No-fault Divorce: What Went Wrong?Routledge, 2019. gada 4. marts - 232 lappuses Since 1970, all the states adopted no-fault divorce statutes, which have had the unexpected effect of producing dire financial conditions for many divorced women and their children. In this important study, economist and lawyer Allen Parkman shows how no-fault divorce has systematically operated against the interests of these women and children. With rare economic and legal insight, Parkman argues that by changing the grounds for divorce without changing the laws that define and allocate property at divorce, the legal system created substantial injustices. The key mistake, he suggests, was in accepting a definition of property that did not include the income-earning capacity--human capital--of the individuals involved. Using human capital theory, Parkman criticizes current divorce law and presents a framework for reform that would reduce the injustices introduced by no-fault divorce. He concludes that a thorough reform, however, may require the changing of the grounds for divorce to mutual consent. This book is essential reading for scholars, professionals, and, indeed, for anyone interested in the health and future of the family and the well-being of women in contemporary U.S. society. |
No grāmatas satura
1.5. rezultāts no 71.
. lappuse
... increased incentives for them to work outside the home and seek additional education to maintain their human capital--their income-earning capacity--have often reduced the welfare of their families. These are not the results expected by ...
... increased incentives for them to work outside the home and seek additional education to maintain their human capital--their income-earning capacity--have often reduced the welfare of their families. These are not the results expected by ...
. lappuse
... increase the welfare of families and society. Other costs of divorce to the spouses and children are more difficult to estimate and they may require a shift to mutual consent as the basis for divorce. The failure to grapple with the ...
... increase the welfare of families and society. Other costs of divorce to the spouses and children are more difficult to estimate and they may require a shift to mutual consent as the basis for divorce. The failure to grapple with the ...
. lappuse
... increase social welfare. As the benefits and costs of activities change, the efficient choices change. Economists view the decision to marry and, sometimes, to divorce as based on the benefits and the costs associated with those choices ...
... increase social welfare. As the benefits and costs of activities change, the efficient choices change. Economists view the decision to marry and, sometimes, to divorce as based on the benefits and the costs associated with those choices ...
. lappuse
... increased, these individuals found that the legal grounds for divorce were more restrictive than they wished. They also found the financial repercussions of divorce prescribed by the law unacceptable. The parties could fabricate ...
... increased, these individuals found that the legal grounds for divorce were more restrictive than they wished. They also found the financial repercussions of divorce prescribed by the law unacceptable. The parties could fabricate ...
. lappuse
... increase financial awards to women. One way was ad hoc adjustments to the definition of property based not on the realization that the definition was conceptually wrong, but instead on a desire to expand the funds available to women and ...
... increase financial awards to women. One way was ad hoc adjustments to the definition of property based not on the realization that the definition was conceptually wrong, but instead on a desire to expand the funds available to women and ...
Saturs
Notes | |
The Introduction of NoFault Divorce Statutes | |
The Impact of NoFault Divorce | |
The Reform of NoFault Divorce | |
References | |
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Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
agreements alimony arrangements at divorce assets awards benefits California child support common law community property compensation contract law costs of divorce couples courts decisions definition of property dissolution divorce rate Divorce Reform Divorce Revolution divorced spouse divorced women economists effect of marriage effect of no-fault efficient breaches Elizabeth Peters employment expected Family Law Quarterly fault divorce fault grounds financial arrangements financial settlements future earnings gains from marriage grounds for divorce Hayes household commodities household production human capital husband Ibid incentive income income-earning increase incurred individuals introduction of no-fault investments Journal labor force Law Review marital property Marriage and Divorce married women Mary Ann Glendon mutual consent negotiating power no-fault divorce laws no-fault grounds occur parties percent production possibility frontiers professional goodwill property settlements recognize reduced result separate property specialize in household specific performance spouse's substantial tend wages Weitzman welfare wife wives