CLAIMS AGAINST FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.
BANKRUPT; MEXICAN CLAIMS; RECEIVER.
COLLECTOR.
REVENUE LAWS, 7. 8. 18.
1. The rule which requires a sailing vessel to keep her course, and allows a steamer to
elect what manœuvre to make to go clear, applies only when there is some imme-
diate danger of collision, if both vessels keep their course; and where a schooner
and steamer on a lake, with plenty of sea room, were six miles apart, and the schoon-
er changed her course, she was not in fault thereby. Propellor Monticello v. Molli-
son, 17 H. 152....423.
2. Though it is a rule that a sailing vessel should keep her course when approaching a
steamer, and it is the duty of the latter to keep out of her way, yet this does not
apply to a case where the steamer was not in fault for not seeing the sailing vessel
till they were too near to allow the steamer to change her course; in such a case,
the steamer having stopped, as soon as the sailing vessel was discovered, and being
in the act of backing when the collision occurred, was held to be in no fault. Peck
v. Sanderson, 17 H. 178....439.
3. A vessel closehauled, meeting one having the wind free, luffed; held to be in fault
for not keeping her course. Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 17 H. 170....434.
4. It is not an excuse for want of a proper look-out in the night, in a place much fre-
quented by vessels, that all hands were employed in reefing, there being no unusual
emergency. Ib.
5. It is not a defence to a cause of collision that the libellants have been paid a total
loss by underwriters. Propellor Monticello v. Mollison, 17 H. 152....423.
6. If the respondent makes satisfaction to the injured party, he cannot be compelled
to answer again to a merely equitable owner of the claim, who must protect his own
rights by intervening in the cause, either before a decree, and becoming dominus litis,
or after the decree, while the money is in the registry. Ib.
7 If both vessels are in fault, the loss by collision is to be divided. Schooner Catha-
rine v. Dickinson, 17 H. 170....434.
When a vessel, injured by collision, is run on to a beach, bilged, and afterwards
raised and repaired, the measure of damage is the cost of raising and restoring her
to as good a condition as she was in at the time of the injury; in such a case, the
owner cannot sell her, as she lies, deduct the price from the value before the col-
lision, and recover the difference. Ib.
COMMON CARRIER
SHIPS, &c. 1-3.
CONDITION.
PUBLIC LANDS, 16.
1. The legislature of a State, if not restrained by its constitution, may make a valid
and binding contract with a banking corporation, in its charter, that no more than a
specified amount of taxes shall be levied on its property during a term of years;
and a succeeding legislature has not power to pass a law impairing the obligation of
such contract. State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 H. 369. ...190.
2. Upon the construction of a banking law of Ohio, involved in this case, held, that it
was not merely declaratory of the intentions of the legislature, but amounted to a
contract. Ib.
3. The principles involved in the preceding decision (State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop,
16 H. 369,) further explained, and applied to this case; but the legislation of Ohio,
respecting the taxation of the plaintiffs, held not to amount to a contract, the obliga-
tion of which had been impaired. Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company v. De-
bolt, 16 H. 416....230.
4. An act of the legislature of Tennessee, providing that where a deed had been de
facto registered for more than twenty years, it should be deemed and taken to have
been lawfully registered, though operating in respect to deeds registered before, and
offered in evidence after its passage, is not a retrospective law, within the meaning
of the constitution of that State. Webb v. Den, 17 H. 576....694.
5. A law of Pennsylvania, passed after the death of one of its citizens, the effect of
which is to compel his executors to pay from property in their hands to be adminis-
tered in Pennsylvania, a tax on property out of that State, bequeathed to citizens
of other States, is not an ex post facto law, within the meaning of the constitution
of the United States. Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 H. 456....610.
Courts of the United StatES, 1–3; FERRy; Mandamus, 2; United STATES.
1. All contracts for a contingent compensation for obtaining legislation, or to use per-
sonal, or any secret, or sinister influence on legislators, are void. Marshall v. Bal-
timore and Ohio Railroad Company, 16 H. 314....153.
2. Secrecy, as to the character under which the agent or solicitor acts, tends to decep-
tion, and is immoral and fraudulent; and where the agent contracts to use such
secrecy, or voluntarily does use it, he cannot have the aid of a court to recover com-
pensation. Ib.
3. Though a collateral contract, made in aid of one tainted by illegality, cannot be en-
forced, yet a bonâ fide purchaser, for value of an illegal claim, who has received the
proceeds thereof, cannot be compelled by the assignor's representatives or creditors,
to account therefor; and if the claim was legalized before the proceeds were re-
ceived, the assignee may rely on his assignment as valid. McBlair v. Gibbes, 17 H.
232....473.
4. Distinction between contracts tainted with illegality, and those collateral thereto and
not affected by the taint. Ib.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1-3; CORPORATION; COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1–3;
EQUITY, 12; EXECUTION, 1; FERRY; GUARDIAN AND WARD; LAW AND FACT.
Though a city council, when acting in its legislative capacity, acts by ordinance, they
may license a ferry by contract in writing, signed by the mayor. Fanning v. Gre-
goire, 16 H. 524....284.
CONSTITUTIONAL Law, 1-3; Courts of the United States, 6. 7; StaTUTES
1. Nothing having been done by the court below after a mandate but to tax the costs,
and they being less than $2,000, no writ of error lies. Sizer v. Many, 16 H. 98....
2. Under the 17th section of the patent act of July 4, 1836, (5 Stats. at Large, 124,)
a writ of error cannot be allowed merely to review a question of costs in a patent
case. Ib.
3. Where a judgment is entered up, and a blank left for the amount of costs, it is proper
for the court, at a subsequent term, to have the costs taxed and the blank filled nunc
pro tunc. Ib.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. The question whether a person, appointed a trustee of a banking corporation, under
the authority of a statute of a State, has power to sue on a note held by the bank,
after he has collected enough to pay its debts, cannot be brought to this court under
the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789, (1 Stats. at Large, 85.) Robertson v.
Coulter, 16 H. 106....45.
2. When a case is brought here under the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789,
(1 Stats. at Large, 85,) upon the ground that a law of a State impairs the obligation
of a contract, this court must determine whether a contract exists, and what are its
constructions and obligations. State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 H. 369. ...190.
3. In construing the constitution of a State, this court will adopt a settled construction,
existing when the contract in question was made, acquiesced in by all the branches
of the government, and under the authority of which the contract was entered into,
and reject a more recent decision by the highest court of the State, as not affording
the rule for such a case. Ib.
4. This court cannot rest its judgment upon an opinion of a state court, concerning
the construction of a statute of the State, if it was not necessary to construe the stat-
ute in order to decide the case in which the opinion was pronounced. Under such
circumstances, this court must examine the question of construction, and decide it,
as seems to them right. Carroll v. Carroll's Lessee, 16 H. 275....128.
5. The courts of the United States can and should take notice of the laws and judicial
decisions of the several States of the Union, and with respect to them, no averment
need be made in pleading, which would not be necessary within the respective
States. Pennington v. Gibson, 16 H. 65....30.
6. The jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States where a corporation is a
party, reexamined and held to attach, where the averment on the record shows that
a citizen of one State sues a corporation, created by the legislature of another State.
Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 16 H. 314....153.
7. An averment that the plaintiff is an alien, and the defendants "The Pennsylvania
Railroad Company," without saying whether a corporation or not, will not support
the jurisdiction. Piquignot v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 16 H. 104....44.
8. If the record contain proper averments of citizenship to give the circuit court juris-
diction, they can be traversed only by a plea to the jurisdiction. Wickliffe v. Owings,
9. To support an action of replevin to recover bank bills, it is not necessary to show
that the plaintiffs assignor could have sued, though the title to the bills was conveyed
to the plaintiff after they were taken and while they were detained by the defendant.
Deshler v. Dodge, 16 H. 622....321.
10. The 11th section of the judiciary act of 1789, (1 Stats. at Large, 78,) does not
apply to an action to recover the note itself, but to an action to recover its contents.
1b.
11. A decree that the respondent, as administrator, is accountable to the representatives
of the deceased for upwards of $2,000, may be appealed from by him, though the same
decree apportions the amount among the complainants, and the distributive share of
each is less than $2,000. Shields v. Thomas, 17 H. 3....335.
12. An appellant cannot sustain his appeal upon the ground that, if interest were added
to the balance of account claimed in the libel, more than $2,000 was in dispute, at
the time of the decree in the circuit court, unless his libel claims interest.
Steamship Ohio, 17 H. 17....344.
13. This court will not allow the libel to be amended here, by the insertion of a claim
of interest, so as to support the jurisdiction. Ib.
14. The next preceding decision applied to this case.
Olney v. Steamship Falcon,
15. A claim in a libel of " $1,800 and upwards," will not support an appeal. Ib.
16. The record of the district court for the northern district of California, in a proceed-
ing to confirm a Mexican title, did not show that the land lay in that district. The
case was remanded. Cervantes v. United States, 16 H. 619....321.
17. The 12th section of the act of August 31, 1852, (10 Stats. at Large, 99,) dispenses
with the requirements of the 9th section of the act of March 3, 1851, (9 Stats. at
Large, 631,) respecting the mode of proceeding in the district court of California, when
either party is dissatisfied with the award of the commissioners concerning titles to
land in that State. And the provisions of the law of 1852, concerning pleadings and
notice, are not so defective as to be invalid. United States v. Ritchie, 17 H. 525...
656.
18. Though the act of 1851 terms the proceeding in the district court an appeal, and,
inasmuch as the commissioners cannot exercise any part of the judicial power under
the constitution, there can be no appeal, strictly speaking, from their decision; yet,
the proceeding in the district court may be and is considered by this court to be an
original proceeding there with a right of appeal to this court. Ib.
19. The district court of the United States in Mississippi, has not jurisdiction to en-
tertain a bill to compel parties to interplead, who are not found within the district,
and on whom no personal service was made. Herndon v. Ridgway, 17 H. 424 ···
588.
COSTS; EQUITY, 10-16; LIEN; MANDAMUS; Parties; PUBLIC LANDS, 9. 10;
UNITED STATES; WRIT OF ERror; Writ of Right.
1. A covenant with several lessors, to keep the demised premises in repair, is joint,
though the lease sets out the proportions in which the lessors own, and reserves the
rent to them, severally, in those proportions. Calvert v. Bradley, 16 H. 580....305.
2. The question, whether a mortgagee of a leasehold interest is liable. on the covenants
in the lease, as an assignee, considered. 1b.
DAMAGES, 1; EVIDENCE, 1; HUSBAND AND Wife.
What, in the technical language of politicians, is denominated "log rolling," is a mis-
demeanor at common law, punishable by indictment. Marshall v. Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Company, 16 H. 314....153.
1. Where the covenantee had been evicted from part of the land, it is erroneous to
instruct the jury to allow a like part of the purchase-money, as damages in an
action of covenant; the value of that part of the land lost, taking the consideration
paid as the value of the whole, and adding interest from the time of the loss, and
expenses, would be the measure of damages. Griffin v. Reynolds, 17 H. 609..
2. Actual damages are to be found by a jury in a patent cause. Seymour v. McCor-
mick, 16 H. 480....267.
3. What they are, cannot be determined by any one precise rule of law, applicable to
all cases. Ib.
4. If the patentee finds it for his interest to retain the entire monopoly, the profits
realized by the infringer may afford a rule. Ib.
5. If he habitually sells licenses, the price of a license may afford the proper measure.
6. To instruct that the measure of damages is the same, whether the patent covers an
entire machine or an improvement on it, is erroneous. Ib.
7. There is no legal presumption binding on a jury, that third persons would have
purchased of the patentee what they bought of the infringer, if the latter had not
made and sold the thing patented. Ib.
ABATEMENT; Constitutional Law, 5.
The defendant having written a letter to his agent, headed "confidential," and the
agent having shown it to the plaintiffs, in an action for a false representation made
by the letter, it was held to be a question for the jury whether the defendant in-
tended his agent should exhibit the letter. Iasigi v. Brown, 17 H. 183....444.
1. An executed marriage settlement must be expounded upon principles applicable to
other deeds. Adams v. Law, 17 H. 417....584.
2. The purpose of a marriage settlement being, to provide a jointure, and not to make
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