Wooster v. Handy. depositions allowed for was taken and admitted in evidence in each suit in which it was entitled. It was for the parties to agree that the fee should be taxed but once for the group of cases, if that was to be the rule. Otherwise, the fee was taxable, because the deposition was taken in each case, and admitted in evidence in each case, although the writing was not repeated for each case. When several cases are heard at the same time, on one argument, a docket fee is always taxed in each case. (9.) Fees paid the same witness in more than one case. In the cases mentioned in Clause (8) above, where the witness was sworn in several cases at once, but his deposition was taken in all of them at the same time, by being written down once, as given, under the titles of all of the several cases, the defendants paid the witness his lawful witness fees in each one of the several cases in which his deposition was entitled, to the same extent they would have done if his deposition had been written down separately for each of the cases. The clerk taxed the fees so paid. The plaintiff objects to the taxation. The amounts objected to are, in the several suits, as follows: No. 3, $75; No. 4, $18; No. 5, $73.50; No. 6, $75; No. 9, $42; No. 10, $42. By § 848, a witness is allowed $1.50 for each day's attendance in Court, or before an officer pursuant to law. This necessarily means, that he is entitled to that in each suit in which he attends. The same section makes special provision for the case where a witness is subpoenaed "in more than one cause between the same parties, at the same Court," thus leaving the case where he attends in more than one cause between different parties, or where only one of the parties is the same, to be regulated by the general provision, in the absence of any rule of Court, or special order, or stipulation of parties. This view was held in Parker v. Bigler, (1 Fisher, 285,) in 1857, in the Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, by Mr. Justice Grier. Wooster v. Handy. (10.) Certified copies of papers put in evidence. The clerk allowed, on taxation, the disbursements paid for various copies of papers put in evidence by the defendants, and forming part of the record for final hearing. They comprised documentary exhibits not from the Patent Office; documentary exhibits from the Patent Office, (other than patents,) but which were not part of the file wrapper and contents of the patent sued on, and not assignments affecting the plaintiff's title to that patent; and certified copies of patents other than the one sued on, which did not affect the plaintiff's title to that patent, and were not mentioned in the bill of complaint. One of the above items was for drawings from the Patent Office, to bind with the printed record, being drawings of patents, and drawings in file wrappers. They pertained to the text in the record, and fairly came under the head of the printing required by the Rule. All of the above items were taxable. They were, under § 983, "copies of papers necessarily obtained for use," being put in evidence, and there being no order rejecting them as evidence. (11.) Incompetent and immaterial testimony. Under the provision of Rule 67 in Equity, that "the Court shall have power to deal with the costs of incompetent, immaterial or irrelevant depositions, or parts of them, as may be just," the plaintiff, now, for the first time, on an appeal from the taxation of costs, applies to the Court to declare certain depositions to be incompetent and immaterial. This is done on an affidavit made by the counsel for the plaintiff, more than a month after the costs were taxed, setting forth, that, in his opinion, certain depositions, evidence and exhibits introduced by the defendants are incompetent or immaterial, and the cost of introducing and printing them should not be charged against the plaintiff. He specities 18 different items. The counsel for the defendants makes an affidavit expressing a contrary opinion. Under this state of facts, it is a sufficient ground for denying the application, that the plaintiff did not, The Citizens' Bank v. Brooks. at or before the final hearing in June, 1884, or before the taxation of costs, move to strike out the evidence in question. Whatever objections may have been taken to any of the testimony at the time it was introduced, (and only such objections could be considered, in any event,) they were waived by the laches. It results, that the taxations are all of them affirmed, except that, in each of the suits Nos. 1, 9 and 10, a docket fee of $20 is to be added. Henry S. Hoyt and Frederic II. Betts, for the plaintiff. John Dane, Jr., W. H. L. Lee and B. F. Lee, for the defendants. THE CITIZENS' BANK vs. FRANK W. BROOKS. In a suit on a personal judgment recovered against the defendant, by the plaintiff, in another Court, the issue of fact was as to whether the defendant employed and paid an attorney who appeared for him in the suit in which the judgment was recovered, he not having been personally served with proThat issue being found for the defendant, it was held that he was not bound by the judgment. cess. On the trial of a suit by the Court without a jury, the defendant having died after the day when the last of the evidence was submitted, judgment was rendered as of that day. (Before WHEELER, J., Vermont, February 18th, 1885.) WHEELER, J. This is an action of debt on a judgment recovered in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, for $9,337.16 damages, and $108.30 costs. The defendant has pleaded five pleas, in the last of which he alleges that he was not a citizen of Kansas, nor in Kansas, at the time of the commencement of that action, nor at any time afterwards; that no process in it was ever served upon him; The Citizens' Bank v. Brooks. that he never authorized or employed any attorney or other person to appear for him and in his behalf, nor authorized or empowered any person to employ or procure an attorney or other person to appear for him and in his behalf; that no attorney or other person ever had any authority to appear for him and in his behalf in that suit; and that he never entered his appearance therein in person. To this plea the plaintiff replies, that the defendant had knowledge of the commencement and pendency of the suit, and did, by his agents, procure attorneys of the Court there to appear for him and in his behalf, in that cause, and that he did, by these attorneys, voluntarily appear in said cause and defend it, and that, after the judgment had been rendered, he paid the attorneys for their appearance in the cause, and for defending it, and ratified and confirmed their appearance in and defence of it. The defendant traversed this replication, and issue to the contrary is joined upon it. The other pleadings are disposed of in such manner as to leave this one for trial and it is tried by the Court, upon waiver in writing of a jury. The record shows service by attachment of property of the defendant, as a non-resident of Kansas, only, and an appearance and answer for the defendant by the attorneys named in the replication. The plaintiff claims that the record of the appearance in the cause, of attorneys of the Court, for the defendant, is conclusive of their right to appear for him, and that evidence to the contrary should not be considered. There are cases which, perhaps, go to this length. (Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481; Lapham v. Briggs, 27 Vt., 26.) But it is now well settled, in the Courts of the United States, that want of jurisdiction to bind the person may be shown in an action upon the judgment against the person. (Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall., 457; Knowles v. Gas Light Co.. 19 Wall., 58; Hall v. Lanning, 91 U. S., 160; Graham v. Spencer, 14 Fed. Rep., 603.) The fact that the attorneys entered an appearance for the defendant is, perhaps, conclusively shown by the record, but that they had authority in fact, or any more than that they assumed to have authority, is not The Citizens' Bank v. Brooks. shown at all by it. The presumption that all was rightly done, arising from their being officers of the Court, is admitted to, and doubtless does, cast the burden upon the defendant, of showing that the appearance was without his authority. The defendant testifies distinctly, that he never employed, nor authorized the employment of, any attorney to appear for him in the case, and there is no proof that he ever did. Three attorneys appeared, one at first and two others afterwards. The testimony of the last two shows that they were engaged by the first, and he is dead, and nothing is produced to show that the defendant ever had any communication with him. A deposition of the defendant was taken by the plaintiff, in Vermont, where the defendant resided, on notice accepted by the attorneys in Kansas, and filed in that cause, in which it is stated that the deponent "is the defendant" in the cause. After the judgment was rendered, the attorneys telegraphed to the defendant: "Simonds writes refusing to be responsible for fees; are we to be paid for services and by whom; answer definitely quick." He answered: "We expect to pay our counsel." In a few days he sent $300 for them. The plaintiff relies upon this to sustain the allegation of the replication, that he knew of the suit, and of the employment and appearance of the attorneys in it, and ratified their doings, and paid them for their services. The substance of the replication is, that he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Court, and that the cause was thereupon tried. If he was heard there upon the trial, he has no right to be heard again upon the questions involved, except upon appeal, but is bound. That he had notice of the suit, however full and formal, out of the jurisdiction, would not bind him. He could not be compelled to appear by anything done without the jurisdiction. (Bischoff v. Wethered, 9 Wall., 812.) Therefore, taking his deposition would not bind him. The other party had the right to take it in order to obtain a judgment to bind the property attached, but he could not be made a party personally in that manner. If he could, the jurisdiction of Courts could be extended without their territorial limits, by merely re |