other party, freely, where it is freely granted to such other nation, or on yielding the compensation where such nation does the same.

ARTICLE XXVII.

His majesty the king of Prussia, and the United States of America, agree, that this treaty shall be in force during the term of ten years from the exchange of ratifications; and if the expiration of that term should happen during the course of a war between them, then the articles before provided for the regulation of their conduct during such a war, shall continue in force until the conclusion of the treaty which shall re-establish peace; and that this treaty shall be ratified on both sides, and the ratifications exchanged within one year from the day of its signature.

In testimony whereof, the plenipotentiaries beforementioned have hereto subscribed their names, and affixed their seals, at the places of their respective residence, and at the dates expressed under their several signatures.

NOW KNOW YE, That we the said United States in Congress assembled, having considered and approved, do hereby ratify and confirm the said treaty and every article and clause therein contained.

In testimony whereof, we have caused our seal to be hereunto affixed. Witness the honourable Nathaniel Gorham, our chairman, in the absence of his excellency John Hancock, our President, this seventeenth day of May, in the year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-six, and of our independence and sovereignty, the tenth.

MAY 31, 1786.

The following letter from the secretary for foreign affairs read:

SIR,

Office for Foreign Affairs, May 29, 1786.

In my negotiations with Mr. Gardoqui I experience certain difficulties, which, in my opinion, should be so managed as that even the existence of them should remain a secret for the present. I take the liberty therefore of submitting to the consideration of Congress, whether it might not be advisable to appoint a committee with power to instruct and direct me on every point and subject relative to the proposed treaty with Spain. In case Congress should think proper to appoint such a committee, I really think it would be prudent to keep the appointment of it secret, and to forbear having any conversation on subjects connected with it, except in Congress, and in meetings on the business of it.

With great respect, I have the honour to be your excellency's most obedient and very humble servant, (Signed) JOHN JAY.

His Excellency the President of Congress.

The above was referred to a committee of three, viz. Mr. King, Mr. Pettit and Mr. Monroe, who, on the 1st August, reported that the letter be referred to a committee of the whole.

AUGUST 1, 1786.

After debate, an order passed for secretary for foreign affairs to attend Congress on Thursday next, at twelve o'clock, on the subject of his letter of 29th May.

AUGUST 3, 1786.

According to order the secretary for foreign affairs attended; and being called upon to state the difficulties mentioned in his letter of the 29th, and explain himself on the subject of that letter,

The secretary for foreign affairs informed Congress that he had some time since received from Mr. Gardoqui an unofficial and unsigned paper,* and afterwards a letter, dated 25th May, 1786,† which he laid before Congress, and the same being read, he then delivered himself as follows:

SIR,

Every person to whom is committed the management of a negotiation, from which many good or ill consequences will probably result, must find himself placed in a very delicate and responsible situation. In that point of light I consider our present negotiations with Spain, and that my sentiments on the subject may be conveyed to Congress with precision, and authentick evidence of them preserved, I have reduced them to writing as concisely and accurately as I could find leisure to do since I received notice to attend this day.

It appears to me, that a proper commercial treaty with Spain would be of more importance to the United States than any they have formed, or can form, with any other nation. I am led to entertain this opinion from the influence which Spain may and will have both on our politicks and commerce.

France, whom we consider as our ally, and to whom we shall naturally turn our eyes for aid in case of war, &c. is strongly bound to Spain by the family compact; and the advantages she derives from it are so various and so great, that it is questionable whether she could ever remain neutral in case of a rupture between us and his catholick majesty. Besides, we are well apprised of the sentiments of France relative to our western claims; in which I include that of freely navigating the river Mississippi. I take it for granted that, while the compact in question exists, France will invariably think it her interest to prefer the good will of Spain to the good will of America; and although she would very reluc

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tantly give umbrage to either, yet, if driven to take part with one or the other, I think it would not be in our favour. Unless we are friends with Spain, her influence, whether more or less, on the counsels of Versailles, will always be against us.

The intermarriages between Spain and Portugal, which have taken place in this and the late reigns, have given the former a degree of influence at the court of the latter which she never before possessed; and leading men in both those kingdoms seem disposed to bury former jealousies and apprehensions in mutual confidence and good offices. How far this system may be perfected, or how long continue, is uncertain; while it lasts, we must expect good or evil from it, according as we stand well or ill with Spain.

Britain would be rejoi ed to find us at variance with Spain on any points. She remembers that we were once her subjects, and loves us not. She perceives that we are her most important rivals in the Spanish trade, and that her nursery of seamen on the banks of Newfoundland will prosper or otherwise, as ours of the like kind shall increase or diminish; and it will increase or diminish in proportion as we may or may not undersell them at foreign markets, among which that of Spain is the most advantageous.

If Spain should be disposed to sink that scale in favour of Britain, there is little reason to doubt but that the latter will offer her powerful inducements to grant and perpetuate valuable preferences to her.

It is hard to say how far these inducements may extend, or how far they might both think it their interest to join in every measure tending to impair our