than things. And there can be no doubt, that the distinction under consideration, as commonly applied, has operated effectually to the disadvantage of Political Economy, both by giving an undue importance to the influence on human happiness of the industry denominated productive, in the estimation of political economists themselves, and also in exciting against it the prejudices of many even of the most enlightened of the community, as a subject of study calculated to withdraw the mind from topics of higher dignity, and greater concernment to man.

We shall now examine the objections which have been made to this view of the nature of wealth. Nothing can be more decided than the opinion which Mr. M'Culloch pronounces respecting it in his first publication. He remarks, that

"If Political Economy were to embrace a discussion of the production and distribution of all that is useful and agreeable, it would include within itself every other science; and the best Encyclopædia would really be the best treatise on Political Economy. Good health is useful and delightful, and therefore, on this hypothesis, the science of wealth ought to comprehend the science of medicine; civil and religious liberty are highly useful, and therefore, the science of wealth must comprehend the science of politics; good acting is agreeable, and therefore, to be complete, the science of wealth must embrace a discussion of the principles of the histrionic art, and so on. Such definitions are obviously worse than useless. They can have no effect, but to generate confused and perplexed notions respecting the objects and limits of the science, and to prevent the student ever acquiring a clear and distinct idea of the nature of the inquiries in which he is engaged."

This passage is quoted by the London Quarterly reviewer with high approbation, and considered by him as entirely inconsistent with the rejection of all distinction between productive and unproductive labour, as these terms are made use of by Adam Smith. Mr. M'Culloch himself has become convinced of this inconsistency; but strongly impressed, it would seem, with the uselessness of the distinction, and even with its non-existence in the nature of things, he has omitted the passage in his last work, and, as before mentioned, has adopted in it the definition of wealth, the propriety of which we are now maintaining. He does not, however, explain his reasons for thus unceremoniously rejecting, and regarding as of no account, an argument which at one time produced such a decided impression on his mind. To us it appears to have no weight whatever, and to involve one of the most remarkable fallacies which have ever obstructed the progress of knowledge. We think it would be equally logical to infer, that because Political Economy embraces a discussion of the production and distribution of all material products that are useful and agreeable, it must include within itself all the sciences and arts which relate to matter, and that Chemistry, Architecture, and Painting, for example, are only branches of it, as to infer that, if it be understood to comprehend every thing having exchangeable value, whether ma

terial or not, "it must include within itself every other science, and that the best Encyclopædia would really be the best treatise on Political Economy." Surely a relation to a common object is not sufficient to identify two sciences. It is the consideration of objects in different points of view which has given rise to the multiplication of the departments of human knowledge. Now, to our apprehension, intellectual products admit of being regarded in a point of view precisely analogous to that which constitutes material objects the subjects of Political Economy. They both possess utility, and they both have exchangeable value.

It has been very generally maintained, that intellectual, or, as they are more commonly denominated, immaterial products, have no durability, and are on that account unsusceptible of accumulation. If this conclusion were just, it is obvious that they could not constitute any portion of capital; and we would readily grant that it would be, if not absolutely inconsistent, yet certainly quite inexpedient, to class them with material products, under the denomination of wealth. But is it true that they have not in fact been accumulated? Are not the enjoyments received from this source, both in Europe and in our own country, vastly greater at the present day than they were two hundred years ago? With the increase of our population has our consumption been increased, only in regard to material commodities? And have not the unproductive labourers of Adam Smith been multiplied in number, in a degree corresponding with that of the productive labourers? To these questions the answer would probably be, that it is not the immaterial products themselves which have been accumulated,-they exist only in the instant of enjoyment,but that it is the capacity of producing them which is to be found now to a greater extent than heretofore, and which it is not denied may be increased or accumulated without limit. This is, however, admitting all that the advocate for the accumulation. of immaterial products would desire. Even in this respect, the analogy is complete between them and material products. If we regard material objects as wealth, it is for no other reason than because of their capacity to furnish enjoyment of some kind or other, at the present or a future time. It is this capacity that endures, and not the enjoyments conferred, which are necessarily consumed, like immaterial products, in the very instant of their production.

Another objection to our definition of wealth, is, that it must necessarily lead to a rejection of all distinction between productive and unproductive labour. And such would be the case, if this could only relate to wealth. But we have endeavoured, in what goes before, to show, that when applied to capital it will fully answer the purposes for which it was originally intended.

On the whole, we do not consider the objections to be very formidable, which have hitherto been made to the definition of wealth under consideration; and we are convinced that its adoption, together with those of capital and productive industry, which we have proposed, would have a tendency to accelerate the progress of Political Economy, and would contribute to the dignity of the science, by extending its sphere from matter to mind. Before we conclude, we shall say a word or two concerning our author's definitions of capital. It has been mentioned, that capital was at first stated by him to denote that portion of the produce of labour which is saved from immediate consumption, and employed in maintaining productive industry, or in facilitating production." We also hinted, that the phraseology of this definition was in our opinion open to objection, although its meaning corresponded with the sense in which capital was usually understood. Not to mention the inconsistency of the author in making use of the term productive industry, while he is an advocate for rejecting all distinction between productive and unproductive labour, we think that the consideration by him of the capital of a nation, as consisting of what is saved from immediate consumption, in which view of it he is, however, far from being singular, to be quite unfortunate, whatever propriety there might be in considering it as such in respect to the present or future enjoyment of the individuals who may possess it. What a person appropriates to capital, is frequently consumed with much more rapidity than what is consumed by him as revenue. The food and clothing of a labourer, can bear no comparison, in point of duration, with the house and furniture of his unproductive employer. Indeed, the circumstance of being appropriated to capital, has no relation to a more or less immediate consumption. It depends entirely on the fact of its being consumed or not by the producers of wealth.

The prejudice of Mr. M'Culloch for enduring commodities, in reference to their capability of constituting capital, with the notion that immaterial products were alone consumed as soon as produced, are probably the reasons which have prevented him from giving a proper extension to the signification of capital, when he had adopted the more liberal one of wealth. In the work before us, he has employed the term with as much latitude as a limitation of it to material objects would allow. "The capital of a country," he says, "may be defined to be that portion of the produce of industry existing in it, which can be made directly available, either to the support of human existence, or to the facilitating of production." By this definition, it was intended to comprehend, under the denomination of capital, the whole stock of a country, as that term is used by Adam Smith, viz. all the material commodities existing in it, without regard

to the character of the consumers, whether they live on rent, profits, or wages. "For any thing," observes our author, "that we can a priori know to the contrary, a horse yoked to a gentleman's coach may be just as productively employed, as if he were yoked to a brewer's dray; though it is quite plain, that whatever difference may really obtain in the two cases, the identity of the horse is not affected-he is equally possessed, in the one case as in the other, of the capacity to assist in production; and so long as he possesses that capacity, he ought to be viewed,, independently of all other considerations, as a portion of the capital of the country." To us, on the contrary, it appears that the point of importance, in relation to the progress of wealth, which it is the object of the political economist to mark by the term capital, is not the possible, but the actual, appropriation of any commodity to the consumption of those who are engaged in the production of wealth. We have no concern with an imaginary state of a country, but only with its really existing condition. And even if wealth be restricted to matter, we consider the definition of Mr. M'Culloch to be wholly inadmissible.

It was our intention, before closing the present article, to compare our views on the definitions of wealth and capital, and the distinction between the different kinds of labour, with those of some of the writers to which they most nearly approach, more especially with those of Mr. Storch of St. Petersburgh. His Course of Political Economy, prepared by him for the use of the present Emperor of Russia, and his brother the Grand Duke Michael, has divided with the treatise of M. Say the reputation of being the best work on the subject to which it relates, yet published on the continent of Europe. In 1825, he added to it a supplemental volume, which contains much able and instructive discussion on fundamental and disputed points. Having, however, already exhausted the space allotted to us, and very probably the patience of our readers, we can now only refer to it as perhaps the most important contribution which has been made to Political Economy, since the publication of the great work of Mr. Ricardo.

ART. IV.-Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Consistory Court of London; containing the Judgments of the Right Hon. Sir William Scott. By JOHN HAGGARD, LL. D. Advocate. 2 vols. 8vo. London.

THE division of labour, in England, is not confined to mechanical and manual operations. It is extended-and with as much. reason and benefit, perhaps to the scientific, literary, political, and legal institutions of that country. Its courts of law are not only very numerous, but their jurisdiction is, in most instances, restrained to a definite and very limited class of subjects. Far otherwise is it in our country. The same judges, in many of the state courts, are required to examine and decide on questions of chancery law, common law-strictly so called-and those parts of the law ecclesiastical, which form a most interesting and important branch of our local jurisprudence. In addition to all this, they have to expound a vast body of statutes, ancient and modern, enacted at different times, and under various exigencies, ever since the settlement of the country. Even the United States' courts, whose authority is, in many respects, more circumscribed than that of any other, have not only chancery, admiralty, and common law jurisdiction, but are likewise empowered and obliged to decide upon the statutes passed by congress, by twenty-four state legislatures, and by the legislatures of divers territories of the United States. Judges, in this country, are sometimes called the people's servants. Truly they are servants of all work.

There are numerous ecclesiastical courts in England; but it is not our design, (although the subject is an interesting and instructive one,) to trace their history or their jurisdiction, nor to point out the boundaries of those different tribunals. Indeed, we are not certain that we have a perfectly accurate knowledge of their boundaries. It is sufficient for our purpose to state, that every diocesan bishop has cognizance of the legality of marriages, and causes of divorce, and power to enforce specifically the rights and obligations resulting from the marriage contract. He has also, in addition to some other less important matters, jurisdiction of the probate of wills disposing of personal property, and of causes relating to administrations. Questions arising on these subjects of his jurisdiction, are litigated in the proper ecclesiastical forum.. The bishop does not, in these days, attend personally in court; but his chancellor, commissary, official principal, (or whatever other title may be given,) sits in judgment, under a subrogated authority. Many eminent lawyers have, at different times, been invested with these important trusts. We mention only Sir Edward Simpson, Sir George Hay, Sir William Wynne, Sir John Nicholl, and Sir William Scott, in proof of this assertion.