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eous report of the facts as to the Alabama to his Government upon the 1st August, 1861,1 and on the 13th August the President desired Mr. Adams to express to Earl Russell his satisfaction at the "just and friendly proceedings and language of the British Government" with respect both to the Oreto and the Alabama. No subsequent departure from this tone can alter the fact that this was the original impression produced upon the mind of the American Government by the circumstances which had occurred down to the 1st August, 1861, as they were known to Mr. Adams on that day.

64. The facts relative to the Georgia are stated in Part VII The Georgia. of the British Case, and in Part VII of the British Counter Case.

65. In the case of the Georgia no information or representation whatever was given or made to the British Government until six days after the ship had put to sea. Information about her had for a long time before (according to the statement of the United States) been in the possession of the American Minister and Consular officers, but they had not communicated it. If what they knew furnished reasonable ground to believe that she was a vessel of an unlawful character, intended for the naval service of the Confederate States, they ought to have communicated it, and are themselves the persons to blame; if not, the necessary conclusion is, that the industry of these officials had failed to discover any information of that kind. Even the statements at last made by Mr. Adams were erroneous, as well as unsupported by any proof.

66. That there was nothing about the vessel herself, or her equipment, which could make it the duty of the Government to seize her, or even to institute inquiries about her, nor anything which ought to have excited the suspicions of the officers of the Revenue, is clear. She was, to all appearance, a vessel intended for commerce; and her build, rig, and fittings, her register, her clearance, her professed destination, the manner in which her crew were hired, and the terms of hiring, were ali perfectly consistent with her apparent character and employment.* There is not, at this moment, any evidence whatever that she had been specially adapted for warlike use, either wholly or in part, before she left this country.

67. The intelligence. of the departure of the Georgia from the Clyde, when first furnished by Mr. Adams to the British Government, together with the assertion (a bare assertion unsupported by any proof) that she was intended for the Confederate service, was accompanied by a statement that "her immediate destination is Alderney, where she may probably be at this moment." One of Her Majesty's ships of war was sent to Alderney in consequence of this statement, but it proved to be erroneous. The Georgia did not go to Alderney, but proceeded to 1 Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. iii. p. 35, vol. vi, p. 414 12 Ibid., vol. i, p. 541.

3 British Case, p. 120; Appendix to ditto, vol. i, p. 399; British Counter Case, p. 90; Appendix to Case of the United States, vol ii, pp. 665, 667.

British Case, p. 122; Appendix to ditto, vol. i, pp. 404, 413; British Counter Case, p. 89; Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. vi, p. 512.

Appendix to British Case, vol. i, p. 418. It is remarked in the Counter Case of the United States (sec. vii, par. 3) that "it appears that orders were given to a British vessel of war to proceed to Alderney; but it does not appear whether those orders were or were not obeyed." Her Majesty's Government did not think it desirable to add to the already voluminous correspondence laid before the Arbitrators by the insertion of documents which were not absolutely necessary. It might be taken for granted, and it is of course the fact, that the captain of Her Majesty's ship Dasher obeyed his instructions, and it was equally certain that he could obtain no intelligence at Alderney of either the Alar or Japan, both of which vessels were afterward found to have gone not to Alderney but to Ushant. The dispatch from the Governor of Alderney reporting the unsuccessful result of the mission of the Dasher is, however, at the disposal of the Arbitrators if they should desire its production.

French waters, where she received her armament. It is suggested, on the part of the United States, that it was the duty of the British Government to employ its naval forces in searching for and pursuing her on the high seas. No such duty exists, or has ever been recognized by maritime powers. It appears further to be suggested that she ought to have been pursued and seized in French waters. So far was this from being the duty of the British Government that it would have been a violation of the territorial sovereignty of France and a direct offense against the law of nations.1 Her Majesty's Government is not aware that any claim has ever been made upon France by the United States, on the ground that this vessel was not prevented from being armed for war within the territorial jurisdiction of that country.

68. The facts relative to the Shenandoah are stated in Part VIII of the British Case, and in Part VII of the British Counter

The Shenandoah. Case.

69. The Shenandoah was a vessel designed and built solely for a mer chant-steamer, and with a view to employment in the China trade; was originally employed in that trade; was afterwards sold in the London market to a Liverpool ship-owner; and was by him dispatched from London with a clearance for Bombay. At the time when she left England she was in no way fitted out, armed, or equipped for war. She had on board two smooth-bore, 12-pounder guns, but they were only the same guns which she had carried during her mercantile em ployment, and such as are usually carried by ships trading in the China seas, to be used as signal-guns, and for other purposes common to merchant-vessels.2

70. No representation was made, no information whatever was given to, or possessed by, the British Government, respecting this ship before her departure from England. The Government first heard of her five weeks after she had sailed, and then not from the Minister or Consul of the United States, but from Her Majesty's Consul at Teneriffe.3

71. There is not the slightest pretense for alleging that, in the char acter and appearance of the vessel, in her fittings or equipment, in her clearance, or in the hiring of her crew, there was anything whatever to excite suspicion in the officers of the Government at the port of London or elsewhere, or to lead to inquiry; nor that she had been, in fact, specially adapted to warlike use, either wholly or in part, before her final departure from this country. It has indeed been suggested, on the part of the United States, that the British Government ought to have known the name of the English merchant by whom she had been bought and was owned when she left England, and the circumstance that he was a connection by marriage of a member of the Liverpool firm of Fraser, Trenholm and Co.; and that it was a proof of a want of "the most ordinary diligence," on the part of Her Majesty's Government, not to be acquainted with and "take notice of" this circumstance. On the part of Great Britain, it is not thought necessary to trouble the Arbitrators with any argument in answer to this remarkable suggestion.

72. In the case of the Shenandoah, as in that of the Georgia, the United States seek to hold Great Britain liable for negligence in not having prevented the equipment or departure of a vessel which was never fitted out, armed, or equipped for war in British territory, and was never specially adapted therein for warlike use; as to which no

1 British Counter Case, pp. 90, 91.

2 British Case, p. 143; Appendix to ditto, vol. i, pp. 481, 494-97, 724, 725; British Counter Case, p. 93.

3 British Case, p. 136; Appendix to ditto, vol. i, p. 477.

"Case of the United States, p. 417.

representation or communication had been made to the Government, and no ground whatever existed for believing that she was intended for the Confederate States; which presented no circumstance of suspicion, and of the very existence of which the Government was totally uninformed. These pretensions are unsupported alike by the three Rules, and by the previously recognized principles of international law.

Georgia, and Shenan

73. It is submitted that, as to every one of these four Conclusion as to ships, the United States have failed to establish the facts the Florida. Alabama, necessary to support an award against Great Britain. It doal. has not been, and cannot be, shown, in the case of any one of them, that the British Government, having reasonable ground to believe that she was intended to cruise and carry on war against the United States, failed to use due diligence to prevent her from being fitted out, armed, or equipped for that purpose within British territory, or from departing thence, after having been specially adapted within it to warlike use.

ish Government in re

sentations of Mr.

74. It was stated in the case of Great Britain that, in the General course course of the years 1861, 1862, 1863, 1864, and 1865, many pursued by the Britrepresentations were addressed by Mr. Adams to Her Ma- gard to the repr jesty's Government respecting vessels which he believed to Adams. be either actually employed in carrying on trade with blockaded ports in articles contraband of war or other things, or to be preparing for such employment; and also with respect to other vessels which he believed to be intended to be used as privateers or commissioned ships of the Confederate States in cruising and carrying on war against the United States. To complaints of traffic carried on with blockaded ports, or in articles contraband of war, it was answered, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, that these were enterprises which Her Majesty's Government could not undertake to prevent, and the repression of which belonged to the United States as a belligerent Power. Allegations, on the other hand, that vessels were being prepared for cruising or carrying on war were immediately referred to the proper officers of the Government at the several localities for careful investigation and inquiry. If, on such investigation, it appeared by sufficient prima facie evidence that any illegal act was being or had been committed, the vessels were forthwith seized, and proceedings instituted according to law; if not, the result was at once communicated to Mr. Adams, and directions were given to the local authorities to watch closely the vessels as to which his suspicions had been aroused.'

It is said, in the Counter Case of the United States, (Sec. III, par. 14,) that "the United States do not understand that it is true that allegations that vessels were being prepared for cruising or carrying on war' were in all cases followed by seizure of the vessels when sufficient primafacie evidence of the illegal purpose was furnished. They understand the exact contrary to be the case."

The general course pursued by the British Government in these matters is correctly described in the foregoing extract from the British Case The United States question whether, "in all cases," this course was adhered to. Even with this addition, however, the proposition questioned is true, excluding only the case of the Alabama, in which some evidence sufficient to justify action on the part of the Government was indeed furnished, but furnished so late that the departure of the vessel took place before the Government had been advised to that effect.

75. It is, however, alleged, on the part of the United States, that each of these four vessels, if not actually armed and equipped Charge that the for war within British territory, obtained her armament from Armament of certain thence; that this armament was in each case purchased and from Great Britain.

1 British Case, pp. 31, 32.

was procured

sent out by the same person or persons who had procured and sent out the ship; that such person or persons was or were an agent or agents of the Government of the Confederate States, employed for these purposes; and that the crews with which the vessels were manned were chiefly composed of British subjects, obtained from England by the same agency. And it is contended that, under these circumstances, the Tribunal ought, as against Great Britain, to assume that these vessels were really armed and fitted out within British territory, and to make its award on that assumption.

76. To assume, under any circumstances, that vessels armed in the waters of Portugal or France were armed in Great Britain, is to assume a fiction; and to base an argument or award on this assumption, would be to base an argument or award upon a fiction. International duties and liabilities cannot be made to repose on such a foundation. If it be meant to affirm that a neutral Government is as much bound to prevent arms from being sent abroad for this purpose and under these circumstances, as to prevent the actual arming of a belligerent vessel of war within the neutral jurisdiction, where is the proof of this supposed obligation, and when was it sanctioned by the general consent of nations? It is perfectly unknown, and was never heard of before. The acts, which are supposed to be virtually the same, and which the neutral Government is on that account supposed to be under the same obligation to prohibit, are in reality different, and the reasons which support the international obligation in the one case are wanting in the other. To attempt to found such an obligation on the second of the three Rules, which prohibits, in language previously familiar to publicists, the use of neutral territory, by the permission or with the acquiescence of the neutral Sovereign, as a base of naval operations, or for the renewal or aug. mentation of military supplies or arms, would be clearly indefensible. Upon the manner in which the phrase "base of operations," and other similar expressions, have been from time to time applied to subjects not within their proper meaning in the diplomatic correspondence of the American Government, some observations will be made hereafter; in this place it is sufficient to point out that the sending abroad of munitions of war which are intended to be used in arming a particular ship, is not the same thing, and does not involve the same hostile use of neutral territory, as the placing of the same armament on board of the belligerent vessel in the port of the neutral country, from whence she is to sail when so armed; nor is it, like the latter, comparatively easy of repression without an unreasonable interference with neutral trade. How indeed is the neutral Government to know the destination of the arms, or for what market or vessel they are intended? This is a matter into which neutral Governments have never been held bound to inquire, and would certainly never undertake to inquire. Does the supposed obligation in respect of the export of arms arise when ship and arms are procured from different countries, or only when they are obtained from the same country?—when from different ports, or only when from the same port?—when purchased by different agents, or only when the agent is the same? Where is the line to be drawn, and is it to be the duty of the neutral Government to search out all these various circumstances, or how many of them; and how is it to do so? Little consid eration is needed to show that, although the several acts, by which a ship, and the armament which is to be put on board of her, are separately procured and sent abroad, may, as against the persons by whom or by whose orders they are done, be regarded as so many steps in the execution of a single enterprise, and parts of one transaction, they can

not with justice be so regarded as against the neutral Government, which (so far as it can deal with them at all in the way of prevention) can only deal with them separately, and which may, and most frequently would, be wholly ignorant of the existence of the plan that was their sole connecting link, or at any rate unable to substantiate it. For the acts done beyond its territorial jurisdiction, whether by neutral citizens, or by belligerents with their aid, the neutral State cannot be held responsible.1

77. The facts relative to the arming of the several vessels now in question have been stated in the Case and Counter Case of Great Britain, and they will be found to illustrate the truth of the foregoing propositions.

78. The Alabama departed from Great Britain wholly unarmed,2 and appears to have been equipped for war in the waters of the Azores, or partly in those waters and partly on the high seas, receiving her armament from two vessels which sailed respectively at different times from Liverpool and from London, without any apparent, known, or suspected connection with her. One of these, the Agrippina, cleared in the month of August from the port of London for Demerara; the other, the Bahama, cleared from Liverpool on the 11th of the same month for Nassau. There is nothing, so far as the British Government is aware, to distinguish these two vessels from others freighted with munitions of war, which might be destined for places in the Confederate States, or to attract the special attention of the officers of customs at the several ports. No information ever reached the British Government which could lead to the belief that they were employed to carry arms to a ship intended for the war service of the Confederate States, or for any purpose which the British Government could be called upon to prevent.

79. The Georgia, which also left Great Britain unarmed, received her armament in French waters from the Alar, a small steamer, which was stated to be a regular trader between the port of Newhaven in Sussex, on the British Channel, and the Channel Islands." The Alar sailed from Newhaven with a regular clearance for Alderney and St. Malo. It sub

See correspondence between the United States and Portugal: Mr. J. Q. Adams to the Chevalier de Serra, March 14, 1818, and September 30, 1820, (Appendix to British Case, vol. iii, pp. 150, 157.)

2 British Case, p. 97; Appendix to ditto, vol. i, p. 205.

4

3 British Case, pp. 100-104; Appendix to ditto, vol. i, pp. 208-213,

Among the papers laid before Congress by the Government of the United States, and now also printed in vol. i of the Appendix to the British Case, (p. 252,) are two dispatches from Mr. Dudley, the United States consul at Liverpool, to his Government. The first of these, dated August 12, 1862, states that he "understands that Laird's gunboat 290 is somewhere either on the coast of England or Ireland, and that they are shipping to-day fifty more men who are to be taken to her to-night on a steamer." In the second, dated the following day, he reports that the men were placed on board the Bahama, which, after shipping them, and cannon, shot, and ammunition, had left her dock at 3 o'clock that morning, and was no longer to be seen. She had, in fact, sailed to meet the Alabama, which was, at that time, not off the coast of England or Ireland, as supposed by Mr. Dudley, but at Terceira, in the Azores, (see affidavits of Redden and Yonge, Appendix to British Case, vol. i, pp. 210, 220.) There appears no reason to believe that Mr. Dudley, before the sailing of the Bahama, knew or supposed that she was intended to carry out men or arms for the Alabama; nor, though he states that he had (apparently on the 13th, after her departure) written all the particulars to Mr. Adams in London, and to the United States consul at Dublin, was any representation made or information given to the British authorities either in London or Liverpool on the subject. The first information received by Her Majesty's government of the armament of the Alabama off Terceira was derived from a report of the customs officials at Liverpool, dated the 3d September following, on the return of the Bahama to that port. (Appendix to British Case, vol. i, p. 208.)

5 British Case, pp. 121-128; Appendix to ditto, vol. i, pp. 401-418.

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