No-fault Divorce: What Went Wrong?Routledge, 2019. gada 4. marts - 232 lappuses Since 1970, all the states adopted no-fault divorce statutes, which have had the unexpected effect of producing dire financial conditions for many divorced women and their children. In this important study, economist and lawyer Allen Parkman shows how no-fault divorce has systematically operated against the interests of these women and children. With rare economic and legal insight, Parkman argues that by changing the grounds for divorce without changing the laws that define and allocate property at divorce, the legal system created substantial injustices. The key mistake, he suggests, was in accepting a definition of property that did not include the income-earning capacity--human capital--of the individuals involved. Using human capital theory, Parkman criticizes current divorce law and presents a framework for reform that would reduce the injustices introduced by no-fault divorce. He concludes that a thorough reform, however, may require the changing of the grounds for divorce to mutual consent. This book is essential reading for scholars, professionals, and, indeed, for anyone interested in the health and future of the family and the well-being of women in contemporary U.S. society. |
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1.5. rezultāts no 64.
. lappuse
... divorce to the legal standards. These legal standards, which were especially unfair to wives who had accommodated the career of their husbands, had not been subjected to close scrutiny under fault divorce ... costs of the alternatives.
... divorce to the legal standards. These legal standards, which were especially unfair to wives who had accommodated the career of their husbands, had not been subjected to close scrutiny under fault divorce ... costs of the alternatives.
. lappuse
... costs of divorce with the true costs. Even with this reform, no-fault divorce would not force the spouses, especially the divorcing spouse, to recognize all the costs of divorce. The incapacity of no-fault divorce to force the divorcing ...
... costs of divorce with the true costs. Even with this reform, no-fault divorce would not force the spouses, especially the divorcing spouse, to recognize all the costs of divorce. The incapacity of no-fault divorce to force the divorcing ...
. lappuse
... divorce states.8 Less obvious, but also substantial, has been the effect of no-fault divorce on families that stay married. The fault grounds for divorce had the effect of providing some protection against the potential costs of divorce ...
... divorce states.8 Less obvious, but also substantial, has been the effect of no-fault divorce on families that stay married. The fault grounds for divorce had the effect of providing some protection against the potential costs of divorce ...
. lappuse
... divorce. I will argue that the primary problem with the no-fault divorce laws has been the ignoring of many of the costs associated with divorce resulting in undesirable decisions being made during marriage and at divorce. Central among ...
... divorce. I will argue that the primary problem with the no-fault divorce laws has been the ignoring of many of the costs associated with divorce resulting in undesirable decisions being made during marriage and at divorce. Central among ...
. lappuse
... costs. Efficient outcomes increase social welfare. As the benefits and costs of activities change, the efficient choices change. Economists view the decision to marry and, sometimes, to divorce as based on the benefits and the costs ...
... costs. Efficient outcomes increase social welfare. As the benefits and costs of activities change, the efficient choices change. Economists view the decision to marry and, sometimes, to divorce as based on the benefits and the costs ...
Saturs
Notes | |
The Introduction of NoFault Divorce Statutes | |
The Impact of NoFault Divorce | |
The Reform of NoFault Divorce | |
References | |
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Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
agreements alimony arrangements at divorce assets awards benefits California child support common law community property compensation contract law costs of divorce couples courts decisions definition of property dissolution divorce rate Divorce Reform Divorce Revolution divorced spouse divorced women economists effect of marriage effect of no-fault efficient breaches Elizabeth Peters employment expected Family Law Quarterly fault divorce fault grounds financial arrangements financial settlements future earnings gains from marriage grounds for divorce Hayes household commodities household production human capital husband Ibid incentive income income-earning increase incurred individuals introduction of no-fault investments Journal labor force Law Review marital property Marriage and Divorce married women Mary Ann Glendon mutual consent negotiating power no-fault divorce laws no-fault grounds occur parties percent production possibility frontiers professional goodwill property settlements recognize reduced result separate property specialize in household specific performance spouse's substantial tend wages Weitzman welfare wife wives