The Chairman:

Will the Chairman of the committee inform us whether the committee itself has drafted the specific act that it wants adopted?

Thomas W. Shelton, of Virginia :

The specific act was drafted by Judge Clayton of the House Committee.

James D. Andrews, of New York:

If we have committed the Association to the approval of this bill, I should be in favor of supporting the report of the committee, with the recommendation of submitting it to the Supreme Court for sanction; otherwise, I should think the action we have taken is not sufficient in deliberating on so momentous a question as the reform of procedure.

Walter George Smith, of Pennsylvania:

May I rise again. It is obvious that the work of so large a body as this Association must be done by committees. It is impossible in the few hours that we have together to give that calm, deliberate consideration to an important, far-reaching question in open debate. Therefore, in all of these matters it has long been the custom for the Association to act through its committees. The subject was presented by the gentleman from Virginia several years ago, and a committee was appointed. That committee made a report, and it was to this effect: That it was unfortunate that there should be different systems of common law pleading and statutory pleading on common law subjects, in the various jurisdictions of the United States; that if one definite system of common law pleading could be formulated by some competent body for the United States Courts, then the states would gradually adopt it, or there would be a tendency thereto, and therefore the chance of obtaining uniformity would be reached in that way, or would be more favorable, if approached in that way. The matter was very fully and carefully presented, and the opinion of the profession was taken privately about it. I am not speaking as a member of the committee, for I am not

such, but I well remember the care taken in ascertaining the opinion of the profession.

I do not presume to criticise the weighty criticism of the gentleman from Massachusetts, a distinguished lawyer and an ex-President of the Association, upon the work of the Supreme Court of the United States in formulating new equity rules. I agree we all must agree-that that court is weighted to the very limit of human endurance. But where can be found a body as competent to submit a form of procedure for the United States Courts in common law pleading? That, no doubt has been the reason why the committee reached its conclusion. If we are to make any progress at any time in a shifting body like this Association when assembled in annual meeting, there must be some end to debate of a subject I agree fully with the gentleman who preceded me, that we should approach the consideration of these matters with extreme care and deliberation, and however greatly we respect authority, we should not accept reports of committees and recommendations on such matters as these without careful consideration. Our by-laws provide for that by requiring the reports to be printed; I think, therefore, I am warranted in insisting that this plan has met the matured approval of the Association, and it would be exceedingly unwise--and I say it with profound respect to the distinguished gentleman who thinks we made a mistake-to attempt now to rescind our action.

Frederick N. Judson, of Missouri:

I agree with the views of the gentleman from Pennsylvania. I regret to differ with my friend from Massachusetts on any subject but I cannot agree in his criticism of the work of the Supreme Court of the United States in framing the new equity rules. I have had occasion to study those rules and to practice under them. I believe their adoption by the Supreme Court was a tremendous step forward. There is no other authority which could have worked such a reform and we owe the court our thanks for the time taken in framing them. No doubt it is true that their efficiency will depend upon their construction and enforcement by Judges who administer them, but I think there can be

no question that their adoption was a step forward, and points the way in which we are to progress if we are to reform our antiquated systems of procedure and make them answer the demands of the people for the prompt administration of justice.

I hope, therefore, we shall take no step backward, but that we shall adopt the report.

Stephen H. Allen, of Kansas:

I am heartily in favor of the principle of the report of this committee that of uniform procedure throughout the United States. I agree with the gentleman from Missouri that the Supreme Court has made a most notable advance in procedure in equity cases, and that the good work ought to be carried on. I have, however, one difference of opinion with the committee. I think that whenever the Congress of the United States acts on this subject, it should do thorough work and that the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity should be abolished at that time, and then that the whole subject of procedure-a uniform system of procedure throughout the United States in the federal courts-should be adopted, and that then we may safely hope to have the states fall in line and have a uniform sensible procedure throughout all of the states in all of the courts. Procedure is something which may be uniform. There is no reason why there should be this vast diversity, this utter complexity, this interminable tangle of rules of procedure. The way to get rid of the tangle is along the lines of the work of this committee by getting away from the various state systems of procedure at law, and having uniformity with procedure in the federal courts. That is a matter of mere minor detail, because it is local. It applies only to the particular state. We are breaking down state lines in business affairs. We have got to have uniformity; we have to be able to get on; and the only way to get on with procedure and to dispose of cases is to have a sensible system. The distinction between suits in equity and actions at law has been abolished in England for forty years. Why do we keep it here? What is the sense of continuing the distinction?

I move that the report be referred back to the committee, with instructions to embody the principle to abolish distinction between actions at law and suits in equity.

The Chairman:

The question is upon the motion to recommit with instructions. Levi Cooke, of District of Columbia:

I rise for information. Would it be in order to defer the vote on this question until some time later in the meeting?

The Chairman:

Anything that is possible and that is in order which will expedite business and not tangle it up may be suggested; and, therefore, I rule anything in order that does not violate any standing rule of the Association.

Levi Cooke, of District of Columbia:

It occurs to me that a number of members present would probably vote more accurately upon this subject after an opportunity for reflection, in view of what has been said this morning. Therefore, if it is in order, I move that the vote on this subject be deferred until tomorrow.

The motion was seconded, but was lost.

F. M. Etheridge, of Texas:

I move to table the motion that was made a moment ago to recommit the report to the committee.

Waldo G. Morse, of New York:

I hope that will not be done, because it would carry the original motion.

Nathaniel W. Ladd, of Massachusetts:

I think that we are just as well prepared to vote on this subject now as we ever will be-except that many of us have not had an opportunity, perhaps, to read the report. For that reason it might be that the plan to recommit is a wise one; but I hope that the mover of the motion will approve of obtaining the approval of the Supreme Court of the United States, or its dis

approval. I do not think that work should be put upon the Supreme Court in the first instance. If the committee finds that the Supreme Court is willing to approve of this action, they can report one year from the present time. There is no hurry about this matter. We have lived under the present system too long not to be able to live under it another year. I trust that with that change, which no doubt will be acceptable to the gentleman who made the motion to recommit, this report will be recommitted, and that it will be further digested.

The Chairman:

The motion to recommit is out of order, because the Association has just voted against the postponement of the subject matter, and the effect of laying the matter on the table would be to postpone it.

Edmund F. Trabue, of Kentucky:

Mr. Storey has presented nothing for consideration. He has simply complained of the work of the committee, and, as has been shown by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that work has been heretofore recommended by the Association. There is nothing suggested by Mr. Storey, except that these rules made by the Supreme Court are such as to indicate that it is too busy to adopt rules, or to give the matter such attention as to evolve proper rules. All modern thought along these lines is towards giving to the courts the utmost power to lay down rules, or to modify them as exigencies may require. It has been done in Great Britain, and it has been done for many years in respect of equity rules in the United States Courts. In a discussion at Chicago a year ago by the Illinois Bar Association, the sentiment was very largely in this direction. In New York, on the contrary, the practice, controlled by legislation, has become so cumbersome as to be almost impracticable.

Now, I urge that the recommendation of the committee be adopted, and that the previous action of the Association be adhered to.