The Archer. bottomry. If the bottomry would not have been good against an ordinary owner, it is not good against one who occupied the relation of owner in the transaction, within the contemplation of all the parties. Upon the equitable principles which prevail in Courts of Admiralty, the lien of the bond must be deemed subordinate to the rights of Harrison. To the extent that Crossman, as master, had authority to represent Harrison as owner, and subject the ship to liens for necessary repairs and supplies, the bond should be sustained, and the libellants be deemed subrogated to the liens. In the language of Story, J., in The Ship Packet, (3 Mason, 255, 259,) "it is not here, as in the Courts of common law, that the bond must be good in whole or not at all." "So far as the money was properly advanced, it may be held to give a valid lien, and be dismissed as to the rest." The District Court disallowed the premium upon the bond, but decreed for the principal, with ordinary interest. It appears that the repairs to a considerable extent were in excess of the necessities of the ship, one item being the entire new coppering of the ship. The bond can only be allowed to stand for such supplies and repairs as a master could properly order. The decree of the District Court must be reversed, with costs of the appeal, and a decree is ordered for the libellant, for such sum as may be found due by a commissioner, to whom it is referred to ascertain and report the amount due. Theodore F. H. Meyer, for the libellant. William W. Goodrich, for the claimant. Roberts v. Hill. DANIEL ROBERTS vs. HENRY H. HILL. IN EQUITY. About six weeks before a national bank stopped business, its officers guaranteed personally to a depositor the payment of money he had on deposit, and turned over to him, in pledge, a promissory note belonging to the bank. It was insolvent at the time, but had not committed an act of insolvency, under section 5,226, or section 5,242, of the Revised Statutes: Held, on the facts, that the pledge was not made in contemplation of insolvency, with a view to prevent the application of the assets in the manner prescribed by the statute, or with a view to prefer one creditor to another. (Before WHEELER, J., Vermont, March 27th, 1885.) WHEELER, J. The orator is receiver of the First National Bank of St. Albans; the defendant is administrator of the estate of D. R. McGregor. The bill is brought to set aside a pledge of a promissory note of $8,031.35, made by the officers of the bank to the defendant's intestate, on the 20th of February, 1884, to secure a deposit of $8,850. The right to have the pledge set aside and recover the note or its proceeds depends entirely upon section 5,242 of the Revised Statutes. There is no question about the validity of the deposit, nor but that the pledge would be good to secure it at common law. The statute makes utterly null and void all transfers of the securities, and payments of the money, of the bank, made after an act of insolvency, or in contemplation thereof, with a view to prevent the application of the assets in the manner prescribed in that chapter, or with a view to the preference of one creditor to another, except payment of the circulating notes. What would be an act of insolvency is not defined, but would apparently be the failure to redeem the circulating notes according to section 5,226, as that is the only thing which would authorize the Comptroller of the Currency, before the Act of June 30th, 1876, (19 U. S. Stat. at Large, 63,) to take possession of a national bank and appoint a receiver. This bank had not committed such an act of insolvency, but, beyond any fair question, was in fact Roberts v. Hill. insolvent at the time of the pledge. The contemplation mentioned in the statute appears to be that of insolvency itself, and not of that particular act of insolvency in not redeeming the circulation. (Case v. Citizens' Bank, 2 Woods, 23.) Here was insolvency in fact to be contemplated, sufficient to avoid the pledge, if actually made in contemplation of it, with a view to prevent the distribution of the assets ratably by a receiver, or to the preference of one creditor to another. The contemplation and view are to be those of the officers of the bank, and not of the creditor. If these motives existed and were operative with them, no innocence or good faith on his part would save the transaction. (Case v. Citizens' Bank, supra.) When the insolvency became permanent, the view to prevent ratable distribution, or to make preferences, would, if it developed into actual existence, remain constant, and vitiate not only all transfers of securities, but all payments of money to depositors, and to any creditors, except of the circulation. The intention of this section would seem to be to prevent the disposition of any of the money or assets to common creditors, whenever the insolvency should become so apparent as to make a receivership, or an ultimate loss to some of the creditors, probable to the just apprehension of the officers, and to hold all for the benefit of all. If this apprehension adequately existed in the minds of the officers of this bank at the time of this pledge, not only this pledge but all subsequent pledges of collaterals to and payments of prior existing debts would be void. It would be manifestly unjust to make an innocent receiver of security or payment give up his, and allow others who could be no more innocent to retain theirs, received when the fate of the institution was more and more imminent. The defendant's intestate is not shown, and does not appear, to have been any relative, favorite, or friend, of any officer of, or person connected with, the bank. He was a mere depositor, at a low rate of interest, for the mutual advantage of himself and the bank. There was a run on the bank by depositors, which alarmed him. He did not want his Roberts v. Hill. money, but wanted to be secure; the officers guaranteed his deposit personally, and turned out this note, to pacify him. He was dealt with as any other creditor equally importunate would have been. There was no intent to favor him over others; their motive was to retain the money. Had he received the money he would have been equally liable to refund that, under this statute, as has been shown. By mustering available assets and raising money, and a like use of securities with other depositors, they met the run for a time, by paying those who would be paid, securing those who would be paid. or secured, and restoring confidence to the rest. They were striving to save the bank, and not striving to help him at the expense of the others. The bank continued business about six weeks after this pledge. Then the officers saw that the effort to maintain it was hopeless, and stopped business. Their apprehension of the condition of the bank, and motive to prevent ratable distribution of the assets, ought to be made to appear clearly in order to justify going back so far as to the time of this pledge and opening all pledges and payments on past debts; and their purposes and acts are to be considered in view of what they could see looking forward, and not wholly by what is apparent now looking backward. If they saw, at the time of the pledge, that the bank was approaching failure, and made the pledge to keep the note out of the assets to be distributed, the pledge would be clearly void; but, if they made it to prevent failure, and expected to prevent failure, it would appear to be good. The insolvency had come gradually and not by any sudden loss which would arrest attention at once. The actual condition was as good as it had been for some time. They must have known that it was perilous, but do not appear to have lost courage, or then to have expected failure. The evidence does not satisfactorily show that they were placing money and securities where they would be kept from the effect of failure, but rather does show that at that time they were using their assets to prevent failure. Therefore, it is not found that this note was pledged VOL. XXIII.-13 The Steam Stone Cutter Company v. Sears. with a view to prevent its application in the manner prescribed by that chapter; nor with a view to a preference of this creditor to any other. Let there be a decree dismissing the bill of complaint, with costs. Roberts & Roberts, for the plaintiff. Jed P. Ladd and Henry C. Adams, for the defendant. THE STEAM STONE CUTTER COMPANY vs. THOMAS SEARS AND OTHERS. IN EQUITY. Under sections 874 and 875 of the Revised Laws of Vermont, of 1880, (title 11, chap. 49,) an attachment on a writ of sequestration, by leaving a copy of the writ, with a description of the estate attached, in the town clerk's office, is valid against subsequent purchasers, without actual notice, and without the entry in a book for that purpose, by the town clerk, of the names of the parties, date of the writ, nature of the action, sum demanded, and officer's return, as required by section 875. (Before WHEELER, J., Vermont, March 27th, 1885.) WHEELER, J. These seven cases each involve title to distinct parcels of land, under the same writ of sequestration and levy of execution that were in question in Steam Stone Cutter Co. v. Jones, (21 Blatchf. C. C. R., 138,) and Steam Stone Cutter Co. v. Sears, (9 Fed. Rep., 8.) The only question made now is whether the attachment on the writ of sequestration, by leaving a copy of the writ, with a description of the estate attached, in the town clerk's office, pursuant to section 874, Revised Laws of Vermont, of 1880, (title 11, |