 We are claiming, in fact, to cognise correctly a logical connection between one set of propositions which we call our evidence and which we suppose ourselves to know, and another set which we call our conclusions, and to which we attach more or less weight...  A Treatise on Probability - 5. lappuseautors: John Maynard Keynes - 1921 - 466 lapasPilnskats - Par šo grāmatu
 | Eino Kaila - 1926 - 184 lapas
...his conclusions, which is independent of the mere fact of our belief, and which is just as» real and objective. though of a different degree, as that which...the argument were as demonstrative as a syllogism». Mit diesen objektiven Wahrscheinlichkeitsrelationen hat nach KEYNES die Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie... | |
 | G. L. S. Shackle - 506 lapas
...his conclusions, which is independent of the mere fact of our belief, and which is just as real and objective, though of a different degree, as that which...ourselves to know, and another set which we call our conelusions and to which we attach more or less weight according to the grounds supplied by the first.*... | |
 | John Cunningham Wood - 1994 - 622 lapas
...his conclusions, which is independent of the mere fact of our belief, and which is just as real and objective, though of a different degree, as that which...the argument were as demonstrative as a syllogism. (6) So in the case of probability we may believe that our judgments can penetrate into the real world,... | |
 | G. L. S. Shackle - 1973 - 512 lapas
...his conclusions, which is independent of the mere fact of our belief, and which is just as real and objective, though of a different degree, as that which...ourselves to know, and another set which we call our con13-2 of Indifference, from its merely negative aspect of 'equal ignorance' concerning the strength... | |
 | Imre Lakatos, Robert S. Cohen, P.K. Feyerabend, Marx W. Wartofsky - 1976 - 788 lapas
...his conclusions which is independent of the mere fact of our belief, and which is just as real and objective, though of a different degree, as that which...of propositions which we call our evidence... and another set which we call our conclusions... (p. 6). In Chapter VIII of his book we find the statement... | |
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