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by him, that he lost the South Stack light, and had not made the Skerries light, when both those lights should have been visible if he was where he supposed himself to be, should have raised a doubt as to the correctness of his assumption that he had been carried by the tide several miles to west of his true course, and made it incumbent on him, in the exercise of reasonable care, to heave the lead at the time he changed his course to east. He was bound to suppose it possible that he was mistaken as to his position, and equally possible that his failure to make the lights was because of a fog, and not because of distance from the Welsh coast. He was bound to know that the lead would tell him whether he was where he supposed himself to be, or near the Welsh coast, and the result shows that if the lead had been used it would have told him, and at once corrected his erroneous and unfounded assumption that he was 15 miles west of the South Stack light.

Still again, the master says that the weather was entirely clear about him, and he had no suspicion that fog was obscuring the lights until, when on the E. S. course, he heard the North Stack gun on his starboard quarter. But the fact that neither the South Stack light nor the Skerries light was visible to him while on the E. & S. course was loudly proclaiming the presence of fog, and yet the master, according to his own statement, navigated his vessel up to the time of his hearing the North Stack gun as if there was no fog, and without any regard whatever to the warnings of fog plainly given by the circumstances as they are narrated by him.

It should, perhaps, be remarked here that doubt is cast upon the master's statement that he never thought of the presence of fog, by the fact proved by other witnesses for the steamer, that the lookouts were doubled and the whistle blown. As, also, doubt is cast upon his statement that he ran at half speed on the easterly course, and slow after again changing to N. 42 deg. E., by the testimony of the engineer that the engine went at full speed until just as the steamer struck. But I judge him by what he says, and he says most earnestly that he had no suspicion of the presence of fog about the lights until he heard the North Stack gun.

Lastly, the master says that while running E. S. he heard the North Stack gun; that he concluded from the sound that the gun was abaft his beam; that he at once changed his course from E. & S. to N. 42 deg. E., and proceeded slow some 15 minutes until he brought up on the shore at Church bay.

The position of the North Stack is fixed, and the point where the vessel stranded is also fixed, and these positions show that when the master changed his course from E. & S. to N. 42 deg. E., he was east of the North Stack gun, and in Holyhead bay. If the master, at the time he abandoned his easterly course, knew that he was east of the North Stack, and in Holyhead bay, it was a gross mistake in navigation for him to take and hold a course N. 42 deg. E., as he did

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after hearing the gun; and we have his own word for the fact that at the time when, upon hearing the gun, he abandoned his easterly course for the course 42 deg. E., he knew that the North Stack was abaft his beam on the starboard quarter, as in fact it was.

Upon the master's showing, therefore, it is impossible to conclude otherwise than that he conspicuously failed to use reasonable care and skill in navigating his vessel upon hearing the North Stack gun, and that the loss in question was the immediate result of his negligence in that particular.

The only suggestion made in regard to this aspect of the case is that the master, when he heard the sound of the North Stack gun, could not have been sure of its bearing. But the difficulty with this suggestion is that the master repeatedly swears that when he heard the gun he knew that it was the North Stack gun, and that he did conclude that the gun was abaft his beam, as in fact it was. Upon the facts as they were, it was great negligence to take and hold a course N. 42 deg. E. after the North Stack gun was heard, and the master swears that he understood the facts to be as in truth they were. How is it possible, then, to absolve him from the charge of having run his ship ashore by failing to exercise reasonable care and skill in her navigation? It is to be remarked in this connection that the fact that the master, when he changed from E. & S. to N. 42 deg. E., knew that he was in Holyhead bay, and east of the North Stack, is fixed beyond dispute by the statement in the defendant's answer, where it is said: "After running on such east course five minutes, a gun was heard on the starboard quarter."

My conclusion, therefore, is that the proofs show that the loss of the goods in question was caused, not by a mere error of judgment on the part of the master of the steamer Montana, but by a failure to exercise reasonable care and skill in the navigation of his ship.

The liability of the defendants follows, of course. Let decrees be entered in favor of the libelants, with an order of reference to ascertain the amount of the loss.

THE ARKANSAS.

(District Court, 8. D. Iowa. 1883.)

1. JURISDICTION IN ADMIRALTY-COLLISION OF VESSEL WITH STRUCTURES IN FIVER AND ON LAND.

There is a clear distinction between torts arising from the collision of ooats with structures placed in the navigable bed of a river, and torts resulting from collisions of boats and vessels with structures on land, whether immediately along the shore or not. Torts of the former class are within the admiralty jurisdiction, and torts of the latter class are of common-law cognizance; and whether the structures are solid or floating, realty or personalty, firmly fixed to the bed of the river or otherwise, does not affect such jurisdiction.

2. SAME-PROCEEDING IN PERSONAM-UNLAWFUL OBSTRUCTION.

Where a vessel is injured by a collision with a structure unlawfully placed in the navigable bed of a river, the party creating the obstruction may be sued for the injury in an action in personam in a proper court of admiralty; but the owners of the vessel cannot in such a case proceed in rem against the solid structure, whatever it may be, because there can be no maritime lien upon such a structure to be enforced in the admiralty by its seizure and sale. 3. SAME-LAWFUL ERECTION OF STRUCTURE.

Where a structure lawfully created in the navigable bed of a river is injured by a collision caused by the negligent management of a vessel, the owner of such structure may proceed in an admiralty court by action in personam against the owners of the vessel, or in rem against the vessel itself.

4. SAME-COMMON LAW-LIEN ON MOVABLES.

The admiralty jurisdiction owes its existence chiefly to the fact that the common-law tribunals, by reason of their modes of procedure and their doctrine that possession is indispensable to a lien upon movables, are wholly inadequate to give relief against ships and vessels afloat upon the high seas and navigable waters of the earth.

5. SAME-FLOOD-COLLISION OF VESSEL WITH BUILDING ON LAND.

The jurisdiction of the admiralty over marine torts depends upon locality,the high seas or other navigable waters within admiralty cognizance; and, being so dependent upon locality, the jurisdiction is limited to the sea, or navigable waters not extending beyond high-water mark; and where a building erected on land near a navigable river is injured by collision, caused by the negligent management of a vessel which has been floated against it by reason of a flood raising the waters of said river above the banks thereof, and carrying said vessel beyond said banks, this does not constitute a tort within the jurisdiction of a court of admiralty.

In Admiralty.

This is a proceeding in rem. The defendant steamer was libeled for an alleged marine tort, to the damage of the plaintiff's property.

The libelants allege that they are the owners of a depot for the reception and storage of oil upon the levee of the city of Keokuk, near the Mississippi river; that on or about the twenty-fourth day of April, 1882, by reason of an unusual and extraordinary flood of said river, the water extended up to and around the libelant's said property; that, in consequence of the careless, negligent, and unskillful manner in which said steamer was managed and navigated, she was floated and propelled upon and against the libelant's said property, whereby a tank containing a large quantity of oil was crushed and broken, and the oil destroyed, etc., to the damage of the libelant in the sum of $600, etc. To this libel the intervening claimants except, upon the ground that the tort complained of, as stated in the libel, is not of admiralty jurisdiction.

Anderson Bros. & Davis, for libelant.

Hagerman, McCrary & Hagerman, for claimant.

LOVE, J. Locality is the test of admiralty jurisdiction over marine torts. When, before the decision in The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443, it was settled that there was no jurisdiction in admiralty above tide-water, it was also settled that a marine tort committed above tide-water was not within the cognizance of the admiralty. When, in that case, the supreme court decided that navigability, and not the flux of the tides, is the true test of this jurisdiction, the Amer.

ican courts of admiralty took cognizance of maritime contracts and torts upon our navigable rivers above as well as below tide-water; and, locality being the test of jurisdiction over marine torts, the only question in the present case is whether the trespass was committed upon land or upon navigable water.

The exceptions to the present libel raise this important question: What is the true limit of admiralty jurisdiction in questions of tort upon our great navigable rivers? Locality being the test of admiralty jurisdiction in such cases, have we any test as to locality itself upon those great rivers which, flowing ordinarily in well-defined channels, not unfrequently rise high above their banks, and cover with their floods extensive regions of country, from bluff to bluff, with a depth of water sufficient to float vessels of considerable size and burden? This precise question could not have arisen prior to the case of The Genesee Chief. When the test of admiralty jurisdiction was the flux and reflux of the tides, the flow of the tide then marked the utmost limit of admiralty jurisdiction, and it ordinarily defined a sufficiently certain boundary. Wherever the tides prevailed there was navigation and maritime commerce, and, by consequence, admiralty jurisdiction. Hence, when a marine tort was committed, there could have been little difficulty in determining by its locality whether it was within the admiralty jurisdiction or not. But the test of admiralty jurisdiction now, being, not the tide flood but navigability, and such rivers as the Missouri and Mississippi being subject to extraordinary and capricious fluctuations, it often becomes a difficult question to determine whether or not a tort committed upon their waters is within the admiralty jurisdiction.

I understand libelant's counsel in this case to contend that it is a question of actual navigation in each case, and that the jurisdiction of the admiralty is co-extensive with the navigation of the vessel. A marine tort, therefore, may be committed within the jurisdiction at any place where the vessel floats upon the waters of a navigable river, whether within its ordinary banks or elsewhere. I am not myself prepared to accept this doctrine. Suppose a vessel floating far from the ordinary banks of the river, over widely-extended bottom lands, should, by the negligence of the navigator, strike and injure some man's fences, houses, or barns; could the tort be brought within the cognizance of the admiralty? Again, suppose some individual should negligently, or without authority or warrant of law, place an obstruction or erection of any kind, not in the navigable channel of the river, but upon some wide bottom land, and a vessel floating over the same during an overflow should run upon the obstruction and receive injury; could the owners of the vessel sue the party creating the obstruction in personam in a court of admiralty? It seems to me that to these questions a negative answer must be given. Yet it is very certain that a case of tort arising from the collision of a vessel with v.17,no.4-25

a structure of the same kind, placed without license or authority in the bed of the river and in navigable water, would be within the admiralty jurisdiction. Atlee v. Packet Co. 21 Wall. 389; Railroad Co. v. Steam-tow Co. 23 How. 209.

What, then, it may be asked, is the criterion of jurisdiction as to place or locality upon these great, ever-changing navigable rivers? When is the locality or place where a tort is committed within admiralty cognizance and when not? I do not myself feel called upon to answer this general question. Though highly desirable, it would no doubt be extremely difficult to lay down any general rule or criterion by which the jurisdiction could be tested in all cases. For the decision of the present case suffice it to say that there is a clear distinction running through the cases between torts arising from the collision of boats with structures placed in the navigable bed of the river, and torts resulting from collision of boats and vessels with structures on land, whether immediately along the shore or not. Torts of the former class are within the admiralty jurisdiction; torts of the latter class are of common-law cognizance. The solution of the question of jurisdiction does not depend, in my judgment, upon the fact of the structure being solid or floating, realty or personalty, firmly affixed to the bed of the river or otherwise. It is a question of place, and of the rightfulness of the structure. Is the structure in the navigable bed of the river, and is it there by lawful authority or not? If the structure is placed in the navigable bed of the river without rightful license or authority, and a vessel is injured by it, the party creating the obstruction may be sued for the injury in an action in personam in a proper court of admiralty. This is manifest from the cases of Atlee v. Packet Co. and Railroad Co. v. Steam-tow Co., cited above.

The owners of the boat cannot, of course, in such case proceed in rem against the solid structure, whatever it may be,-whether a bridge, a pier, boom, or signal-post,-because there can be no maritime lien upon such a structure to be enforced in the admiralty by its seizure and sale. Such is the doctrine in the case of The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213.

But suppose, on the other hand, the structure, whether bridge, boom, pier, or light-house, be a lawful one; suppose it to be placed in the navigable bed of the river by lawful authority; and suppose some reckless mariner should carelessly run his vessel upon it and injure it; can it be doubted that the tort thus committed would be within the admiralty jurisdiction? Can it be doubted that in such case the owner of the structure might proceed against the owners of the boat in personam, or against the boat itself in rem? The tort itself would be a marine tort; it would be, as to place, within the admiralty jurisdiction. The owner of the structure would have a right to proceed in rem against the boat, because, from its nature, a maritime lien could attach to the boat. The owner of the structure would, in this respect, have a certain

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