No-fault Divorce: What Went Wrong?Routledge, 2019. gada 4. marts - 232 lappuses Since 1970, all the states adopted no-fault divorce statutes, which have had the unexpected effect of producing dire financial conditions for many divorced women and their children. In this important study, economist and lawyer Allen Parkman shows how no-fault divorce has systematically operated against the interests of these women and children. With rare economic and legal insight, Parkman argues that by changing the grounds for divorce without changing the laws that define and allocate property at divorce, the legal system created substantial injustices. The key mistake, he suggests, was in accepting a definition of property that did not include the income-earning capacity--human capital--of the individuals involved. Using human capital theory, Parkman criticizes current divorce law and presents a framework for reform that would reduce the injustices introduced by no-fault divorce. He concludes that a thorough reform, however, may require the changing of the grounds for divorce to mutual consent. This book is essential reading for scholars, professionals, and, indeed, for anyone interested in the health and future of the family and the well-being of women in contemporary U.S. society. |
No grāmatas satura
1.–5. rezultāts no 77.
. lappuse
... divorce, such as adultery, cruelty, and desertion, with the no-fault grounds of "incompatibility" or "irretrievable breakdown." Under fault divorce, the spouse seeking the divorce had to prove that the other spouse was guilty of a ...
... divorce, such as adultery, cruelty, and desertion, with the no-fault grounds of "incompatibility" or "irretrievable breakdown." Under fault divorce, the spouse seeking the divorce had to prove that the other spouse was guilty of a ...
. lappuse
... marriage. So long as the benefits of marriage exceed the costs for both spouses, the couple stays married. When the costs exceed the benefits for one spouse, that spouse may seek a divorce. The divorce laws influence the costs of dissolving ...
... marriage. So long as the benefits of marriage exceed the costs for both spouses, the couple stays married. When the costs exceed the benefits for one spouse, that spouse may seek a divorce. The divorce laws influence the costs of dissolving ...
. lappuse
... divorcing spouse can be less than the loss experienced by the other members of the family. These divorces reduce social welfare. In addition, no-fault laws encourage the members of families to make other social-welfare-reducing ...
... divorcing spouse can be less than the loss experienced by the other members of the family. These divorces reduce social welfare. In addition, no-fault laws encourage the members of families to make other social-welfare-reducing ...
. lappuse
... marriage continuing, but no-fault divorce reduced this protection and the resulting negotiating power of the spouse who did not want to dissolve the marriage,4 usually the wife.5 The loss of negotiating power has unfortunately reduced ...
... marriage continuing, but no-fault divorce reduced this protection and the resulting negotiating power of the spouse who did not want to dissolve the marriage,4 usually the wife.5 The loss of negotiating power has unfortunately reduced ...
. lappuse
... divorces.9 The fault divorce system was predicated on the belief that unless the breakdown of a marriage could be attributed solely to the wrongdoing of a single, identifiable spouse, divorce was not permitted. In most states, a divorce ...
... divorces.9 The fault divorce system was predicated on the belief that unless the breakdown of a marriage could be attributed solely to the wrongdoing of a single, identifiable spouse, divorce was not permitted. In most states, a divorce ...
Saturs
Notes | |
The Introduction of NoFault Divorce Statutes | |
The Impact of NoFault Divorce | |
The Reform of NoFault Divorce | |
References | |
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agreements alimony arrangements at divorce assets awards benefits California child support common law community property compensation contract law costs of divorce couples courts decisions definition of property dissolution divorce rate Divorce Reform Divorce Revolution divorced spouse divorced women economists effect of marriage effect of no-fault efficient breaches Elizabeth Peters employment expected Family Law Quarterly fault divorce fault grounds financial arrangements financial settlements future earnings gains from marriage grounds for divorce Hayes household commodities household production human capital husband Ibid incentive income income-earning increase incurred individuals introduction of no-fault investments Journal labor force Law Review marital property Marriage and Divorce married women Mary Ann Glendon mutual consent negotiating power no-fault divorce laws no-fault grounds occur parties percent production possibility frontiers professional goodwill property settlements recognize reduced result separate property specialize in household specific performance spouse's substantial tend wages Weitzman welfare wife wives