, Cimbala examines coercion and the theory of collective security, which implies a willingness on the part of individual states, such as the NATO nations, to combine against any aspiring aggressor. With his examples, and the arguments they illustrate, Cimbala shows that although coercive strategy is a remedy for neither the ailments of U.S. national security nor world conflict, it will become more important in peace, crisis, and even war in the next century, when winning with the minimum of force or without force will become more important than winning by means of maximum firepower. |
Saturs
23 | |
43 | |
Coercive Military Strategy and Desert Storm Limitation without Restraint | 69 |
Vietnam and Coercive Strategy | 97 |
Collective Security and Coercion | 113 |
Operations Not War and Coercive Military Strategy | 134 |
Conclusion | 156 |
Notes | 185 |
207 | |
219 | |
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acceptable according action actual addition air power allied American apparent armed forces Army attack battle Bosnia Bush campaign cause chapter civil clear coalition coercion coercive diplomacy coercive military strategy coercive strategy Cold Cold War collective security combat command commitment compellence conflict continued conventional crisis management Cuba Cuban missile crisis decision Defense destroy destruction deterrence effective enemy escalation Europe example expected failed fighting future George ground Gulf important influence interest involvement Iraq Iraqi issue Kennedy Khrushchev Kuwait leaders leadership less limited means missions necessary North noted nuclear objectives Office opponent organization peace operations peacekeeping planning political possible potential President Press problem reason requirements response result risk Russian Saddam Second side significant Soviet Union Special successful Table taking theory threat tion U.S. military unconventional United University Vietnam warfare wars weapons
Populāri fragmenti
4. lappuse - For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill.
5. lappuse - When one treats people with benevolence, justice, and righteousness, and reposes confidence in them, the army will be united in mind and all will be happy to serve their leaders. The Book of Changes says: "In happiness at overcoming difficulties, people forget the danger of death.
14. lappuse - The combat is the single activity in War ; in the combat the destruction of the enemy opposed to us is the means to the end ; it is so even when the combat does not actually take place, because in that case there lies at the root of the decision the supposition at all events that this destruction is to be regarded as beyond doubt.
4. lappuse - Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances. The next best is to attack his army. The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative.
207. lappuse - Soviet Attitudes Towards Nuclear War: Do They Really Think They Can Win?
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