No-fault Divorce: What Went Wrong?Routledge, 2019. gada 4. marts - 232 lappuses Since 1970, all the states adopted no-fault divorce statutes, which have had the unexpected effect of producing dire financial conditions for many divorced women and their children. In this important study, economist and lawyer Allen Parkman shows how no-fault divorce has systematically operated against the interests of these women and children. With rare economic and legal insight, Parkman argues that by changing the grounds for divorce without changing the laws that define and allocate property at divorce, the legal system created substantial injustices. The key mistake, he suggests, was in accepting a definition of property that did not include the income-earning capacity--human capital--of the individuals involved. Using human capital theory, Parkman criticizes current divorce law and presents a framework for reform that would reduce the injustices introduced by no-fault divorce. He concludes that a thorough reform, however, may require the changing of the grounds for divorce to mutual consent. This book is essential reading for scholars, professionals, and, indeed, for anyone interested in the health and future of the family and the well-being of women in contemporary U.S. society. |
No grāmatas satura
1.–5. rezultāts no 35.
. lappuse
... employment prospects, but her husband was leaving the marriage with his income intact. The provision of professional goodwill created an additional source of funds for her. The more I investigated how society was reacting to the no ...
... employment prospects, but her husband was leaving the marriage with his income intact. The provision of professional goodwill created an additional source of funds for her. The more I investigated how society was reacting to the no ...
. lappuse
... employment opportunities for women and the availability of improved forms of contraception, have reduced both the benefit of marriage and the cost of divorce for some people.15 Under those circumstances, we would expect to observe fewer ...
... employment opportunities for women and the availability of improved forms of contraception, have reduced both the benefit of marriage and the cost of divorce for some people.15 Under those circumstances, we would expect to observe fewer ...
. lappuse
... employment and remarrying opportunities. Children can be an encumbrance that reduces income and opportunities for those who rear them, translating into a reduced human capital at divorce. Economics can provide a framework for evaluating ...
... employment and remarrying opportunities. Children can be an encumbrance that reduces income and opportunities for those who rear them, translating into a reduced human capital at divorce. Economics can provide a framework for evaluating ...
. lappuse
... employment opportunities to accommodate the other spouse. Generally, wives are the spouses that adjust, but as the economic opportunities of women increase, we would expect to find more men making these sacrifices. In this book, I ...
... employment opportunities to accommodate the other spouse. Generally, wives are the spouses that adjust, but as the economic opportunities of women increase, we would expect to find more men making these sacrifices. In this book, I ...
. lappuse
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Saturs
Notes | |
The Introduction of NoFault Divorce Statutes | |
The Impact of NoFault Divorce | |
The Reform of NoFault Divorce | |
References | |
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agreements alimony arrangements at divorce assets awards benefits California child support common law community property compensation contract law costs of divorce couples courts decisions definition of property dissolution divorce rate Divorce Reform Divorce Revolution divorced spouse divorced women economists effect of marriage effect of no-fault efficient breaches Elizabeth Peters employment expected Family Law Quarterly fault divorce fault grounds financial arrangements financial settlements future earnings gains from marriage grounds for divorce Hayes household commodities household production human capital husband Ibid incentive income income-earning increase incurred individuals introduction of no-fault investments Journal labor force Law Review marital property Marriage and Divorce married women Mary Ann Glendon mutual consent negotiating power no-fault divorce laws no-fault grounds occur parties percent production possibility frontiers professional goodwill property settlements recognize reduced result separate property specialize in household specific performance spouse's substantial tend wages Weitzman welfare wife wives