matter should be carefully considered and if such a change in the law is unwise, all possible effort made to prevent it. I urge every member of the American Bar Association to study the Oldfield Bill and, if possible, to read the testimony before the Oldfield Committee. If, after full consideration, the members of the Association conclude that the bill in whole and in part is thoroughly bad, in that it would operate to discourage invention at a time when it needs most to be encouraged, and is an entering wedge for further destructive legislation, they can perform a public service by opposing it. I only call attention to the fact that a very large number of our business enterprises have been established and their methods developed, relying upon the law as it stands. Whether it is for the public interest that these enterprises should be demoralized by such a modification in the law as is proposed, or whether expediency or good faith permit such change, are questions not within the scope of this paper.

I believe that there is but little occasion for the revision of our patent laws in so far as fundamental principles or the provisions of the statute are concerned. The substantive law seems altogether admirable. It is far otherwise with the procedure of the courts and Patent Office. The entire practice in patent cases in the courts up to the recent rules formulated by the Supreme Court of the United States was vicious and defective to the last degree. It is doubtful if it will be satisfactory under the new rules.

Reform in the procedure in patent cases is a legitimate field for effort. The methods of the Patent Office, particularly in interference cases, need thorough revision. All such changes can be easily brought about if only sufficient and definite attention is given to the subject.

Under the present system of nine Circuit Courts of Appeal there is serious confusion in the application of the patent law to special cases, resulting in some instances in a divergence of views between two different Courts of Appeal as to the validity and scope of the same patent, and generally in the different circuits in a want of harmony as to questions of patentability,

construction of patents and infringement that is a serious evil. The establishment of a single Court of Appeals in Patent Causes, for which the American Bar Association has worked so assiduously for more than ten years, will correct these evils. Although there is no valid argument against such a Patent Court of Appeals and no real criticism upon the American Bar Association's Bill providing for its establishment, Congress has as yet failed to act. This most important of all reforms in patent matters is sure to come and the more vigorously the members of the American Bar Association press for it, the sooner will the law be passed.

I have said nothing in this paper as to the sense and justice of a full recognition of intellectual property as a real thing, or as to the clear right of such property to protection on scientific, logical and ethical grounds. I have endeavored to approach the subject matter entirely from the point of view of the interest of the community as a whole, which, in my opinion, requires for its prosperity an adequate patent system. I believe that ours is adequate, that in its substance it is not open to serious criticism and that it would be a national misfortune if it were weakened as proposed by the Oldfield Bill.

I have only touched upon many most important phases of the situation which would require complete discussion if the question under consideration were whether or not our Patent Law should be amended on the lines of the Oldfield Bill or otherwise. For example, I have not undertaken to advance the many reasons why compulsory licenses would surely be arbitrary, unfair and utterly ineffective for the purpose intended. I have not dealt, except incidentally, with the allegation which is sometimes made that any patent system, and that of the United States in particular, promotes monopoly to an offensive extent. I have made no reference to such charges as that inventions are "suppressed " and patents "pigeonholed," a proposition which, as a substantial matter, has never been and cannot be supported by any evidence. The testimony before the Patent Committee of the House of Representatives, to which reference has already been made, deals with these and many like questions. My single purpose in this paper is to emphasize the controlling importance of a liberal

patent system, to point out that at the present time it is more essential than ever to our national well-being, and to express my belief that no fundamental changes in our law are now desirable. Particularly, there should be, in my opinion, no change in the direction foreshadowed by the Oldfield Bill.

PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

COMPARATIVE LAW BUREAU

The Sixth Annual Meeting of the Comparative Law Bureau of the American Bar Association was held at the Windsor Hotel, Montreal, Canada, on Tuesday, September 2, 1913, at 2 P. M.

The Director, Simeon E. Baldwin, of Connecticut, presided. The Treasurer, Eugene C. Massie, of Virginia, the Secretary, William W. Smithers, of Pennsylvania, and the Assistant Secretary, Robert P. Shick, of Pennsylvania, were also in attendance. The Treasurer's report was found to be in accord with the checks, orders and bank deposit book, which he produced.

The following corporate body members, by delegates, were present:

Pennsylvania Bar Association: Francis Rawle, William Draper Lewis, William N. Appel, David Werner Amram, William W. Smithers and Robert P. Shick.

South Dakota Bar Association: John H. Voorhees and Marshall McKusick.

University of Maine Law School: Lucilius A. Emery, W. E. Walz, Henry Bert Montague and Claude D. Graton.

Law Department, University of Minnesota: Rome G. Brown, Edward S. Thurston and William R. Vance.

University of Pennsylvania Law School: William Draper Lewis and William E. Mikell.

Chicago Correspondence School of Law: E. C. Westwood and . Charles F. Westwood.

Cornell University College of Law: Frank Irvine and Frank G. Bogert.

Yale University Law School: William H. Taft and Simeon E. Baldwin.

The Western Reserve University Law School: Walter T. Dunmore, H. H. Johnson, Alexander Hadden and C. M. Finfrock.

Michigan State Bar Association: B. E. Barlow.

Bar Association of the City of Boston: Ezra R. Thayer and Frank W. Grinnell.

University of North Dakota Law School: H. A. Bronson and Robert L. Henry, Jr.

The Law Library of Dayton, Ohio: Daniel W. Iddings and George R. Young.

Law Association of Philadelphia: Joseph C. Fraley, Hampton L. Carson and W. W. Smithers.

University of Michigan, Department of Law: Edwin C. Goddard and Edson R. Sunderland.

Harvard University Law School: Samuel R. Williston.

The following members were also present in their individual capacity: Edgar H. Farrar, Louisiana; William O. Hart, Louisiana; Stephen S. Gregory, Illinois; Rudolph Matz, Illinois; Andrew A. Bruce, North Dakota; W. A. Henry, North Dakota; John M. Patterson, Pennsylvania; Francis Fisher Kane, Pennsylvania; Meredith Hanna, Pennsylvania; Franklin Spencer Edmonds, Pennsylvania; Francis E. Hinckley, District Attorney of the United States Court for China, Shanghai, China; Walter S. Penfield, District of Columbia; Clarence Edwards, New Mexico; Edward D. Robbins, Connecticut; Joseph Perkins Chamberlain, of the Legislative Drafting Fund, Columbia University, New York; J. Aspinwall Hodge, New York; Amasa M. Eaton, Rhode Island; Robert M. Hughes, Virginia; Tore Teigen, South Dakota; Henry A. Muller, South Dakota; George N. Williamson, South Dakota; Joseph Kirby, South Dakota; Charles Friend, Wisconsin.

The roll of delegates and other members present was called and the attendance noted by the Secretary.

On motion, the reading of the minutes of the previous meeting held August 26, 1912, was dispensed with, inasmuch as those minutes are set out at length in the last Annual Report of the American Bar Association.

The Director then delivered his annual address.

(The address follows these minutes, page 843.)