 I think, in every point unquestionable, probability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those, of which we have had none; and therefore 'tis impossible this presumption can arise from...  A Treatise on Probability - 81. lappuseautors: John Maynard Keynes - 1921 - 466 lapasPilnskats - Par šo grāmatu
 | David Hume - 1826 - 508 lapas
...usual attendant. According to this account of things, which is, I think, in every point unquestionable, probability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance...impossible this presumption can arise from probability. The same principle cannot be both the cause and effect of another ; and this is, perhaps, the . Of... | |
 | David Hume - 1874 - 604 lapas
...which have fallen under our observation. We suppose, but are never able to prove, that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery. We have already taken notice of certain relations, which... | |
 | David Hume - 1874 - 604 lapas
...which have fallen under our observation. We suppose, but are never able to prove, that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery. We have already taken notice of certain relations, which... | |
 | Thomas Ebenezer Webb - 1885 - 400 lapas
...Neither, according to Hume, can the proposition be proved by any arguments from probability ; for " probability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance...and those of which we have had none ; and therefore it is impossible this presumption can arise from probability," inasmuch as " the same principle cannot... | |
 | David Hume - 1888 - 752 lapas
...think, in every point unquestionable, probability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance beiwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and...impossible this presumption can arise from probability. The same principle cannot be both the cause and effect of another ; and this is, perhaps, the only... | |
 | Edmund König - 1888 - 360 lapas
...einer causalen Abhängigkeit aller Er*) We suppose, but are never able to prove, that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects of which we have had experience and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery. Tr. III, 6, p. 127. scheinungen von anderen unterscheidet... | |
 | David Hume - 1890 - 598 lapas
...which have fallen under our observation. We suppose, but are never able to prove, that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery. We have already taken notice of certain relations, which... | |
 | David Hume - 1893 - 190 lapas
...which have fallen under our observation. We suppose, but are never able to prove, that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects of which we have had experience and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery. When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression... | |
 | 1924 - 440 lapas
...have had experience." Nor can this be regarded as established by an argument from probability, for "Probability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance...impossible this presumption can arise from probability. The same principle cannot be both the cause and effect of another." Thus, the proposition concerning... | |
 | David Hume - 1927 - 444 lapas
...which have fallen under our observation. We suppose, but are never able to prove, that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery.1 We have already taken notice of certain relations, which... | |
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