The Consolidated Electric Light Co. v. The Edison Electric Light Co. of assigns to any degree." It would seem, therefore, that the term "assignee," as first used in the patent laws, was used in its most strict and literal sense, and was understood to refer to the inventor's assignee, and that, in order to extend the benefits of the provision to subsequent assignees, it was deemed proper to designate them as "assignees of assigns to any degree." It is, undoubtedly, a fair and reasonable interpretation of the section in question, to hold that the patent may issue to the person who, by the records of the Office, is assignee of the patent, although not technically the assignee of the inventor. Such was the ruling in Selden v. Stockwell Gas Burner Co., (19 Blatchf. C. C. R., 544.) The purpose of the section is to permit a patent to issue to the person who has the title to the invention upon the records of the Patent Office. This purpose is attained when the patent runs to the ultimate assignee of the invention. It is equally well attained when the patent runs to the inventor, or to the inventor's assignee, if, by force of an assignment on record at the time, the grant inures, as soon as the patent issues, to the ultimate assignee. That the legal title vests at once in the person who, by the records, is entitled to it, was held in Gayler v. Wilder, (10 How., 477.) That case is also authority for the proposition, that it is not mandatory, under the language of the section, that the patent run in form to the person who is the owner of the invention, according to the records of the Office, at the time when the patent issues. In Gayler v. Wilder, the patent was issued to the inventor after the Act of 1837, notwithstanding he had assigned his whole invention to another, whose assignment was duly recorded before the patent issued; and it was held, that the legal title to the invention was notwithstanding in the assignee and not in the inventor. The plaintiff in that case could have acquired no legal, that is, no statutory, title, if the patent could only issue lawfully to the person who was the owner of the invention at the time. Nothing in the language of the section, or in the other sections of the patent laws, implies that a patent cannot be Wilkinson v. Culver. properly issued to any assignee whose assignment is duly recorded, when it can be done without impairing the rights of any other person having person having a paramount title to the inven tion. Inasmuch as the grant runs to the grantee named in the patent, and his assigns, and operates, therefore, in favor of the ultimate assignee, to convey him a record title, as completely as if he had been named in the patent, and as it is not essential that the grantee named be one who owns the invention when the patent issues, it should be held that a patent is valid when issued to any assignee of record. The demurrer is overruled. Edward N. Dickerson and Amos Broadnax, for the plaintiff. William M. Evarts and John C. Tomlinson, for the defendants. GEORGE WILKINSON, RECEIVER OF THE AMERICAN TRUST COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY vs. DELOS E. CULVER. Where a receiver appointed by a Court of New Jersey recovers, as such, a judgment in a Court of that State, on a promissory note, and brings suit on it in New York, he sues on it as an individual and not as receiver, although, in the title of the cause, in the declaration, he calls himself receiver. (Before CoXE, J., Southern District of New York, December 7th, 1885.) Wilkinson v. Culver. COXE, J. The plaintiff declares upon a judgment recovered by him, as receiver of the American Trust Company of New Jersey, in the Supreme Court of that State, upon certain promissory notes made by the defendant. The defendant demurs upon the ground that the plaintiff is the receiver of a New Jersey corporation, appointed by a Court of Chancery of that State, and, as such receiver, cannot maintain an action in this Court. The position of the defendant, in this respect, is sustained by the following authorities. (Booth v. Clark, 17 How., 327; Peale v. Phipps, 14 Id., 368; Holmes v. Sherwood, 3 Mc. Crary, 405; Olney v. Tanner, 10 Fed. Rep., 101; Hazard v. Durant, 19 Id., 471.) The plaintiff, however, though he disputes the accuracy of this contention, insists that the law invoked to sustain the demurrer is not applicable to the present controversy, for the reason that he is not suing as receiver, but as an individual. It is argued, that the addition of the words, "receiver, etc.," to the plaintiff's name, in the title of the cause, is mere descriptio persona, and may be rejected as surplusage. I am unable to see why this position is not well founded. A judgment upon a note merges the note, and no other suit can be maintained on the same instrument. Such a judg ment, when binding personally, can be relied on as a bar, in a second suit upon the note. (Eldred v. Bank, 17 Wall., 545; Ries v. Rowland, 4 McCrary, 85; Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 1 Id., 388.) The plaintiff does not sue because he is receiver, but because he is a judgment creditor. The action is on the judgment. He must, in order to recover, prove the judgment. He is not required to prove his title as receiver. That was done in the action in New Jersey upon the notes. It was necessary there, in order to obtain the judgment, but, having obtained it, the plaintiff, as an individual, can maintain the present suit. That such is the law in the case of an administration is very clear. In Talmage v. Chapel, (16 Mass., 71,) the Court says: "The action is on a judgment already recovered by the VOL. XXIII.-27 Wilkinson v. Culver. plaintiff, and it might have been brought by him in his own name, and not as administrator. For the debt was due to him, he being answerable for it to the estate of the intestate; and it ought to be considered as so brought, his style of administrator being merely descriptive, and not being essential to his right to recover. It is important to the purposes of justice that it should be so; for an administrator appointed here could not maintain an action upon this judgment, not being privy to it. Nor could he maintain an action on the original contract; for the defendants might plead in bar the judgment recovered against them in New York. The debt sued for is in truth due to the plaintiff in his personal capacity. For he makes himself accountable for it by bringing his action; and he may well declare that the debt is due to himself." To the same effect are Biddle v. Wilkins, (1 Peters, 686;) Bonafous v. Walker, (2 Term R., 126;) Freeman on Judgments, § 217. Which one of these arguments does not apply to the case at bar? The reasoning is, it would seem, as applicable to a receiver as to an administrator. The demurrer is overruled. The defendant has twenty days in which to answer. Cortlandt Parker and Edgar P. Hill, for the plaintiff. R. Floyd Clarke, Frederic F. Culver and James W. Culver, for the defendant. The Western Union Telegraph Co. v. The Baltimore and Ohio Telegraph Co. THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY vs. THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO TELEGRAPH COMPANY. IN EQUITY. Where, on a motion for a preliminary injunction, in a suit in equity, to restrain the infringement of re-issued letters patent, the plaintiff, a corporation, uses extracts from communications made to its officers by an attorney in its employ, in the course of proceedings to obtain a re issue of the patent, on the question of the reasons for procuring such re-issue, the defendant is entitled, in taking proofs for final hearing, on that question, to introduce in evidence the entire communications containing such extracts. (Before WALLACE, J., Southern District of New York, December 24th, 1885.) WALLACE, J. Upon a motion in this cause for a preliminary injunction, (25 Fed. Rep., 30,) one of the questions involved was, whether the re-issued patent upon which the suit is founded was obtained for the legitimate purpose of correcting mistake or inadvertence in the specification and claims of the original, or whether it was obtained merely for the purpose of expanding the claims of the original, in order to subordinate to the re-issue certain improvements or inventions made by others intermediate the grant of the original and the application for the re-issue. To fortify its theory of the true reasons for obtaining the re-issue, the complainant, upon that motion, embodied, in affidavits then used, extracts from communications made by Mr. Buckingham, a patent expert and attorney in the office of the general solicitor of the complainant, to the president and the vice-president of the complainant, when the subject of applying for a re-issue was under consideration by the officers of the complainant, and while the proceedings for a re-issue were pending. The cause has proceeded to the taking of proofs for final hearing, and the defendant now wishes to introduce in evidence the original |