case and this is probably the most important case dealing with this matter, and it went to the U.S. Supreme Court--had anything to do with price fixing. In the Hinton case the union demanded the packers should buy only from union members. The Supreme Court, ruling this was illegal action, at this time struck down the whole structure of price agreements.

When the Federal Trade Commission initiated legal proceedings against the Alaska Salmon Industry, Inc., and all unions operating in Alaska in 1954, it was not because the industry and the unions had abused the privilege extended to us by the Justice Department in the form of a letter of immunity under which we operated at that time, but rather because the Federal Trade Commission felt we were doing something we should not do; namely, negotiate for a fish price. Congress, I am sure, in passing the antitrust act, had no intention that this act would be applied against fishermen, nor any idea it would be so construed.

The statement of Chairman Dixon of the Federal Trade Commission that the passage of this act would result in unionization of the fishing industry seems to be one of the most objectionable features as far as the Federal Trade Commission is concerned. Such arguments on the part of the Federal Trade Commission are not valid in our opinion and should be entirely discounted because the policy of the Congress is clearly spelled out in labor legislation, now the law of the land, which not only provides for but deems it desirable to provide for free collective bargaining through labor unions.

We like to emphasize this leigslation is permissive and will permit a fisherman to negotiate for his wages (fish prices) through an agency of his own choice. This could be a union, but it could also be a marketing association. It would give the fisherman an additional choice of bargaining procedures suited to particular needs which may be prevalent in the industry in which the fisherman may operate.

I would also stress passage of this bill which would not allow a union to bypass provisions now in effect under the Marketing Act of 1934. We would have no more rights as a union than is now possessed by the maketing associations. A union could not demand that the buyer or canner only buy fish from union members any more than a marketing association can demand it. Before 1954 we had unions and marketing associations and both worked very well within their respective scopes of operation. There is no reason to assume the same conditions will change if this bill is enacted into law. The reason we feel legislation must be adopted by Congress is that under present conditions labor organizations representing fishermen cannot fulfill their duty and obligations to their members because of the bar and obstacles placed against them by the application of the antitrust act.

Since 1954 most of the fishery unions have lost 50 or more precent of their membership. Some unions have folded up altogether. Funds which were available to enable union officials to represent their members before Congress are no longer available; consequently, we have lost most of our voice when it comes to testifying on fishery policy and necessary legislation. The number of small marketing associa tions that have taken over bargaining duties for fishermen neither have the money nor the opportunity and training to perform the functions

as a legislative representative for their members. If the fishing industry to survive we need representation in the Nation's Capital by men who know the practical problems facing the fishermen, and men who will be able to transmit the fishermen's views to Congress. Under the present laws the unions can negotiate on a collective basis with the canners a fish price for a company or employee fisherman, but we are prevented from doing this with respect to an independent fisherman. The term independent fisherman is, we believe, much abused, particularly if we talk about fishermen in Alaska. In some instances the company will finance a boat. Thereafter the independent fisherman must sign a contract to sell his fish exclusively to the packer who furnished the money. He cannot move his boat from one district to another without specific permission. He must obey all orders from the superintendent as to the delivery of his fish and other conditions the company may impose. Where such fisherman belongs to a small marketing association and where in some instances he must bargain individually with the canner, having no other place except this same canner to sell his fish, it can readily be understood such fisherman is under a terrific handicap.

Alaska, where we operate, is different in that the only markets available to fishermen are the canners operating in the district where the fishing takes place. There is no auction and no bidding for the fish. If a contract price cannot be agreed upon, the fisherman must take what is offered or else throw his fish overboard and this he is forbidden to do under law. He has no other place to go and, having no ice or refrigeration, cannot keep his fish. When a union is bargaining with the industry, such bargaining is usually completed a month or two before the season starts. This allows sufficient time for the planning of an orderly operation. Where the packer, on the other hand, must deal with a number of marketing associations and in most instances he cannot deal with them except immediately before the season opens, he does not actually know if he is going to be able to operate or not. While agreements might be reached with some, others refuse to go along. This has resulted in several strikes which have been extremely harmful both to industry and labor. In one instance last year, due to inadequate bargaining procedures, no agreements were reached and the end result was the Japanese fishing companies were invited to buy the salmon and did so with the result and the loss of the season earnings to all monthly workers. While it is difficult at best to reach agreements in Alaska, it is almost impossible under present handicaps. The salmon fishery is highly seasonal and a strike of any length of time in the fishing season simply means a complete loss of earnings for that year.

So many of the people living in Alaska depend solely upon the salmon for their livelihood. In other places in Alaska we find owners of purse seine boats making a deal with the company that the owner of the boat will receive a substantial bonus at the end of the season. Because a crewmember cannot bargain directly with the cannery but must bargain with the boatowner, which is the employer, and because the boatowner already is assured of a bonus which renders it unnecessary for him to worry or bargain for a realistic fish price, the crew is left without any protection whatsoever.

We submit that the fishermen, being American citizens, should also be entitled to those rights and privileges granted other American workmen. It is our belief the proposed bill will be of much benefit to the fishermen and the industry as a whole as it will provide stability, which is badly lacking in many instances today. In any event, it is the barest minimum we can live with, and without legislation to bring us out of the legal jungle in which we operate now we cannot hope to maintain the fishing industry on an even keel.

Those of you sitting on this committee are well aware of how precarious our condition really is. We are beset with problems everywhere we turn. In the Pacific Northwest and Alaska, Japan and Russia are steadily increasing their efforts to take every fish they can. Japan is trying to destroy our salmon resources in the North Pacific waters. Russia is also coming closer and closer to our eastern shores. The United States has dropped to fifth place in the production of fish. We have an import policy which makes it possible for foreign nations to flood our domestic market with fishery products, which has resulted in nearly 60 percent of all the fish that we eat in this country originating from abroad. Soon we will become dependent upon these foreign importers for our fishery needs. In the meantime, the fishery organizations who used to represent the interests of American fishermen are broke or are going broke. They have lost their income and membership because of a law which should not have applied against them to start with, and they can no longer afford the expense of properly representing their own industry.

We have many serious ills in our industry. Lack of bargaining is, of course, only one of these, but the inability for a union to hold its membership because it cannot bargain for them certainly has helped to still those voices which shoudd have been heard more often when fishery policies were decided.

I do not know what more I can say. Perhaps I have taken too much of your time, but I sincerely hope you will read the record as established by the Senate hearings. I believe the record tells a convincing story and it is our hope you will become convinced it is right and just that this proposed legislation should be acted upon favorably. Mr. LENNON. Thank you very much for your very interesting state

ment.

I will ask the author of the bill if he has any questions.

Mr. PELLY. I think your statement speaks for itself and clearly indicates a fundamental right, the right of collective bargaining, has been denied to the fishermen due to the fact, as I gather, there were in some instances evidence of illegal procedures in the past.

I will ask you this one question: Is it not true that this legislation as it is drawn here simply corrects the interpretation that has been placed upon the right of collective bargaining and specifically that the shares of a fishermen are in effect wages and therefore the crew should have a voice in establishing what their return from the catch should be.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Well, this legislation will make it possible for a fisherman, in addition to marketing associations and co-ops, whatever instruments he now bargains through, he now will have a chance to have a union represent him as bargaining agent. Prior to 1954 we as

a union negotiated these fish prices on a collective basis with the various companies with which we dealt. There was some question which arose in 1946 as to the application of the Antitrust Act against this type of bargaining.

The Justice Department at that time, however, could find no ininstances where the packers or the unions had violated the law as to price fixing, and that the collective bargaining engaged in by the packers and the unions had resulted in any restraint of trade in any way or form, so they granted us a letter of immunity, and we operated under that letter of immunity from 1946 to 1954.

As far as I know, during that period of time there was never any question that the Justice Department at any time found any violation which they felt could be prosecuted, or that the letter of immunity should be withdrawn.

On that basis we really felt somewhat surprised when the Federal Trade Commission came in in 1954 and initiated these proceedings which resulted in the loss of the bargaining rights.

This bill now will restore some of these bargaining rights, perhaps not in the same form as they existed prior to 1954. Prior to 1954 we bargained as a union. Under this bill the union, in effect, becomes a marketing association because we must adhere to and abide by the terms of the marketing act in our conduct of bargaining for fishermen, so there is some difference in the type of bargaining that will take place.

As you will recall, the first bill we had on this subject was an amendment to the Taft-Hartey Act which would have put us back under exactly the same kind of bargaining we had prior to 1954. This did not find too much favor with certain people in Congress and other Government agencies, so the bill was changed to what it is today.

However, even though the bill might be limited, and it is limited so far as we are concerned, we believe it will do a lot of good to bring order out of the present chaos in which we find the fishing industry today. We cannot see where this bill, by giving the union a right to bargain, where prices to the consumer would be increased in the slightest.

I want to point out to the committee that when you talk about prices on a product such as canned salmon, for example, the price of raw fish is perhaps the smallest cost which goes into this particular product. You have cannery workers, machinists, shipwrights, cannery men. All of these are bargained for by the union. All of these have set wages and they are part of the cost of this product. On top of that the product must compete with meat and any other food products.

As I said in my testimony on the Senate side, I forgot the year but I believe it was in 1963, they paid more for pink salmon to the fishermen and got less for it on the market than they ever had before, so your market price in the final analysis depends upon the demand and the market conditions as they exist.

This is highly competitive. For example, we have to compete with tuna and everything else. If we do not compete we will not be able to stay in business.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I cannot see where there will be a claim that this will enhance prices to the consumer.

On the other hand, I believe we can certainly claim that the people engaged in the fisheries do have and should have the same rights as other American citizens to be properly represented in their collective bargaining efforts.

Mr. PELLY. I think you have made a very fine statement. I think you appreciate the fact that because we have an unfavorable Federal Trade Commission report that this committee will have to convince itself and its fellow Members of Congress that this legislation in no way, shape, or form would result in a monopoly or restraint of trade. So far as I am concerned I am convinced on this score but I would rather let the other members of the committee take the time and invite your answers to any doubts they might have, and then following you we have a former member of the Justice Department who is here to testify as to the legal aspects. He can talk on this subject more knowledgeably.

Mr. DINGELL. You made the comment twice while I was listening that fishermen should be afforded the same rights given other American workers.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Yes.

Mr. DINGELL. First of all-how are rights afforded fishermen who are members of trade unions in a different status from other American workers ?

Mr. JOHANSEN. The answer is quite simple. The fishermen represented by us, employee fishermen, have all the rights of any other

workmen.

Mr. DINGELL. They do?

Mr. JOHANSEN. They do. We bargain for the fish prices and we bargain for any conditions they should have, the same as we do, for example, for a cook, a cannery man, or anybody else.

The problem here is that these people today are in the minority. Most of the fishermen are not employee fishermen. They have been classified under several of these rulings as independent contractors, independent entrepeneurs.

For example, in Alaska particularly, and I rather like to talk about that because I know those conditions better than I do in any other place in the fishing industry, a good fisherman perhaps comes to a packer and says "I would like to buy my own boat. Will you finance me?" Well, if it is a good fisherman the packer will finance him.

Then he becomes an independent fisherman. That is on paper. However, he is not very independent because the company owns his boat until it is paid for. He is under the company's direction. He cannot sell the fish to anybody else. He has to sell it to the company. He cannot bargain. He cannot have a union bargain for him because of his newly acquired independent stature, so he must bargain either individually for himself or through a marketing association, and he is handicapped in doing this because if he bargains for himself he does not dare to say too much to his employer because if he does he might lose his boat, his gear, and his chance to operate that boat. The company owns it.

Mr. DINGELL. That company owns an interest in it?

Mr. JOHANSEN. The company owns everything until he has the boat paid for and it will take him many years to pay for it.