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Third. To assure substantive due process, there must be controls over computer input and output. Since one of the most basic threats posed by the computer is the exchange of information among agencies and among companies, information collected for one purpose should not be utilized for another without tight conditions attached, without the involvement of the individual.

Fourth. Some system must be devised to give the individual a chance to explain personal data susceptible to derogatory interpretation. One of the drawbacks of our highly mobile, computerized society is that a man's past is ever with him. He should have a chance to expunge the record.

Walter Malone expressed the sentiment in his poem, "Opportunity":

"Weep not for precious chances passed away!

Weep not for golden ages on the wane!
Each night I burn the records of the day-

At sunrise every soul is born again!"

Yet the people most concerned with out growing communications-surveillance system are given no chance for due process. In many cases, the victim never knows why or how he has failed in an endeavor.

As Prof. Arthur R. Miller writes:

"The computer's impact on traditional relationships between individuals and organizations, and the impending emergence of computer technology as a medium of communication with national dimensions, suggests that congressional action to protect privacy values may be both necessary and appropriate."

However, I agree with Professor Miller that the uncertain direction of the computer age and the lack of obvious and easy solutions have combined to make the desirability and effectiveness of congressional action still very much a matter of conjecture. Furthermore, as he points out:

"Our limited experience with data centers and networks and the enormously complex problems of distinguishing between governmental and private systems and determining the extent to which the private ones should be federally regulated make the obstacles to drafting comprehensive national legislation virtually insurmountable at the present."

Fifth. The most effective action Congress can take is the enactment of laws controlling the collection and the use of data in certain areas. Examples of this are S. 782, my Federal employee privacy bill; S. 1791, my bill to limit certain types of privacy invasion by governmental statistical questionnaires; and proposals for some type of credit reporting act to protect consumers against erroneous credit reporting.

Sixth. If the problem of computer technology is too vast to be dealt with in one statute, still I believe it can be controlled by the Federal Government in the same way we have handled other vast, complex communication problems such as the radio, telegraph, television, and telephone. This is through an independent regulatory agency.

I see no existing agency which could assume these complicated and delicate problems. Those charged with regulating communications have built-in biases in their operating methods and their approaches to these problems, particularly the preservation of individual privacy.

While I dislike adding to an already weighty bureaucracy, the problem is serious enough to warrant a separate agency. For this reason, therefore, I would support the creation of some separate agency to deal specifically with computer systems.

I believe we have learned enough over the past 50 years about the design and operations and problems of regulatory agencies to enable us to create one which has built-in protections to assure that it serves the interests of the individual citizen and not solely those of the industry it is supposed to regulate.

Beyond the immediate legal and practical threats to individuals, there is a greater danger to our social fabric presented by the network of computer systems which crisscross the Nation. These mammoth communications devices, while encouraging actual surveillance, in certain circumstances under certain conditions, have also created a climate of apprehension and fear of "snoopers"—private or official.

To the alienated in our society, and to the not-so-alienated, the computer card either has become, or stands in danger of becoming, a symbol of administrative coldness, of dehumanized impersonal decisions lacking the input which ideally should inform administration in any organization with fairness, intelligence, and humanity.

The reasons for this growing public attitude should be carefully considered by executives in the public as well as private sector of our national life.

Seventh. On both sides, public and executive, there is a real need for education and for reassessment as to what corporate or governmental goals are important in this computer age.

Efficiency and economy can be balanced with privacy and constitutional freedom. But it must be done now if our form of liberty is to survive.

The computer field is so vast that talking about it is like the story of the two elderly ladies in a town in North Carolina. They entertained the new young preacher on Sunday afternoon, and then invited him to dinner that evening. He said he had to preach at Sunday evening service first, so one of the ladies stayed home to prepare the dinner and the other went with the preacher to the church. When they returned after the services, the one who had stayed home asked how he had preached. The other lady said he had preached in the apostolic style. He just took the gospel and preached all over the place.

That is what it is easy to do with the subject of computers. The implications and impact of computers on our society are almost inconceivable in their immensity and intensity. One can talk about the issue at great length and to great extent and never exhaust the subject, never completely resolve the problem. While I believe that much more thought and discussion should be devoted to the legal and social implications of a computer-based civilization, I am not in favor of our merely preaching all over the place for the indefinite future. We know enough now of the implications of this technology to begin taking action both in the private and the public sectors to bring the electronic brains under effective control of the human beings they are created to serve.

EXHIBIT 1

NOVEMBER 10, 1969.

Hon. DAVID M. KENNEDY,
Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In connection with the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee's study of data banks and individual privacy, I have been seriously concerned about the guidelines issued by the Secret Service to encourage federal employees' reporting on private citizens for a vast number of reasons. I discussed this last week in a speech on "Computers and Individual Privacy", a copy of which is enclosed for your use.

I have no quarrel with the goal of the Secret Service to perform their duties efficiently. It is clear, however, to anyone educated in our constitutional form of government, that the criteria for filling information about individuals are questionable from a due process standpoint; are impractical; and are conducive to a mass surveillance unprecedented in American history.

Your attention is directed to such examples in the guidelines as the invitation to Civil Service workers throughout government to supply:

1. Information about individuals who "make oral or written statements about high government officials in the following categories”: (2) Threatening statements; (2) Irrational statements; and (3) Abusive statements.

2. Information on professional gate crashers.

3. Information on persons who insist upon personally contacting high Government officials for the purpose of redress of imaginary grievances, etc.

4. Information pertaining to a threat, plan or attempt by an individual, a group, or an organization to physically harm or embarrass the persons protected by the U.S. Secret Service, or any other high U.S. Government official at home or abroad. 5. Information about people who take part in demonstrations. These guidelines are a direct threat to first amendment freedoms. Many people, with complete faith in their government, believe that the place to start with a complaint is with the President or Vice President. Yet some of these people who write a strong letter will never know they have been fed into yet another government data system. Similarly thousands of well-meaning, loyal Americans have engaged in some form of demonstration in connection with the Vietnam war, welfare and civil rights policies of the government, and many other causes.

What the Subcommittee wishes to know in order to respond to complaints about this surveillance is:

Are these records now to be part of standard employment checks for (a) suit. ability and (b) security clearances? What standards have been promulgated by

37-583-74-pt. 2—20

the Secret Service for maintaining such a data bank? Will this information be computerized? Will it be available for use by other federal agencies? If so, which

ones?

What procedures have been established for (1) Preserving the confidentiality of this data; (2) affording citizens subject to such a report the opportunity to review their files and to rebut derogatory information?

Would you also supply copies of any published federal regulations governing this data bank and its use.

Your assistance in our study is appreciated.
With all kind wishes, I am.

Sincerely yours,

SAM J. ERVIN, Jr.,

Chairman.

Hon. RANDOLPH W. THROWER,

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
Washington, October 22, 1969.

Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Treasury Department,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR COMMISSIONER THROWER: A recent supplement to the Internal Revenue Service Manual regarding protection of the President entitled, "Guidelines for Reporting Information", dated August 26, 1969, has come to our attention. Recognizing as we do the importance of safeguarding the life of the President, nevertheless, it appears to us that a number of the guidelines contained in that supplement are overly broad and devoid of relevance for that purpose. They will succeed in doing nothing but adding to investigative files the names of American citizens who are doing nothing more than exercising their right of freedom of speech and their right to petition their government for redress of grievances. The disastrous effects of having information considered derogatory in such investigative files on employment possibilities, security clearance and even to positions on advisory committees of government agencies is too well known to require reiteration here. (You may have noticed recent news stories in the New York Times concerning scientists being blacklisted by HEW for service on advisory review committees on the basis of such so-called derogatory information.) In particular, I would like to suggest modification be considered or elimination of the following guidelines:

1. PROTECTIVE INFORMATION

A. Information pertaining to a threat, plan or attempt by an individual, a group, or an organization to physically harm or embarrass the persons protected by the U.S. Secret Service, or any other high U.S. Government officials at home or abroad.

Comment: Certainly the desire to embarrass any government official hardly indicates a desire to harm him. Embarrassment may be caused in many ways, including the exposure of peccadilloes, or even malfeasance in office.

D. Information on persons who insist upon personally contacting high Government officials for the purpose of redress of imiginary grievances, etc.

Comment: Many Americans attempt to contact high Government officials for the purpose of redressing grievances. The grievances may be in the view of some individuals including the government officials involved, imaginary. Nevertheless, it is fairly clear many of the grievances are not imaginary and it has only been by the sustained effort of such individuals that the grievances have been brought to public attention and corrective measures taken. American citizens should not be inhibited in trying to see high government officials by fear that this will be considered derogatory information by the Secret Service.

E. Information on any person who makes oral or written statements about high Government officials in the following categories: (1) threatening statements, (2) irrational statements, and (3) abusive statements.

Comment: A comment similar to the item above could be made about irrational statements and abusive statements. There are many people who write abusive letters and make abusive statements about government officials. However, merely because a letter or statement is abusive in tone does not indicate a desire to cause physical harm. Similarly, those who make irrational statements

do not necessarily indicate any desire nor inclination to harm. Unless the purpose of this guideline is really just to collect a list of all those who make abusive or irrational statements about high government officials in the United States, it seems difficult to believe that this kind of information is necessary as a positive method of protecting such officials.

Just in passing the recent speech by Vice-President Spiro Agnew reported in yesterday's Washington Post and New York Times as well as being carried by all the news media, was considered by at least Senators William Fulbright and Hugh Scott to be abusive about some Congressional leaders who are opposed to the war in Vietnam. Would Vice President Agnew's speech be covered by this regulation and would it have to be reported?

I. Information regarding anti-American or anti-U.S. Government demonstrations in the United States or overseas.

Comment: To be specific, are the recent moratorium demonstrations on October 15th considered to be either anti-American or anti-Government and must all participants be reported to the Secret Service? If so, are you including the names of all the U.S. Senators and Congressmen who participated?

Is there a difference between anti-American or anti-U.S. Government or is one term intended to mean anti-administration?

As I stated at the beginning of my letter, I recognize the necessity for guarding the President and other government officials protected by the U.S. Secret Service. However, collecting information of the kinds suggested in these guidelines will not really focus on this problem and instead, will fill investigatory files with useless information which will be derogatory to countless millions of Americans. We would appreciate your reconsidering this manual supplement. We would be quite willing to discuss this matter further either with you or with those who have the responsibility of issuing such instructions.

Sincerely yours,

LAWRENCE SPEISER, Director, Washington Office.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEISER: Commissioner Thrower has asked me to respond to your October 22 letter regarding our Manual Supplement "Protection of the President: Guidelines for Reporting Information." If you have a copy of the document in question, you will see that the guidelines in question were issued by the United States Secret Service. The guidelines were distributed to Internal Revenue Service employees in an effort to be of maximum assistance to Secret Service in meeting their protective responsibilities.

I have referred your letter to the Secret Service, and I assume you will be hearing from that office in the near future.

Sincerely,

LEON C. GREEN, Deputy Assistant Commissioner.

[From manual Supplement, U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, Aug. 22, 1969]

PROTECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: GUIDELINES FOR REPORTING INFORMATION

SECTION 1. BACKGROUND

The U.S. Secret Service is charged with the responsibility of protecting the President and certain other high-level Government officials and public figures. This responsibility includes the evaluation of all information concerning threats against the personal safety of those being protected. It is incumbent upon the Internal Revenue Service, along with other agencies, to assist the Secret Service in this responsibility by the timely reporting of any information which will help that organization to do its job effectively.

SECTION 2. PURPOSE

This Manual Supplement provides: U.S. Secret Service Liaison Guidelines, which outlines the type of information most useful to the Secret Service (see

Attachment 1); instructions for reporting this information; and a list of Secret Service field offices.

SECTION 3. GUIDELINES

Employees should: familiarize themselves with the attached document, U.S. Secret Service Liaison Guidelines; be alert to circumstances which warrant their consideration; report information in accordance with Section 4 of this Manual Supplement; and upon request, cooperate fully with the Secret Service in discharging their responsibilities in this area.

SECTION 4. REPORTING PROCEDURES

.01 As indicated in the Secret Service guidelines, information should be promptly referred to the Secret Service Washington Office. Employees will use their discretion to determine the most judicious method of notifying the Secret Service. If the referral is urgent, employees are authorized to telephone the nearest Secret Service Office. When time permits, a written report should be sent to the Secret Service Washington Office. Attachment 2 to the Manual Supplement contains a list of Secret Service field offices giving their addresses and telephone numbers.

.02 In all cases, the person making the referral will prepare a written report for his own file. This report will contain: all the information given to the Secret Service, the Secret Service office and personnel notified, and the time and date of the referral.

SECTION 5. EFFECT ON OTHER DOCUMENTS

IRM 1941.7 is supplemented; and Manual Supplement 19G-46, dated June 1, 1966, is superseded.

(Attachment)

U.S. SECRET SERVICE LIAISON GUIDELINES

Subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, the United States Secret Service is charged by Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3056, with the responsibility of protecting the person of the President of the United States, the members of his immediate family, the President-Elect and Vice President, or other officer next in the order of succession to the Office of President, and the Vice PresidentElect, protect the person of a former President and his wife during his lifetime. the person of the widow of a former President until her death or re-marriage, and minor children of a former President until they reach 16 years of age, unless such protection is declined, protect persons who are determined from time to time by the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Advisory Committee as being major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates which should receive such protection (unless the candidate has declined such protection).

Detecting and arresting any person committing any offense against the laws of the United States relating to coins, obligations, and securities of the United States and foreign Governments. Several other responsibilities are delegated to the U.S. Secret Service by the Secretary of the Treasury, such as investigation of violations of the Gold Reserve Act, and such other functions as are authorized by law.

Effective liaison with other law enforcement and Government agencies is necessary to insure we receive all information they may develop regarding any of our responsibilities. A Special Agent of the Liaison Division, U.S. Secret Service, will maintain contact with your agency at a headquarters level. Certain guidelines are set forth below which may assist you in determining our interests.

1. PROTECTIVE INFORMATION

A. Information pertaining to a threat, plan or attempt by an individual, a group, or an organization to physically harm or embarrass the persons protected by the U.S. Secret Service, or any other high U.S. Government official at home or abroad.

B. Information pertaining to individuals, groups, or organizations who have plotted, attempted, or carried out assassinations of senior officials of domestic or foreign Governments.

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