Netherclift v. Robertson.

the Dominican treaty. All sugar was taxable, and, therefore, "all sugar" was included in the statute. In other words, it cannot be said that Congress, in 1870, intended to annul a provision which then had no operative existence, and could have none, unless special privileges were, in the future, accorded to some other nation. If, for instance, in 1867, Congress had passed a law providing that if, at any time thereafter, Hawaiian sugar should be admitted free, Dominican sugar, also, should be so admitted, there certainly is room to doubt whether such an Act would be repealed or affected by the subsequent re-enactment of a general statute imposing a duty upon all sugar, Hawaiian and Dominican included. If after, or even at the time of, the Hawaiian treaty, Congress had imposed a duty upon Dominican sugar, or generally upon all sugar, excepting "Sandwich Island sugar," the argument that the law-making power intended to disregard the treaty obligations would then be well nigh irresistible. But in the Bartram and Whitney cases there would seem, perhaps, to be some force in the proposition that the annulling or suspending legislation took place when there was nothing to suspend or annul, and when the provisions of the treaty could not have been present to the minds of the law-makers. Though the question, in this respect, may not be free from doubt, it is entirely clear that it is the duty of this Court to follow the law as settled by these decisions. It is, indeed, freely conceded that they are controlling, and it is not easy to perceive why they do not dispose of the present controversy.

Leaving out of view, for the moment, all other considerations, by what process of reasoning can the Court reach a conclusion favorable to the plaintiffs, and at the same time give force to the construction that the stipulations of the ninth article are satisfied when no unfriendly discrimination is made against the products and manufactures of the Dominican Republic? Even though this article were incorporated in haec verba in the Act of 1883, so as to eliminate all ques-tions as to its present validity and operative force, it would not avail the plaintiffs. If the rule of interpretation in Bar

Netherclift v. Robertson.

tram v. Robertson is correct, the plaintiffs have no right to complain so long as they pay no higher duty than is imposed upon similar importations from other countries. The situation is not affected by the one exception in favor of the Hawaiian Islands.

In other respects, too, these decisions are precedents as controlling of a cause arising since the Act of 1883 as prior thereto.

At

The only new element in the case at bar is found in the provisions of the eleventh section of that Act. It is contended, that by this legislation the dormant and moribund features of the treaty were revived, strengthened and made operative. I cannot think that the Court would be justified in giving to the broad and general language of the eleventh section a construction so radical and far-reaching. the date of the Act Congress found the Hawaiian treaty in full operation-a treaty affecting a group of lonely and isolated islands far out in the Pacific; a treaty by the terms of which the United States permitted certain articles to enter our ports free, upon the express consideration, however, that the island ports should be open to a much larger number of articles the growth or manufacture of this country. No other similar treaty was in operation. The Courts had expressly decided that the convention with the Hawaiian Islands did not set in motion provisions similar to the one in question. If not annulled, they at least were suspended and disutilized. Dominican sugar had paid duties for sixteen years. The aim of the law-makers was to preserve unchanged and unimpaired the existing state of things. It is hardly supposable that it was their purpose to make a sweeping change in the law; to open our ports, without advantage or consideration, to the products of many countries; to destroy a vast source of revenue; and to encourage fraud by making the Dominican Republic the dumping ground for the sugar and molasses of the West Indies. If this had been their design, they would have said so in language too plain and unequivocal to admit of doubt. It is thought, also, that there is force in the

Bogart v. The Electrical Supply Company.

proposition, that the provisions of the ninth article of the Dominican treaty amount simply to an agreement between the contracting parties not to discriminate against each other in the future by unfriendly legislation. The action of Congress is necessary, and, until such action is had, the Courts must follow the law as it is found on the statute books. (Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curtis, 454, 463.)

The questions involved in this controversy are of such interest and importance that they will, doubtless, be presented for final settlement to the Supreme Court. Under existing law, however, it is not possible for the plaintiffs to recover. There must, therefore, be a verdict directed for the defend

ant.

ABRAHAM L. BOGART

V8.

THE ELECTRICAL SUPPLY COMPANY. IN EQUITY.

Where an attorney is required, by an order of the Court, to pay the costs to which his client was unjustly subjected, growing out of the resistance of the attorney to the substitution of a new one, the payment of such costs may be enforced by an attachment for contempt of Court, notwithstanding the abolition of imprisonment for debt.

(Before WALLACE, J., Southern District of New York, June 22d, 1886.)

WALLACE, J. Upon further consideration, the doubt suggested, upon the argument of this motion, as to the power of the Court to enforce obedience to the order requiring the attorney to pay the costs of the reference to the master, by attachment, has been wholly removed. The attorney was required by the order to pay the costs to which his client had

Bogart v. The Electrical Supply Company.

been unjustly subjected, upon his application for leave to substitute a new attorney, which resulted in a reference to a master, and a decision that the attorney was not entitled to further compensation than he had already received. He has not paid the costs. Treating the present application as though it were made by the client, the plaintiff in the suit, instead of the master, in whose behalf it is really made, it is one for the exercise of the summary jurisdiction possessed by Courts over attorneys, as their officers, by attachment, when the professional conduct of the attorney, in a cause pending before the Court, is involved. The statute, (§ 725, U. S. Rev. Stat.,) has not restricted the power of the Court to punish for contempt any officer of the Court, in his official transactions, or his disobedience of any lawful order. It was entirely proper to order the attorney to pay the costs which he had unnecessarily imposed upon his client, and a decent regard for the dignity of the Court requires that obedience to the order be compelled. If the respondent had alleged his inability to comply with the terms of the order, such an excuse would be considered, but, in the absence of such an excuse, the case is one where the remedy by attachment should be allowed.

The statutes prohibiting imprisonment for debt have no application to such a case. The Courts have always allowed the summary remedy of an attachment to compel an attorney to observe the duties incident to his professional relations towards his client, and towards the other officers of the Court; and in this State it is even held that it is not essential to the exercise of this summary remedy that the transactions should arise out of a suit in the Court or in reference to any legal proceedings. (Matter of Dakin, 4 Hill, 42; Bowling Green Savings Bank v. Todd, 52 N. Y., 489; Matter of H., 87 N. Y., 521.)

The affidavits on the part of the respondent indicate that he has not been guilty of any intentional disobedience of the order, but rather that he has acted upon a misconception of his rights and duties. An attachment will be

The Bermuda.

issued unless within fifteen days he pays the sum heretofore ordered to be paid, as taxed by the Court.

Walter D. Edmonds, for the plaintiff.

Andrew H. H. Dawson, for the respondent.

THE BERMUDA.

Where a bill of lading declares non-accountability of the carrier for jewelry, unless its value is therein declared and extra freight paid, such stipulation is a reasonable one, and concealment by the shipper, of the fact that a package shipped under the bill of lading contains jewelry, is an imposition on the carrier, and destroys the claim of the shipper to indemnity, in case of loss.

(Before BLATCHFORD, J., Eastern District of New York, June 22d, 1886.)

BLATCHFORD, J. The decision of the District Court, dismissing the libel, was correct, and the grounds assigned for it were proper. (27 Fed. Rep., 476.) There was a special acceptance of the merchandise, under the clause in the bill of lading in regard to non-accountability for gold or silver, manufactured, plated articles, jewelry, trinkets and watches, contained in any package or parcel shipped under the bill of lading, "unless the value thereof will be therein expressed, and extra freight, as may be agreed, be paid." The shippers were, in view of that clause, substantially guilty of imposition on the owners of the vessel, and of misrepresenting the nature of the articles, within the rule sanctioned in Hart v. Pennsyl vania Railroad Co., (112 U. S., 340,) where it is said: "If the shipper is guilty of fraud or imposition, by misrepresenting the nature or value of the articles, he destroys his claim to indemnity, because he has attempted to deprive the carrier of the right to be compensated in proportion to the value of the ar