must be deliberate and designed, and not the mere effect of human infirmity, or negligence, or mistake.

All the witnesses, who were examined concerning the Jewish law, agreed, that if one witness only is disqualified, it entirely invalidates the ceremony-because there is then only one competent witness. Assuming this to be unquestionable, the court proceeded:

"I shall dismiss from my consideration much irrelevant matter, which has been introduced, particularly with respect to the conduct of the parties; because if I understand the rabbies correctly, if Miss Goldsmid was claiming the benefit of marriage, and the attesting witnesses were not competent at the time, the ceremony would signify nothing. Something has also been said of the undue interference of Mr. Goldsmid the father, for the purpose of setting aside this matrimonial union. But every parent is deeply interested in the welfare of his children, as affected by such connexions; and has a right to question a matrimonial contract entered into in the minority of his child; and I do not see that this right has been exercised, on this occasion, with any impropriety. The young lady appears to have been of the tender age of sixteen, with all the inexperience and susceptibility of hasty impressions that are incident to that age, and it is the order of God, and the daily practice of society, that the experience of the father shall protect the inexperience of the child. It is said that he is chargeable with inconsistency, in his manner of behaviour to this young man, as he had received Bromer into his family with great familiarity; but it never can be supposed, that every man who receives a person into his family on a footing of civility, means that he should marry his daughter. It has been observed also, that it would be to the disadvantage of the young lady, that the marriage should now be set aside; but the father has only to choose between calamities; he has a right to determine as he considers to be best for the interest and happiness of his family-and we must presume he has so done. On the conduct of the young lady, I am unwilling to make any observation unfavourable to her, in consideration of her tender age. But as to Mr. Bromer, though much has been said of the honourable state of matrimony, it must not be forgotten that it may be pursued on dishonourable motives; and though I do not say it is so here, yet when a man who is hospitably received into a family, avails himself of the opportunity of engaging, with clandestinity, the affections of a young lady, I do not think that he is a proper subject of lofty panegyric on that account.

"I throw out of the case, also, all discussion on the reasonableness of the Jewish law, since I must take that as I find it. I must observe, however, that it does not seem to be without apology or reason, as I take the intention to be to render clandestine marriages almost impossible. Clandestine marriages are considered as evils, in all civilized societies. In England they are discountenanced by the Marriage Act, and generally among Protestants. In many Catholic countries also, the law interposes to prevent them. The law of the Jews, by its original incapacity of repeal, is out of the protection of the laws of the countries in which they dwell; and it seems, therefore, to have done reasonably in providing, that if such contracts cannot be rendered null and void, by positive enactment, they shall be clogged with ceremonies, which render it almost impossible that they should be effectually performed." Vol. I. pp. 327.328.

One of the witnesses, whose attestation is an essential part of the ceremony of Kedushim, was, in this case, first cousin to Mr. Bromer, being the son of his mother's sister. The only Jewish Doctor, who attempted to support the distinction above-mentioned, between a relation ex parte paterna and ex parte materna, was one of those who had testified in the case of Lindo vs. Belisario; and though he was highly complimented for

his knowledge by the counsel, the judge said a want of learning did not appear to be the principal defect imputable to him, since he seemed to be a Doctor of rather a loose school. "I think," said he, "I perceive something of Sadducean laxity in his opinions, both in this and in the former cause, which detracts a little from the respect which might otherwise be given to his erudition; for I cannot forget, that in the former case he had said that Kedushim, without consummation, was perfect marriage-now he says otherwise." On the authority of the Talmud, and other books of high reputation, this witness was held to be incompetent, on account of his relation, though ex parte maternâ.

It

The other witness to the ceremony was accused of non-conformity to the Jewish religion, and was therefore alleged to be incompetent and disqualified to give validity to a Kedushim. was proved that he had profaned the Sabbath, by riding in coaches and snuffing candles, stirring the fire and eating forbidden meats-that he had repeatedly, within ten years, done these acts; and upon being remonstrated with on such occasions, replied that he was no Jew, but considered himself as bound only to the exterior observances of the religion, in compliance with the wishes of his father. The learned judge said there could not be a stronger instance of disclaimer of all observance of the regulations. and ordinances of that religion-or of an uncircumcised heartand that his disqualification disposed of the whole case; since as before observed, two competent witnesses were required-but in this instance there was not even one. The court therefore pronounced against the validity of the marriage, declared that Miss Goldsmid was not Mr. Bromer's wife, and sentenced him to perpetual silence on the subject of his claim to her.

Selden says there must be proper witnesses-testes idonei—to attest a betrothment, and indeed that they are of the very substance of such a contract. To illustrate still farther than we have already done, the multifarious implications which a laconic legal phrase sometimes involves, we subjoin the answer of an erudite Jew to an interrogatory, filed in the above-mentioned case, respecting the conduct which disqualifies a person to be a proper witness of such of a transaction :

"Committing murder, blasphemy, eating forbidden food, and profaning the Sabbath, by kindling, extinguishing, or stirring a fire, or snuffing candles, or riding out on horseback, or in a carriage, on the Sabbath-day, are the principal acts by which a person becomes disqualified, according to the laws and customs of the Jews, to be a competent witness to give validity to any Kedushim or Jewish marriage contract."

It is refreshing to a liberal mind, to contrast the protection that has been extended, for many years, to the Jews in England and Holland, with the narrow and persecuting spirit by which they were formerly pursued and "peeled" throughout the nations

of Christendom. Erroneously taking the supposed purposes of God for the rule of duty, instead of adhering to the spirit of his commandments, Christian rulers and Christian subjects have waged a most unholy warfare, and perpetrated the most revolting enormities, upon the outcasts of Israel. We hail the dawn of a brighter day, and fervently pray that it may not be overcast. We would further, by our feeble efforts, all practicable and sober means of meliorating the condition of those, to whom pertain the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service, and the promises; whose are the fathers, and of whom, as concerning the flesh, is the Redeemer of the world. And while we approve of benevolent exertions to exalt their character and promote their happiness in other countries, we shall not cease to reprobate the stigmatizing of them with disabilities in any part of our own.

The Marriage Act does not extend to marriages solemnized beyond the sea. Such marriages, when called in question in the English courts, are decided upon according to the lex loci contractus.

"All nations," says Sir Edward Simpson, "allow marriage contracts; they are juris gentium, and the subjects of all nations are equally concerned in them; and from the infinite mischief and confusion that must necessarily arise to the subjects of all nations, with respect to legitimacy, successions, and other rights, if the respective laws of different countries were only to be observed, as to marriages contracted by the subjects of those countries abroad, all nations have consented, or must be presumed to consent, for the common benefit and advantage, that such marriages should be good or not, according to the laws of the country where they are made. It is of equal consequence to all, that one rule in these cases should be observed by all countries-that is, the law where the contract is made. By observing this law, no inconvenience can arise; but infinite mischief will ensue if it is not."*

He illustrates the effect of a contrary doctrine, by the case of marriage in France, void by the law of that country. The parties come into England, and an attempt is made, by the repudiated woman, to enforce restitution of conjugal rights. If such alleged marriage were to be supported by the courts, on the ground that it would have been valid if similarly celebrated there, the husband might return to France and legally marry another woman, his first marriage being null in that country. He might then return to England, and live there without liability to a prosecution for bigamy-because no felony committed abroad can be tried in England. So if two French subjects, before the passing of the Marriage Act, had clandestinely married in England, the wife would have been entitled, by the English law, to all the rights of a wife. But if this marriage should be held void in France, the husband might take a second wife there, and she would there be entitled to her legal rights, as such-and the chil

* 2 Haggard, 417-Scrimshire vs. Scrimshire; decided in 1752.

dren would be illegitimate in one country, and legitimate in the

other.

The last judgment pronounced by Sir W. Scott in the Consistory Court, and reported by Dr. Haggard, brought forward the principles above stated in regard to foreign marriages-and they were explicitly recognised as sound, salutary, and of binding obligation on all courts in which the validity of marriages is directly or incidentally discussed and determined. Three other cases of a much earlier date are subjoined-from which much valuable information may be collected on this important subject. We have just made an extract from the first of them-and can only refer our readers to the others, which were decided in the Court of Arches, in 1776 and 1802, by Sir George Hay and Sir William Wynne, respectively.

After the passing of the English Marriage Act, it was for some time a disputed question, whether Gretna Green marriages, as they are called, contracted in Scotland, according to the laws of that country, by English subjects, who repaired thither for that purpose only, were valid in England. But in 1769, this question was decided affirmatively, in the High Court of Delegates-the court of dernier resort-in the case of Compton vs. Bearcroft, of which we are not aware that there is any full report extant.

These principles are obviously of immense importance in the United States, where the law regulating the solemnization of marriages, is, or may be different in each of the numerous sovereignties that compose the Union. In some states, the intermarriage of white persons and mulattoes is forbidden, and declared to be utterly void. In other states, there is no such restraint upon the liberty and taste of the people-and we find, in conformity with the doctrine of the English courts, and the jus gentium, that where a mulatto and a white woman, inhabitants of a state where they could not legally intermarry, went into an adjoining state, where no such restriction was imposed upon the liberty of its citizens, and there were joined in wedlock,—their marriage, upon their return, was recognised by the highest judicial tribunal, as valid, and they were held entitled to all the legal rights and incidents, as well as the domestic endearments of holy matrimony, (16 Tyng, 157.) The same principle has been applied in several other cases in this country; and we are not aware that any of our courts have ever denied it. In some instances, however, they seem not to have proceeded with much confidence, but to have arrived at their result by an unassured groping after the true path. The four last cases in the work now under review, will enable such tribunals as examine them, to move with a firmer step, by illuminating the ground over which they

move.

It does not follow, as an inference from the doctrine, that a

marriage, if valid by the law of the place where it is contracted, is valid in all other places-that a divorce or a sentence of nullity of marriage decreed in one country, is necessarily and universally binding on other countries. Sir William Scott said, (vol. i. p. 297,) he was not prepared to acknowledge, that a judgment of a country, on the validity of a marriage, not within its territories, nor had between subjects of that country, would in all cases be binding. For instance-a French marriage is brought in question before a Consistory Court in England-a French judgment on that marriage, would be entitled to much weight; but it does not follow, that the judgment of a court at Brussels, on a marriage in France, would have the same authority-much less on a marriage celebrated in England. And in NewYork and Massachusetts, it has been judicially decided, "that if a husband leaves his wife, or a wife her husband, and removes into another state, for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, and a divorce is there decreed, on grounds which would not authorize it by the law of the state where the marriage was contracted, and the parties cohabited-such decree is void in the latter state, and will be treated as a nullity; whether the question arises collaterally, or in a suit by the wife, to enforce the allowance of alimony. "We admire the spirit of the late Chief Justice Sewall of Massachusetts, who declared that the former laws of Vermont, by which the courts were there authorized to proceed in suits for divorce, instituted by persons transiently in that state, against persons resident and domiciled in other states, who were never amenable to the sovereignty of Vermont, were not to be justified by any principles of comity, which have been known to prevail in the intercourse of civilized states. He added, "I must be permitted to say, the operation of this assumed and extraordinary jurisdiction, is an annoyance to the neighbouring states, injurious to the habits and morals of their people; and the exercise of it is, for these reasons, to be reprobated in the strongest terms, and to be counteracted by legislative provisions in the offended states." Though this evil is removed in Vermont, yet an inspection of the late Mr. Griffith's Law Register, will show that it still exists in many other states.

It was our purpose to notice some of the cases of divorce reported by Dr. Haggard, and to remark at some length upon the numerous causes and demoralizing facilities for obtaining divorces in the United States. But it is impossible to treat this topic. as it deserves, (or even as we intended,) at the close of this too protracted article. We shall therefore only state, that in 1821, there were, in the several states of the Union, more than twenty different causes of divorce, either à vinculo matrimonii or à mensa et thoro; and that in South Carolina alone, no divorces are granted for any cause whatever. We have yet to learn, that the