1. A preliminary injunction will not is-
sue, at the suit of one of two compet-
itors for the award of a medal by the
American Institute of New York, for
superiority in a "fan," to restrain the
Institute from delivering the medal of
superiority to the other, on a bill filed
to enjoin such delivery and for a de-
cree that it be delivered to the plain-
tiff. New York Exhaust Ventilator Co.
v. American Institute,
See CARRIER, 7.
COPYRIGHT, 7.
NATIONAL BANK, 3 to 5.
PATENT, 4, 18.
TRADE-MARK, 3 to 7.
1. In July, 1855, a firm composed of A
and four others went into liquidation.
In a suit in equity brought in a State
Court of Alabama, in June, 1871, by
D. against the five members of the
firm, in regard to real estate in Ala-
bama, no one of the five was served
with process, but under an employ-
ment by A., who had no authority in
regard to the other four, a lawyer in
Alabama appeared and answered for
A. and the firm. There was a money
decree in April, 1882, against A., and
the five members of the firm, naming
them, "or such of them as are now
surviving," not stating who the sur-
vivors were, three of them being then
dead. In a suit in Connecticut, on
the decree, against A. and M., the
two surviving members of the firm:
Held,
(1.) A. was bound by the decree
against him individually;
(2.) Under sections 2,905 and 2,913
of the Code of Alabama, the decree
against the five members of the firm
was a valid decree against the sur-
vivors. Downs v. Allen,
2. In rendering a judgment for the
amounts of the decrees in Alabama,
interest on them was not allowed. id.
3. In a suit on a personal judgment re-
covered against the defendant, by the
plaintiff, in another Court, the issue
of fact was as to whether the defend.
ant employed and paid an attorney
who appeared for him in the suit in
which the judgment was recovered,
he not having been personally served
with process. That issue being found
1. In a suit in equity, in this Court,
against an Illinois corporation, for in-
fringing in New York, by an agent
there, at its place of business there,
a trade-mark of the plaintiff, the sub-
poena was served on that agent, at
New York, according to the statute
of New York. The defendant, in mov-
ing to set aside the service, showed
that there was no one in New York
but such agent, who could be served.
The motion was denied. Estes v.
Belford,
3. A citizen of Illinois attended this
Court for the trial of a suit in it
against himself, and as a necessary
witness on the trial of other suits in
it to which he was not a party.
fore the trial of his own suit was fin-
ished, and before he had been called
as a witness in the other suits, he was
served, while in attendance at the
trial, in Connecticut, with a com-
plaint and a summons commencing
this suit, without attachment: Held,
on a plea in abatement, that the com-
Misconduct of a juror, during the
trial, by conversing with one of the
parties and expressing an opinion on
the case, is waived by the other party,
if known to him at the time and not
brought to the notice of the Court un-
til after a verdict against him. id.
See INTEREST, 1.
MUNICIPAL BOND, 2.
PRACTICE, 1, 2, 4.
See CONTRACT, 1.
COSTS, 10.
1. Under a contract of marine insur-
ance on a vessel, made in anada, the
question of the right of the insurer
to a lien on the proceeds of the sale
of the vessel, in an Admiralty Court
in the United States, for money due
as an unpaid premium for the insur-
ance, is controlled by the law of Can-
ada. The Waubaushene,
2. Such a lien is not recognized by the
jurisprudence of the United States;
and the statute of New York creating
a lien for premiums in favor of under-
![[blocks in formation]](https://books.google.lv/books/content?id=D_g7AAAAIAAJ&hl=lv&output=html_text&pg=PA587&img=1&zoom=3&q=contract&cds=1&sig=ACfU3U37BkcMsMYEgjOpmD0i87rQkAU-nQ&edge=0&edge=stretch&ci=127,201,759,261)
1. The New York limitation of six
years commenced to run, on a note,
six years and two months before
suit was brought. The statute (Code
of Civil Procedure, § 401) provides,
that "if, after a cause of action has
accrued against a person, he departs
from and resides without the State,
or remains continuously absent there-
from for the space of one year or
more, the time of his absence is not a
part of the time limited for the com-
mencement of the action." This
means. that if the person departs
from the State, and resides without it
for any length of time, that time is
to be taken out, while absences for
less than a year, not accompanied by
residence without the State, are not
to be taken out. Although the de-
fendant was not continuously absent
from the State for one year between
the time the limitation began to run
and the bringing of the suit, yet, as
he resided without the State, during
that interval, for a length of time
which, deducted from the six years
and two months, left less than six
years to be reckoned towards the
statute bar, the action was brought
in time. Satterthwaite v. Abercrom-
bie,
1. A married woman endorsed the
promissory note of her husband,
made payable to her order, in this
way: "Pay to the order of P. For
value received, I hereby charge my
separate estate with payment of the
within note:" Held, that her promise
1. The captain of a barge owned by the
defendant was assisting the plaintiff
and other employés in loading the
barge with iron rails. Two men.
worked on the hand winch, the cap
tain hooked the tongs on the rails,
and the plaintiff was one of two men
who guided the rails into the barge
after they were hoisted by the winch.
It was the duty of the man who was
at the tongs to give the order to
hoist. The captain gave the order
prematurely, and a rail fell on the
plaintiff and injured him: Held, by
ALLACE, J., that the negligence of
the captain was not the negligence of
the defendant, and by BENEDICT, J.,
that it was. Quinn v. New Jersey
Lighterage Co.,
A track repairer on the structure of
an elevated railroad, who, while en-
gaged in his work, is injured by the
negligence of an engineer on the road
in running his train at too high a
rate of speed, both being employés
of the railroad corporation, cannot re-
cover against the corporation, be-
cause he was a fellow servant with
the engineer Van Sickle v. Man-
hattan Railway Co.,
422
1. C., owning 12 coupons, of $25 each,
cut from bonds of a town, bought
from S., a banker, 79 other coupons,
of the same issue, of $25 each, for
$79, and immediately brought suit
against the town, on the 91 coupons,
in a State Court, and then removed
the suit into this Court. C. and S.
long time: Held, that the transfer was
made with a view of a preference,
within the meaning of section 5,242
of the Revised Statutes, and was
void; and that the receiver of the
bank was entitled, in a suit in equity
against the transferee, to a decree
setting aside the transfer. Roberts v.
Hill,
312
testified that there was no arrange-
ment qualifying the absolute sale.
The transaction was conducted by
correspondence, but it was not pro-
duced, nor were the books of S. On
this and other evidence, the Court
held that C. was collusively made a
party, and that the suit must be re-
manded to the State Court, under sec-
tion 5 of the Act of March 3d, 1875,
(18 U. S. Stat. at Large, 472.) 3. Where a receiver of a national bank,
Chandler v. Town of Attica,
2. In a suit by T. against a town, on
bonds, it appearing that they were
issued in fraud of the rights of the
town, T. endeavored to show by P.,
from whom he bought them, that P.
was a holder of them in good faith
and for value. The case rested on
the testimony of P. alone, and the
Court left the question to the jury:
Held, that the jury had the right to
reject the testimony of P., as incred-
ible. Tracy v. Town of Phelps, 71
1. About six weeks before a national
bank stopped business, its officers
guaranteed personally to a depositor
the payment of money he had on de-
posit, and turned over to him, in
pledge, a promissory note belonging
to the bank. It was insolvent at the
time, but had not committed an act
of insolvency, under section 5,226, or
section 5,242, of the Revised Stat-
utes: Held, on the facts, that the
pledge was not made in contempla-
tion of insolvency, with a view to
prevent the application of the assets
in the manner prescribed by the stat-
ute, or with a view to prefer one
creditor to another. Roberts v. Hill,
2. In January, 1884, a run on a national
bank occurred, continuing two days.
On February 20th, 1884, the officers
of the bank transferred to a depositor
a note, to avoid paying him the
amount of his deposit, which he had
demanded. The bank failed early in
April. It was insolvent at the time
of the transfer, and had been for a
appointed by the Comptroller of the
Currency, has in his possession bonds
pledged to the bank for a debt, and
has obtained from this Court an order,
under the statute, to sell them, and a
corporation, a citizen of Vermont, has
brought a suit in Canada, against the
receiver, to recover the bonds, this
Court has jurisdiction of a bill filed
by the receiver against the corpora
tion, to enjoin it from further prose-
cuting the suit in Canada, and will
issue a preliminary injunction to that
effect. Hendee v. Connecticut and
Passumpsic Rivers R. R. Co., 453
![[blocks in formation]](https://books.google.lv/books/content?id=D_g7AAAAIAAJ&hl=lv&output=html_text&pg=PA588&img=1&zoom=3&q=contract&cds=1&sig=ACfU3U0gUI9qBr8nESmWx-bcA3oSHYy5Dw&edge=0&edge=stretch&ci=512,775,381,183)
6. The plaintiff drew a sight draft on a
person who owed him money, and de-
posited the draft in a national bank.
where he kept an account, which
credited its amount to him, on its own
books, as a cash item, but did not en-
ter the amount in his pass-book until
after it had failed, and then without
his knowledge. The bank was insol-
vent at the time of the deposit, but
the amount of the draft was received
by its collecting agent, from the
drawer, after it had failed and closed
its doors, and went into the hands of
its receiver. In a suit in equity by
the plaintiff against the receiver to
recover the amount: Held, that the
draft belonged to the bank at the
time it was paid by the drawee, and
that the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover. St. Louis & San Francisco
Railway Co. v. Johnston,
1. Sections 4,465 and 4,469 of the Re-
vised Statutes, imposing a penalty on
a steamer for carrying more passen-
gers than its certificate of inspection
allows, apply to a steamer engaged
in carrying passengers on the waters
of Jamaica Bay, which are public
navigable waters of the United States,
and open to the Atlantic Ocean, and
thus a highway over which commerce
may be carried on with other States
and foreign countries, and are such
waters as section 4,400 embraces, al-
though it does not appear that the
steamer was engaged in transporting
passengers or freight passing between
places outside of the State of New
York and places within that State.
The Hazel Kirke,
Under a statute of New Jersey,
which requires, in order to the for-
mation of a limited partnership, the
filing, with a certificate, of an affi-
davit that the sums contributed by
each of the special partners "have
been actually and in good faith paid
in cash," and provides that, if there
is any false statement in the certifi-
cate or affidavit, all the partners shall
be liable as general partners, if such
a certificate and affidavit are filed,
but one of the partners, instead of
having paid his contribution in cash,
only gave his check for the amount,
which was not paid till a month after-
wards, he is liable as a general part-
McGinnis v. Flynn,
1. Invention, (1.)
2. Novelty.
3. Form of Patent, (2.)
4. Duration,
5. Re-issue, (3.)
6. Assignment, (4 to 6.)
7. License, (7.)
8. Infringement, (8 to 10.)
9. Damages, (11, 12.)
10. Suit in Equity, (13 to 17.)
11. Injunction, (18.)
12. Repeal of Patent, (19, 20.)
|