No-fault Divorce: What Went Wrong?Routledge, 2019. gada 4. marts - 232 lappuses Since 1970, all the states adopted no-fault divorce statutes, which have had the unexpected effect of producing dire financial conditions for many divorced women and their children. In this important study, economist and lawyer Allen Parkman shows how no-fault divorce has systematically operated against the interests of these women and children. With rare economic and legal insight, Parkman argues that by changing the grounds for divorce without changing the laws that define and allocate property at divorce, the legal system created substantial injustices. The key mistake, he suggests, was in accepting a definition of property that did not include the income-earning capacity--human capital--of the individuals involved. Using human capital theory, Parkman criticizes current divorce law and presents a framework for reform that would reduce the injustices introduced by no-fault divorce. He concludes that a thorough reform, however, may require the changing of the grounds for divorce to mutual consent. This book is essential reading for scholars, professionals, and, indeed, for anyone interested in the health and future of the family and the well-being of women in contemporary U.S. society. |
No grāmatas satura
1.–5. rezultāts no 39.
. lappuse
... Perspective on the Introduction of No-Fault Conclusion Notes 5 The Impact of No-Fault Divorce The Divorce Rate The Financial Condition of Divorced Women Property The Incentive to Marry The Labor Force Participation Rate.
... Perspective on the Introduction of No-Fault Conclusion Notes 5 The Impact of No-Fault Divorce The Divorce Rate The Financial Condition of Divorced Women Property The Incentive to Marry The Labor Force Participation Rate.
. lappuse
What Went Wrong? Allen M. Parkman. Property The Incentive to Marry The Labor Force Participation Rate of Married Women Education The Quality of Life for Married Women The Quality of Family Life Conclusion Notes 6 The Reform of No-Fault ...
What Went Wrong? Allen M. Parkman. Property The Incentive to Marry The Labor Force Participation Rate of Married Women Education The Quality of Life for Married Women The Quality of Family Life Conclusion Notes 6 The Reform of No-Fault ...
. lappuse
... large, it is essential that the divorce laws create incentives for people to make social-welfare-enhancing decisions. Allen M. Parkman Albuquerque, New Mexico Acknowledgments This book would not have been possible without the.
... large, it is essential that the divorce laws create incentives for people to make social-welfare-enhancing decisions. Allen M. Parkman Albuquerque, New Mexico Acknowledgments This book would not have been possible without the.
. lappuse
... incentive for spouses to make certain contributions to their family such as the contributions of married women who ... incentives for women to be housewives and mothers and increased incentives for them to work outside the home and seek ...
... incentive for spouses to make certain contributions to their family such as the contributions of married women who ... incentives for women to be housewives and mothers and increased incentives for them to work outside the home and seek ...
. lappuse
... incentives to marry and to stay married change. Economists have argued that changes that have occurred since World War II, such as the expanded employment opportunities for women and the availability of improved forms of contraception ...
... incentives to marry and to stay married change. Economists have argued that changes that have occurred since World War II, such as the expanded employment opportunities for women and the availability of improved forms of contraception ...
Saturs
Notes | |
The Introduction of NoFault Divorce Statutes | |
The Impact of NoFault Divorce | |
The Reform of NoFault Divorce | |
References | |
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agreements alimony arrangements at divorce assets awards benefits California child support common law community property compensation contract law costs of divorce couples courts decisions definition of property dissolution divorce rate Divorce Reform Divorce Revolution divorced spouse divorced women economists effect of marriage effect of no-fault efficient breaches Elizabeth Peters employment expected Family Law Quarterly fault divorce fault grounds financial arrangements financial settlements future earnings gains from marriage grounds for divorce Hayes household commodities household production human capital husband Ibid incentive income income-earning increase incurred individuals introduction of no-fault investments Journal labor force Law Review marital property Marriage and Divorce married women Mary Ann Glendon mutual consent negotiating power no-fault divorce laws no-fault grounds occur parties percent production possibility frontiers professional goodwill property settlements recognize reduced result separate property specialize in household specific performance spouse's substantial tend wages Weitzman welfare wife wives