No-fault Divorce: What Went Wrong?Routledge, 2019. gada 4. marts - 232 lappuses Since 1970, all the states adopted no-fault divorce statutes, which have had the unexpected effect of producing dire financial conditions for many divorced women and their children. In this important study, economist and lawyer Allen Parkman shows how no-fault divorce has systematically operated against the interests of these women and children. With rare economic and legal insight, Parkman argues that by changing the grounds for divorce without changing the laws that define and allocate property at divorce, the legal system created substantial injustices. The key mistake, he suggests, was in accepting a definition of property that did not include the income-earning capacity--human capital--of the individuals involved. Using human capital theory, Parkman criticizes current divorce law and presents a framework for reform that would reduce the injustices introduced by no-fault divorce. He concludes that a thorough reform, however, may require the changing of the grounds for divorce to mutual consent. This book is essential reading for scholars, professionals, and, indeed, for anyone interested in the health and future of the family and the well-being of women in contemporary U.S. society. |
No grāmatas satura
1.–5. rezultāts no 23.
. lappuse
... economists call human capital, as property. During marriage, some spouses, such as professionals, may acquire human capital, while other spouses, such as housewives, may lose human capital. Recognizing the effect of marriage on the ...
... economists call human capital, as property. During marriage, some spouses, such as professionals, may acquire human capital, while other spouses, such as housewives, may lose human capital. Recognizing the effect of marriage on the ...
. lappuse
... Economists view the decision to marry and, sometimes, to divorce as based on the benefits and the costs associated with those choices. Over time, the costs and benefits of marriage and divorce can change and then the incentives to marry ...
... Economists view the decision to marry and, sometimes, to divorce as based on the benefits and the costs associated with those choices. Over time, the costs and benefits of marriage and divorce can change and then the incentives to marry ...
. lappuse
... economists or financial analysts. When marriage was a more stable institution and the laws determining the grounds for divorce were strictly enforced, there were only a few divorces and the laws that controlled the financial ...
... economists or financial analysts. When marriage was a more stable institution and the laws determining the grounds for divorce were strictly enforced, there were only a few divorces and the laws that controlled the financial ...
. lappuse
... economists view the financial aspects of the relationship much as a business partnership: If the marriage is dissolved, the parties should share the gains or losses of the partnership, but assets acquired outside marriage are not part ...
... economists view the financial aspects of the relationship much as a business partnership: If the marriage is dissolved, the parties should share the gains or losses of the partnership, but assets acquired outside marriage are not part ...
. lappuse
... economists. Shortly after the introduction of no-fault divorce, state legislatures and the courts recognized that something was amiss with the finances of divorced women and the children of divorced parents. They groped for a way to ...
... economists. Shortly after the introduction of no-fault divorce, state legislatures and the courts recognized that something was amiss with the finances of divorced women and the children of divorced parents. They groped for a way to ...
Saturs
Notes | |
The Introduction of NoFault Divorce Statutes | |
The Impact of NoFault Divorce | |
The Reform of NoFault Divorce | |
References | |
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Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
agreements alimony arrangements at divorce assets awards benefits California child support common law community property compensation contract law costs of divorce couples courts decisions definition of property dissolution divorce rate Divorce Reform Divorce Revolution divorced spouse divorced women economists effect of marriage effect of no-fault efficient breaches Elizabeth Peters employment expected Family Law Quarterly fault divorce fault grounds financial arrangements financial settlements future earnings gains from marriage grounds for divorce Hayes household commodities household production human capital husband Ibid incentive income income-earning increase incurred individuals introduction of no-fault investments Journal labor force Law Review marital property Marriage and Divorce married women Mary Ann Glendon mutual consent negotiating power no-fault divorce laws no-fault grounds occur parties percent production possibility frontiers professional goodwill property settlements recognize reduced result separate property specialize in household specific performance spouse's substantial tend wages Weitzman welfare wife wives